s>/->.X  ^7i. 


7^ 


6?, 


O) 


"-^'i 


V^^i^^t    lO/^^ri^  t-^^f^^ 


p 


\  ^ 


.  \ 


Ip  (fja.lk<r-i^'-, 


-T^^f 


//7  (>0 


% 


A  careful  and   ftridl 

ENQUIRY 

INTO 

The  77todern  prevailing  Notions 

OF    THAT 

FREEDOM  of  WILL, 

Which  is  fuppofed  to  be  eflential 
T    O 

Moral  Agency^  T^ertue  and  VicCj 
Reward  "^xi^  Punijhment^  Praife 
.and  Blame. 


ByJONATHANEDWARDSjA.M. 

Pallor   of  the   Church  in   Stsckbridge, 
Rom*  ix.    16.  //  is  not  cf  him  that  willeth — — 


B  CIS  TO  N,     N.  E. 

Printed    axid   Sold    hj    S.    Kt/Teland,    m    Qiieen-flreety, 

Mdccliv, 


THE 


PREFACE. 


???|gANY 


find  much   Fault  with   the  callinp: 


S!2P  'i^Pp   profeffing  Chriftians,    that  differ  one  from 
W^^^^^  another  in  ibme  Matters    of  Opinion,    by 
ItmiSIM^  ^^^'^nd:  Names-,   efpecially  calling  them  by 
m^i^illMI  ^^^-  Names  of  particular  Men,  who  have 
didinguifhed  themfelves  as  Maintainers  and 
Promoters  of  thofe  Opinions  :  as    the  calling  fome  pro- 
telling  Chriilians  Jrminians,  from  ArminiUs  ;    others  Ari- 
ans,  trom  Arius  ;   others  Socinians,  from  SocinuSy   and  the 
like.     They  think  it  unjufl  in  it  felf  -,   as  it  feems  to  fdp- 
pofe  and  fuggeft,  that  the  Perfons  mark'd   out    by  thefe 
Names,  received  thofe  Do6trines    which    they  entertain, 
out  of  Regard  to,  and  Reliance  on  thofe  Men  after  whom 
they  are  named  ;   as  tho'  they  made  them  their  Rule  :  in 
the  fame  Manner,  as  the  Followers  of  Christ  are  called 
Chriftians  \  after  his  Name,  whom  they  regard  &  depend 
upon,^  as  their  great  Head  and  Rule.     Whereas,     this  is 
an  unjud  and  groundlefs  Imputation  on  thofe  that  go  un- 
der the  foremention'd  Denominations,     Thus   (fay  they) 
there  is  not  the  lead  Ground  to  fuppofe,    that  the  chief 
Divines,  who  embrace' the  Scheme  of  Dodrine  which  is 
by  many  called  Arminianifm,   believe  it  the  more  becaufe 
Anninius  believed  it  :    and  that  there  is  no  Reafon  to 
think  any  other,  than  that  they  fincerely  and  impartially 
ftudy  the  holy  Scriptures,  and  enquire  after  the  Mind 
of  Chrift,  with  as  much  Judgment  and  Sincerity,  as  any 
ol  thole  that  call  them  by  thcfe  Names  j   that  they  feek 
after  Truth,   and  are  not  careful  whether  they  think  ex- 
aaiy  ^sArminius^id  ;    yea,  that  in   fome  Things  they 
adualiy  differ  from  him.     This  Pradice  is  alfo  elteemed 

A  2  actually 


n 


The  P  R  E  F  ^  C  E. 


adlnally  injurious  on  this  Account,  that  it  is  fuppofed  na- 
turally ro  lead  the  Multitude  to  imagine  theDifference  be- 
tween Perfons  thus  named  &  others,to  be  greater  than  it  is  •, 
^a,  as  tho'  it  were  lb  great,  that  they  muft  be  as  it  were, 
another  Species  of  Beings.      And   they  objedl  againflic' 
as  arifing  from  an  uncharitable,  narrow,conTradled  Spirit ; 
which,  they  fay,  qommonly   inclines  Perfons   to  confine 
all  thax  is  good  to  themfelves  and  their  own   Party,    and 
to   make  a   wide   Diftinction   between   themfelves    and  \ 
others,  and  ftigmatize  thofe  that  differ  from  them    with  ' 
odious  Names.     They   fay  moreover,  thac  the   keeping 
up  fuch  a  Diitindlion  of   Najnes  has  a  diredt  Tendency 
to  uphold  Diliance  3c  Difaffedion,  and  keep  alive  mutual 
Hatred  among  Chriftians,  who  ought  all  to  be  united  in   \ 
Friendfhip  and  Charity,  however  they  can't  in  allThings  j 
think  alike.  i 

I  confefs,  thefe  Things  are  very  plaufible.  And  I  will  ' 
not  deny,  that  there  are  fome  unhappy  Confcquences  of  j 
this  Diftinvflion  of  Narnes^  and  that  Men's  Infirmities  and  i 
evil  Difpofitions  oFten  make  an  ill  In-iprovement  of  it.  ^ 
But  yet  I  humbly  conceive,  thefe  Objections  are  carried  < 
far  beyond  Reafon.-  The  Generality  of  Mankind  are  J 
difpofed  enough,  and  a  great  Deal  too  much,  to  Uncha-  ; 
ritablenefs,  and  to  be  cenforious  and  binter  towards  thefe  i 
thac  differ  from  them  in  religious  Opinions  :  which  evil  \ 
Temper  of  Mind  will  take  Occafion  to  exerc  it  felf,  from  • 
many  Things  in  themfelves  innocent,  ufeful  &  necelfiry.  \ 
hut  yet  there  is  no  NeceiTuy  to  fuppofe,  that  the  thus  j 
didingulfhing  Perfons  of  different  Opinions  by  different  j 
Names,  arifes  mainly  from  an  uncharitable  Spirit.  Ic  i 
niay  arife  from  the  Difpofition  there  is  in  Mankind  ^ 
(whom  God  has  dillinguifhed  with  an  Ability  and  In-  § 
clination  for  S})eech)  to  improve  the  Benefit  of  Language,  .' 
in  the  proper  Ufe  and  Defign  of  Nanies,  given  to  I'hings  \ 
which  they  have  often  Occafion  to  fpeak  of,  or  fignify  i 
their  Minds  about ;  v-'hich  is  to  enable  them  to  exprefs  ^ 
their  Ideas  with  Eafe  and  Expedition,  v^ithout  being  in-  j 
cumber'd  v/ith  an  ohfcure  and  diiiicuk  Circumlocution.  ' 
j\nd  the  thus  di(l:inr^uin"iint^  Pcrf-^^ns  ofdifi-crenc  Opinions  ! 
^    '•  "  "  hi] 


i:\ic  P  R  E  F  A  C  E. 


Ill 


in  religious  Matters,  may  not  imply,  nor  infer  any  more 
than  that  there  is  a  Difference,  and  that  the  Difference 
is  fuch  as  we  find  we  have  often  Occafion  to  take  Notice 
of,  and  make  Mention  of.  That  which  we  have  frequent 
Occafion  to  fpeak  of  ('whatever  it  be„  that  gives  the  Oc- 
cafion)  this  wants  a  Name  :  and  'tis  always  a.  Defe<5t  in 
Language,  in  fuch  Cafes,  to  be  obliged  to  make  ufe  of  a 
Defcription,  inftead  of  a  Name.  Thus  we  have  often 
Occafion  to  fpeak  of  thofe  who  are  the  Defcendants  of 
rhe  ancient  Inhabitants  of  France^  who  were  Subjeds  or 
Heads  of  the  Government  of  that  Land,  and  fpake  the 
Language  peculiar  to  it  ;  in  Diftindion  from  the  Dc- 
fce^ndants  of  the  Inhabitants  of  Spaifj,  V;ho  belonged  to 
that  Community,  and  fpake  the  Language  ot  that  Coun- 
try. And  therefore  we  find  the  great  Need  of  diftinifb 
Names  to  fignify  thcfe  different  Sorrs  of  People,  and  the 
great  Convenience  of  thofe  dillinguifhing  Words,  French^ 
and  Spaniards  •,  by  which  the  Signification  of  our  Minds 
is  quick  and  eafy,  and  our  Speech  is  delivered  from  the 
Burden  of  a  continual  Reireration  of  diffufe  Defcrip- 
tions,  with  which  if  mud  otherwife  be  embarafs'd. 

I'hat  the  Difference  of  the  Opinions  of  thofe,  who  in 
their  general  Scheme  of  Divinity  agree  with  thefe  two 
noted  Men,  Calvin^  and  Jrmbnus^\s  a'l^hing  there  is  often 
Occafion  ro  fpeak  of,  is  what  the  Pradice  of  the  latter,  in 
felf  confeffes  ;  who  are  often,  in  their  Difcourfes  and 
Writings,  taking  Notice  of  the  fup^)ofed  abfurd  and 
pernicious  Opinions  of  the  former  Sort.  And  therefore 
the  making  Ufe  of  different  Names  in  this  Cafe  can't  rea- 
fonably  beobjededagainff,or  condemned, as aXhing  which 
mufi:  come  from  fo  bad  a  Caufe  as  they  alTign.  It  is 
eafy  to  be  accounted  for,  without  fuppofing  it  to  arife 
from  any  other  Source,  than  the  Exigence  and  natural 
Tendency  of  the  State  of  Things  ;  considering  theFaculty 
and  Difpofition  God  has  given  Mankind,  to  expsefs 
Things  which  they  have  frequent  Occafion  to  mention, 
by  certain  diftingiiifning  Names.  It  is  an  Effed  that  is 
fimilar  to  what  we  fee  arife,  in  innumerable  Cales -which 
•are  parallel, where  cheCaufe  is  not  ai  all  blame-wonhy. 

Neverwhelefs, 


iv  The  PREFACE. 

Neveithelefs,  at  firft  I  had  Thoughts  of  carefully  a- 
void.ng  the   Ufe  of  the  Appellation,  JrmMa^,  in  this 
i  reatile.     But  I  foon  found  1  Ihould  be  put  to  greacDiffi- 
culty  by  It ;  and  that  myDifcoiiife  would  be  fo  incumber'd 
with   an   otren   repeated   Circumlocution,   inftead  of  a   ' 
JName. -which  would  exprefs  the  Thing  intended,  as  well-: 
r!^L    l"V^^'  ^  altered  niy  Purpofe.     And  therefore  I   ' 
muftafttheExcufeot  fuch  as  are  apt   to  be  offended 
wi£h  Things  of  this  Nature,  that  I  have  fo  freely  ufed  the 
i  erm  JrmmiM  in  the  following  Difcourfe.     1   profcfs  it 
to  be  without  any  Defign,  to  ftigmatize  Perfons  of  any 
Sort  with  a  Name  of  Reproach,  pr  at  all  to  make  theti 
appear  more  odious.     If   when  I   had  Occafion  to  fneak    ' 
of  tnofc  Divines  who  are  commonly  called  by  this  nLc,.    - 
Ihad  ..nfteadof   fty ling  them  ^n;;i;;/.«,  called   :h,m 
thee  Ma,,  as  Dr.  Whitby  does  Cahtniftic  Divines  ;  it  nrc^ 
bably  would   not  have  been  taken    any    better,   ^r   tho'c 

lfj.7  ^  t'""  "^.TP""'  ""'  ™°''^  g"'''^  Manners.  I 
bave,done  as  I  would  be  done  by,  in  thisMatter.  How- 
ever the  Perm  Cahinift  is  in  thefe  Days,  among  moft,   a 

vef  iV  ,f  "'"■  i^'P™''''  ^''^"  the  Term  °m/«4  ; 
^  I  r  r"L"°i  "''^  "  ^'  ^"  «"^''"«'to  be  called  a  Cahi. 
^¥,  for  Dirtinaion's  Sake  :  tho'  I  utterly  difclain,  a 
Dcpenaance  on  C,hi„,  or  believing  the  Dodrines  which 
I  k,K]Decau<e  he  believed  and  taught  thein  ;  and  can- 
not juflly  be  charged  with  believing  in  every  Thin<.  jull 
TiS  he  taught.  ^  o  J^^^ 

But  left  I  fliould  really  be  an  Occafion  of  Injury  to 
fome  Perfons  I  would  here  give  Notice,  that  tho'  1  au- 
rally fpeak  of  tnat  Doftrine,  concerning  Free-will  a°nd 
moral  Agency,  which  I  oppofe,  as  an  Jr%ima,  Doftrine 
^•et  1  would  not  be  underftood.  that  every  Divine  o^ 
Author  whom  I  haveOccafion  to  mention  as  maintaini,!^ 
that  Doanne,  was  properly  an  .^rmimar,,  or  one  of  thai 
Sort  which  IS  commonly  called  by  that  Name.  Some 
of  them  went  far  beyond  the  Jnm>ua>is  :  And  I  would 
by  no  Cleans  charge  ^r«;M/^w  in  general  with  all  tlie 
corruprDoitnne,  which  thefe  maintain'd.  Thus  for  In- 
stance.  V.  would  be  very  injurious,   it  I  ihould  rank  Jr. 


%.  mtmart 


The   PRE  F  A  C  E.  v 

minian  Divines  in   general,  with    fuch    Auihors   as. Mr. 
Chubb.     I  doubt  not,    many   of  them  have  fome  of  his 
Dodrines  in  Abhorrence  •,   tho'  he  agrees,   for  the  mod 
Part,  v;ich  /Irminiam^  in  hisi  Notion  of  the   Freedom  of 
the  Will.     And  on  the  other  Hand,    tho'  I  fuppofe  this 
Notion  to  be  a  leading  Article  in  the  Aiininian  Scheme, 
that  which,  if  pUrfued  in   it's  Confequences,  will  t:ru]y 
infer,  or  naturally  lead  to  all  the  reft  -,  yet  1  don't  charge 
all  that  h^ve.  held  this    Dodrine,   with  being  Arm fiians. 
For  whatever  may  be  the  Confequences  of  the  Doftrine 
really,   yet  fome  that  hold  this  Dodrine,  may  not  own 
nor  fee  thefe  Confequences  -,  and  it  ^would  be  unjuft,  ia 
many  Inftances,  to  charge  every  Author  v/ith  believing 
and  maintaining  all  the  real  Confequences  of  his  avowed 
Dodrines.      And  I  defire  it  may  be  particularly  noted, 
that  tho'  I  have  Occafion   in  the  following  Difcourfe, 
often  to  mention  theAuthor  of  the  Book  cninkdyJpi  EJTay 
en  tbeFreedom  of  the  tVill^  in  God  &  the  Creature^z.^  holding 
that  Notion  of  Freedom  of  Will,    which  I  oppofe  \  yec 
I  don't  mean  to  call  him  an  Arminian  :    however  in  that 
Dodrine  he  agrees  with  Jrminians,  and  departs  from  the 
current  and  general  Opinion  of  Calvimjls,     If  the  Author 
of  that  Eflay  be  the  fame  as  it  is  commonly  afcribed  to, 
he  doubtlefs  was  not  one  that  ought  to  bear  that  Name. 
But  however  good  aDivine  he  was  in  many  RefpedSjyeC 
that-particular  Arminian  Dodrine    which  he  maintain'd, 
is  never  the  better  for  being  held  by  fuch  an  One  :    nor 
is  there  lefs  Need  of  oppofing  it  on  that  Account  ;    but 
rather  is  there  the  more  Need  of  it  j  as  it  v^^ill  be  likely 
to  have  the  more  pernicious  Influence,  for  being  taught  by 
a  Divine  of  his  Name  and  Charader  ;    fuppofing    the 
Dodrine  to  be  wrong,  and  in  it  lelf  to  be  of  an  ill  Ten- 
dency. 

I  have  Nothing  further  to  fay  by  Way  of  Preface; 
but  only  to  befpeak  the  Reader's  Candour,  and  calm  At- 
tention to  what  I  have  written.  The  Subjcd  is  of  fuch 
Importance,  as  to  demand  Attention,  and  the  mod  tho- 
rough Confideration.  Of  all  Kinds  of  Knowlege  that 
we  can  ever  obtain,  the  Knowledge   of  God,   and   the 

Knowlege 


VI 


The  PREFACE: 


Knowlege  of  our  felves,    are  the  molt  importanr.     As 
Religion  is  the  great  Bufinefs,  Tor  which  we  are  created, 
and  on  which  our  Happinefs  depends  -,   and  as  Religion 
confids   in  an  Intercourfe  between  our  felves   and  our 
Maker  •,  and  fo  has  it's  Foundation  in  God's  Nacure  and 
-our's,  and  in  the  Relation    that  God  and  we  iiand  in  to 
each  other ;   therefore   a  true  Knowledge  of  both   mull 
be  needful  in  Order  to  true  Religion.     But   the  Know- 
ledge  of  our  felves  confilts  chiefly   in  right   Apprehen- 
fions  concerning  thofe   two  chief  Faculties  ot  our  Na- 
ture, the  Under/} anding  and  fFilL     Both  are  very  impor- 
tant :  yet  the  Science  of  the  latter  mull  be  confefs'd    to 
be  of  greateft  Moment  •,    in  as  much  as  all  A^ertue  and 
Religion  have  their  Seat   more  immediately  in  the  Will, 
confiding  more  efpecially  in  right    Ads  and   Habits  of 
this  Faculty.     And  the  grand  Queftion  about  the  Free- 
dom of  the  Will,  is  the  main  Point  that  belongs  to  the 
Science   of    the    Will,     l^herefore  I    fay,    the  Impor- 
tance of  this  Subjed  greatly  demands  the    Attention    ofj 
Chriftiafks,    and  efpecially  of  Divines.       But    as  to  myi 
Manner  of  handling  the  Subjed,    I  will  be  far  from  pre-  S 
fiuning  to  fay,  that  it  is  fuch  as   demands    the   Attention  \ 
of  the  Reader  to  what  I  have  written.     I  am   ready  to  : 
own, that  in  this  Matter  I  depend  on  the  Reader'sC(j«r/<f/5'.  i 
But  Qnly  thus  far  I  may  have  fome  Colour  for  putting  in  j 
a  Claim  ;    that  if  the  Reader  bedifpofed  to  pafs  his  Cen- j 
fere  on  what  I  have  written,  I  may  be  fully  and  patiently  ^j 
heard,  and  well  attended  to,    before  I  am   condemned.  | 
However,  this  is  what  1  Would  humbly  a/k  of  myReaders  ;  \ 
together  with  the  Prayers  of  all  fincere  Lovers  of  Truths  ■ 
that  I  may  have  much  of  that   Spirit    which  Chrift  pro-  i 
mifed  his  Difciples,  which  guides  into    ail  Truth  ;     and  j 
that  the  bleffed  and   powerful  Influences   of  this  Spirii^ 
would  make  Truth  vidorious  in  the  World.  _1 


I 

■J«1»ii»rji*— ■— «l»r»  I.I    ,1  ,: iwr'fci m     I 


General    TABLE 
Oi  the  CO  NT E  NTS. 


PART     I. 

Wherein  are  explain'd  various  Terms  and  Things  belonging  to 
the  Subject  of  the  enfuing  Difcourfe. 

SECT.  I.  Concerning  the  Nature  of  the //-?//,     Pag.  i,^r. 
SECT.  II.    Concerning  the   Determination  of  the   Will. 
Pag.  5. 
SECT.  III.    Concerning  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms   Nc" 
cejfity^  Impojfibility^  Inability ^  &c.  and   of  Contingence,         Pag.  1 3. 
SECT.  IV.  Of  theDirtindionof  «^/«r«^/andw2<?r^^/Necei^lty 
and  Inability.  Pag.  20. 
SECT.   V .    Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liberty^  and  of  ?n{jral 
Agency,  Pago  27. 

P  A  R  T      II. 

Wherein  it  is  confidered,  Whether  there  is,  or  can  be  any 
fuch  Sort  of  Freecom  of  Will,  as  that  wherein  Arminians 
place  the  EfTence  of  the  Liberty  of  all  moral  Agents  ;  and 
whether  any  fuch  Thing  ever  was^  or  can  be  conceived  of. 

OECT.  I.  Shewing  the  manifeft  Incondftence  of  the  Ar7ni^ 
^  nian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will,  confifting  in  the  Will's 
[df-determining  Power.  Pag.  31. 

SECT.  II.    Several  fuppofed  Ways  of  evading  the  foregoing 
Reafoning  confidered.  Pag.  35. 

SECT.  III.     Whether  any  Event  whatfocvci,   and  VoUttQn 
%\  particular,  caci  come  to  pals  w'  hut  a  Caujc  of  it's  Exiftence. 

Jr.  Pag.  41. 

a  ^    Necffj  SECl' 


r/5g  C  O  N  T  E  N  T  S. 

SECT.  IV.  Whether  Volition  can  arife  without  aGaufe,thro' 
the  A£livity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul.  Pag.  47. 

SECT.  V.  Shewing  that  if  the  Things  alTerted  in  thefc 
Evafions  fhould  be  fuppofed  to  be  true,  they  are  altogether 
impertinent,  and  can't  help  the  Caufe  of  Arminian  Liberty  ; 
and  how  this  being  the  State  of  the  Cafe,  Arminian  Writers  are 
obliged  to  talk  inconfiflently.  Pag.  51. 

SECT.  VI.  Concerning  the  Will's  determining  in  Things 
which  are  perfecflly  indiffererit^  in  the  View  of  theMind.  Pag.  55. 

SECT.  VII.  Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will 
conlifting  in  Indifference.  Pag.  63. 

SECT.  VIII.  Concerning  the  fuppofed  Liberty  of  the  Will, 
as  oppofite  to  all  NeceJJtty,  Pag.  73. 

SECT.  IX.  Of  the  Connexion  of  the  Ads  of  the  mil 
with  the  Didlates  of  the  Underjlanding.  Pag.  76, 

SECT.  X,    Volition  necefianly  connedled  with  the  Influ- 
ence of  Motives.    With  particular  Obfervation  of  the  great  In- 
confiftence   of  Mr.    Chubh''s  Affertions  and  Reafonings,   about- 
the  Freedom  of  the  Will.  Pag.  84 

SECT.  XI,  The  Evidence  of  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of^ 
the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  Paa;.  98. 

SECT.  XII.  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  future  Vo-  . 
litions  of  moral  Agents,  inconjiflent  with  fuch  a  Contingence  of  1 
thole  Volitions,  as  is  without  all  Neceffity.  Pag.  117.  "^ 

And  infers  a  Neceffity  of  Volition,  as  much  as  an  alfolute  \ 
Decree.  Pag.  122,  ] 

SECT.  XIII.  Whether  we  fuppofe  the  Volitions  of  moral  \ 
Agents  to  be  connected  with  any  Thing  antecedent,  or  not,  ^ 
yet  they  muft  be  necejfary^  m  fuch  a  Senfe,  as  to  overthrow  \ 
Arminian  Liberty.  Pao".  131.  1 


PART     III.  j 

Wherein  is  enquired.  Whether  any  fuch  Liberty  of  Will  as  \ 
Ar?fiinians  hold,  be  ncccfTary  to  moral  Agency,  Vertue  and  ^ 
Vice,  Praife  and  Difpraife,  ^c.  \ 

CECT.  I.    God's  ?noral  Excellency  necejfary^  yet  veriuous  and  1 

^^  Praife-worthy.  Pag.  13c.  \ 

SECT.  IL    The  A^s  of  the  Will  of  the   human  Soul   of  ^ 

Jesus  Christ  mccffarily  holy^  yet  veriuous^  praife-ivorthy^  rezvar-  ] 

^'^k\^.^:  ^  P^g-  13?-  \ 

SECT.  III.    The  QiS&-    '  fuch  as  are  ^iven  up  cfGsd  to  Sin^  \ 

i.  • '      1 


Ihe   CONTENTS. 

and  of  fallen  Man  in  general,  proves  moral  Necejftty  and  Inahiliff 
to  be  confident  with  Blame-worthinefs.  Pag.  153, 

SECT.  IV.  Command^  and  Obligation  to  Obedience^  con- 
Jijient  with  moral  Inability  tO  obey.  Pag.  1 59; 

•  SECT. 'V.  That  iSzWn'/y  of  Defires  and  Endeavours,  which 
is  fiippofed  to  excufe  in  the  Non-performance  of  Things  in 
themfelves  good,  particularly  confidered.  Pag.  170. 

'  SECT.  VI.  Liberty  of  Indifference^  not  only  not  necejfary  to 
Vertue,  but  utterly  inconfiftent  with  it  :  and  all,  either  vertuous, 
or  vicious  Habits  and  Inclinations^  inconfiftent  with  Arminian 
Notions  of  Liberty,  and  moral  Agency.  Pag.  178. 

SECT.  VII.  Arminian  Notions  of  moral  Agency  inconfiftent 
with  all  Influence  of  Motive  and  Inducement^  in  either  vertuous 
or  vicious  Adions.  Pag.  185. 


PART     IV. 

Wherein  the  chief  Grounds  of  the  Reafonings  of  Arminians^  in 
Support  and  Defence  of  their  Notions  of  Liberty,  moral 
Agency, ^^.  and  againft  the  oppofiteDodrine,  are  confidered. 

OECT.  I.  The  EJfence  of  the  Vertue  and  Vice  of  the  Difpo- 
^  fitions  of  the  Heart,  and  A6ts  of  the  Will,  lies  not  in  their 
Ca^e^  but  their  Nature,  Pag.  192. 

.  Sect.  II.  The  Falfenejs  and  Inconfiflence  of  that  metaphy- 
fical  Notion  of  ASiion  and  Agency^  which  feems  to  be  generally 
entertain'd  by  the  Defenders  of  the  foremention'd  Notions  of 
Liberty,  moral  Agency,  ^c.  Pag.  198. 

'  SECT.  III.  The  Reafons  why  fome  think  it  contrary  to 
common  Senfe^  to  fuppofeThings  which  are  necejjary^  to  be  worthy 
of  cither  Praife  or  Blame.  Pag.  206. 

SECT.  IV.  It  is  agreable  to  common  Senfcy  and  the  natural 
Notions  of  Mankind.,  to  fuppofe  moral  Necefiity  to  be  confident 
with  Praife  and  Blame,  Reward  and  Punilhment.        Pag.  212. 

SECT.  V.  Concerning  thofe0.y.^^wij,  That  this  Scheme  of 
NecefTity  renders  all  Means  and  Endeavours  for  the  avoiding  of 
Sin,  or  the  obtaining  Vertue  and  Holinefs,  vain  and  to  noPur-. 
pofe  ;  And  that  it  makesMen  no  more  than  meer  Machines.,  in 
Affairs  of  Morality  and  Religion.  Pag.  220. 

SECT.  VI.  Concerning  that  Objefficn  againft  the  Dodrine 
which  has  been  maintain'd,That  it  agrees  with  the  StoicalDoC' 
%ine  of  Fate^  and  the  Opinion  of  Mr.  Hohbes.  Pag.  227, 

SECT.  VII.  Concexning  the  Neciffity  of  the  diifine  Jfill, 
.Pa^.  230.  SECT. 


The  CONTENTS. 

•  SECT.  VIII.  Some  further  Ohje5lions  againft  the  moral 
Necefjjty  of  God's  Volitions^  confidered.  Pag.  239. 

SECT.  IX.  Concerning  that  Qbjecilon  againft  the  Do6trine 
which  has  been  maintain'd.  That  it  makes  God  the  Author  of 
Sin.  '  Pag.  252, 

SECT.  X.    Concerning  Sin's  fir  ft  Entrance   into  the  World, 

Pag.  268. 

SECT.  XI.  Of  a  fuppofed  Inconfijience  of  thefe  Principles 
with  God's  moral  CharaSier.  Pag.  270. 

SECT.  XII.  Of  a  fuppofed  Tendency  of  thefe  Principles 
to  Atheifm^  and  Licentioufmfs,  Pag.  274. 

SECT.  XIII.  Concerning  that  ObjeSiion  againft  the  Rea- 
foaing  by  which  the  Cahini/ii cDo^irinQ  is  fupported,  That  it  is 
metaphyfical  and  ahjlrufe.  Pag.    278, 


Tihe   CONCLUSION. 

X JITHAT  Treat?nent  this  Difcourfe  may  probably  meet  with, 

'  ^     from  fome  Perfons.  Pag.  285. 

Confequences  concerning  feveral  Cahini/iic  Do6lrines  ;  fuch  as 

an  univerfal^  decifwe  Providence,  Pag.  286.  \ 

"^ThQ  X.ot2i\  Depravity  2ind  Corruption  of  Man* s  Nature.  Pag.  287.  \ 
Efficacious  Grace.  Pag.  288.  { 

An   univerfal  and  abfolute   Decree  ;    and  abfolute,   eternal,  [ 

perfonal  Ele5lion.  Pag.  28c,  1 

Particular  Redemption.  Pag.  290.  ;i 

Perfeverance  of  Saints.  Pag.  291.   '. 

Concerning   the  Treatment  which   Cahinifiic  Writers   and  i] 

Divines  have  met  with.  Pag.  292.  'i 

The  Unhappinefs   of  the   Change   lately   in  many  Proteftant  I 

Countries.  Pag.  293.  ij 

The  Boldnefs  of  fome  Writers.  Ibid.  \] 

The  cxcdkntfFi/do/n  appearing  in  the  holy  Scriptures.     P.ult;. 


PART    I. 


jp<ii#  ^  ^i##f#.f  #®##'#f###i^«'-*^""-*' 


iilit.  r^^fo  c^^  fS^  cS% c9Sn cfJfo  ^fe  ^^j .^^  S^^ Sjt  S^h ^fe'$^^; #fe  T^  ^k/ 


PART     I. 

Wherein  are  explained  and  ftated  various 
Terms  and  Things  belonging  to  the  Sub- 
jed  of  the  enfuing  Difcourfe, 


^r^  *jy*  %C^ 


•VBf  •^j^   "VB^* 


«VV  •W  ^JtV*  •\A/*  "MV*  •\A/'  WTUt  'W*  '\J0^*  *^  'W 


Section     I. 
Concerning  the  Nature  of  the  Will* 


illlim^'^  n^ay  polTibly  be  thought,  that  there  Is  na 
^v^^^dj^^^'^^i^  great  Need  of  going  about  to  define  or  delcribs. 
Sh%^  T  d^<^  the  Will  \  this  Word  being  generally  as  v/ell 
ll^^ll^  underftood  as  any  other  Words  we  can  ule  to 
^^lllf  1^  explain  it  :  And  fo  perhaps  it  would  be,  had 
^^P^S'^^^^  not  Philofophers,  Metaphyikians  and  Polemic 
Divines  brought  the  Matter  into  Obfcurity  by  the  Things 
they  have  faid  of  it.  But  fmce  it  is  fo,  I  think  it  may  be  of 
fome  Ufe,  and  will  tend  to  the  greater  Clcarnefs  in  the  fol- 
lowing Difcourfe,  to  fay  a  few  Things  concerning  it. 

And  therefore  I  obferve,  that  the  IVill  (without  ariy  meta- 
phyfical  Refining)  is  plainly,  That  by  which  the  Mind  chufes  any 
Thing.  The  Faculty  of  the  JVill  is  that  Faculty  or  rower 
or  Principle  of  Mind'  by  which  it  is  capable  oi  chufing  :  AnA(ft 
of  the  Will  is  the  fame  as  an  A&.  of  Chujmg  or  Choice, 

B  If 


2         The  Nature  of  the  Will       Part  L 

If  any  think  'tis  a  more  perfe<5l  Definition  of  the  Will,  to 
fay,  that  it  is  that  by  which  the  Soul  either  chufei  or  refufes  ; 
I  am  content  with  it  :  tho'  I  think  that  'tis  enough  to  fay,  It's 
that  by  which  the  Soul  chufes  :  For  in  every  A(5t  of  Will 
"whatfoever,  the  Mind  chufes  one  Thing  rather  than  another ; 
it  chufes  fomething  rather  than  the  Contrary,  or  rather  than 
the  Want  or  Non-Exiflence  of  that  Thing.  So  in  every  A61 
cf  Refufal,  the  Mind  chufes  the  Abfence  of  the  Thing  re- 
fufed  J  The  Pofitive  and  the  Negative  are  fet  before  the  Mind 
for  it's  Choice,  and  it  chufes  the  Negative  ;  and  the  Mind's 
making  it's  Choice  in  that  Cafe  is  properly  the  A61  of  the 
Will  :  The  Will's  determining  between  the  two  is  a  volun- 
tary determining  ;  but  that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  making  a 
Choice.  So  that  whatever  Names  we  call  the  A6t  of  theWill 
by,  Chufing^  Refufing^  Approving^  Difapprovtng^  Likings  Dijliking^ 
Embracing^  RejeLiing^  Deterfniningy  DireSf'tng^  Commanding^  Por^ 
biddings  hidming  or  being  averfe^  a  being  pkafed  or  dtfpleas' d  with  i 
all  may  be  reduced  to  this  of  Chuftng,  For  the  Soul  to  adl  vo- 
hntarily^  is  evermore  to  ac^  eleiiively. 

Mr.  Loch  *  fays,  "  TheWill  fignifies  Nothing  but  a  Power 
**  or  Ability  to  prefer  or  chufe"  And  in  the  foregoing  Page 
fays,  *'  The  Word  Preferring  feems  bed  to  exprefs  the  A6t  of 
Volition  ;"  But  adds,that  "  it  does  it  not  precifely  ;  For  (fays 
he)  "  tho'  a  Man  would  prefer  Flying  to  Walking,  yet  who 
*'  can  fay  he  ever  wills  it  f"  But  the  Inftance  he  mentions 
don't  prove  that  there  is  any  Thing  elfe  in  Willing^  but  meerly 
Preferring  :  For  it  fhould  be  confidered  what  is  the  next  and 
immediate  Obje6t  of  the  Will,  with  refpecft  to  a  Man's 
Walking,  or  any  other  external  A6tion  ;  which  is  not  his  be- 
ing removed  from  one  Place  to  another  -,  on  the  Earth,  or 
thro'  the  Air  ;  thefe  are  remoter  Objeds  of  Preference  ;  but 
fuch  or  fuch  an  immediate  Exertion  of  himfelf.  The  Thing 
nextly  chofen  or  prefer'd  when  a  Man  wills  to  walk,  is  not  his 
being  removed  to  fuch  a  Place  where  he  would  be,  but  fuch 
an  Exertion  and  Motion  of  his  Legs  and  Feet  &c.  in  order  to 
it.  And  his  willing  fuch  an  Alteration  in  his  Body  in  the  pre- 
fent  Moment,  is  nothing  elfe  but  his  chufmg  or  preferring 
fuch  an  Alteration  in  his  Body  at  fuch  a  Moment,  or  his  lik- 
ing it  better  than  the  Forbearance  of  it.  And  God  has  fo 
made  and  eftablifti'd  the  human  Nature,the  Soul  being  united 
to  a  Body  in  proper  State,  that  the  Soul  preferring  or  chufing 
fuch  an  immediate  Exertion  or  Alteration  of  the  Body,  fuch 
an  Alteration  inftantaneoufly  follows.     There  is  nothing  elfe 

ia 

^  Human  Underftandirg.  F.dit.  7.  Vol.  LP.  1974 


Se<a.  I.     The  Nature  of  th£  Will  3 

in  the  A<5llngs  of  my  Mind,  that  I  am  confcious  of  while  I 
walk,  but  only  my  preferring  or  chufmg,  thro'  fucceffive  Mo- 
ments, that  there  fhould  be  fuch  Alterations  of  my  external 
Senfations  and  Motions  ;  together  with  a  concurring  habitual 
Expectation  that  it  will  be  fo  ;  having  ever  found  by  Experi- 
ence, that  on  fuch  an  immediate  Preference,  fuch  Senfations 
andMotions  do  adually  inftantaneouny,&  conftantly  arife.  But 
it  is  not  fo  in  the  Cafe  of  Flying  :  Tho'  a  Man  may  be  faid 
remotely  to  chufe  or  prefer  1*  lying  ;  yet  he  don't  chufe  or  pre- 
fer, incline  to  or  defire,  under  Circumftances  in  View,  any- 
immediate  Exertion  of  the  Members  of  his  Body  in  order  to 
it  ;  becaufe  he  has  no  Expedation  that  he  fliould  obtain  the 
defired  End  by  any  fuch  Exertion  ;  and  he  don't  prefer  or  in- 
cline to  any  bodily  Exertion  or  Effort  under  this  apprehended 
Circumftance,of  it's  being  wholly  in  vain.  So  that  if  we  care- 
fully diftinguifh  the  proper  Objeds  of  the  feveral  Ads  of  the 
Will,  it  will  not  appear  by  this,  and  fuch-like  Inftances,  that 
there  is  any  Difference  between  Volition  and  Preference  ;  or  that 
a  Man's  chufmg,  liking  befl,  or  being  beft  pleafed  with  a 
Thing,  are  not  the  fame  with  his  willing  that  Thing ;  as  they 
feem  to  be  according  to  thofe  general  and  more  natural  Noti- 
ons of  Men,  according  to  which  Language  is  formed.  Thus 
an  A(5t  of  the  Will  is  commonly  exprefs'd  by  it'spleaftngaMan 
to  do  thus  or  thus  ;  and  a  Man's  doing  as  he  wills^  and  doing 
"as  he  pleafesy  are  the  fame  Thing  in  common  Speech. 

Mr.  Locke  fays,  f  "  TheWill  is  perfecSlly  diftinguifh'd  from 
*'  Defire  ;  which  in  the  very  fame  Action  may  have  a  quite 
•'  contrary  Tendency  from  that  which  our  Wills  ht  us  uporu 
*'  A  Man  (fays  he)  whom  I  cannot  deny,  may  oblige  me  to 
*'  ufe  Perfwafions  to  another,  which,  at  the  fame  Time  I  am 
"  fpeaking,  I  may  wilh  may  not  prevail  on  him.  In  this 
"  Cafe  'tis  plain  the  Will  and  Defire  run  counter."  I  don't 
fuppofe,  that  JVill  and  Defire  are  Words  of  precifely  the  fame 
Signification;  /iF/7/feems  to  be  aWord  of  a  more  generalSigni- 
fication,  extending  to  Things  prefcnt  and  abfent,  Defirs  rc- 
fpeds  fomething  abfent.  I  may  prefer  my  prefent  Situation 
and  Poflure,  fuppofe  fitting  flill,  or  having  my  Eyes  open, 
and  fo  may  will  it.  But  yet  I  can't  think  they  are  fo 
entirely  diflinct,  that  they  can  ever  be  properly  faid  to  rua 
counter.  A  Man  never,  in  any  Inftance,  wills  any  Thing 
contrary  to  his  Defires,  or  defires  any  Thing  contrar)^  to  his 
Will.  The  foremention'd  Inflance,  which  Mr.  Locke  pro- 
duces, don't  prove  that  he  ever  .does.  He  may,  on  fomeCon- 
^deration  or  other,  will  to  utter  Speeches  which  have  a  T'ea- 
B  2  deucy 

f  HaiB.  Und,  Vo!.  L  F.  205,  204,,. 


4  the  Nature  oftSeW^.       Part  I. 

dency  to  perfwade  ancFther,  and  ftill  may  defire  that  they  may 
not  perfwade  him  :  But  yet  his  Will  and  Defire  don't  run 
counter  at  all  :  The  Thing  which  he  wills,  the  very  fame  he 
defires  ;  and  he  don't  will  a  Thing,  and  defire  the  contrary' 
in  any  Particular.  In  this  Inftance,  it  is  not  carefully  obferv- 
ed,  what  is  the  Thing  will'd,  and  what  is  the  Thing  defired  : 
If  it  were,  it  would  be  found  that  Will  and  Defire  don't  clalh 
in  the  leaft.  T]ie  Thing  will'd  on  fome  Confideration,  is  to 
utter  fueh  Words  ;  and  certainly,  the  fame  Confideration  fo 
influences  him,  that  he  don't  defire  the  contrary  \  all  Things 
confidered,  he  chufes  to  utter  fuch  Words,  and  don't  defire 
not  to  utter  'em.  And  fo  as  to  the  Thing  which  Mr.  Locke 
fpeaks  of  as  defired,  viz.  that  the  Words,  tho'  They  tend  to 
perfwade,  fhould  not  be  efte<ftual  to  that  End,  his  Will  is 
not  contrary  to  this  ;  he  don't  will  that  they  fhould  be  efFed- 
ual,  but  rather  wills  that  they  fhould  not,  as  he  defires.  In 
order  to  prove  that  the  Will  and  Defire  may  run  counter,  it 
fhould  be  fhown  that  they  may  be  contrary  one  to  the  other 
in  the  fame  Thing,  or  v^'ith  refpe6l  to  the  very  fame  Objed  of 
Will  or  Defire  :  But  here  the  Objedls  are  two  ;  and  in  each, 
taken  by  themfelves,  the  Will  and  Defire  agree.  And  'tis  no 
Wonder  that  they  fhould  not  agree  in  different  Things,  how- 
ever little  diftinguifhed  they  are  in  their  Nature.  The  Will 
may  not  agree  with  the  W^ill,  nor  Defire  agree  with  Defire,  in 
different  Things.  As  in  this  very  Inftance  which  yix,- Locke 
mentions,  a  Perfon  may,  on  fome  Confideration,  defire  to  ufe 
Perfwalions,  and  at  the  fame  Time  may  defire  they  may 
not  pn^vail  ;  But  yet  no  Body  will  fay,  that  Defire  runs  coun- 
ter to  Defire  ;  or  that  this  proves  that  Defire  is  perfectly  a " 
diflin6t  Thing  from  Defire.——  The  like  might  be  obfervecl  of 
the  other  Inftance  Mr.  Locke  produces,  of  a  Man's  defiring  tci 
be  eafed  of  Pain  &c. 

But  not  to  dwell  any  longer  on  this,  whether  Defire  and 
W'lU^  and  whether  Preference  and  Volition  be  precifely  the  fame 
Things  or  no  ;  yet,  I  truft  it  will  be  allowed  by  all,  that  in 
every  A6t  of  Will  there  is  an  A61  of  Choice  ;  that  In 
every  Volition  there  is  a  *Preference,or  a  prevailing  Inclination 
of  the  Soul,  whereby  the  Soul,  at  that  Inftant,  is  out  of  a 
State  of  perfect  Indifference,  with  refped  to  the  direct  Object 
of  the  Volition.  So  that  in  every  Acf ,  or  going  forth  of  the 
Will,  there  is  fomePreponderation  of  the  Mind  or  Inclination, 
one  Way  rather  than  another  ;  and  the  Soul  had  rather  have 
or  do  one  Thing  than  another,  or  than  not  to  have  or  do  that 
Thing  ;  and  that  there,  where  there  is  -abfolutely  no  prefer- 
ring or  chuilng,  but  a  perfed  continuing  Equilibrium,  therein 
uo  Volition. 

Section 


Se<a.II.  Of  the  Determination  of  the  Will.  5 

Section     II. 
Concerning  the  Determination  of  the  WilL 

T^  determining  the  IViU^  if  the  Phrafe  be  ufed  with  any  Mean-. 
*-^  ing,  mull  be  ivXtx^^t^^caufing  that  the  A£i  of  theWill  or  Choice 
Jhould  be  thus,  and  not  otherwife  :  And  the  Will  is  faid  to  be  de- 
termined, when,  in  Conlequence  of  feme  Adion,  or  Influence, 
its  Choice  is  d^fecSted  to,  and  fix'd  upon  a  particular  Objecft. 
As  when  we  fpeak  of  the  Determination  of  Motion,  we  mean 
cauiing  the  Motion  of  the  Body  to  be  fuch  a  Way,  or  in  fuch 
a  Diredion,  rather  than  another. 

To  talk  of  the  Determination  of  the  Will,  fuppofes  an 
EfFed,  which  muft  have  a  Caufe.  If  theWill  be  determined, 
there  is  a  Determiner.  This  mud  be  fuppofed  to  be  intend- 
ed even  by  them  that  fay,  theWill  determmes  itfelf.  If  it  be 
fo,  the  Will  is  both  Determiner  &  determined  ;  it  is  a  Caufe 
that  ads  and  produces  Effeds  upon  it  feif,  and  is  the  Objed 
of  its  own  Influence  and  Adion. 

With  refped  to  that  grand  Enquiry,  IFhat  determmes  th$ 
IVill,  it  would  be  very  tedious  and  utineceilary  at  prefent  to 
enumerate  and  examine  all  the  various  Opinions,  which  have 
been  advanced  concerning  this  Matter  ;  nor  is  it  needful  that 
I  ihould  enter  into  a  particular  Difquifition  of  all  Points  deba- 
ted in  Difputes  on  that  Quefl:ion,  Whether  the  Will  always  fol^ 
lozvs  the  laji  Dilate  of  the  Underjlanding,  It  is  fuflicient  to  my 
prefent  Purpofe  to  fay,  — -  It  is  that  Motive,  zvhich,  as  it  ftands 
in  the  View  of  the  Mind,  is  thejirongejl,  that  determims  the  Will:  — 
But  it  may  be  neceffary  that  I  (hould  a  little  explain  my 
Meaning  in  this. 

By  Motive,  I  mean  the  whole  of  that  which  moves,  excites 
or  invites  the  Mind  to  Volition,  whether  that  be  one  Thing 
fmgly,  or  many  Things  conjundly.  Many  particular  Things 
may  concur  and  unite  their  Strength  to  induce  the  Mind  ; 
•and  when  it  is  fo,  all  together  are  as  it  were  one  complex 
Motive.  And  when  I  fpeak  of  the  Jirongeft  Motive,  I  have 
Refped  to  the  Strength  of  the  whole  that  operates  to  induce 
to  a  particular  Ad  of  Volition,  whether  that  be  the  Strength 
of  one  Thing  alone,  or  of  many  together. 

-^  I  What- 


6       What  determines  the  Will      Part  I. 

Whatever  is  a  Motive,  in  this  Senfe,muft  be  fomething  that 
is  extant  in  the  View  or  Apprehenfton  of  the  Vnderjianding^  or  per- 
ceiving Faculty.  Nothing  can  induce  or  invite  the  Mind  to 
will  or  a(5t  any  Thing,  any  further  than  it  is  perceived,  or  is 
feme  Way  or  other  in  the  Mind's  view  ;  for  what  is  wholly 
unperceived,  and  perfe<5tly  out  of  the  Mind's  view,can't  afFea 
the  Mind  at  all.  'Tis  moft  evident,  that  nothing  is  in  the 
Mind,  or  reaches  it,  or  takes  any  Hold  of  it,  any  otherwifc 
than  as  it  is  perceiv'd  or  tho't  of. 

And  I  think  it  muft  alfo  be  allowed  by  all,  that  every  Thing 
that  is  properly  called  a  Motive,  Excitement  €r  Inducement 
to  a  perceiving  willmg  Agent,  has  fome  Sort  and  Degree  of 
Tendency y  or  Advaniuge  to  move  or  excite  the  Will,  previous  to 
the  Effect,  or  to  the  A6t  of  the  Will  excited.  This  previous 
Tendency  of  the  Motive  is  what  I  call  the  Strength  of  the  Mo- 
tive, That  Motive  which  has  a  lefs  Degree  of  previous  Ad- 
vantage or  Tendency  to  move  the  Will,  or  that  appears  lefs 
inviting,  as  it  ftands  in  the  View  of  the  Mind,  is  what  I  call 
a  weaker  Motive.  On  the  contrary,  that  which  appears  moft 
inviting,  and  has,  by  what  appears  concerning  it  to  the  Un- 
derftanding  or  Apprehenfion,  the  greateft  Degree  of  previous 
Tendency  to  excite  and  induce  the  Choice,  is  what  I  call  the 
Jirotigejl  Motive.  And  in  this  Senfe,  I  fuppofe  the  Will  is  al- 
ways determined  by  the  ftrongeft  Motive. 

Things,  that  exift  in  the*  View  of  the  Mind,  have  their 
Strength,  Tendency  or  Advantage  to  move  or  excite  its  Will, 
from  many  Things  appertaining  to  the  Nature  and  Cir- 
cumftances  of  the  T^hing  view'd^  the  Nature  and  Circumftances 
of  the  Mind  that  viewsy  and  the  Degree  &Manner  of  its  Fieiu  ; 
which  it  would  perhaps  be  hard  to  make  a  perfect  Enumeration 
of.  But  fo  much  I  think  may  be  determin'd  in  general,with- 
out  Room  for  Controverfy,  that  whatever  is  percei|^d  or  ap- 
prehended by  an  intelligent  &  voluntary  Agent,  which  has  the 
Nature  and  Influence  of  a  Motive  to  Vplitipn  or  Choice,  is 
confider'd  or  view'd  as  good  ;  nor  has  it  any  Tendency  to  in- 
vite or  engage  the  Election  of  the  Soul  in  any  further  Degree 
than  it  appears  fuch.  For  to  fay  otherwife,  would  be  to  fay, 
th'dt  Things  that  appear  have  a  Tendency  by  the  Appearance 
they  make,  to  engage  the  Mind  to  ele6t  them,  fome  other 
Way  than  by  their  appearing  eligible  to  it  ;  which  is  ab- 
furd.  And  therefore  it  muft  be  true,  in  fome  Senfe,  that  the 
^il/  always  is  as  the  greate/?  apparent  Good  is.  But  only,  for  the 
right  underftanding  of  this,  two  Things  muft  be  well  and 
di^linctly  obferved, 

I.  It 


Se<a.  IL      What  determines  the  Will       7 

I.  It  muft  be  obferved  in  what  Senfe  lufe  the  Term  Goodi 
tiamcly,  as  of  the  fame  Import  with  Agreahle.  To  appear 
good  to  the  Mind,  as  I  ufe  the  Phrafe,  is  the  fame  as  to  appear 
agreahle^  or  feem  pkafing  to  the  Mind.  Certainly,  nothing  ap- 
pears inviting  and  eUgible  to  the  Mind,  or  tending  to  engage 
il's  Ire  ination  and  Choice,  confidered  2iS  evil  or  difagreabk  i 
nor  indeed,  as  'indifferent^  and  neither  agreable  nor  difagrea- 
ble.  But  if  it  tends  to  draw  the  Inchnation,  and  move  the 
Will,  it  muft  be  under  the  Notion  of  that  which /tt//i  the 
Mind.  And  therefore  that  muft  have  the  greateft  1  endency 
to  attrad  and  engage  it,  which,  as  it  ftands  in  the  Mind's 
View,  fuits  it  beft,  and  pleafes  it  moft  ;  and  in  that  Senfe,  is 
the  greateft  apparent  Good  :  to  fay  otherwife,  is  little,  if  any 
Thing,  fhort  of  a  dire6l  and  plain  Contradidion. 
■  ■  The  Word  Good^  in  this  Senfe,  includes  in  its  Signification, 
the  Removal  or  Avoiding  of  Evil,  or  of  that  which  is  difa- 
greab.'e  &  uneafy.  'Tis  agreable  and  pleafmg,  to  avoid  what 
is  difagreable  and  difpleafing,  and  to  have  Uneafinefs  remo- 
ved. So  that  here  is  iacluded  what  Mr.  Lpcke  fuppofes  deter- 
mines the  Will.  For  when  he  fpeaks  of  Uneaiinefs  as  de- 
termining the  Will,  he  muft  be  underftood  as  fuppofing  that 
the  End  or  Aim  which  governs  in  the  Volition  orA6t  of  Prefe- 
rencCjis  the  Avoiding  or  Removal  of  that  Uneafinefs  ;  and  that 
is  the  fame  Thing  as  chufing  and  feeking  what  is  more  eafy 
and  -agreable. 

2.  When  I  fay,  the  Will  i«  as  the  greateft  apparent  Good 
is,  or  (as  I  have  explain'd  it)  that  Volition  has  always  for  its 
Objcd:  the  Thing  which  appears  moft  agreable  ;  it  muft  be 
carefully  obferved,  to  avoid  Confufion  and  needlefs  ObjecStion, 
that  I  fpeak  of  the  dire^  and  immediaU  Obje6l  of  the  A6t  of 
Volition  ;  and  not  fome  Objedl  that  the  A6t  of  Will  has  not 
an  immediate,  but  only  an  indire6t  and  remote  Refpe<5t  to. 
Many  Ads  of  Volition  have  fome  remote  Relation  to  an  Ob- 
je6t,  that  is  different  from  the  Thing  moft  immediately  wiird 
and  chofen.  Thus,  when  a  Drunkard  has  his  Liquor  before 
him,  h  he  has  to  chufe  whether  to  drink  it,or  no  ;  the  proper 
and  immediate  Objeds,  about  which  his  prefent  Volition  is 
converfant,  and  between  which  his  Choice  now  decides,  are 
his  own  Ads,  in  drinking  the  Liquor,  or  letting  it  alone  ;  and 
this  will  certainly  be  done  according  to  what,  in  the  prefent 
View  of  his  Mind,  taken  in  the  whole  of  it,  is  moft  agreable 
to  him.  If  he  chufes  or  wills  to  drink  it,  and  not  to  let  it 
alone  ;  then  this  Adion,  as  it  ftands  in  the  View  of 
his  Mind,  with  all  that  belongs  to  its  Appearance  there,  is 
more  agreable  and  pkafing  than  letting  it  alone. 

B^4.  But 


8        What  determines  the  WilL      Part  I. 

But  the  Objecls  to  which  this  Aft  of  Volition  may  relate 
more  remotely,  and  between  which  his  Choice  may  determine 
more  indire6tly,  are  the  prefent  Pleafure  the  Man  expe6ts  by 
drinking,  and  the  future  Mifery  which  he  judges  will  be  the 
Confequence  of  it  :  He  may  judge  that  this  future  Mifery, 
when  it  comes,  will  be  more  difagreable  and  unpleafant,  than 
refraining  frorn  drinking  now  would  be.  Byt  thefe  two 
Things  are  not  the  properObjeds  that  theAdl  of  Volition  fpo- 
ken  of  is  nextly  converfant  about.  For  the  A^  of  Will  fpo- 
ken  of  is  concerning  prefent  Drinking  or  Forbearing  to  drink. 
\i  he  wills  to  4nnk,  then  Drinking  is  the  proper  Objedt  of  the 
Act  of  hisWill  J  and  drinking,  on  fomeAccount  or  other,  now 
appears  moft  agreable  to  him,  &  fuits  him  beft.  If  he  chufes 
to  refrain,  then  Refraining  is  the  immediate  Obje6t  of  his 
Will,  and  is  mofi:  pleafing  to  him.  If  in  the  Choice  he 
makes  in  the  Cafe,  he  prefers  a  prefent  Pleafure  to  a  future 
Advantage,  which  he  judges  will  be  greater  when  it  comes  } 
then  a  leffer  prefent  Pleafure  appears  more  agreable  to  hini 
than  a  greater  Advantage  at  a  Diftance.  If  on  the  contrary  a 
future  Advantage  is  prefer'd,  then  that  appears  moft  agreable, 
and  fuits  him  beft.  And  fo  ftill  the  prefent  Volition  is  as 
the  greateft  apparent  Good  at  prefent  is, 

I  have  rather  chofen  to  exprefs  my  felf  thus,  that  the   JPlli 
always  is  as  the  greatcji  apparent  Good^    or  as  what  appears   moft  a- 
greahk^  is^  than  to  f.iy  that  the  Will  is  determined  by  the  greateft 
apparent  Good,   or   by  what  feems   moft  agreable  ;    becaufe 
an  appearing  moft  agreable   or  pleafmg  to  the  Mind,   and  the 
Mind's  preferring  and  chufmg,  feem    hardly   to   be   properly 
^nd  perfc6tly  diftind:.     If  ftri6t  Propriety  of  Speech  be  inlifted 
on,     it   may     more   properly    be    faid,    that    tlje     voluntary 
Miion  which   is   the  immediate   Confequence  and  Fruit   of 
the    Alind's  Volition  or  Choice,  is  4eter7nined  by  that   which 
appears  moft  agreable,  than  the  Preference  or   Choice  it  felf ; 
t>ut  that  the  A6t:  of  Volition  it  {t\i  is   always    determin'd  by 
that  in  or  about  the  Mind's  View  of  the  Object,   which  caufes 
it  to  appear  moft  agreable.     I  fay,  in   or  about  the  Mi?-id's  View 
of  the  Obje6t,  becaufe  what  has  Influence  to  render  an  Objedt 
in  View  agreable,   is   not  only   what   appears  in   the    Objedl  | 
view'd»    h\i\.  ^\{o  the  Manner  oi  the  View,    and  the   State  and  ' 
Circumftances  of  the  Mind  that  views.— Particularly  to  enume-    ' 
rate  all  Things  pertaining  to  theMind'sView  of  theObjecSts  of 
Volition,  which  have  Influence   in  their  appearing  agreable  to 
the  Mind,   would  be  a  Matter   of  no  fmall  Difficulty,  and  ! 
might  require  a  Treatife  by  it  felf,  and  is  not  neceflary  to  my 
prefent  Purpofe.     I  ftiall  therefore  only  mentioa  fome  Things  ., 
ijfi  general,  L  Oni' 


Seft.II.     What  determines  the  Will.      .  9 

I,  One  Thing  that  makes  an  Obje6t  propofed  to  Choice 
agreable,  is  the  apparent  Nature  and  Circumjiayices  of  the  Ohje^^ 
And  there  are  various  Things  of  this  Sort,  that  have  an  Hand 
in  rendring  the  Obje<5l  more  or  lefs  agreable  ;    as, 

I.  That  which  appears  in  the  Objed,  which  renders  it 
'lieautiful  and  pleafant,  or  deformed  and  irkfom  to  the  Mind^; 
viewing  it  as  it  is  in  it  felf 

I  2.  The  apparent  Degree  of  Pleafure  or  Trouble  attending 
the  Objedt,  or  the  Confequence  of  it.  Such  Concomitants  and 
Confequents  being  view'd  as  Circumftances  of  the  Obje6t,  are 
to  be  confidered  as  belonging  to  it,  and  as  it  were  Parts  of  it; 
as  it  ftands  in  the  Mind's  View,  as  a  propofed  Obje6t  of 
Choice. 

3.  The  apparent  State  of  the  Pleafure  or  Trouble  that  ap- 
pears, with  Refpe6t  to  Dijlance  of  Time  ;  being  either  nearer 
or  farther  off.  'Tis  a  Thing  in  it  felf  agreable  to  the  Mind, 
to  have  Pleafure  fpeedily  ;  and  difagreable,  to  liave  it  delayed  : 
So  that  if  there  be  two  equal  Degrees  of  Pleafure  fet  in  the 
Mind's  View,  and  all  other  Things  are  equal,  but  only  one 
is  beheld  as  near,  and  the  other  far  off ;  the  nearer  will  ap- 
pear moft  agreable,  and  fo  will  be  chofen.  Becaufe,  tho'  the 
Agreablenefs  of  the  Objedls  be  exa6tly  equal,  as  view'd  in 
Themfelves,  yet  not  as  view'd  in  their  Circumftances  ;  one 
of  them  having  the  additional  Agreablenefs  of  the  Circum- 
ilance  of  Nearnefs. 

II.  Another  Thing  that  contributes  to  the  Agreablenefs  of 
an  Object  of  Choice,  as  it  ftands  in  the  Mind's  View,  is  the 
Manner  of  the  View,  If  the  Obje6l  be  fomething  which  ap- 
pears connecfted  with  future  Pleafure,  not  only  will  the  Degree 
of  apparent  Pleafure  have  Influence,  but  alfo  the  Manner  of 
the  View,    efpecially  in  two  Refpecfts. 

1 .  With  refpe6l  to  the  Degree  of  Judgment^  or  Firmnefs 
of  Affent^  v^ith  which  the  Mind  judges  the  Pleafure  to  be  fu- 
ture. Becaufe  it  is  more  agreable  to  have  a  certain  Happinefs, 
than  an  uncertain  one  ;  and  a  Pleafure  view'd  as  more  proba- 
ble, all  other  Things  being  equal,  is  more  agreable  to  the 
Mind,  than  that  which  is  view'd  as  lefs  probable. 

2.  With  refpe6l  to  the  Degree  of  the  Idea  of  the  future 
Pleafure.  With  Regard  to  Things  which  are  the  SubjeA  of 
our  Thoughts,  either  paft,  prefent  or  future,  we  have  much 
more  of  an  Idea  or  Apprehenfion  of  fomeThings  than  others  ; 
that  is,  our  Idea  is  much  more  clear,  lively  and  ftrong.- 
Thus,  the  Ideas  we  have  of  fenfible  Things  by  immediate 
Senfation,  are  ufually  much  more  lively  than  thofe  we  have 
by  meer  Imagination,  or  by  Contemplation  of  them  when  ab- 

fent. 


lo       What  determines  ty^^  Will.     Part  I. 

fent.     My  Idea  of  the  Sun,  when  I  look  upon  it,  is  more 
vivid,  than  when  I-only  think  of  it.     Our  Idea  of  the   fweet 
Rehfh  of  a  dehcious  Fruit  is  ufually  ftronger  when  we  tafte  it, 
than  when  we  only  imagine  it.    And  fometimes,the  Ideas  we 
haveof  Things  byContempIation,are  much  ftronger  &  clearer, 
than  at  other  Times.      Thus,   a  Man  at  one   Time  has   a 
muchftronger  Idea  of  the  Pleafure  which  is  to  be  enjoyed  in 
mating  fome  Sort  of  Food  that  he  loves,than  at  another.    Now 
the  Degree,  or  Strength  of  the  Idea  or  Senfe  that  Men  have 
of  future  Good  or  Evil,  is  one  Thing  that  has  great  Influ- 
ence on  their  Minds  to  excite  Choice  or  Volition.     When  of 
two  Kinds  of  future  Pleafure,  which   the  Mind  confiders  of, 
and  are  prefented  for  Choice,  both  are  fuppofed  exa6tly  equal 
^  the  Judgment,    and  both  equally  certain,    and  all   other 
Things  are  equal,  but  only  one  of  them  is  what  the  Mind 
has  a  far  more  lively  Senfe  of,  than  of  the  other  ;  this  has  the 
greateft  Advantage  by  far  to  aiFect  and  attradl:  tlie  Mind,   and 
move  theV/ill.     HTis  now  more  agreable  to  the  Mi»d,  to  take 
the  Pleafure  it  has  a  ftrong  and  lively  Senfe  of,  than  that 
which  it  has  only  a  faint  Idea  of.     The  View  of  the  former 
is  attended  with  the  ftrongeft  Appetite,  and  the  greateft  Unea- 
finefs  attends  the  Want  of  it ;   and  'tis  agreable  to  the  Mind, 
to  have  Uneafuiefs  removed,  and  it's  Appetite  gratified.     And 
if  feveral  future  Enjoyments  are  prefented  together,  as  Com- 
petitors for  the  Choice  of  the  Mind,  fome  of  them  judged  to 
be  greater,  and  others  lefs  ;  the  Mind  alfo  having  a  greater 
Senfe  and  more  lively  Idea  of  the  Good  of  fome  of  them,  and 
of  others  a  lefs  ;   and  fome  are  viewM  as  of  greater  Certainty 
or  Probability  than  others  ;  and  thofe  Enjoyments  that  appear 
moft  agreable  in  one  of  thefe  Refpeds,  appears  leaft  fo   in 
others  :     In  this  Cafe,    all  other  Things  being  equal,   the  A- 
greablenefs  of  a  propofed  Objedlof  Choice  will  be  in  a  De- 
gree fome  Way  compounded  of  the  Degree  of  Good  fuppofed 
by  the  Judgment,  the  Degree  of  apparent  Probability  or  Cer- 
tainty of  that  Good,  and  the  Degree  of  the  View  or  Senfe,  or 
Livelinefs  of  the  Idea  the  Mind  has,  of  that  Good  ;  becaufe 
all  together  concur  to  conftitute  the  Degree  in  which  the  Ob- 
je(5l  appears  at  prefent   agreable  ;    and  accordingly   Volition 
will  be  determined. 

^  I  might  further  obferv^e,  the  State  of  the  Mind  that 
views  a  propofed  Objeift  of  Choice,  is  another  Thing  that 
contributes  to  the  Agreablenefs  or  Difagreablenefs  of  that 
Object ;  the  particular  Temper  which  the  Mind  has  by  Na- 
ture, or  that  has  been  introduced  and  eftablilhed  by  Educa- 
idon,  Example,  Cuftom,  or  fome  other  Means  3  or  theFrame 

or 


Sed.  li.    What  determines  the  WilL       1 1 

or  State  that  the  Mind  is  in  on  a  particular  Occafion. 
That  Object  which  appears  agreable  to  one,  does  not  fo  to 
another.  And  the  fame  Object  don't  always  appear  alike  agre* 
able  to  the  fame  Perfon,  at  different  Times.  It  is  moft  a- 
greable  to  fome  Men,  to  follow  their  Reafon  ;  and  to  others, 
to  follow  their  Appetites  :  To  fome  Men,  it  is  more  agreable 
to  deny  a  vicious  Inclination,  than  to  gratify  it  ;  Others  it 
fuits  bcft  to  gratify  the  vileft  Appetites.  'Tis  more  difagrea- 
bJe  to  fome  Men  than  others,  to  counter-a6t  a  former  Refo- 
Jution.  In  thefe  Refpe<5ts,  and  many  others  which  might  be 
mention'd,  different  Things  will  be  moft  agreable  to  different 
Perfons ;  and  not  only  fo,  but  to  the  fame  Perfons  at  diffe- 
rent Times. 

But  pofTibly  'tis  needlefs  and  improper,  to  mention  the 
Frame  and  State  of  the  Mind,  as  a  diftin^  Ground  of  the 
Agreablenefs  of  Objeds  from  the  other  two  mentioned  be- 
fore ;  'z;/z.  The  apparent  Nature  and  Circumftances  of  the 
Objeds  view'd,  'and  the  .Manner  of  the  View  :  Perhaps  if 
we  ftri6tly  confider  the  Matter,  the  different  Temper  and 
State  of  the  Mind  makes  no  Alteration  as  to  the  Agreable- 
nefs of  Objects,  any  other  Way,  than  as  it  makes  the  Ob- 
jedts  themfelves  appear  differently  beautiful  or  deformed, 
having  apparent  Pleafure  or  Pain  attending  them  ;  And  as  it 
occalions  the  Manner  of  the  View  to  be  different,  caufes  the 
Idea  of  Beauty  or  Deformity,  Pleafure  or  Uneafmefs  to  be 
more  or  lefs  lively. 

However,  I  think  fo  much  is  certain,  that  Volition,  In  no 
one  Inftance  that  can  be  mentioned,  is  otherwife  than  the 
greateft  apparent  Good  is,  in  the  Manner  which  has  been 
explained.  The  Choice  of  the  Mind  never  departs  from  that 
which,  at  that  Time,  and  with  Refpedl  to  the  dired:  and 
immediate  Objeds  of  that  Decifion  of  the  Mind,  appears 
moft  agreable  and  pleafmg,  all  Things  confidered.  If  the  im- 
mediate Objedts  of  the  Will  are  a  Man's  own  A6lions,  then 
thofe  Anions  which  appear  moft  agreable  to  him  he  wills.  If 
it  be  now  moft  agreable  to  him,  all  Things  conridered,to  walk, 
then  he  now  wills  to  walk.  If  it  be  now,  upon  the  whole  of 
what  at  prefent  appears  to  him,moft  agreable  to  fpeak,  then  he 
choofes  to  fpeak  :  If  it  fuits  him  beft  to  keep  Silence,  then 
he  choofes  to  keep  Silence.  There  is  fcarcely  a  plainer 
and  more  univerfal  Didate  of  the  Senfe  and  Experience  of 
Mankind,  than  that,  when  Men  acSl  voluntarily,  and  do  what 
they  pleafe,  then  they  do  what  fuits  them  beft,  or  what  is 
Cjoft  agrmhk  to  them.     To  fay,  that  they  do  what  they  pleafe, 

or 


1 2       What  determines  the  Will     Part  I. 

or  what  pleafes  them, ,  but  yet  don't  do  what  is  agreahh  to 
them,  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  they  do  what  they  pleafej 
but  don't  adl  their  Pleafure  ;  and  that  is  to  fay,  that  they, 
do  what  they  pleafe,  and  yet  don't  do.  what  they  pleafe. 

It  appears  from  thefe  Things,  that  in  fome  Senfe,  the  WtU> 
always  follows  the  loft  Diclate  ef  th^  Under/landing.  But  then  the; 
Underjianding  muftbe  taken  in  a  large  Senfe,  as  including  the 
whole  Faculty  of  Perception  or  Apprehenfion,  and  not  meerly 
what  is  called  Re af on  ox  Judgment.  If  by  the  Dictate  of  the; 
Underftanding  is  meant  what  Rcafon  declares  to  be  beft  or 
moft  for  the  Perfon^'s  Happinefs,  taking  in  the  whole  of  his 
Duration,  it  is  not  true,  that  the  Will  always  follows  the  laft 
Di(5late  of  the  Underftanding.  Such  a  Dictate  of  Reafon  is 
quite  a  different  Matter  from  Things  appearing  now  moft 
agreahle ;  all  Things  being  put  together  which  pertain  to 
the  Mind's  prefent  Perceptions,  Apprehenfions  or  Ideas,  in 
any  Refpect.  Altho'  that  Didate  of  Reafon,  when  it  takes 
Place,  is  one  Thing  that  is  put  into  the  Scales,  and  is  to  be 
confidered  as  a  Thing  that  has  Concern  in  the  compound  In- 
fluence which  moves  &  induces  the  Will  ;  and  is  one  Thing 
that  is  to  be  confidered  in  eftimating  the  Degree  of  that  Ap- 
pearance of  Good  which  the  Will  always  follows  ;  either  as 
having  its  Influence  added  to  other  Things,  or  fubduded 
from  them.  When  it  concurs  with  other  Things,  then  its 
Weight  is  added  to  them,  as  put  into  the  fame  Scale  j  but 
when  it  is  againft  them,  it  is  as  a  Weight  in  the  oppofite 
Scale,  where  it  refifts  the  Influence  of  other  Things  :  yet 
it's  Refiftance  is  often  overcome  by  their  greater  Weight,and 
fo  the  Ad  of  the  Will  is  determined  in  Oppofition  to  it. 

The  Things  which  I  have  faid  may,  I  hope,  ferve,  in  fome 
Meafure,  to  illuftrate  and  confirm  the  Pofition  I  laid  down 
in  the  Beginning  of  this  Sedion,  viz.  That  the  IVill  is  always 
determined  by  thejlrongeji  Motive^  or  by  that  View  of  the  Mind 
which  has  the  greateft  Degree  of  previous  Tendency  to  ex- 
cite Volition.  But  whether  I  have  been  fo  happy  as  rightly 
to  explain  theThing  wherein  conlifts  the  Strength  of  Motives, 
or  not,  yet  my  failing  in  this  will  not  overthrow  the  Pofition 
it  felf  5  which  carries  much  of  its  own  Evidence  with  it,  and 
is  the  Thing  of  chief  Importance  to  the  Purpofe  of  the  en- 
fuing  Difcourfe  :  And  the  Truth  of  it,  I  hope,  will  appear 
•with  greater  Clearnefs,  before  I  have  flnifhed  what  I  have  to 
fay  on  the  Subjed  of  human  Liberty.  ^    # 

SECT. 


Sed. III.    The  Nature  of  Neceffity.        1 3 

Section     III. 

Concer?ting  the  Meaning  of  the  Tenns  Ne- 
ceffity, Impoffibility^  Inability,  &c  ;  and 
^Contingence.  .  ^  ^^     -   -^ 


THE  Words  iy^-f^ry,  Lnpoffihle  he.  arc  abundantly  ufed 
in  Controverfies  about  Free-will  and  moral  Agency  ; 
and  therefore  the  Senfe  in  which  they  are  ufed,  Ihould 
be  clearly  underftood. 

Here  I  might  fay,  that  a  Thing  is  then  faid  to,  be  necejjaryy 
when  it  mull  be,  and  cannot  be  otherwife.  .  But  this  would 
not  properly  be  a  Deiinition  of  NeceiTit)',  or  an  Explana- 
tion of  the  Word,  any  more  than  if  I  explain'd  the  Word 
nmji^  by  there  being  a  Neceffity.  The  Words  mujiy  can^ 
and  cannot^  need  Explication  as  m.uch  as  the  Words  neceffary^ 
and  unpojfihle  -,  excepting  that  the  former  are  Words  that 
Children  commonly  ufe,  and  know  fomething  of  the  Mean- 
ing; of  earlier  than  the  latter. 


'& 


The  Word  yieceffary^  as  ufed  in  common  Speech,  is  a  rela- 
tive Term  ;  and  relates  to  fome  fuppofed  Oppofition  made 
to  the  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  fpoken  of,  which  is  overcome, 
or  proves  in  vain  to,  hinder  or  alter  it.  That  is  neceffary,  ia 
the  original  and  proper  Senfe  of  the  Word,  which  is,  or  will 
be,  notwithftanding  all  fuppofable  Oppofition.  To  fay,  that 
a  Thing  is  neceffary,  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  that  it  is 
impoITible  ihould  not  be  :  But  the  Word  impojfible  is  mani- 
feftly  a  relative  Term,  and  has  Reference  to  fuppofed  Power 
exerted  to  bring  a  Thing  to  pais,  which  is  infufficient  for  the 
Effea  ;  As  the  Word  utiable  is  relative,  and  has  Relation  to 
Ability  or  Endeavour  which  is  infufficient  ;  and  as  the 
Word  Irrefifiahle  is  relative,  and  has  always  Reference  to 
Refiftance  which  is  made,  or  may  be  made  to  fome  Force 
or  Power  tending  to  an  Eflfe6t,  and  is  infufficient  to  withftand 
the  Power,  or  hinder  the  EfFecl.  The  common  Notion  oi^ 
Neceffity  and  Impoffibility  implies  fomething  that  fruftrates 
Endeavour  or  Deiirc, 

Here 


14  7^^  Nature  Part  L 

Here  feveral  Things  are  to  be  noted. 

1.  Things  arefaid  to  be  neceflary  in  general^  which  are  or 
will  be  notwithftanding  any  fuppofable  Oppofition  from  us  or 
othersy  or  from  whatever  Quarter.  But  Things  are  faid  to  be 
neceflaiy  to  us,  which  are  or  will  be  notwithftanding  all  Op- 
pofition fuppofable  in  the  Cafe  from  us.  The  fame  may  be 
obferved  of  the  Word  impofftble^  and  other  fuch  like  Terms. 

2.  Thefe  Terms  necejfary,  impojfible,  irrefijiihle  Sec,  do  efpeci- 
ally  belong  to  the  Controverfy  about  Liberty  and  moral  A- 
gency,  as  ufed  in  the  latter  of  the  two  Senfes  now  mention'd, 
viz.  as  neceffary  or  impoffible  to  us,  and  with  Relation  to  any 
fuppofable  Oppofition  or  Endeavour  of  ours. 

3.  As  the  Word  Necejftty,  in  it's  vulgar  and  common  Ufe, 
is  relative,  and  has  always  Reference  to  fome  fuppofable  in- 
fufficient  Oppofition  ;  fo  when  we  fpeak  of  any  Thing  as  ne- 
ceffary to  us,  it  is  with  Relation  to  fome  fuppofable  Oppofition 
of  our  TVills,  or  fome  voluntary  Exertion  or  Effort  of  ours  to 
the  contrary.  For  we  don't  properly  make  Oppofition  to 
an  Event,  any  otherwife  than  as  we  voluntarily  oppofe  it. 
Things  are  faid  to  be  what  mujl  be,  or  necejfarily  are,  as  to  us, 
^htn  they  are,  or  will  be,  tho'  we  defire  or  endeavour  the 
contrary,  or  try  to  prevent  or  remove  their  Exiftence  :  But 
fuch  Oppofition  of  ours  always  either  confifts  in,  or  implies 
Oppofition  of  our  Wills. 

^Tis  manifeft  that  all  fuchlike Words  &  Phrafes,  as  vulgarly 
ufed,  are  ufed  and  accepted  in  this  Manner.  A  Thing  is 
faid  to  be  neceffary,  when  we  can't  help  it,  let  us  do  what  we 
will.  So  any  Thing  is  faid  to  be  impoffible  to  us,  when  we 
would  do  it,  or  would  have  it  brought  to  pafs,  and  endea- 
vour it ;  or  at  leaft  may  be  fuppofed  to  defire  and  feek  it ; 
but  all  our  Defires  and  Endeavours  are,  or  would  be  vain. 
And  that  is  faid  to  be  irrefiflibk,  which  overcomes  all  our 
Oppofition,  Refiftance,  and  Endeavour  to  the  contrary.  And 
we  are  to  be  faid  Unable  to  do  a  Thing,  when  our  fuppofable 
Defires  and  Endeavours  to  do  it  are  infufficient. 

We  are  accuftomed,  in  the  common  Ufe  of  Language,  to 
apply  &  underftand  thefe  Phrafes  in  this  Senfe  :  We  grow  up 
t^ith  fuch  a  Habit  j  which  by  the  daily  Ufe  of  thefe  Terms, 
in  fuch  a  Senfe,  from  our  Childhood,  becomes  fix'd  and 
fettled  }  fo  that  the  Idea  of  a  Relation  to  a  fuppofed  W^iil, 
Defire  and  Endeavour  of  ours,    is  ftrongly  conne<5ted  with 

thefe 


SedJII.  r/'Neceflity.  15 

thefe  Terms,  and  naturally  excited  in  our  Minds,  whenever 
we  hear  the  Words  ufed.  Such  Ideas,  and  thefe  Words>  are 
fo  united  and  aflbciated,  that  they  unavoidably  go  together  ; 
one  fuggefts  the  other,  and  carries  the  other  with  it,  and  ne-- 
ver  can  be  feparated  as  long  as  we  live.  And  if  we  ufe  the 
Words,  as  Terms  of  Art,  in  another  Senfe,  yet,  unlefs  we 
are  exceeding  circumfpe6t  and  wary,  we  fhall  infenfibly  flide 
into  the  vulgar  Ufe  of  them,  and  fo  apply  the  Words  in  a  very 
inconfiftent  Manner  :  this  habitual  Connexion  of  Ideas  will 
deceive  &  confound  us  in  ourReafonings  &  DifcourfeSjwhere- 
in  we  pretend  to  ufe  thefe  Terms  in  that  Manner,  as  Terms 
of  Art. 

4.  It  follows  from  what  has  been  obferved,  that  when  thefe 
Terms  neceffary^  impojfible^  irreJi/Uhle^  imahle  kc.  are  ufed  in 
Cafes  wherein  no  Oppofition,  or  infufficient  Will  or  Endea- 
vour, is  fuppofed,  or  can  be  fuppofed,  but  the  very  Nature  of 
the  fuppofed  Cafe  it  felf  excludes  and  denies  any  fuch  Oppofi- 
tion,Will  orEndeavour  ;  thefeTerms  are  then  not  ufed  in  their 
proper  Signification,  but  quite  befide  their  Ufe  in  common 
Speech.  The  Heafon  is  m.anifeft  ;  namely,  that  in  fuch 
Cafes,  we  can't  ufe  the  Words  with  Reference  to  a  fuppofa- 
ble  Oppofition,  Will  or  Endeavour.  And  therefore  if  any 
Man  ufes  thefe  Terms  in  fuch  Cafes,  he  either  ufes  them 
nonfenfically,  or  in  fome  new  Senfe,  diverfe  from  their  ori- 
ginal and  proper  Meaning.  As  for  Inftance  ;  If  a  Man  fhould 
affirm  after  this  Manner,  That  it  is  neceffary  for  a  Man,  and 
what  muft  be,  that  a  Man  fliould  chufe  Virtue  rather  than 
Vice,  during  the  Time  that  he  prefers  Virtue  to  Vice  5  and 
that  it  is  a  Thing  impoffible  and  irrefiftablc,  that  it  fliouid  be 
otherwife  than  that  he  fhould  have  this  Choice,  fo  long  as  this 
Choice  continues  ;  fuch  a  Man  would  ufe  thefe  Terms  mu/^p 
irrejijiible  Sec.  v/ith  perfe<5t  Infignificence  and  Nonfenfe,  or  in 
fome  new  Senfe,  diverfe  from  their  common  Ufe  ;  which  is 
with  Reference,  as  has  been  obferved,  to  fuppofable  Oppo- 
fition, Unwiilingnefs  and  Refiftance  ;  whereas,  here,  the  very 
Suppofition  excludes  and  denies  any  fuch  Thing  ;  for  the 
Cafe  fuppofed  is  that  of  being  willing,  and  chufmg. 

5.  It  appears  from  what  has  been  faid,  that  thefe  Terms 
necejfary^  hnpoffihk  &c.  are  often  ufed  by  Philofophers^  and  Me- 
taphyficians  in  a  Senfe  quite  diverfe  from  their  common  Ufe 
and  original  Signification  :  For  they  apply  them  to  many 
Cafes  in  which  no  Oppofition  is  fuppofed  or  fuppofable.  Thus 
they  ufe  them  with  Refpedl  to  God's  Exiftence  before  tha 
Creation  of  the  World,  when  there  was-  no  pther  Being  but 

He; 


'1 6  The  Nature  ■  Part  L 

He  :  fo  with  regard  to  many  of  the  Difpofitlons  and  A<5ls  oif 
-the  divine  Being,  fuch  as  his  loving  Himfelf,  his  loving 
•Righteoufners,  hating  Sin  &c.  So  they  apply  thefe  Terms  to 
many  Calcs  ot  the  Inclinations  and  Adions  of  created  intel- 
ligent Beings,  Angels  and  Men  \  wherein  all  Oppofition  of 
the  Will  is  fliut  out  and  denied,  in  the  very  Suppofition  of 
the  Caie.     • 

MefapJjyfical  or  Philofophkal  NecefTity  is  nothing  different 
from  their  Certainty.  I  fpeak  not  now  of  the  Certainty  of 
Knowledge,  but  the  Certainty  that  is  in  Things  themfelves, 
which  is  the  Foundation  of  the  Certainty  of  the  Knowledge 
of  them  ;  or  that  wherein  lies  the  Ground  of  the  Infallibility 
of  the  Proportion  which  affirms  them. 

What  is  fometimes  given  as  the  Definition  of  Philofophical 
NecelTity,  namely.  That  by  which  a  Thing  cannot  but  be, or  whereby 
it  cajinot  be  otherwifey  fails  of  being  a  proper  Explanation  of  it, 
on  two  Accounts  :  i^fV/?,  the  Words  Ca?2,  or  Cannot,  need 
Explanation  as  much  as  the  Word  Necejjity  ;  and  the  former 
may  as  well  be  explained  by  the  latter,  as  the  latter  by  the 
former.  Thus,  if  any  one  afked  us  what  we  mean,  when  we 
fay,  a  Thing  cannot  but  be,  we  might  explain  our  felves  by  fay- 
ing, we  mean,  it  muft  neceffarily  be  fo  ;  as  well  as  explain 
Neceirity,by  faying,it  is  that  by  which  aThing  cannot  but  be. 
And  Secondly,  this  Definition  is  liable  to  the  fore-mention'd 
great  Inconvenience  :  The  Words  cannot,  or  unable,  are  pro- 
perly relative,  and  have  Relation  to  Power  exerted,  or  that 
may  be  exerted,in  order  to  the  Thing  Ipoken  of;  to  which,as 
I  have  now  obferved,  the  Word  Necejjity,  as  ufed  by  Philofo- 
phers,  has  no  Reference. 

Philofophical  Neceffity  is  really  Nothing  elfe  than  the  full 
and  fix'd  Connexion  between  the  Things  iignified  "hy  the 
^ubje(^  ^TPredicate  of  a  Propofition» which  affirms  Something 
jo  he  true.  TVlien  there" is  luch  a  Connediou,then  theThing 
affirmed  in  the  Propofition  is  neceiTary,  in  a  Philofophical 
Senfe  ;  whether  any  Oppofition,  or  contrary  Effort  be  fup- 
pofed,  or  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe,  or  no.  When  the  Subject 
and  Predicate  of  the  Propofition,  which  affirms  the  Exiftence 
of  any  Thing,  either  SublIance,Quality,  A(5t  or  Circumftance, 
have  a  full  and  certain  Connexion,  then  the  Exiftence  ot 
Being  of  that  Thing  is  faid  to  be  neceffary  in  a  metaphyfical 
Senfe.  And  in  this  Senfe  I  ufe  the  Word  Necejjity,  in  the  fol- 
lowing Difcourfe,  when  I  endeavour  to  prove  that  Neceffity  is 
not  iiiconjj/ifnt  with  Liberty, 

The 


Sea.IJI.  of  Neceffity.  17 

The  Subje6t  and  Predicate  of  a  Pfopofitioa,  which  affirms 
Exiftence  of  Something,  may  have  a  full,  iixd,  and  certain 
Connection  fever al  Ways. 

(i.)  They  may  have  a  full  and  perfe^  CdnnecStidn  m  and 
sfthemfehjes  j  becaufe  it  may  imply  a  Contradiaion,  or  grofs 
Abfurdity,  to  fuppofe  them  not  conneded.  Thus  many 
Things  are  neceffary  in  their  owti  Nature.  So  the  eternal 
Exiftence  of  Being  generally  confidered,  is  necefTary  In  itfilf: 
becaufe  it  would  be  in  it  felf  the  gfeareft  Abfurdity,  to  deny 
the  Exiftence  of  Being  in  general,  or  to  fay  there  was  abfo- 
lute  and  univerfal  Nothing  ;  and  is,  as  it  were  the  Sum  of  all 
Contradiaions  ;  as  might  be  ftieWn,  if  this  were  a  proper 
Place  for  it.  So  God's  Infinity,  and  other  Attributes  are 
riecefiary.  So  it  is  necefiary  in  its  otvn  Nature,  that  two  and 
two  fliould  be  four  ;  and  it  is  neceffary,  that  all  fight  Linej 
drawn  from  the  Center  of  a  .  Circle"  to  the  Circumference 
ft-.ould  be  equal.  It  isneceffaryj  fit  andfuitable,  that  Meri, 
(hould  do  to  others,  as  they  would  'thlt  they  iliouid  do  to 
them.  So  innumerable  Metaphyfical  and  Mathematical 
Truths  are  neceffary  in  Themfdves  j'The  Subj eft  and  Predicate 
of  the  Propofition  w  hich  affirms  theiii,  are  perfqdly  conneacd 
cfthe?nj elves,       '  "  '  '     ': 

(2.)  The  Connedion  of  the  Subje(5l  and  Predicate  of  ai 
Proportion,  which  affirms  the  Exiftence  of  Something,  may 
be  tix'd  and  made  certain,  becaufe  the  Exiftence  of  that 
Thing  is  already  come  to  pafs  ;  and  either  now^  is,  or  has 
been  ;  and  To  has  as  it  were  made  fure  of  Exiftence.  And 
therefore,  the  Propofition  which  affirms  prefent  and  paft  Ex- 
iftence of  it,  may  by  this  Meaiis  be  mlde  certain,  and  ne- 
ceffirily  and  unalterably  true  ;  the  paft  Event 'has  fix'd  and 
decided  the  Matter,  as  to  it's  Exiftence  ;  and  has  made  it 
impoflible  but  that  Exiftence  (hould  be. truly  predicated  of  if. 
Thus  the  Exiftence  of  whatever  is  already  come  to  pafs,  i| 
liow  become  neceffary  ;  'tis  become  impoffible  it  fhould  bet 
othcrwife  thaii.  true,  that  fudh  a  Thing  has  been* 

(3.)  The"^^t^^'^a-?(d  ffedicate  of  at  Propofition  which 
affirms  Something  to  be,,  may  have  a  real  and  certain  Con- 
fieaioh  confequeniially  ;  and  fo  the  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  may 
be  confequentially  neceffary  ;  as  it  may  b^  furely  and  lirmly; 
cdnneded  with  fomething  ehe,  that  is  neceffar}^  in  one  of 
the  former  Refpcds!  As  it  is  either  fully  and  thoroughly 
conuedcd  with  that  which  is  abfdlutely  neceffai^  in.  its   owrt 

C    '  Nature, 


i8  The  Nature  Part  L 

Njitufe,'6r  with  fomething  which  has  already  received  and 
made  furc  of  Exiftence:  This  Neceffity  hes /«,  or  may  be 
explained  by  the  Connexion  of  two  or  more  Propofitions  one 
with  another,  lliings  which  are  perfedly  conneded  with 
other  Things  that  are  neceilary,  are  neceflaryThemfelves,  by 
a  NecefTity  of  Confequence. 

And  here  it  may  be  obferved,  that  all  Things  which  are 
future,  or  which  will  hereafter  begin  to  be,  which  can  be 
faid  to  be  neceirary,are  neceiTary  only  in  this  laft  Way.  Their 
Exiftence  is  not  neceflary  in  it  felf  ;  for  if  fo,  they  always 
would  have  exifted.  Nor  is  their  Exiftence  become  ne- 
ceiiarv  by  being  made  fure,  by  being  already  come  to  pafs. 
Therefore,  the  only  Way  that  any  Thing  that  is  to  come  to 
pafs  hereafter,  is  or  can  be  neceffary,  is  by  a,  Conne6Hon 
with  fomething  that  is  neceffary  in  it's  own  Nature,  or  fome- 
thing that  already  is,  or  has  been  ;  fa  that  the  one  being 
fuppofed,  the  other  certainly  follows.  And  this  alfo  is  the 
only  Way  that  all  Things  paft,  excepting  thofe  which  were 
from  Eternity,  could  be  neceffary  before  they  came  to  pafs^  or 
could  ccme  to  pafs  neceffarily  j  and  therefore  the  only  Way 
in  which  any  Effefl  or  Event,  or  any  Thing  whatfoever  that 
ever  has  had,  or  will  have  a  Beginning,  has  come  into  Being 
neceffarily,  or  will  hereafter  neceffarily  exift.  And  therefore 
this  is  the  Neceffity  which  efpecially  belongs  to  Contraverfies 
about  the  Ads  of  the  Will, 

It  may  be  of  fome  Ufe  in  thefe  Controverftes,  further  to 
obferye  concerning  ?Nefaphy/ical'NcceiT\ty^  that  (agreable  to  the 
Diftinftion  before  obferved  of  Neceffity,  as  vulgarly  under- 
fcood)  Things  that  exift  may  be  faid  to  be  neceffary,  either 
Vi\th  2.  general  or  particular  Neceffity.  The  Exiftence  of  a 
Idling  may  be  faid  to  be  neceftary  witli  a  general  Neceftlty, 
when  all  Things  whatfoever  being  conlidered,  there  is  a 
f^oundation  for  Certainty  of  their  Exiftence  ;  or  when  ii> 
the  moft  general  and  univerfal  View  of  Things,  the  Subjecfl 
and  Predicate  of  the  Propolition,  which  affirms  its  Exift- 
ence, would  appear  with  an  infallible  Conne6lion. 

,  An  Event,  or  the  Exiftence  of  a  Thing,  may  be  faid  to  be 
neceffary  with  a  particular  Neceffity,  or  with  Regard  to  a  par- 
ticular Perfon,  Thing  or  Time,  when  Nothing  that  can  be 
taken  into  Confideration,  in  or  about"  that  Perfon,  Thing 
or.  Time,  alters  the  Cafe  at  all,  as  to  the  Certainty  of  that 
Eyent>  or  the  Exiftence  of  that  Thing  j  or  can  be  of  any 
*  "  AccouiU 


ScdJII.  c/NeccfTity.  19 

Account  at  all,  in  determining  the  Infallibility  of  the  Con- 
rkec!:lion  of  the  Subjed  and  Predicate  in  the  Propofition  which 
affirms  the  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  ;  fo  that  it  is  all  one,  as 
to  that  Perfon,  or  Thing,  at  leaft,  at  that  Time,  as  if  the 
Exiftence  were  necefTary  with  a  NeceiTity  that  is  moft  urn- 
verfal  and  <^hfolute.  Thus  there  are  many  Things  that  H ap- 
peal to  particular  Peribns,  which  they  have  no  Hand  in,  and 
in  ihe  Exiftence  of  which  noWiil  of  theirs  has  any  Concern, 
at  leaft,  at  that  Time  ;  which,  whether  they  are  ne- 
ceflar)^  or  not,  with  Regard  to  Things  in  general,  yet  are  ne- 
ceflary  to  them,  and  with  Regard  to  any  Volition  of  theirs 
at  that  Time  ;  as  they  prevent  all  A(5ls  of  the  Will  about: 
the  Affair.  —  I  fliall  have  Occafion  to  apply  this  Obferva- 
tion  to  particular  Infrances  in  the  following  Difcourfe.— Whe- 
ther the  fame  Things  that  are  neceflary  with  3.  particular  Ne- 
ccfiity,  be  not  alfo  necclTary  with  a  ^<?/7^r^/ NeceiTity,  may  be 
a  Matter  of  future  Confideration.  Let  that  be  as  it  will,  it 
alters  not  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  Ufe  of  this  Diftinclion  of 
the  Kinds  of  Neceffity. 

Thefe  Things  may  be  fufficient  for  the  explaining  of  the 
Terms  Necejfary  and  Kccejftty^  as  Terms  of  Art,  and  as  often 
ufed  by  Metaphyficians,  and  controverfial  Writers  inDivinity, 
in  a  Senfe  diverfe  from,  and  more  extenfive  than  their  origi- 
nal Meaning,  in  common  Language,  which  was  before  ex- 
plain'd. 


What  has  been  faid  to  Ihew  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms 
NeccJJary  and  Necejfity^  may  be  fufficient  for  the  Explaining  of 
the  oppofiteTerm.s,  hnpoffiblc  and  Impojjibil'ity.  For  tliere  is  no 
Difference,  but  only  the  latter  are  negative,  and  the  former 
pofitive.  Impojjibility  is  the  fame  as  negative  Neceffity^  or  a 
NecefTity  that  a  Thing  fliould  not  be.  And  it  is  ufed  as  a 
Term  of  Art  in  a  like  Diverfity  from  the  original  and  vulgar 
Meaning,   with  Neceffity. 

The  fame  may  be  obferved  concerning  the  Words  Unahky 
and  Inability.  It  has  been  obferved,  that  thefeTerms,  in  their 
original  and  common  Ufe,  have  Relation  to  Will  and  En- 
deavour, as  fuppofable  in  the  Cafe,  and  as  infufncient  for 
the  bringing  to  pafs  the  Thing  will'd  and  endeavoured.  But 
as  thefe  Terms  are  often  ufed  by  Philofophers  and  Divines, 
efpecially  Writers  on  Controverfies  about  Free-Wili,  they 
are  ufed  in  a  quite  different,  and  far  more  extenfive  Senfe  i 
and  are  applied  to  many  Cafes  wherein    no  Will  or   Endea- 

C  2  vour 


.20  0/"  natural  and  Part  !• 

voiir  for  the  bringing  of  the  Thing  to  pafs,  is  or  can  be  fup- 
pofec,  but  is  adualiy  denied  and  excluded  in  the  Nature  of 
the  C^fe. 

As  the  Words  necejjary^  impojfihle ^unable  Sec.  are  ufed  by  pole- 
mic Writers,  in  a  Senfe  diverfe  from  their  common  Significa- 
tion, the  hke  has  happen'd  to  the  Term  Contingent.  Any 
7'hing  is  faid  to  be  contingent,  or  to  come  to  pafs  by  Chance, 
or  Accident,  in  the  original  Meaning  of  fuch  Words,  when 
its  Conne6lion  with  its  Caufes  or  Antecedents,  according  to 
the  eftablifti'd  Courfe  of  Things,  is  not  difcerned  ;  and  fo 
is  what  we  have  no  Means  of  the  Forelight  of.  And  efpe- 
cially  is  any  Thing  faid  to  be  contingent  or  accidental  with 
regard  to  us,  when  any  Thing  comes  to  pafs  that  we  are  con- 
cerned in,  as  Occafions  or  Subjeds,  without  our  Foreknow- 
ledge, and  befide  our  Defign  and  Scope. 

But  the  Word  Contingent  is  abundantly  ufed  in  a  very  diffe- 
rent Senfc  ;  not  for  That  whofe  ConnecStion  with  the  Series  of 
Things  we  can't  difcern,  fo  as  to  forefee  the  Event  ;  but  for 
fomething  which  has  abfolutely  no  previous  Ground  or  Rea- 
fon,  with  v.hich  it's  Exillence  has  any  iix'd  and  certaui  Con- 
ne<5tion. 


Section     IV. 

Of  the  DiJlinSlion  of  natural  afid  moral 
Neceffity,  ^W  Inability. 

THAT  NccefTity  which  has  been  explained,  confifting  in 
an  infallible  Connexion  of  the  Things  fignified  by  the 
Subjed  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition,    as    intelligent 
Beings  arc  the  Subjeds  of  it,   is   diftinguilh'd  into  moral  and 
natural  Necellity. 

I  fhall  not  novv'  ftand  to  enquire  whether  this  Diftincflion  be 
a  proper  and  perfea  Diflin6ticn  ;  but  fliall  only  explain  how 
thefe  two  Sorts  of  Neceffity  are  underftood,  as  the  Terms  are 
fometimcs  ufed,   and    as  they  arc   ufed  in  the  following  Dif- 

tX'Urfe.  •       ■         • 

Th9 


Sefl.  IV.  moral  Neceffity.  2t 

The  Phrafe,  moral  Necejity^  is  ufed  varioudy  :  fometimes  'tis  ■ 
ufed  for  a  Neceffity  of  moral  Obligation.  So  we  fay,a  Man  is 
under  Neceffity,  when  he  is  under  Bonds  of  Duty  and  Con-- 
fcience,  which  he  can't  be  difcharged  from.  So  the  Word 
Neceffity  is  often  ufed  for  great  Obligation  in  Point  of  Intereft. 
Sometimes  by  moral  Neceffity  is  meant  that  apparent  Con- 
nedlion  of  1  hings,  which  is  the  Ground  of  ?noral  Evidence  ; 
and  fo  is  diftinguifh'd  from  abfohite  Neceffity^  or  that  fure  Con^ 
necftion  of  Things,  that  is  a  Foundation  for  infallible  Certainty, 
In  this  Senfe,  moral  Neceffity  fignihes  much  the  fame  as  that 
high  Degree  of  Probability,  which  is  ordinarily  fufficicnt  to 
fatisfy,  and  be  relied  upon  by  Mankind,  in  their  Condud  and 
Behaviour  in  the  World,  as  they  would  confult  their  own 
Safety  and  Intereft,  and  treat  others  properly  as  Members  of 
Society.  And  fometimes  by  moral  Neceffity  is  meant  that 
Neceffity  of  Connexion  &Confequence,which  arifes  from  fuch 
moral  Caufes^  as  the  Strength  of  Inclination,  or  Motives,  and 
the  Connection  which  there  is  in  many  Cafes  between  thefe, 
and  fuch  certain  Volitions  and  A6tions.  And  it  is  in  this 
Senfe,  that  I  ufe  the  Phrafe,  moral  NeceJJlty^  in  the  following 
Difcourfe. 

By  natural  Neceffity,,  as  applied  to  Men,  I  mean  fuch  Ne- 
ceffity as  Men  are  under  through  the  Force  of  natural  Caufcs  ; 
as  diihnguifh'd  from  what  are  called  moral  Caufes,  fuch  as 
Habits  and  Difpofitions  of  the  Heart,  and  moral  Motives  and 
Inducements.  Thus  Men  placed  in  certain  Circumftances, 
are  the  Subje6ls  of  particular  Senfations  by  Neceffity  :  They 
feel  Pain  when  their  Bodies  are  wounded  ;  they  fee  the  Ob- 
je6ls  prefented  before  them  in  a  clear  Light,  when  their  Eyes 
are  open'd  :  fo  they  afient  to  the  Truth  of  certain  Propofiti- 
ons,  as  foon  as  the  Terms  are  underftood  ;  as  that  two  and 
two  make  four,  that  black  is  not  white,  that  two  parallelLines 
can  never  crofs  one  another  :  fo  by  a  natural  Neceffity  Men's 
Bodies  move  downwards,  when  there  is  nothing  to  fupport 
them. 

But  here  feveral  Things  may  be  noted  concerning  thefe 
two  Kinds  of  Neceffity. 

I ,  Moral  Neceffity  may  be  as  abfolute,  as  natural  Neceffity. 
That  is,  the  Effect  may  be  as  perfectly  connected  with  its  mo- 
ral Caufe,  as  a  naturally  necelTary  Effc6t  is  with  it's  natural 
Caufe.  Whether  the  Will  in  every  Cafe  is  neceffarily  deter- 
mined by  the  ftrongeil  Motive,  or  whether  the  Will  ever 
makes  any  Refitlance  to  fuch  a  Motive,  or  can  ever  oppofe 
the  flrongert  prefent  Inclination,  or  not  ;  if  that  Matter  (hould 
be  controverted,   yet  I  fappofe  none  will  deny,   but  that,   in 


22  Of  natural  and  Part  I. 

fome  Cafes,  a  previous  Bias  and  Inclination,  or  the  Motive 
pfelentcd,  may  be  fo  powerful,  that  the  A61  of  the  Will  may 
be  certainly  and  indifTolubly  conneded  therewith.  When 
Motives  or  previous  Bias  are  very  ftrong,  all  will  allow  that 
there  is  fome  Difficulty  in  going  againft  them.  And  if  they 
■were  yet  ftronger,  the  Difficulty  would  be  ftill  greater.  And 
therefore,  if  more  were  ftill  added  to  their  Strength,  to  a  cer- 
tain Degree,  it  would  make  the  Difficulty  fo  great,  that  it 
would  be  wholly  impoffihle  to  furmount  it  ;  for  this  plain  Rea- 
fon,  becaufe  whatever  Power  Men  may  be  fuppofed  to  have 
to  furmount  Difficulties,  yet  that  Power  is  not  infinite  ;  and  fo 

foes  not  beyond  certain  Limits.  If  a  Man  can  furmount  ten 
)egrees  of  Difficulty  of  this  Kind,  with  twenty  Degrees  of 
Strength,  becaufe  the  Degrees  of  Strength  are  beyond  theDe- 
grees  of  Difficulty  ;  yet  if  the  Difficulty  be  increafed  to  thirty, 
or  an  hundred,  or  a  thoufand  Degrees,  and  his  Strength  not 
alfo  increafed,  his  Strength  will  be  wholly  infufficient  to  fur- 
mount the  Difficulty.  As  therefore  it  muft  be  allowed,  that 
there  may  be  fuch  a  Thing  as  a  fure  and  perfeSf  Conne6tion 
between  moral  Caufes  and  Effiscfts  ;  fo  this  only  is  what  I  call 
by  the  Name  of  msral  NeceJJity. 

2.  V/hen  I  ufe  this  Diftindion  of  moral  and  yiatural  Ne- 
ifjfuy^  I  would  not  be  underftood  to  fuppofe,  thr^t  if  any 
'Ihing  comes  to  pafs  by  the  former  Kind  of  Neceffity,  the 
'Nature  of  Things  is  not  concerned  in  it,  as  well  as  in  the 
latter.  I  don't  mean  to  detcrmine,that  when  a  moral  Habit  or 
Motive  is  fo  ftrong,  that  the  A(5l  of  the  Will  infallibly  follows, 
this  is  not  owing  to  the  Nature  of  Things.  But  thefe  are  the 
Names  that  thefe  two  Kinds  of  Necellity  have  ufually  been 
called  by  ;  and  they  muft  be  diftinguiftied  by  fome  Names  or 
other  ;  for  there  is  a  Diftindion  or  Diff'erence  between  them, 
that  'is  very  important  in  its  Confequences.  Which  Diffe- 
rence does  not  lie  fo  much  in  theNature  of  the  ConneSiion^-SiS  in 
the  two  Terms  connected.  The  Caufe  with  which  the  Effe^ 
is  connecfted,  is  of  a  particular  Kind  ;  vix.  that  which  is  of  a 
moral  Nature  ;  either  fome  previous  habitual  Difpofition,  or 
fome  Motive  exhibited  to  the  Underftanding.  And  the  Effect 
is  alfo  of  a  particular  Kind  j  being  likewife  of  a  moral  Nature  ; 
confifting  in  fome  Inclination  or  Volition  of  the  Soul,  or  vo- 
luntary Adion. 

I  fuppofe,  that  Neceffity  which  is  called  natural,  in  Diftinc- 
tion  from  fnoral  Neceffity,  is  fo  called,  becaufe  7neer  Nature,  as 
the  Word  is  vulgarly  ufed,   is  concerned,  without  any  Thing 

oi 


Sed.  IV.  moral  Neceffity.  23 

of  Choice.  The  Word  Nature  is  often  ufed  In  Oppofition  to 
Choice  ;  not  becaufe  Nature  has  indeed  never  any  Hand  in  our 
Choice .;  But  this  probably  comes  to  pafs  by  Means  that 
we  firft  get  our  Notion  of  Nature  from  that  difcernable  and 
obvious  Courfe  of  Events,  which  we  obCerve  in  many  Things 
that  our  Choice  has  no  Concern  in  ;  and  efpecially  in  the 
material  World  ;  which,  in  very  many  Parts  of  it,  wc  eafily 
perceive  to  b€  in  a  fettled  Courfe  ;  the  ftated  Order  and  Man^ 
ner  of  Succeflion  being  very  apparent.  But  where  we  don't 
readily  difcern,  the  Rule  and  Connexion,  (tho*  there  be  a 
Connexion,  according  to  an  eftablifli'd  Law,truly  takingPlace) 
we  fignify  the  Manner  of  Event  by  fome  other  Name,  Eveii 
in  many  Things  which  are  feen  in  the  material  and  inanimate 
World,  v/hich  don't  difcernably  and  obvioufly  come  to  pafs 
according  to  any  fettled  Courfe,  Men  don't  call  the  Maimer 
of  the  Event  by  theName  of  Nature .,huthy  fuchNames  asy/m- 
dent^^Chaticefimtingeme  kc.  So  Men  make  aDiftindion  between 
Nature  and  Choice  ;  as  tho'  they  were  compleatly  and  uni- 
verfally  diftind.  Whereas,  I  fuppofe  none  will  deny  but  that 
Choice,  i?i  many  Cafes,  arifes  from  Nature,  as  truly  as  other 
Events.  But  the  Dependance  &  Connection  between  A61:s  of 
Volition  or  Choice,  and  their  Caufes,  according  to  eftablifhed 
Laws,  is  not  fo  fenfible  and  obvious.  And  we  obferve  that 
Choice  is  as  it  were  a  new  Principle  of  Motion  and  A<5tion, 
different  from  that  eftablilh'd  Law  k  Order  of  Things  which 
is  moft  obvious,  that  is  (een  efpecially  in  corporeal  and  fenfi- 
ble Things  ;  And  alfo  that  Choice  often  interpofes,  interrupts 
and  alters  the  Chain  of  Events  in  th«fe  external  Objects,  and 
caufes  'em  to  proceed  otherwife  than  they  would  do,  if  let  a-r 
lone,  and  left  to  go  on  according  to  the  Laws  of  Motion 
among  themfelves.  Hence  it  is  fpoken  of,  as  if  it  were  a 
'  Principle  of  Motion  entirely  diftind  from  Nature,  and  pro- 
perly fet  in  Oppofition  to  it.  Names  being  commonly  given 
to  Things, according  to  what  is  moft  obvious,  and  is  fuggefted 
by  what  appears  to  the  Senfes  without  Refle(5tion  &  Refearch, 

"'  3.  It  muft  be  obferved,  that  in  what  has  been  explained,  as 
fignified  by  the  Name  of  uMoral  NeceJJityy  the  Word  Necejjity  is 
not  ufed  according  to  the  original  Defign  and  Meaning  of  the 
Word  :  For,  as  was  obferved  before,  fuch  Terms  necejjhry^  int" 
pojjible,  irreftjiihle  Sic.  in  common  Speech,  and  their  moft  pro- 
per Senfe,  are  always  relative  ;  having  Reference  to  fome  fup- 
pofable  voluntary  Oppofition  or  Endeavour,  that  is  infufficient. 
But  no  fuch  Oppofition,  or  contrary  Will  and  Endeavour,  is 
fuppofable  in  the  Cafe  of  moral  Neceffity ;  which  is  a  Cer- 
tainty 


^4-  .0/*  natural  and  Parti 

tainty  of  the  Inclination  and  Will  it  felf ;  which  does  not 
admit  of  the  Suppofition  of  a  Will  to  oppofe  and  refift  it. 
For  'tis  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  the  fame  individual  Will  to  oppof^ 
it  felf,  in  its  prefent  Ad  ;  or  the  prefent  Choice  to  be  oppo- 
-fite  to,and  refifting  prefentChoice  :  as, abfurd  as  it  is  to  talk  of 
two  contrary  Motions,  in  the  fame  moving  Body,  at  the  fame 
Time.  And  therefgre, the  very  Cafe  fuppofed  never  admits 
of  any  Trial,  whether  an  oppofmg  or  refilling  Will  can  over- 
come this  Neceflity. 

What  has  been  faid  of  natural  and  moral  Neceflity,  may 
ferve  to  explain  what  is  intended  by  natural  and  moral  Inal?ir 
lity.  We  are  faid  to  be  naturally  unable  to  do  a  Thing,  w4ien 
we  can't  do  it  if  we.  will,  becaufe  what  is  moft  commonly 
called  Nature  don't,  allow  of  it,  or  becaufe  of  fome  impeding 
■Defed  or  Obstacle  that  is  extrinfic  to  the  Will  ;  either  in 
the  Faculty  of  Underftanding'j  Conftitution  of  Body,  or  ex- 
ternal Objeds.  Moral  Inability  confifis  not  in  any  of  thefe 
Things. ;  but  either  in  theWant  of  Inclination ;  or  theStrength 
of  a  contrary  Inclination  ;  or  the  want  of  fufficient  Motives  in 
View,  to  induce  and  excite  the  Act  of  theWill,orthe  Strength 
of  apparent  Motives  to  the  contrary.  Or  both  thefe  may  be 
refolved  into  one  ;  and  it  may  be  faid  in  one  Word,  that  mo- 
jal  Inability  coniifis  in  the  Oppofition  or  Want  of  Inclination. 
For  when  a  Perfon  is  unable  to  will  or  chufe  fuch  a  Thing, 
tlirough  a  Defecft  of  Motives^  or  Prevalence  of  contrary  Mo- 
tives, 'tis  the  fame  Thing  as  his  being  unable  through  the 
Want  of  an  Inclination,  or  the  Prevalence  of  a  contrary  Incli- 
nation, in  fuch  Circumftancep,and  under  the  Influence  of  fucli 
Views.  .:     .?  V    .: 

-    To  give  fome  Infl:ances  of  this  7nQral  Jnabllity, A  Woman 

of  great  Honour  and  Chaflity  may  have  a  moral  Inability  to 
proftitute  her  felf  to  her  Slave.  A  Child  of  great  Love  and 
Duty  to  his  Parents,  may  b^e  unable  to  be  willing  to  kill  his 
Father,  '  A  very  lafcivious  Man,  in  Cafe  of  certain  Opportu-, 
nities  and  Temptations,  and  in  the  Abfence  of  fuch  and  fuch 
Restraints,  may  be  unable  to  forbear  gratifying-  his  Luft.  A 
Drunkard,  under  fuch  and  fuch  Circumftances,  may  be  una-r 
ble  to  forbear  taking  of  ftrong  Drink.  A  very  malicious 
Man  may  be  unable  to  exert  benevolent  A(5ts  to  an  Enemy,o'r 
to  defire  his  Profpcnty  :  Yea, fome  may  be  fo  under  the  Power 
of  a  vile  Difpolition,  that  they  may  be  unable  to  love  thofc 
who  are  mofl:  worthy  of  their  Efleem  &  Afi'cdion.  A  ftrong 
Habit  of  Virtue  and  great  Degree  of  Holinefs  may  caufe  a 
moral  Inability  to  love  VVickednefs  in.  general,  may  render  a 

Ma« 


1 


Sed.  IV.  moral  Inability.  25 

Man  unable  to  takeComplacence  in  wicked  Pcrfons  orThings; 
ortochufe  a  wicked  Life j  and  prefer 'it  to  a  vertuous  Lffe. 
And  on  the  other  Hand,  a  great  Degree  of  habitual  Wicked- 
ncfs  may  lay  a  Man  under  an  Inability  to  love  and  ckoofe  Ho- 
linefs  ;  and  render  him  utterly  unable  to  love  an  infinitely 
■»holy  Being,  or  to  choofe  and  cleave  to  him  as  his  chief  Good. 

-  Here  it  may  be  of  Ufe  to  obferve  this  Diftindion  of  moral 
Inabilitvs  w'z.  of  that  which  is  general  and  habitual.,  and  that 
which  is  particular  and  occaftonal.  By  a  general  and  habitual  mo- 
ral Inability,  I  mean  an  Inability  in  the  Heart  to  all  Exercifes 
or  Acls  of  Will  of  that  Nature  or  Kind,  through  a  lix'd  and 
habitual  -Inclination,  or  an  habitual  and  Itated  Defedl, 
or  Want  of  a  certain  Kind  of  Inclirtation,  Thus  a  very 
ill-natur'd  Man  may  be  unable  to  exert  fuch  Ads  of 
Benevolence,  as  another,  who  is  full  of  £:ood  Nature,  com- 
monly exerts  ;  and  a  Man,  whofe  Heart  is  habitually  void  of 
Gratitude,  may  be  unable  to  exert  fuch  and  fuch  grateful AcSIs, 
through  that  ftated  Defed  of  a  grateful  Inclination.  Byparti^ 
cular  and  occaftonal  moral  Inability,  I  mean  an  Inability  of  the 
Will  or  Heart  to  a  particular  Acl,thro'  the  Strength  or  Defecfl: 
of  prefent  Motives,  or  of  Inducem.ents  prefented   to  the  View 

of  the  Underftanding,  on  this  Occafion. If  it  be  fo,  that   the 

Will  is  always  determined  by  the  ftrongefl  Motive,  then  ifr 
mufl  always  have  an  Inability,in  this  latter  Senfe,to  a6l  other- 
wife  than  it  does  ;  it  not  being  polTible,  in  any  Cafe,  that  the 
Will  lhould,at  prefent,  go  againft  the  Motive  which  has  now, 
allThings  confidered,  the  greatell  Strength  &  Advantage  to  ex- 
cite and  induce  it.— The  former  of  thefe  Kinds  of  moral  Ina- 
bility, conlilling  in  that  which  is  ftated  habitual  and  general, 
is  moft  commonly  called  by  the  Name  of  Inability  ;  becaufe 
the  Word  Inability.,  in  its  molt  proper  and  original  Significa- 
tion, has  Refpe6t  to  fome  Jlated  Defecf.       And  this  efpecially 

obtains  the  Name  oi  Inability  alio  upon  another  Account  : 

I  before  obferved,  that  the  Word  Inability  in  its  criminal  and 
moft  common  Ufe,  is  a  relative  Term  3  and  has  Refped:  to 
Will  2nd  Endeavour,  as  fappolabie  in  the  Cafe,  and  as  in- 
fufficient  to  bring  to  pafs  the  Thing  deiired  and  endeavoured. 
Now  there  may  be  more  of  an  Appearance  h  Sh:5dov/  of  thisj 
with  Refpecl  to  the  Acts  which  arife  from  a  tixM  and  flrong 
Habit,  than  others  that  arife  only  from  tran(icnt  Occtilons  and 
Caufes.  Indeed  Will  and  Endeavour  againfl,  or  diverfe  from 
frejent  A6ts  of  the  Will,  are  in  no  Cafe  fjppofable,  vv^hether  , 
thofe  Afts  be  occafional  or  habitual  ;  for  liiat  v/ould  be  to  ^ 
fuppofe  the  "Will,  atpref:at,  to  be  othcrv/ifv^  than,   at  rref^nt,' 

D  *         ;t 


26  (ytooral  Inability.  PartJ. 

it  is.  But  yet  there  may  be  Will  and  Endeavour  againfl/«/«r/ 
A(5ts  of  the  Will,  or  Volitions  that  are  likely  to  take  Place,  as 
view'd  at  a  Diftance.  'Tis  no  Contradidion,  to  fuppofe  that 
the  A6ts  of  the  Will  at  one  Time,  may  be  againft  the  Adts 
of  the  Will  at  another  Time  ;  and  there  may  be  Defires  and 
Endeavours  to  prevent  or  excite  future  Ads  of  the  Will  ;  But 
fuch  Defires  and  Endeavours  are,  in  many  Cafes,  rendered 
infufficient  &  vain,  thro'  Fixednefs  of  Habit  :  When  the  Oc- 
cafion  returns,  the  Strength  of  Habit  overcomes,  and  baffles 
all  fucji  Oppofition.  In  this  Refpedl,  a  Man  may  be  in  mife- 
rable  Slavery  and  Bondage  to  a  ftrong  Habit.  But  it  may  be 
comparatively  eafy  to  make  an  Alteration  with  Refpe6t  to  fuch 
future  Ads,  as  are  only  occafional  and  tranfient  ;  becaufe  the 
Occafion  or  tranfient  Caufe,  if  forefeen,  may  often  eafily  be 
prevented  or  avoided.  On  this  Account,  the  moral  Inability 
that  attends  fix'd  Habits,  efpecially  obtains  the  Name  of  Ina- 
hility.  And  then,  as  the  Will  may  remotely  and  indiredly  re- 
lift  it  felf,  and  do  it  in  vain,  in  the  Cafe  of  ftrong  Habits  ;  fo 
Heafon  may  refift  prcfent  Acts  of  the  Will,  and  it's  Refiftance 
be  infufficient  ;  and  this  is  more  commonly  the  Cafe  alfo, 
"when  the  Acts  arife  from  ftrong  Habit, 

But  It  mtift  be  obferved  concerned  moral  Inability,  in  each 
Kind  of  it,  that  the  Word  Inability  is  ufed  in  a  Senfe  very  di- 
verfe  from  its  original  Import.  The  Word  fignifies  only  a 
natural  Inability,  in  the  proper  Ufe  of  it  ;  and  is  applied  to 
fuch  Cafes  only  wherein  a  prefent  Will  or  Inclination  to  the 
Thing,  with  Refped  to  which  a  Perfon  is  faid  to  be  unable, 
is  fuppofable.  It  can't  be  truly  faid,  acccrding  to  the  ordi- 
nary Ufe  of  Language,  that  a  mahcious  Man,  let  him  be 
never  fo  malicious,  can't  hold  his  Hand  from  ftriking,  or  that 
he  is  not  able  to  fliew  his  Neighbour  Kindnefs  ;  or  that  a 
Drunkard,  let  his  Appetite  be  never  fo  ftrong,  can't  keep  the 
Cup  from  his  Mouth.  In  the  ftndeft  Propriety  of  Speech,  a 
Man  has  a  Thing  in  his  Power,  if  he  has  it  in  his  Choice, 
or  at  his  Election  :  And  a  Man  can't  be  truly  faid  to  be  una* 
able  to  dti.a  Thing,  when  he  can  do  it  if  he  will,  'Tis  im- 
properly faid,  that  a  Perfon  can't  perform  thofe  external  Ac- 
tions, which  are  dependent  on  theAd  of  the  Will,  and  which 
^ould  be  eafily  performed,  if  the  Ad  of  the  Will  were  pre- 
fent. And  if  X  be  improperly  faid,  that  he  cannot  perform 
thofe  external  voluntary  Adions,  which  depend  on  the  Will, 
tis  in  fome  RefpcX^  more  improperly  faid,  that  he  is  unable  ta 
:xert  the.  Acts  of  \\q  Will  themfelves  ;  becaufe  it  is  more 
videmly  falfe,  with  ^^^efpect  to  thefe,  that  he  caiVt  if  he  will  ; 


Scd-IV.  Of  Liberty  ^;/(^  moral  Agency.  27 

Tor  to  fay  fo,  is  a  down-right  Contradiction  :  It  is  to  fay,  he 
<afit  will,  if  he  does  will.  And  in  this  Cafe,  not  only  is  it 
true,  that  it  is  eafy  for  a  Man  to  do  the  Thing  if  he  will 
but  the  very  willing  is  the  doing  ;  when  once  he  has  will'd, 
the  Thing  is  performed  ;  and  nothing  elfe  remains  to  be 
■done.  Therefore,  in  thefe  Things  to  afcribe  a  Non-perfor- 
Tti  ance  to  the  want  of  Power  or  Ability,is  not  juft  ;  becaufe  the 
Thing  wanting  is  not  a  being  ahle^  but  a  being  willing.  There 
are  Faculties  of  Mind,  and  Capacity  of  Nature,  and  every 
Thing  elfe,  fnfficient,  but  a  Difpofition  :  Nothing  is  wantin''- 
but  a  WilL  "* 


Section    V. 
Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liberty,  and  of. 
moral  Agency, 

THE  plain  and  obvious  Meaning  of  the  Words  Freedom 
and  Liberty^  in  common  Speech,  is  Poiuer,  Opportunity^ 
or  Advantage,  that  any  one  has,  to  do  as  he  pleafes.  Or  in 
other  Words,  his  being  free  from  Hindrance  or  Impediment 
in  the  Way  of  doing,  or  conducting  in  any  Refpecl,  as  he 
wills.  *  And  the  contrary  to  Liberty,  whatever  Name  we 
call  that  by,  is  a  Perfon's  being  hinder'd  or  unable  jto  con- 
duct as  he  will,  or  being  necelTitated  to  do  otherwife. 

If  this  which  I  have  mentioned  be  the  Meaning  of  the 
Word  Liberty,  in  the  ordinary  Ufe  of  Language  ;  as  I  trult 
that  none  that  has  ever  learn'd  to  talk,  and  is  unprejudiced, 
will  deny  ;  then  it  will  follow,  that  in  Propriety  of  Speech, 
neither  Liberty,  nor  it's  contrary,  can  properly  be  afcribed  ta 
any  Being  or  Thing,  but  that  which  has  fuch  a-  Faculty, 
Power  or  Property,  as  is  called  Will.  For  that  which  i.«i 
pofTeffed  of  no  fuch  Thing  as  JViU,  can't  have  any  Power  or 
Opportunity  of  doing  according  to  ifs  Will,  nor  be  necelhtated 
to  ad:  contrary  to  its  Will,  nor  be  reftrained  from  acfling  agrea- 
biy  to  it.  And  therefore  to  talk  of  Liberty,  or  the  contrary, 
as  belonging  to  the  very  Will  it  fclf,  is  not  to  fpeak  good  Senfe  ; 
if  we  judge  of  Senfe,  and  Nonfenfe,  by  the  orighial  &  proper 
Signification  of  Words.  For  the  Will  it  felf  is  not  an  Agent 
that  has  a  Will :    The   Power   of  choofing,  it  felf,  has  not  a 

D  2  Power 

*  I  fay  not  only  doing,hut  comiuBing  ;  becaufe  a  voluntary  fc^rbearing 
to  do,  fitting  ftilijkeeping  Silence  &c.are  Inftanccs  of  PerfonsCoWz^^?,  a- 
bout  whichLiberi)'  is  exercived  i  tiio'  they  are  nqt  (o  properly  calledirW//^. 


2  8         Th  Notion  «?/*  Liberty,       Parti. 

Power  of  chuTmg.  That  which  has  the  Power  of 
Volition  or  Choice  is  the  Man  or  the  Soul,  and  not 
the  Power  of  VoHtion  it  felf.  And  he  that  has  the  Li- 
berty of  doing  accordino;  to  his  Will,  is  the  Agent  or  Doer 
who  is  poffefTed  of  the  Will  ;  and  not  the  Will  which  he  is 
pofTeffed  of.  We  fay  with  Propriety,  that  a  Bird  let  loofe  has 
Power'&  Liberty  to  fly  ;  but  not  that  the  Bird's  Power  of 
flying '  has  a  Power  ^v  Liberty  of  flying.  To  be  free  is  the 
Property  of  an  Agent,  who  is  pofieflTed  of  Powers  &  Facul- 
ties, as  much  as  to  be  cunning,  valiant,  bountiful,  or  zea- 
lous. But  thefe  Qiialities  are  the  Properties  of  Men  or  Per- 
fons  ;  and  not  the  Properties  of  Properties. 

Tliere  arc  two  Things  that  are  contrary  to  this  which  is 
'  calledLiberty  in  commonSpeech.  One  is  Conjiraint  ;  the  fame 
is  otherwife  called  Force^  CoJupulftony  &  CoaSiion  ;  which  is  a 
Pel  fon's  being  necelTitated  to  do  a  Thing  contrary  to  his  Will. 
'^Phe  other  \%~Re[iramt  \  which  is  his  being  hindred,  and  not 
tiaviiig  Power  to  do  according  to  his  Will.  But  that  which 
lias  no  W^ill,  can't  be  the  Subject  of  thefe  Things.  —  I 
need  fay  the  lefs  on  this  Head,  Mr.  Locke  having  fet  the  fame 
Thing  iforth,  with  fo  great  Ciearnefs,  in  his  EJ^y  on  the  human 
XJnderJland'ing, 

But  one  Thing  more  I  would  obferve  concerning  what  is 
vulgarly  called  Liberty  ;  namely,  that  Power  h  Opportunity 
for  one  to  do  and  conduct  as  he  will,  or  according  to  his 
Choice,  is  all  that  is  meant  by  it  ;  w^ithout  taking  into  the 
Meaning  of  the  Word,  any  Thing  of  the  Caufe  or  Original 
of  that  Choice  ;  or  at  all  confidering  how  the  Perfon  came 
to  have  fuch  a  Volition  ;  whether  it  was  caufed  by  foine  ex- 
ternal Motive,  or  internal  habitual  Bias  ;  whether  it  was  de- 
term  in'd  by  fome  internal  antecedent  Volition,  or  whether  it 
happen'd  witlu)ut  a  Caufe  ;  whether  it  was  necefiarily  con-. 
nec5Vcd  with  fomething  foregoing,  or  not  conneded.  Let  the 
Perfon  come  by  his  Volition  or  Choice  how  he  will,  yet,  if 
he  is  able,  and  there  is  Nothing  in  theWay  to  hinder  his  pur- 
fuing  and  executing  his  Will,  tlic  Man  is  fully  &  perfec1:ly 
free,,  according  to  the  primary  and  commoa  Notion  of  Free- 
dom. 

What  lias  been  faid  may  be  fuflicient  to  fhew  what  is 
meant  by  Libcrtyy  according;  to  the  common  Notions  of  Man- 
kind^ arid  in  the  ufual  $i  primary  Acceptation  of  the  Word  : 
But  the  Word,  as  ufed  by  Arminlans^  Pelagians  h  others,  who 
oppofc  the  Cahinijh^  has  an  entirely  different  Signification,— 
7'hcfif;  fevcral  Things   belong  to   their  Notion  of    Liberty. 

I.  That 


'Sed.V.         and  of  moral  Agency.         29 

f>  That  it  confifts  in  a  Self-detenmning  Power  in  the  Will,  or 
a  certain  Sovereignty  the  Will  has  over  it  felf,  and  it's  own 
A6ls,  whereby  it  determines  it's  own  Volitions  ;  fo  as  not  to 
be  dependent  in  it's  Determinations,  on  any  Caufe  without 
it  felf,  nor  determined  by  any  Thing  prior   to  it's  own  A6ls. 

2.  Indifference  belongs  to  Liberty  in  their  Notion  of  it,  or  that 
the  Mind,   pre\'ious  to  the  A6t  of  Volition  be,    in  iquilibriG, 

3.  Contifigence  is  another  Thing  that  belongs  and  is  effential 
to  it  ;  not  in  the  common  Acceptation  of  the  Word,  as  that 
has  been  already  explained,  but  as  oppofed  to  all  Neceffity, 
or  any  fixed  Sz  certain  Connecflion  with  fome  previous  Ground 
or  Reafon  of  it's  Exiftence.  They  fuppofe  the  EfTence  of  Li- 
berty fo  much  to  confift  in  thefe  Things,  that  unlefs  the 
Will  of  Man  be  free  in  this  Senfe,  he  has  no  real  Free- 
dom, how  much  foever  he  may  be  at  Liberty  to  a<5l  ac- 
cording to  his  Will. 

A  moral  Jgent  is  a  Being  that  Is  capable  of  thofe  Adlions 
that  have  a  moral  Quality,  and  which  can  properly  be  de- 
nominated good  or  evil  in  a  moral  Senfe,  vertuous  or  vici- 
ous, commendable  or  faulty.  To  moral  Agency  belongs  a 
moral  Faculty^  or  Senfe  of  moral  Good  &  Evil,  or  of  fuch  a 
Thing  as  Defert  or  Worthinefs  of  Praife  or  Blame,  Re- 
ward or  Punifl-.ment  ;  and  a  Capacity  which  an  Agent  has 
of  being  influenced  in  his  A6lions  by  moral  Inducements  or 
Motives,  exhibited  to  the  View  of  Underftanding  &  Rea- 
fon, to  engage  to  a  Condu6t  agreable  to  the  moral  Faculty. 

The  Sun  is  very  excellent  &  beneficial  in  it*s  A<51:Ion  and 
Influence  on  the  Earth,  in  warming  it,  and  caufmg  it  to 
bring  forth  it's  Fruits  ;  but  it  is  not  a  moral  Agent  :  It's 
A(5tion,  tho'  good,  is  not  vertuous  or  meritorious.  Fire 
that  breaks  out  in  a  City,  and  confumes  great  Part  of  it,  is 
very  mifchievous  in  its  Operation  ;  but  is  not  a  moral  A- 
gent  :  what  it  does  is  not  faulty  or  finful,  or  deferving  of 
any  Punifliment.  The  brute  Creatures  are  not  moral  Agents  : 
the  A6lions  of  fome  of  'em  are  very  profitable  &  pleafant ; 
others  are  veiy  hurtful  :  yet,  feeing  they  have  no  moral  Fa- 
culty, or  Senfe  of  Defert,  and  don't  a6l  from  Choice  guided 
by  Underftanding,  or  with  a  Capacity  of  reafoning  and  re- 
fleding,  but  only  from  Inftincft,  and  are  not  capable  of  be- 
ing influenced  by  moral  Inducements,  their  Actions  are  not 
properly  finful  or  vertuous  ;  nor  are  they  properly  the  Sub- 
jeds  of  any  fuch  moral  Treatment  for  what  they  do,  as  mo- 
ral Agents  are  for  their  Faults  or  good  Deeds. 

Here 


3©  0/ Moral  Agency.  Part  I. 

Here  it  may  be  noted,  that  there  Is  a  circumftantial  Diffe- 
rence between  the  moral  Agency  of  a  Ruler  and  a  Subje^, 
I  call  it  drcumftantial^  becaufe  it  lies  only  in  the  Difference 
of  moral  Inducements  they  are  capabk  of  being  influen- 
ced by,  arifing  from  the  Difference  of  Circumflances.  A 
Ruler  ailing  in  that  Capacity  only,  is  not  capable  of  being 
influenced  by  a  moral  Law,  and  it's  Sanations  of  Threat- 
nings  and  Promifes,  Rewards  and  Punifliments,  as  the  SubjeSf 
is  ;  tho'  both  may  be  influenced  by  a  Knowledge  of  moral 
Good  and  Evil.  And  therefore  the  moral  Agency  of  the 
Supreme  Being,  who  a6ts  only  in  the  Capacity  of  a  Ruler  to- 
wards his  Creatures,  and  never  as  a  Subje^^  differs  in  that 
Refpedl:  from  the  moral  Agency  of  created  intelligent  Be- 
ings. God's  A6iions,  and  particularly  thofe  which  he  ex- 
erts as  a  moral  Governour,  have  moral  Qualifications,  are 
morally  good  in  the  higheft  Degree.  They  are  moft  per- 
fectly holy  &  righteous  ;  and  we  muft  conceive  of  Him  as 
influenced  in  the  higheft  Degree,  by  that  which,  above  all 
others,  is  properly  a  moral  Inducement  ;  vix,  the  moral  Good 
which  He  fees  in  fuch  and  fuch  Things  :  And  therefore  He 
is,  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe,  a  moral  Agent,  the  Source  of  all 
moral  Ability  &  Agency,  the  Fountain  and  Rule  of  ail  Ver- 
t\ie  and  moral  Good  ;  tho'  by  Reafon  of  his  being  Supreme 
over  all,  'tis  not  poffible  He  ihould  be  under  the  Influerx^  of 
Law  or  Command,  Promifes  or  Threatnings,  Rewards  or  Pu- 
nifhments,  Counfels  orWarnings.  The  effential  Qualities  of 
a  moral  Agent  are  in  God,  in  the  greateft  polfible  Perfedlion  ; 
fuch  as  Underftanding,to  perceive  the  Difference-between  mo- 
ral Good  &  Evil  ;  a  Capacity  of  difcerning  that  moral  Wor- 
thinefs  and  Demerit,  by  which  fome  Things  are  Praife-wor- 
thy,  others  defcrving  of  Blame  and  Puni{hment  ;  and  alfo 
a  Capacity  of  Choice,  and  Choice  guided  by  Underftanding, 
and  a  Power  of  ading  according  to  his  Choice  or  Pleafure,and 
being  capable  of  doing  thofe  Things  which  are  in  the  highefi: 
Senfe  Praife-worthy.  And  herein  does  very  much  conflft  that 
Image  of  God  wherein  he  made  Man,  (which  we  read  of  Gen, 
I.  26,27.  &  Chap.  IX.  6.)  by  which  God  diftinguiflied  Man 
from  the  Beafts,  viz.  in  thofe  Faculties  &  Principles  of  Na- 
ture, whereby  He  is  capable  of  moral  Agency.  Herein  very 
much  confifts  the  natural  Image  of  God  ;  as  his  fpiritual  and 
moral  Image,  wherein  Man  was  made  at  firft,  confifted  in  that 
moral  Excellency,  that  he  was  endowed  with. 

PART 


(  %t  ) 


PART     11. 

Wherein  it  is  confidered  whether  there  is 
or  can  be  any  fuch  Sort  of  Freedom  of 
Will,  as  that  wherein  Arminiam  place 
the  Eflence  of  the  Liberty  of  all  moral 
Agents ;  and  whether  any  fuch  Thing 
ever  was  or  ca7^  be  conceived  of. 


Section     L 

Shewing  the  manifejl  Inconjtjience  of  the 
Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will, 
confifting  in  the  JVilFs  felf-determining 
Power. 


H 


Aving  taken  Notice  of  thofe  Things  which  may  be 
neceffary  to  be  obferved,  concerning  the  Meaning  of 
the  principal  Terms  and  Phrafes  made  ufe  of  in  Con- 


troverfies  concerning  human  Liberty,  and  particularly  ob- 
ferved what  Liberty  is,  according  to  the  common  Language, 
and  general  Apprehenfion  of  Mankind,  and  what  it  is  as 
underftood  &  maintained  by  Arminians  ;  I  proceed  to  confider 
the  Arminian  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Will^  and  the  fup- 
pofcd  NecejQity  of  it  in  Order  to  moral  Agency,  or  in  Order 
to  any  One's  being  capable  of  Vertue  or  Viee,  aad  properly 

the 


3  2  ^e  Inconfifience  Part  II. 

the  Subjea  of  Command  or  Counfel,  Praife  or  Blame,  Pro- 
mifes  or  Threatnings,  Rewards  or  Punifhments  ;  or  whether 
that  which  has  been  defcribed,  as  the  Thing  meant  by  Li- 
berty in  common  Speech,  be  not  fufficient,  and  the  only  Li- 
berty, which  makes,  or  can  make  any  one  a  moral  Agent, 
and  fo  properly  the  Subjedt  of  thefe  Things.  In  thh  Part^  I 
ihall  confider  whether  any  fuch  Thing  be  poffible  or  concei- 
vable,as  that  Freedom  of  Will  which  Jrminians  infift  on  ;  and 
Ihall  enquire  whether  any  fuch  Sort  of  Liberty  be  neceffary 
to  moral  Agency  ^c.  in  the  next  Part. 

And  Firft  of  all,  I  (hall  confider  the  Notion  of  a  Self^ 
determining  Power  in  the  Will  :  wherein,  according  to  the 
Jrminians^  does  moft  efientially  confift  the  Will's  Freedom  ; 
and  fliall  particularly  enquire,  whether  it  be  not  plainly  ab- 
furd,  and  a  manifeft  Inconliftence,  to  fuppofe  that  the  Will  it 
felf  determines  all  the  free  A£fs  of  the  Will. 

Here  I  fhall  not  infift  on  the  great  Impropriety  of  fuch 
Phrafes,  and  Ways  of  fpeaking,  as  the  Wilts  determini?ig  it 
felf  ;  becaufe  Actions  are  to  be  afcribed ,  to  Agents,  and  not 
properly  to  the  Powers  of  Agents  j  which  improper  W^ay  of 
ipeaking  leads  to  many  Miftakes,  and  much  Confufion,  as 
Mr.  Locke  obferves.  But  I  fhall  fuppofe  that  the  Jrminians^ 
when  they  fpeak  of  the  Will's  determining  it  felf,  do  by  the 
JVill  mean  the  Soul  willing,  I  fhall  take  it  for  granted,  that 
■when  they  fpeak  of  the  Will,  as  the  Determiner,  they  mean 
the  Soul  in  the  Exercife  of  a  Power  of  Willing^  or  acSting  volun- 
tarily. I  fhall  fuppofe  this  to  be  their  Meaning,  becaufe  No- 
thing elfe  can  be  meant,  without  the  groffeft  and  plaineft  Ab- 
furdity.  In  all  Cafes,  when  we  fpeak  of  the  Powers  or  Prin- 
ciples of  Ading,  as  doing  fuch  Things,  we  mean  that  the  A- 
fents  which  have  thefe  Powers  of  ading,  do  them,  in  the 
ixercife  of  thofe  Powers.  So  when  we  fay.  Valour  fights 
courageoufly,  we  mean,  the  Man  who  is  under  the  Influ- 
ence of  Valour  fights  courageoufly.  When  we  fay.  Love 
feeks  the  Objcdt  loved,  we  mean,  the  Perfon  loving  feeks  that 
Objedt.  When  we  fay,  the  Underftanding  difcerns,  we  mean 
the  Soul  in  the  Exercife  of  that  Faculty.  So  when  it  is  faid, . 
the  Will  decides  or  determines,  the  Meaning  muft  be,  thae 
the  Perfon  in  the  Exercife  of  a  Power  of  Willing  &  Chufing, 
or  the  Soul  acting^  voluntarily,  determines. 

Therefore 


Se(S.I.     Of  Self-determining  Yovjtu       33 

Therefore,  if  the  Will  determines  all  its  own  free  A6ls, 
the  Soul  determines  all  the  free  Ads  of  the  Will  in  the  Ex- 
ercife  of  a  Power  of  Willing  and  Chuiing  ;  or^  which  is  the 
fame  Thing,  it  determines  them  of  Choice  ;  it  determines 
it's  own  AxSs  by  chuiing  it's  own  Ads.  If  the  Will  deter- 
mines the  Will,  then  Choice  orders  and  determines  the 
Choice  :  and  Ads  of  Choice  are  fubjed  to  the  Decifion, 
and  follow  the  Conduct  of  other  Ads  of  Choice.  And 
therefore  if  the  Will  determines  all  it's  own  free  Ads,  then 
every  free  Ad  of  Choice  is  determined  by  a  preceeding  Ad 
of  Choice,  chuHng  that  Ad.  And  if  that  preceeding  Ad  of 
the  Will  or  Choice  be  alfo  a  free  Ad,  then  by  thefe  Princi- 
ples, in  this  Ad  too,  the  Will  is  Self-determined  ;  that  is, 
this,  in  like  Manner,  is  an  Ad  that  the  Soul  voluntarily  chu- 
fes  ;  or  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  it  is  an  Ad  determined  ftill 
by  a  preceeding  Ad  of  the  Will,  chufing  that.  And  the  like 
may  again  be  obferved  of  the  laft  mentioned  Ad.  Which 
brings  us  diredly  to  a  Contradidion  :  for  it  fuppofes  an  Ad  of 
the  Will  preceeding  the  firft  Ad  in  the  whole  Train,  direding 
and  determining  the  reft  ;  or  a  free  Ad  of  the  Will,  before 
the  firft  free  Ad  of  the  Will.  Or  elfe  we  muft  come  at  laft 
to  anAd  of  theWill,  determining  the  confequent  Ads,wherein 
the  Will  is  not  felf-determined,  and  fo  is  not  a  free  Ad,  in 
this  Notion  of  Freedom  :  But  if  the  firft  Ad  in  the  Train,de- 
termining  and  fixing  the  reft,  be  not  free,  none  of  them  all 
can  be  free  ;  as  is  manifeft  at  firft  View,  but  fhall  be  demon- 
ftrated  prefently. 

If  the  Will,  which  we  find  governs  the  Members  of  the 
Body,  and  determines  and  commands  their  Motions  and 
Adions,  does  alfo  govern  it  felf,  and  determine  it's  own  Mo- 
tions and  Ads,  it  doubtiefs  determines  them  the  fame  Way, 
even  by  antecedent  Volitions.  The  Will  determines  which 
Way  the  Hands  and  Feet  fhall  move,  by  an  Ad  of  Volition 
or  Choice  :  and  there  is  no  other  Way  of  the  Will's  deter- 
mining, direding  or  commanding  any  Thing  at  all.  Whatio- 
ever  the  Will  commands,  it  commands  by  an  Ad  of  the  Will. 
And  if  it  has  it  felf  under  it's  Command^  and  determines  it 
felf  in  it's  own  Adions,  it  doubtiefs  does  it  the  fame  Way  that 
it  determines  other  Things  which  are  under  it's  Command. 
So  that  if  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  confifts  in  this,  that  it 
has  it  felf  and  it's  own  Adions  under  it's  Command  and 
Diredlon,  and  it's  own  Volitions  are  determined  by  it  fcif, 
k  will  follow,  that  every  free  Volition  ariles  from  another  an- 
tecedent Volition,   direding  and  commanding  that  ;    And   it 

£  that 


34     Of  Self-detenni7tingVovjtx.    Part  IL 

that  dtreaing  Volition  be  alfo  free,  in  that  alfo  the  Will  is  de- 
termined ;  that  is  to  fay,  that  directing!  Volition  is  deter- 
mined by  another  going  before  that  ;  and  fo  on,  'till  we 
come  to  the  firft  Volition  in  the  whole  Series  :  And  if  that 
firft  Volition  be  free,  and  the  Will  f elf- determined  in  it,  then 
that  is  determined  by  another  Volition  preceeding  that 
Which  is  a  Contradiction  ;  becaufe  by  the  Suppofition,  it  can 
have  none  before  it,  to  direct  or  determine  it,  being  the  firft  in 
the  Train.  But  if  that  firft  Volition  is  not  determined  by  any 
preceeding  Ad  of  the  Will,  then  that  A6t  is  not  determined 
by  the  Will,  and  fo  is  not  free,  in  the  Arm'mian  Notion  of 
Freedom,  which  confifts  in  the  Will's  Self-determination. 
And  if  that  firft  A6t  of  the  Will,  which  determines  and 
fixes  the  fubfequent  A6ts,  be  not  free,   none  of  the  following 

Acts,    which  are  determined   by   it,    can  be  free. If  we 

fuppofe  there  are  five  A6ts  in  the  Train,  the  fifth  and  laft  de- 
termined by  the  fourth,  and  the  fourth  by  the  third,  the  third 
by  the  fecond,  and  the  fecond  by  the  firft  ;  If  the  firft  is  not 
determined  by  the  Will,  and  fo  not  free,  then  none  of  them 
are  truly  determined  by  the  Will  :  that  is,  that  each  of  them 
are  as  they  are,and  not  otherwife,is  not  firft  owing  totheWill, 
but  to  the  Determination  of  the  firft  in  the  Series,  which  is  not 
dependent  on  the  Will,  and  is  that  which  the  Will  has  no 
Hand  in  the  Determination  of.  And  this  being  that  which 
decides  what  the  reft  ftiall  be,  and  determines  their  Exift- 
ence  ;  therefore  the  firft  Determination  of  their  Exiftence 
is  not  from  the  Will.  The  Cafe  is  juft  the  fame,  if  inftead 
of  a  Chain  of  five  A6ts  of  the  Will,  we  Ihould  fuppofe  a 
Succeffion  of  Ten,  or  an  Hundred,  or  ten  Thoufand.  If 
the  firft  A6t  be  not  free,  being  determined  by  fomething  out 
of  the  Will,  and  this  determines  the  next  to  be  agreeable  to 
it  felf,  and  that  the  next,  and  fo  on  ;  They  are  none  of  them 
free,  but  all  orignally  depend  on,  and  are  determined  by 
fome  Caufe  out  of  the  Will  :  and  fo  all  Freedom  in  the  Cafe 
is  excluded,  and  no  Ad  of  the  Will  can  be  free,  according 
to  this  Notion  of  Freedom.  If  we  ftiould  fuppofe  a  long 
Chain,  of  ten  Thoufand  Links,  fo  conne6ted,  that  if  the  firft 
Link  moves,  it  will  move  the  next,  and  that  the  next  ;  and  fp 
the  whole  Chain  muft  be  determined  to  Motion,  and  in  the 
Direction  of  it's  Motion,  by  the  Motion  of  the  firft  Link  ; 
and  that  is  moved  by  fomething  elfe  :  In  this  Cafe,  tho'  all 
the  Links,  but  one,  are  moved  by  other  Parts  of  the  fame 
Chain  ;  yet  it  appears  that  the  Motion  of  no  One,  nor  the 
Diredlion  of  it's  Motion,  is  from  any  Self-moving  or  Self- 
determining  Power  in  the  Chain,  any  more  than  if  every 

Link 


Seft.  II.     Some  Evafions  conjidered.  3  5 

Link  were  immediately  moved  by  fomething  that  did  not  be- 
long to  the  Chain. If  the  Will  be  not  free  in  the  firft  Act, 

which  caufes  the  next,  then  neither  is  it  free  in  the  next, 
which  is  caufed  by  that  firft  A6t  :  for  tho'  indeed  the  Will 
caufed  it,  yet  it  did  not  caufe  it  freely ;  becaufe  the  preceeding 
Acft,  by  which  it  was  caufed,  was  not  free.  And  again,  if  the 
Will  ben't  free  in  the  fecond  Ad:,  fo  neither  can  it  be  in  the 
third,  which  is  caufed  by  that  ;  becaufe,  in  like  Manner,  that 
third  was  determined  by  an  Act  of  the  Will  that  was  not  free. 
And  fo  we  may  go  on  to  the  next  Adl,  and  from  that  to  the 
next  J  And  how  long  foever  the  Succeflion  of  A6ls  is,  it  is  all 
one  ;  if  the  firft  on  which  the  whole  Chain  depends,  and 
which  determines  all  the  reft,  ben't  a  free  Ac5t,  the  Will  is 
not  free  in  caufing  or  determining  any  one  of  thofe  A6ts  ; 
becaufe  the  A(5t  by  which  it  determines  them  all,  is  not  a  free 
Ad  ;    and  therefore  the  Will  is  no  more  free  in  determining 

them,  than  if  it  did  not  caufe  them  at  all. Thus,  this  Ar^ 

fninian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  the  Will,  confifting  in  the  Will's 
Self-Determination^  is  repugnant  to  itfelfjand  (huts  it  felf  wholly 
out  of  the  World. 


Section     IL 

Several fufpofed  Ways  ^p/' evading  the  fore-- 
r4  K^^^S  R^^foningj  conjidered. 

IF  to  evade  the  Force  of  what  has  been  obferved,  it  (hould 
be  faid,  that  when  the  Arminiam  fpeak  of  the  Will's  deter- 
niining  it's  own  Ads,  they  don't  mean  that  the  Will  de- 
termines it's  A6ts  by  any  preceeding  Ad,  or  that  one  Ad  of 
the  Will  determines  another  j  but  ^only  that  the  Faculty  or 
Power  of  Will,  or  the  Soul  in  the  13  fe  of  that  Power,  de- 
termines it's  own  Volitions  ;  and  that  it  does  it  without  any 
Ad  going  before  the  Ad  determined  ;  fuch  an  Evafion  would 

be  full  of  the  moft  grofs  Abfurdity. 1  confefs,  it  is  an  Eva- 

fion  of  my  own  inventing  ;  and  I  don't  know  but  I  fnould 
wrong  the  Jrminians,  in  fuppofing  that  any  of  them  would 
make  ufe  of  it.  But  it  being  as  good  a  one  as  I  can  in- 
vent, I  would  obferve  upon  it  a  few  Things, 

E  2  Firji^ 


36  Suppofed  Evafions  Part  II. 

Firf,  If  the  Faculty  or  Power  of  the  Will  determines  aa 
A6t  of  Volition,  or  the  Sonl  in  the  Ufe  or  Exercije  of  that 
Pcu'cr,  determines  it,  that  is  the  lame  Thing  as  for  the  Soul 
to  determine  V'^olltion  by  an  Mf  of  Will.  For  an  Exerdfe  of 
the  Power  of  "^ill,  and  an  Acl  of  that  Power,  are  the  fame 
Thing.  Therefore  to  fay,  that  the  Power  of  Will,  or  the 
Soul  in  the  Vfc  or  Exemfe  of  that  Power,  determines  Voli- 
tion, without  an  y/^  of  Will  preceeding  the  Volition  deter- 
mined,  is  a  Contradi6lion. 

Strom^y  If  a  Powder  of  Will  determines  the  A(5l  of  theWill, 
then  a  Power  of  Chufmg  determines  it.  For,  as  was  before 
obfcrved,  in  every  AS:  of  Will,  there  is  Choice,  and  a  Power 
of  Willing  is  a  Power  of  Chufmg.  But  if  a  Power  of  Chufmg 
determines  the  Ad  of  Volition,  it  determines  it  by  chufmg  it. 
For  'tis  moil  abfurd  to  fay,  that  a  Power  of  Chufmg  deter- 
mines one  Thing  rather  than  another,  without  chuling  any 
Thing.  But  if  a  Power  of  Chufmg  determines  Volition  by 
chufine  it,  then  here  is  the  A6t  of  Volition  determined  by 
an  antecedent  Choice,  chufmg  that  Volition. 

77;/7yA)',  To  fay,  the  Faculty,  or  the  Soul,  determines  it's 
owm  Volition,  but  not  by  any,  A6t,  is  a  Contradiction,  Be- 
caufe  for  the  Soul  to  dire<^,  decide,  or  determine  any  Thing, 
is  to  ad  ;  and  this  is  fuppofed  ;  for  the  Soul  is  here  fpoken 
of  as  being  a  Caufe  in  this  Affair,  bringing  fomething  to 
pafs,  or  doing  fomething  ;  or,  which  is  the  lame  Thing,  ex- 
erting It  felt  in  order  to  an  Effe6t,  which  Efied  is  the  Deter- 
mination of  Volition,  or  the  particular  Kind  and  Manner  of 
an  Ati  of  Will.  But  certamiy,  this  Exertion  or  Action  is 
not  the  fame  with  the  Effe6t,  in  order  to  the  Production  of 
which  it  IS  exerted  j   but  mud  be  fomething  prior  to  it. 

J^ain,  The  Advocates  for  this  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of 
the  Wj]],  ipeak  of  a  certain  Sovereignty  in  the  Will,  whereby 
it  has  Power  to  determine  it's  own  Volitions.  And  there- 
jore  the  Determination  of  Volition  muil  itfeif  be  an  Ad  of 
the  Will  ;  ibr  otherwite  it  can  l^e  no  Exercife  of  that  fuppofed 
Power  and  Sovereignty.  ^ 

J^alti,  If  the  Will  determines  it  felf,  then  either  the  Will 
is  acYive  in  determining  it's  Volitions,  or  it  is  not.  If  it  be 
adive  in  it,  then  the  Determination  is  an  Adl  gf  the  Will  ; 
^\\d  10  there  is  one  Ad  of  the  Will  determining  another. 
But  if  the  Will  is  not  a^ii'ie  in  the  Determination,  then  how 
-     ^  does 


Sea.  II.  confidered.  37 

does  it  exerdfe  any  Liberty  in  it  ?     Thefe  Gentlemen  fuppofe 
that   the   Thing   wherein    the   Will     exerdfes   Liberty,      is 
in  it's   determining    it's    own   Ads.        But    how    can   this 
be    if  it   ben't   active  in  determining  ?     Certainly  the  Will, 
or  the  Soul,  can't  exerdfe  any  Liberty   in  that  wherein   it  dont 
aa,  or  wherein  it  don't  exerdfe  it  felf     So  that   if  either   Part 
of  this  Dilemma  be  taken,  this  Scheme   of  Liberty,  confift- 
inff  in  Self-determining  Power,   is  overthrown.     If  there   be 
an  Aa  of  the  Will  in  determining  all    it's   own   free  htXsy 
then  one  free  Aa  of  the  Will  is  determined  by  another  ;  and 
fo  we  have  the  Abfurdity  of  every  free  Aa,  even   the  very 
fir  ft,   determined  by   aforegoing  tree  Aa.     But   if  there  be 
no  Aa  or  Exercife  of  the  Will  in  determining  it  s  own  Aas, 
then   no  Liberty  is  exercifed  in   determining   them.      From 
whence  it  follows,  that  no  Liberty  confifts  in  the  Will  s  Power 
to  determine  it's  own  Aas  :  Or,    which  is  the   fame  Thing, 
that  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as  Liberty  coniifting  in  a  belt-de- 
termining Power  of  the  Will. 

If  it  (hould  be  faid,    That  altho'  it  be  true,  if  the  Soul  de- 
termines it's  own  Volitions,    it  muft  be  aaive   in   fo  doing, 
and  the  Determination  it  felf  muft  be  an  Aa  ;     yet   there  is 
no  Need  of  fuppofing  this  Aa  to  be  prior  to  the  Volition  de- 
termined i   But  the  Will  or  Soul  determines   the  Acl  of  the 
Will  in  IVilling  ;    It  determines  it's  own  Volition,   in  the  very 
Aa  of  Volition  ;  It  direas  and  limits  the   A61  of  the  Will, 
caufing  it  to  be  fo   and   not   otherwife,   in  exerting   the  Aa, 
without  any  preceeding  Aa  to  exert  that.  .  If    any  fhould  fay 
after  this  Manner,they  muft  mean  one  of  thefe  three  Things  : 
Either,  (i.j  That  the  determining  Aa,   tho'  it  be  before  the 
Aa  determined  in  the  Order  of  Nature,   yet  is  not  before  it 
in  the  Order  of  Time.     Or  (2)  That  the  determining  Aa  is 
not  before  the  Aa  determined,    either  in  the  Order   of  Time 
or  Nature,   nor  is  truly  diftina  from  it  ;     But  that  the  Soul^s 
determining  the  Aa  of  Volition   is  the  fame  Thing   with   it  s 
exerting  the  Aa  of  Volition  :    The   Mind's   exerting   fuch  a 
particular  Aa,   is    it's  caufing  and  determining  the  Aa.     Or, 
(3.)  That  Volition  has  no   Caufe,    and   is   no   Effea  ;  but 
comes  into  Exiftence,  with   fuch  a  particular  Determination, 
without  any  Ground  or  Reafon  of  it's   Exiftence   and  Deter- 
mination.  I  ftiall  confider  thefe  diftinaiy. 

(i.j  If  all  that  is  meant,  be,  that  the  determining  Aa  is 
not  before  the  Aa  determined  in  Order  of  Time,  it  will  not 
help  the  Cafe  at  all,   tho'  it  lliould  be  allowed.     If  it  be  be- 


38  Suppo/ecl  Evafions  PartIL 

fore  the  <5etfermin'd  A61  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  being  the 
Caufe  or  Ground  of  it's  Exiftenee,  this  as  much  proves  it  to 
Be  dil^in(5l  from  it,  and  independent  on  it,  as  if  it  were  be- 
fore in  the  Order  of  Time.  As  the  Caufe  of  the  particular 
Motioh  of  a  natural  Body  in  a  certain  Direcftion,  may  have 
fto  Diftance  as  to  Time,  yet  can't  be  the  fame  with  the  Mo- 
tion effeded  by  it,  but  muft  be  as  diftin6t  from  it,  as  any 
other  Gaufe,  that  is  before  it's  Effecfl  in  the  Order  of  Time  : 
as  the  Archited  is  diftindl  from  the  Houfe  which  he  builds, 
or  the  Father  diftind  from  the  Son  which  he  begets.  And  if 
the  Acfl  of  the  Will  determining  be  diftin<5l  from  the  A61  de- 
termined, and  before  it  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  then  we  can 
go  back  from  one  to  another,  'till  we  come  to  the  firil  in  the 
Series,  which  has  no  Ad  of  the  Will  before  it  in  the  Order 
of  Nature,  determining  it  ;  and  confequently  is  an  A61  not 
determined  by  the  Will,  and  fo  not  a  free  Ad,  in  this  Notion 
of  Freedom.  And  this  being  the  Acft  which  determines  all 
the  Reft,  none  of  them  are  free  Ads.  As  when  there  is  a 
Chain  of  many  Links,  the  firft  of  which  only  is  taken  hold 
of  and  drawn  by  Hand  ;  all  the  reft  may  follow  and  be  mov- 
ed at  the  fame  Inftant,  without  any  Diftance  of  Time  ;  but 
yet  the  Motion  of  one  Link  is  before  that  of  another  in  the 
Order  of  Nature  ;  the  laft  is  moved  by  the  next,  and  that 
by  the  next,  and  fo  'till  we  come  to  the  firft  ;  which  not 
being  moved  by  any  other,  but  by  fomething  diftindt  from 
the  whole  Chain,  this  as  much  proves  that  no  Part  is  moved 
by  any  Self-moving  Power  in  the  Chain,  as  if  the  Motion 
of  one  Link  followed  that  of  another  in  the  Order  of  Time. 

(2.)  If  any  ftiould  fay,  that  the  determining  Ad  is  not  be- 
fore the  determined  Ad,  either  in  the  Order  of  Time,  or  of 
Nature,  nor  is  diftinct  from  it  ;  but  that  the  Exertion  of  the 
Ad  is  the  Determination  of  the  Ad  ;  That  for  the  Soul  to 
exert  a  particular  Volition,  is  for  it  to  caufe  and  determine 
that  Act  of  Volition :  I  would  on  this  obferve,  that  the 
Thing  in  Queftion  feems  to  be  forgotten,  or  kept  out  of 
Sight,  in  a  Darknefs  and  Unintelligiblenefs  of  Speech  5  un- 
lefs  fuch  an  Objedor  would  mean  to  contradid  himfelf.  The 
very  Ad  of  Volition  it  felf  is  doubtlefs  a  Determination  of 
Mind  ;  i.  e.  it  is  the  Mind's  drawing  up  a  Conclufion,  or 
coming  to  a  Choice  between  two  Things,  or  more,  propofed 
to  it.  But  determining  among  external  ObjeSis  of  Choice,  is 
not  the  fame  with  determining  the  JSf  of  Choice  it  felf,among 
various  poffible  Ads  of  Choice.  The  Queftion  is,  What 
infiuences,  direds,  or  determines  the  Mind  or  Will  to  come 

to 


Se(3:.II.  conjidered.  39 

to  fuch  a  Conclufion  or  Choice  as  it  does  ?  or  whajt  is  the 
Cauie,  Ground  or  Reafon,  why  it  concludes  thus,  and  not 
Qtherwife  ?  Now  it  muft  be  anrwered,according  to  theyirminian 
Notion  of  Freedom,  that  the  Will  influences,  orders  ancl 
determines  it  felf  thus  to  a6t.  And  if  it  does,  I  f^y,  it  muft 
be  by  fome  antecedent  A^.  To  fay,  it  is  caufed,  influencec| 
and  determined  by  fomething,  and  yet  not  determined  by  any 
Thing  antecedent,  either  in  Order  of  Time  or  Nature,  is  a 
Contradi6tion.  For  that  is  what  is  meant  by  a  Thing's  be- 
ing prior  in  the  Order  of  Nature,  that  it  is  fome  Way  the 
Caufe  or  Reafon  of  the  Thing,  with  Refped  to  which  it  is 
faid  to  be  prior. 

If  the  particular  A(5t  or  Exertion  of  Will,  which  comes 
into  Exiftence,be  anyThing  properly  determined  at  all,then  ij 
has  fome  Caufe  of  it's  exifting,  and  of  it's  exifting  in  fuch  ^ 
particular  determinate  Manner,  and  not  another  ;  fome 
Caufe,  whofe  Influence  decides  the  Matter  :  which  Caufe  i$ 
diftindt  from  the  EfFe6l,  and  prior  to  it.  But  to  fay,  that  the 
Will  or  Mind  orders,  influences  and  determines  it  felf  to  ex- 
ert fuch  an  A6t  as  it  does,  by  the  very  Exertion  it  felf,  is  to 
make  the  Exertion  both  Cauie  &  EfFed:  j  or  the  exerting  fuch 
an  A(5t,  to  be  a  Caufe  of  the  Exertion  of  fuch  an  A6t.  Fo]^ 
the  Queftion  is.  What  is  the  Caufe  and  Reafon  of  the  Soul'^ 
exerting  fuch  an  h&i  ?  To  which  the  Anfwer  is,  the  Soul  ex- 
erts fuch  an  A(5t,and  that  is  the  Caufe  of  it.  And  fo,  by  this, 
the  Exertion  muft  be  prior  in  the  Order  of  Nature  to  it  felf, 
and  diftind  from  it  felf. 

(3.J  If  the  Meaning  be,  that  the  Soul's  Exertion  of  fuch 
a  particular  Adt  of  Will,  is  a  Thing  that  comes  to  pafs  of  it 
felf  without  any  Caufe  ;  and  that  there  is  abfolutely  no 
Ground  or  Reafon  of  the  Soul's  being  determined  to  exert 
fuch  a  Volition,  and  make  fuch  a  Choice,  rather  than  ano- 
ther ;  I  fay,  if  this  be  the  Meaning  of  Jrmimans^  when  they 
contend  fo  earneftly  for  the  Will's  determining  it's  own  Acts, 
and  for  Liberty  of  Will  confifting  in  Self-determming  Power  ; 
they  do  nothing  but  confound  Themfelves  and  others  with 
Words  without  a  Meaning.  In  the  Queftion,  fP^hat  determines 
the  JVill  f  and  in  their  Anfwer,  that  the  Will  determines  it  felf^ 
and  in  all  the  Difpute  about  it,  it  feems  to  be  taken  for  grant- 
ed, that  fomething  determines  the  W^ill  ;  and  the  Controverfy 
on  this  Head  is  not,  whether  any  Thing  at  all  determmes  it, 
or  whether  it's  Determination  has  any  Caufe  or  Foundation 
at  all  ;    But  where  the  Foundation  of  it  is,   whether  in  the 

WiU 


40  Evafions  conjidered.  Part  IL 

Will  it  felf,  or  fomewhere  elfe.  But  if  the  Thing  intended 
be  what  is  above-mention'd,  then  all  comes  to  this,  that  No- 
thing at  all  determines  the  Will  ;  Volitio  i  having  abiblutely 
no  Caufe  orFoundation  of  it'sExiflence,either  within,  or  with- 
out. There  is  a  great  Noife  made  about  Self-determining 
Power,  as  the  Source  of  all  free  A6ts  of  the  Will  :  But  when 
the  Matter  comes  to  be  explained,  the  Meaning  is,  that  no 
Power  at  all  is  the  Source  of  thefe  Ads,  neither  Self-deter- 
mining Power,  nor  any  other,  but  they  arife  from  Nothing  ; 
no  Caufe,  no  Power,  no  Influence,  being  at  all  concern'd  in 
the  Matter. 

However,  this  very  Thing,  even  that  the  free  Ads  of  the 
Will  are  Events  which  come  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe,  is  cer- 
tainly implied  in  the  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will ;  tho' 
it  be  very  inconfiftent  with  many  other  Things  in  their 
Scheme,  and  repugnant  to  fome  Things  implied  in  their  No- 
tion of  Liberty.  Their  Opinion  implies,  that  the  particular 
Determination  of  Volition  is  without  any  Caufe  ;  becaufe 
they  hold  the  free  Ads  of  the  Will  to  be  Contingent  Events  ; 
and  Contingence  is  effential  to  Freedom  in  their  Notion  of  it. 
But  certainly,  thofe  Things  which  have  a  prior  Ground  and 
Reafoa  of  their  particular  Exiftence,  a  Caufe  which  antece- 
dently determines  them  to  be,  and  determines  them  to  be 
juft  as  they  are,  don't  happen  contingently.  If  fomething 
foregoing,  by  a  caufal  Influence  and  Connedion,  determines 
and  fixes  precifely  their  coming  to  pafs,  and  the  Manner  of 
it,  then  it  don't  remain  a  contingent  Thing  whether  They 
ihali  come  to  pafs  or  no. 

And  becaufe  it  is  a  Quefl:ion,  in  many  Refpeds,  very  im- 
portant in  this  Controverfy  about  the  Freedom  of  Will, 
Whether  the  free  A6ls  of  the  Will  are  Events  which  come  to  pafs 
without  a  Caufe  ?  I  (hall  be  particular  in  examining  this 
Point  in  the  two  following  Sedions. 


SlCTJON 


Sfea^.ill.     No  Event  without  a  Caufe.    41 


Section     III. 

Whether  any  Event  whatfoeve?\andV oWtxon 
in  particular^  can  co77ie  to  pajs  without 
a  Caufe  of  it's  Exijience. 

i'r   .  ■      ■■  ,      ; 

BEfore  I  enter  on  any  Argument  on  this  Subje^,  I  would 
explain  how  I  would  be  underftood,  when  I  ufe  the 
Word  Caufe  in  this  Difcourfe  :  fince,  for  want  of  a 
better  Word,  1  fliall  have  Occafion  to  ufe  it  in  a  Senfe  which 
is  more  extenfive,  than  that  in  which  it  is  fometimes  ufed* 
The  Word  is  often  ufed  in  fo  retrained  a  Senfe  as  to  fignify 
only  that  which  has  a  pofitive  Efficiency  or  Influence  to  produce 
a  Thing,  or  bring  it  to  pafs.  But  there  are  many  Things 
tvhich  have  no  fuch  pofitive  productive  Influence  ;  which  yet 
are  Caufes  in  that  Refpe6t,  that  they  have  truly  the  Nature 
of  a  Ground  or  Reafon  why  fome  Things  are,  rather  than 
others  ;  or  why  they  are  as  they  are,  rather  than  otherwife. 
Thus  the  Abfence  of  the  Sun  in  the  Night,  is  not  the  Caufe 
of  the  falling  of  the  Dew  at  that  Time,  in  the  fame  Manner 
as  it's  Beams  are  the  Caufe  of  the  Afcending  of  the  Vapours 
in  the  Da) -Time  ;  And  it's  Withdrawment  in  the  Winter,  is 
not  in  the  fame  Manner  the  Caufe  of  the  Freezing  of  the 
Waters,  as  it's  Approach  in  the  Spring  is  the  Caufe  of  their 
Thawing.  But  yet  the  Withdrawment  or  Abfence  of  the 
Sun  is  an  Antecedent,  with  which  thefe  EfFe(ffs  in  the  Night 
and  Winter  are  connected,  and  on  which  they  depend  ;  and 
is  one  Thing  that  belongs  to  the  Ground  and  Reafon  why 
they  come  to  pafs  at  that  Time,  rather  than  at  other  Times  ; 
,  tho'  the  Abfence  of  the  Sun  is  Nothing  pofitive,  nor  has 
atiy  pojGitive  Influence. 

It  may  be  further  obferved,  that  when  I  fpeak  of  ConneSiion 
■ef  Caufes  and  Effeds^  I  have  Refpect  to  moral  Caufes,  as  well 
as  thofe  that  are  called  natural  in  Diftindion  from  'em. 
Moral  Caufes  may  be  Caufes  in  as  proper  a  Senfe,  as  any 
Caufes  whatfoever  ;  may  have  as  real  an  Influence,  and  may 
as  truly  be  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of  an  Event's  coming  to 
pafs. 

Therefore  I  fometimes  ufe  theV/ord  Caife^  in  this  Enquiry^ 
to  fignify  any  AntHidm>i  either  natural  or  moral,  pofitive  or 

F  negative, 


42     No  Event  without  a  Caufe.     Part  IL 

negative,  on  which  an  Event,  either  a  Thing,  or  the  Manner 
and  Circumftance  of  a  Thing,  fo  depends,  that  it  is  the 
Ground  and  Reafon,  either  in  Whole,  or  in  Part,  why  it  is, 
rather  than  not  ;  or  why  it  is  as  it  is,  rather  than  otherwife  j 
Or,  in  other  Words,  any  Antecedent  with  which  a  confeqiient 
Event  is  fo  connected,  that  it  truly  belongs  to  the  Reafoa 
why  the  Proportion  which  affirms  that  Event,  is  true  ;  whe- 
ther it  has  any  pofitive  Influence,  or  not.  And  in  an  Agrea- 
blenefs  to  this,  I  fometimes  ufe  the  Word  Effe^^  for  the 
Confequence  of  another  Thing,  which  is  perhaps  rather  an 
Occafion  than  a  Caufe,  moft  properly  fpeaking. 

I  am  the  more  careful  thus  to  explain  my  Meaning,  that  I 
may  cut  off  Occafion,  from  any  that  might  feek  Occafion  to 
cavil  and  object  againft  fome  Things  which  I  may  fay  con* 
cerning  the  'Dependance  of  all  Things  which  come  to  pafs, 
on  fome  Caufe,   and  their  Connection  with  their  Caufe, 

Having  thus  explained  what  I  mean  by  Cauje^  I  afTert,  that 
Nothing  ever  comes  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe.  What  is  Self- 
exigent  muft  be  from  Eternity,  and  mull  be  unchangeable  : 
But  as  to  all  lliings  that  begin  to  hc^  they  are  not  belf-ex- 
iftent,  and  therefore  muft  have  fome  Foundation  of  their  Ex- 
tftence  without  themfelves.  —  That  whatfoever  begins  to  be, 
which  before  was  not,muft  have  a  Caufe  why  it  then  begins  to 
cxift,  fccms  to  be  the  firfi:  Dictate  of  the  common  and  natural 
Senfe  which  God  hath  implanted  in  the  Minds  of  all 
Mankind,  and  the  main  Foundation  of  all  our  Reafonings 
about  the  Exiftence  of  Things,  paft,  prefent,  or  to  come. 

And  this  Didate  of  common  Senfe  equally  refpects  Sub- 
fiances  and  Modes,  or  Things  and  the  Manner  and  Circum- 
flances  of  Things.  Thus,  if  we  fee  a  Body  which  has  hither- 
to been  at  Reft,  ftart  out  of  a  State  of  Reft,  and  begin 
to  move,  we  do  as  naturally  and  neceffarily  fuppofe  there  is 
fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  this  new  Mode  of  Exiftence,  as 
of  the  Exiftence  of  a  Body  it  itM  which  had  hitherto  not 
exifted.  And  fo  if  a  Body,  which  had  hitherto  moved  in  a 
certain  Direction,  fhould  fuddenly  change  the  Direction  of 
its  Motion ;  or  if  it  ftiould  put  off  it's  old  Figure,  and  take 
a  new  one  ;  or  change  it's  Colour  :  the  Beginning  of  thefe 
new  Modes  is  a  new  Event,  and  the  Mind  of  Mankind 
neceffiarily  fuppofes  tiiat  there  \%  fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  of 
them» 

If 


Seil.III.    No  Eve?tt  without  a  Caufe.     43 

■  If  this  grand  Principle  of  common  Senfe  be  taken  away,  all 
Arguing  tromEffects  to  Caufes  ceafethjand  fo  all  Knowlege  of 
any  £x;itence,  befides  what  we  have  by  the  moft  direct  and 
immediate  Intuition.  Particularly  all  our  Proof  of  the  Being 
of  God  ceafes  :  We  argue  his  Being  from  our  own  Being, 
ana  the  Being  of  othtr  Things,  which  we  are  fenfibie  once 
were  not,  but  have  begun  to  be  ;  and  from  the  Being  of  the 
World,  with  all  it*s  conftituent  Parts,  and  the  Manner  ot 
their  Kxirtcnce  5  all  which  we  fee  plainly  are  not  neceffary  in 
their  own  Nature,  and  fo  not  Self-exiftent,  and  therefore 
muil  have  a  Caufe.  But  if  Things,  not  in  themfelves  ne- 
celTary,  may  begin  to  be  without  a  Caufe,  all  this  arguing  is 
vain. 

Indeed,  I  will  not  afErm,  that   there   is   in   the  Nature   of 
Th  ngs    no  Foundation  for  the  Knowledge   of  the   Being  of 
God  Without  any  Evidence  of  it  from  his  Works.    I    do  fup- 
pofe  there  is  a  great  Abfurdity,  in  the  Nature  of  Things   fun- 
p!y  confidered,    in  fuppofing  that   there  fhould  be   no   God, 
or  in  denying  Being   m   general,    and   fuppofmg   an   eternal, 
abfolute,  univerfal  Nothing  :     And  therefore  that  here  would 
be  Foundation  of  intuitive  Evidence  that   it  cannot  be,    and 
that  eternal  infinite  moft  perfect  Being  muft  be  ;     if  we   had 
Strength  and  Compreheniion  of  Mind   fafficient,   to   have   a 
clear   Idea    of  general    and  univerfal    Being,      or,   which   is 
the  fame  Thing,    of  the  infinite,   eternal,   moft   perfed   di- 
vine Nature  and  Eftence.     But   then  we  fhould  not  properly 
come  to  the  Knowledge  of  the  Being   of  God   by    arguing  ; 
but  our  Evidence  would  be  intuitive  :     We  Ihould  fee   it,   as 
we  fee  other  Things  that   are   necelTary   in   themfelves,    the 
Contraries  of  which  are  in  their  own  Nature  abfurd  and  con- 
tradiilory  ;   as  we  fee  that  twice  two  is  four  ;    and    as  we    fee 
that  a  Circle  has  no  Angles.     If  we  had  as   clear  an  Idea  of 
univerfal  ini'nite  Entity,   as  we  have  of  thefe  other  Things,  I 
fuppoie  we  ihould  moft  intuitively  fee  the  Abfurdity  of  fuppo- 
fing  fuch   Being   not  to  be  ;    fhould  immediately    fee   there 
is  no  Room  tor   the   Queftion,    whether   it   is   pofTible   that 
Being,    in    the  moft  general   abftraded  Notion  of  it,    fliould 
not  be.     But  we  have  not  that  Strength  and  Extent  of  Mind, 
to  know  this  certainly   in   this    intuitive  independent   Man- 
ner :  But  the  Way  that  Mankind  come  to  the  Knowledge  of 
the  Being  of  God,  is  that  which  the  Apoftle  fpeaks  of,  Rom. 
,\.  20.  77?^  ifjvifihle  Things  of  Him,  from  the  Creation  of  the  IVcrld^ 
are  clearly  fe en  ;    being  under fiood  by  the  Things  that  are  made  ;  even 
his  eternal  Power  and  Godhead,     VVe  firjl  afcend^     and  prove   a 

F  2  Pojleriorip 


44     J^o  'Event  without  a  Caufe.     Part  11. 

Pofteriorly  or  from  Effedls,  that  there  muft  be  an  eternal 
Caufe  ;  and  then  fecondly^  prove  by  Argumentation,  not  In- 
tuition, that  this  Being  muft  be  necefTarily  ejciftent  ;  and 
then  thirdly^  from  the  proved  NeceiTity  of  hisExiftencejWe  may 
defccnd^  and  prove  ^any  of  his  Perfedlions  a  Priori, 

But  if  once  this  grand  Principle  of  common  Senfe  be  given 
up,  that  what  is  not  necejfary  in  it  felf^  mufl  have  a  Caufe  ;  an(J 
•we  begin  to  maintain,  that  Things  may  come  into  Exiftence, 
and  begin  to  be,  which  heretofore  have  not  been,  of  them- 
felves,  without  any  Caufe  \  all  our  Means  of  afcending  in 
our  arguing  from  the  Creature  to  the  Creator,  and  all  our 
Evidence  of  the  Being  of  God,  is  cut  off  at  one  Blow.  In 
this  Cafe,  we  can't  prove  that  there  is  a  God,  either  from 
the  Being  of  the  World,  and  the  Creatures  in  it,  or  from  the 
Manner  of  their  Being,  their  Order,  Beauty  and  Ufe.  For 
if  Things  may  come  intp  Exiftence  without  any  Caufe  at  all, 
then  they  doubtlefs  may  without  any  Caufe  anfwerable  to  the 
Effed.  Our  Minds  do  alike  naturally  fuppofe  and  determine 
both  thefe  Things  j  namely,  that  what  begins  to  be  has  a 
Caufe,  and  alfo  that  it  has  a  Caufe  proportionable  and 
agreable  to  the  EfFea.  The  fame  Principle  which  leads  us  to 
determine,  that  there  cannot  be  any  Thing  coming  to  pafs 
without  a  Caufe,  leads  us  to  determine  that  there  cannot  be 
more  in  the  Effea  than  in  the  Caufe. 

Yea,  if  once  it  fhould  be  allowed,  that  Things  may  come 
to  pals  without  a  Caufe,  we  Ihould  not  only  have  no  Proof 
of  the  Being  of  _  God,  but  we  (hould  be  without  Evidence  of 
the  Exiil:cnce  of  any  Thing  whatfoever,  but  our  own  imme- 
diately prefent  Ideas  and  Confcioufnefs.  For  we  have  no 
Wa^  to  prove  any  Thing  elfe,  but  by  arguing  from  Effeas 
to  Caules  :  from  the  Ideas  now  immediately  in  View,  we  ar- 
gue other  Things  not  immediateiy  in  View  :  from  Senfations 
now  excited  in  us,  we  infer  the  Exiftence  of  Things  without 
us,  as  theCaufes  of  thefe  Senfations  :  And  from  the  :£x- 
iftence  of  thefe  Things,  we  argue  other  Thiigs,  which  they 
depend  on,  as  Eflfeas  on  Caufes.  We  infer  the  paft  Exift- 
ence of  our  Selves,  or  any  Thing  elfe,  by  Memory  ;  only 
as  we  argue,  that  the  Ideas,  which  are  now  in  our  Minds, 
5ire  the  Confequences  of  paft  Ideas  and  Senfations.  We  im- 
piediately  perceive  nothing  elfe  but  the  Ideas  which  are  this 
Moment  extant  in  our  Minds.  W^e  perceive  or  know  other 
Things  only  hy  Meam  qf  thefe,  as  neceflarily  conneaed  with 

othersj 


Seft.in.    No  Event  without  a  Caufe.     45 

others,  and  dependent  on  them.  But  if  Things  may  b^ 
without  Caufes,  all  this  neceflary  Connecftion  and  Depen- 
iience  is  dilTolved,  and  fo  all  Means  of  our  Knowledge  is 
gone. '  If  there  be  no  Abrurdity  or  Difficulty  in  fuppofing 
one  Thing  to  Hart  out  of  Non-Exiftence,  into  Being,  of  ^t 
felf  without  a  Caufe  ;  then  there  is  no  Abfurdity  or  Difficulty 
in  fuppofing  the  fame  of  Millions  of  Millions.  For  Nothing, 
or  no  Difficulty  multiplied,  ftill  is  Nothing,  or  no  Difficulty  : 
Nothing  multiplied  by  Nothing  don't  increafe  the  Sum. 

And  indeed,  according  to  the  Hypothefis  I  am  opppfin^, 
of  the  A6ts  of  the  Will  coming  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe,  it 
is  the  Cafe  in  Fad,  that  Millions  of  Millions  of  Events  are 
continually  coming  into  Exiftence  Contingently^  without  any 
Caufe  or  Reafon  v/hy  they  do  fo,  all  over  the  World,  every 
Day  and  Hour,  thro'  all  Ages.  So  it  is  in  a  conftant  Suc- 
ceffion,  in  every  moral  Agent.  This  Contingency,  this 
efficient  Nothing,  this  effectual  No-Caufe,  is  always  ready 
at  Hand,  to  produce  this  Sort  of  EfFeds,  as  long  as  the 
Agent  exifts,  and  as  often  as  he  has  Occalion. 

If  it  were  fo,  that  Things  only  of  one  Kind,  wz.  AcSVs  of 
the  Will,  feem'd  to  come  to  pafs  of  Themfelves'j  but  thofe 
of  this  Sort  in  general  came  hito  Being  thus  5  and  it  were 
an  Event  that  was  continual,  and  that  happen'd  in  a  Courfe, 
wherever  were  capable  Subjeds  of  fuch  Events  ;  this  very 
Thing  would  demonflrate  that  there  was  fome  Caufe  of  theni, 
which  made  fuch  a  Difference  between  this  Event  and  others, 
^nd  that  they  did  not  really  happen  contingently.  For  Con- 
tingence  is  blind,  and  do^s  not  pick  and  choofe  for  a  particu- 
lar Sort  of  Events.  Nothing  has  no  Choice.  ThisNo-Caufe, 
which  caufes  no  Exiftence,  can't  caufe  the  Exiftence  which 
comes  to  pafs,  to  be  of  one  particular  Sort  only,  diftmguifli'd 
from  all  others.  Thus,  that  only  one  Sort  of  Matter  drops 
out  of  the  Heavens,  even  Water,  and  that  this  comes  fo 
often,  fo  conflantly  and  plentifully,  all  over  the  World,  in  all 
Ages,  Ihows  that  there  is  fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  the  falling 
of  Water  out  of  the  Heavens  ;  and  that  fomething  beiides 
meer  Contingence  has  a  Hand  in  the  Matter. 

If  we  fliould  fuppofe  Non-entity  to  be  about  to  bring  forth  ; 
and  Things  were  coming  into  Exiftence,  without  any  Caufe 
or  Antecedent,  on  which  the  Exiftence,  or  Kind  or  Manner 
of  Exiftence  depends  ;  or  which  could  at  all  determine  whe- 
ther the  Things  (hould  be  5  Stones,   or  Stars,  or  Beafts,   or 

Angels, 


46  Volition  arifes  not  Part  11. 

Angels,  or  human  Bodies,  or  Souls,  or  only  fome  new  Mo- 
tion or  Figure  in  natural  Bodies,  or  fome  new  Senfations  in 
Animals,  or  new  Ideas  in  the  human  Uoderftanding,  or  new 
Volitions  in  the  Will  J  or  any  Thing  elfe  of  all  the  infinite 
Number  of  Poflibles  ;  then  certainly  it  would  not  be  expect- 
ed, altho'  many  Millions  of  Millions  of  Things  are 
coming  into  Exiftence  in  this  Manner,  all  over  the  Face  of 
the  Earth,  that  they  fhould  all  be  only  of  one  particular 
Kind,  and  that  it  fliould  be  thus  in  all  Ages,  and  that  this 
Sort  of  Exiftences  fliould  never  fail  to  come  to  pafs  where 
there  is  Room  for  them,  or  a  Subjecft  capable  of  them,  and 
that  conftantly,  whenever  there  is  Occafion  for  them. 

If  any  fhould  imagine,  there  is  fomething  in  the  Sort  of 
Event  that  renders  it  poffible  for  it  to  come  into  Exiftence 
without  a  Caufe  ;  and  fhould  fay,  that  the  free  Acfts  of  the 
Will  are  Exiftences  of  an  exceeding  different  Nature  from 
other  Things  ;  by  Reafon  of  which  they  may  come  into  Ex- 
iftence without  any  previous  Ground  or  Reafon  of  it,  tho* 
other  Things  cannot  ;  If  they  make  this  Objedion  in  good 
Earneft,  it  would  be  an  Evidence  of  their  ftrangely  forget- 
ing  themfelves  :  For  they  would  be  giving  an  Account  of 
fome  Ground  of  the  Exiftence  of  a  Thing,  when  at  the  fame 
Time  they  would  maintain  there  is  no  Ground  of  it's  Exift- 
ence. Therefore  I  would  obferve,  that  the  particular  Nature 
of  Exiftence,  be  it  never  fo  diverfe  from  others,  can  lay  no 
Foundation  for  that  Thing's  coming  into  Exiftence  without  a 
Caufe  ;  becaufe  to  fuppofe  this,  would  be  to  fuppofe  the 
particular  Nature  of  Exiftence  to  be  a  Thing  prior  to  the 
Exiftence  ;  and  fo  a  Thing  which  makes  Way  for  Exift- 
ence, with  fuch  a  Circumftance,  namely  without  a  Caufe  or 
Reafon  of  Exiftence.  But  that  which  m  any  Refpe6t  makes 
Way  for  a  Thing's  coming  into  Being,  or  tor  any  Manner 
or  Circumftance  of  iv's  firft  Exiftence,  muft  be  prior  to  the 
Exiftence.  The  diftinguiftiM  Nature  of  the  EfFea,  which 
is  fomething  belonging  to  the  Effe6t,  can't  have  Influence 
backward,  to  ad  before  it  is.  The  peculiar  Nature  of  that 
Thing  called  Volition,  can  do  Nothing,  can  have  no  Influ- 
ence, while  it  is  not.  And  afterwards  it  is  too  late  for  it's 
Influence  :  for  then  the  Thing  has  made  fure  of  Exiftence 
already,  without  it's  Help. 

So  that  it  is  indeed  as  repugnant  to  Reafon,  to  fuppofe 
that  an  Adl  of  the  Will  ftiouid  come  into  Exiftence  without 
a  Caufe,  as  to  fuppofe  the  human  Soul,  or  an  Angel,   or 

the 


§e6l.IV.  withmt  a  Caufe.  47 

the  Globe  of  the  Earth,  or  the  whole  Univerfe,  (hould  come 
into  Exigence  without  a  Caufe.  And  if  once  we  allow,  that 
fuch  a  Sort  of  Effed  as  a  Volition  may  come  to  pafs  without 
a  Caufe,  how  do  we  know  but  that  many  other  Sorts  of 
Effe<5ls  may  do  fo  too  ?  'Tis  not  the  particular  Kind  of 
EfFedt  that  makes  the  Abfurdity  of  fuppofmg  it  has  being 
without  a  Caufe,  but  fomething  which  is  common  to  all 
Things  that  ever  begin  to  be,  viz,  that  they  are  not  Self- 
exiftent,  or  ncceflary  in  the  Nature  of  Things. 


Section  IV.  , 

Whether  Volition  can  arife  without  a  Caujhy 
through  the  Activity  of  the  Nature  of 
the  SouL 

THE  Author  of  the  Efay  on  the  Freedom  of  the  TFilI  in 
God  and  the  Creatures^  in  Anfwer  to  that  ObjecStion 
againft  his  Dodrine  of  a  Self-determining  Power  in  the 
Will,  (P. 68,69.)  ThatNothlng  is,or  cvmes  to  fafs^without  afuffident 
Reafon  why  it  is,  and  why  it  is  in  this  Manner  rather  than  another ^ 
allows  that  it  is  thus  in  corporeal  Things,  which  are  -properly 
ond  philofophically  fp caking  pajjive  Beings  ;  but  denies  that  it  is 
thus  in  Spirits^  which  are  Beings  of  an  aSfive  Nature^  who  have 
the  Spring  of  ASiion  within  thejnfelveSy  and  can  determine  them-- 
felves.  By  which  it  is  plainly  fuppofed,  that  fuch  an  Event 
as  an  Ad  of  the  Will,  may  come  to  pafs  in  a  Spirit,  without 
^  fufficicnt  Reafon  why  it  comes  to  pafs,  or  why  it  is  after 
this  Manner,  rather  than  another  ;  by  Reafon  of  the  Acti- 
vity of  the  Nature  of  a  Spirit.——  But  certainly  this  Author, 
in  this  Matter,  mull  be  very  unwary  and  inadvertent.     For, 

I.  The  Objedion  or  DifRculty  propofed  by  this  Author, 
feems  to  be  forgotten  in  his  Anfwer  or  Solution.  The  very 
Difficulty,  as  he  himfelf  propofes  it,  is  this  ;  How  an  Event 
can  come  to  pafs  witiwut  a  fufpcient  Reafcn  why  it  is,  or  why  it 
is  in  this  Manner  rather  than  another  f  Inftead  of  folving  this 
Difficulty,  or  aniwenng  this  Queflion  with  Regard  to  Voli- 
tion, as  he  propofes,  he  forgets  himfelf,  and  anfwers  ano- 
ther Queftjon  quite  divcrfe,  and  wholly  inconfiftent  with 
this,  vis:..  What  is  a  fufficient  Reafon  why  it  is,  and  why  it  is 

in 


48     Volition  not  without  a  Caufe    Part  II. 

in  this  Manner  rather  than  another  ?  And  he  afTigns  the 
Active  Being's  own  Determination  as  the  Caufe,  and  a 
Caufe  fufficient  for  the  EfFe6t  ;  and  leaves  all  the  Difficulty 
ilrirefolved,  and  the  Queftion  unanfwered,  which  yet  returns, 
^ven,  How  the  Soul's  own  Determination,  which  he  fpeaks 
of,  came  to  exift,  and  to  be  what  it  was  without  a  Caufe  ? 
The  Adivity  of  the  Soul  may  enable  it  to  be  the  Caufe  of 
Efffedts' ;  but  it  doA't  at  all  enable  or  help  it  to  be  the  Sub- 
je<5t  of  Effedts  which  have  no  Caufe  ;  which  is  the  Thing 
this  Author  fuppof^s  concerning  A6ls  of  the  Will.  Activity 
of  Nature  will  no  more  enable  a  Being  to  produce  Effeds, 
and  determine  the  Manner  of  their  Exiftence,  within  it  felf, 
without  a  Caufe,  than  out  of  it  felf,  in  fome  other  Being. 
But  if  an  adive  Being  (hould,  through  it's  Adivity,  produce 
and  determine  an  Effedl  in  fome  external  Objecl,  how  abfurd 
would  it  be  to  fay, that  theEffedt  was  produced  without  a  Caufe  ! 

2.  The  Queftion  is  not  fo   much.  How  a   Spirit  endowed 

with  Adivity  comes  to  acSt,    as  why  it  exerts   fuch  an   A61,  \ 

and  not  another  ;    or  why  it  ads  with  fuch  a  particular  De-  ;; 

termination  ?     If  Adivity  of  Nature  be  theCaufe  why  a  Spirit  '' 

(the  Soul  of  Man  for  Inltance)  ads,  and  don't  lie  ftill  ;    yet  j 

that  alone  is  not  the  Caufe  why  it's   Adion  is  thus   and  thus  ( 

limited,  directed  and  determined.     Adlive  Nature   is  a  general  \ 
Thing  ;    'tis  an  Ability  or  Tendency   of  Nature   to   Adion, 

generally  taken   ;    which   may  be  a   Caufe  why  the    Soul  ,j 

ads   as   Occafion    or  Reafon   is   given   ;     but    this    alone  ■■. 

can't  be  a  fufficient   Caufe    why     the     Soul     exerts    fuch  ' 

a  particular    Ad,     at     fuch   a  Time,   rather  than    others.  ' 

In  order  to  this,   there  muft  be    fomething  befides  a  general  \ 

Tendency  to  Adion  ;   there  muft  alfo  be    a  particular   Ten-  ] 

dency  to  that  individual  Adion. If  it  ftiould  be   afked,  I 

why  the  Soul  of  Man  ufes  it's  Adivity  in  fuch   a  Manner  as  1 

it  does ;   and  it  ftiould  be   anfwered,   that  the   Soul   ufes  it's  ■; 

Adivity  thus,  rather  than  otherwife,   becaufe  it  has  Adivity  ;  \ 

would  fuch  an  Anfwer  fatisfy  a  rational   Man  ?     Would  it  ] 

not  rather  be  looked  upon  as  a  very  impertinent  one  I  'i 

3.  An  adive  Being  can  bring  no  Effeds  to  pafs  by  his  ' 
Adivity,  but  what  are  confequent  upon  his  ading  :  He  pro-  I 
duces  Nothing  by  his  Adivity,  any  other  Way  than  by  the  \ 
Exercife  of  his  Adivity,  and  fo  Nothing  but  the  Fruits  of  i 
it's  Exercife  :  He  brings  Nothing  to  pafs  by  a  dormant  I 
Adivity.  But  the  Exercife  of  his  Adivity  is  Adion  ;  and  fo  ' 
his  Adion,  or  Exercife  of  his  Adivity,  roufi;  be  prior  to  the  , 


Sedl-IV.      thro  the  SouTs  Adlivity.  49 

EfFe(5ts  of  his  Acclivity.  If  an  a6live  Being  produces  an 
EfFe6l  in  another  Beings  about  which  IiiSJ*' Activity  is  convcr- 
fant,  the  EfFe6l  being  the  Fruit  of  his  Ailivity,  his  A6ti- 
vity  muft  be  firft  exercifed  or  exerted,  and  the  Effect  of  it 
muft  follow.  So  it  murt:  be,  with  equal  Reafon,  if  the 
a6live  Being  is  his  own  Objev5t,  and  his  Acflivity  is  conver- 
fant  about  Himfelf,  to  produce  and  determine  fome  Eifedl 
in  himfelf ;  ftill  the  Exercife  of  his  AvStivity  muft  go  before 
the  Effect,  which  he  brings  to  pafs  and  determines  by  it. 
And  therefore  his  A6tivity  can't  be  the  Caufe  of  the  Deter- 
mination of  the  firft  A6lion,  or  Exerciie  of  Adivity  it  feJf, 
whence  the  Effeds  of  A6livity  arife  \  for  that  would  imply 
aContradi6tion  ;  It  would  be  to  fay,the  firft  Exercife  of  Adivity 
is  before  the  firft  Exercife  of  A6tivity,    and  is  the  Caufe  of  it. 

4.  That  the  Soul,  tho'  an  a6live  Subftance,  can't  dherjify 
it's  own  Ads,  but  by  firft  a6ting  ;  or  be  a  determinmg 
Caufe  of  different  Ads,  or  any  different  Effeds,  fometimes 
of  one  Kind,  and  fometmies  of  another,  any  other  Way 
than  in  Confequence  6f  it's  own  diverfe  Ads,  is  manifeft  by 
this  ;  That  if  fo,  then  the  faine  Caufe,  the  fame  caufal 
Power,  Force  or  Influence,  ivkhout  Variation  in  any  Refpe£fy 
would  produce  different  Effeds  at  different  Time's.  For  the 
fame  Subftance  of  the  Soul  before  it  ads,  and  the  fame 
adive  Nature  of  the  Soul  before  it  is  exerted  (i,  e.  before  in 
the  Order  of  Naturej  would  be  the  Caufe  of  different 
Effeds,  "uiz,  different  Volitions  at  diff'erent  Times.  But  the 
Subftance  of  the  Soul  before  it  ads,  and  it's  adive  Nature 
before  it  is  exerted,  are  the  fame  without  Variation.  For  'tis 
fome  Ad  that  makes  the  firft  Variation  in  the  Caufe,  as  to  any 
caufal  Exertion,  Force  or  Influence.  But  if  it  be  fo,  that 
the  Soul  has  no  different  Caufality,  or  diverfe  caufal  Force 
or  Influence,  in  producing  thefe  diverfe  Effeds  ,  then  'tis 
evident,  that  the  Soul  has  no  Influence,  no  Hand  in  the 
d'iverfity  of  the  Effed  ;  and  that  the  Difference  of  the  Effed 
can't  be  owing  to  any  Thing  in  the  Soul  ;  or  which  is  the 
fame  Thing,    the  Soul  don't  determine   the  Diverfity  of    the 

Effed  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Supp9fition. 'Tis  true, 

the  Subftance  of  the  Soul  before  it  ads,  and  before  there  is 
any  Difference  in  that  Refped,  may  be  in  a  different  State 
and  Circumftances  :  But  thofe  whom  I  oppofe,  v/ill  not: 
allov/  the  diff"erent  Circumftances  of  the  Soul  to  be  the  de- 
termining Caufes  of  the  i\ds  of  the  Vv^'ill  •  as  being  con- 
trary to  tiieir  Notion  of  Self-detenninatiou  and  Self-motiou, 


50  Volition  not  without  a  Caufe  &c.  Part  IL 

5.  Let  us  fuppofe,  as  thefe  Divines  do,  that  there  are  no 
Aas  of  the  Soul,  ftriaiy  fpeaking,  but  free  Volitions  ; 
Then  it  will  follow,  that  the  Soul  is  an  a^ive  Being  in 
Nothing  further  than  it  is  a  voluntary  or  ele6tive  Being  ; 
and  whepever  it  produces  EfFeds  aaively,  it  produces  Effeds 
voluntarily  and  eledively.  But  to  produce  Effeds  thus,  is 
the  fame  Thing  as  to  produce  Effects  in  Confequence  of^  and 
according  to  it's  own  Choice.  And  if  fo,  then  furely  the 
Soul  don't  by  it's  Adtivity  produce  all  it's  own  Ads  of  Will 
or  Choice  themfeives  :  For  this,  by  the  Suppofition,  is  to 
produce  all  it's  free  A6ls  of  Choice  voluntarily  and  eledive- 
ly,  or  in  Confequence  of  it's  own  free  Ads  of  Choice,  which 
brings  the  Matter  diredly  to  the  fore-mentioned  Contra- 
diction, of  a  free  A6t  of  Choice   before  the  tirft  free   Ad  of 

Choice. According  to  thefe  Gentlemen's   own  Notion  of 

Adion,  if  there  arifes  in  the  Mind  a  Volition  without  a  free 
Ad  of  the  Will  or  Choice  to  determine  and  produce  it, 
the  Mind  is  not  the  adive  voluntary  Caufe  of  that  Voli- 
tion ;  becaufe  it  don't  arife  from,  nor  is  regulated  by  Choice 
or  Defign»  And  therefore  it  can't  be,  that  the  Mind  fliould 
be  the  adive,  voluntary,    determining  Caufe  of  the  lirft  and 

leadmg  Volition  that   relates  to  the  Affair. The  Mind's 

htv!\%  2i  dcfigning  Q-^wit^  only  enables  it  to  produce  Effeds  in 
Confequence  of  it's  Defign  ;  it  will  not  enable  jit  to  be  the 
defigning  Caufe  of  all  it's  own  Defigns.  The  Mind's  being 
an  ele^live  Caufe,  will  only  enable  it  to  produce  Effeds  in 
Confequence  of  it's  Ele£iions^  and  according  to  them  ;  but 
can't  enable  it  to  be  the  eledive  Caufe  of  all  it's  own  Elec- 
tions ;  becaufe  that  fuppofes  an  Eiedion  before  the  firft  E- 
ledion.  So  tli£  Mind's  being  an  .ja^ive  Caufe  enables  it  to 
produce  Effeds  in  Confequence  of  it's  own  ASfs^  but  can't 
enable  it  to  be  the  determining  Caufe  of  all  it's  own  Ads  ; 
for  that  is  ftill  in  the  fame  Manner  a  Contradidion  ;  as  it 
fuppoles  a  determining  Act  converfant  about  the  firft  Act, 
and  prior  to  it,  having  a  caufal  Influence  on  it's  Exiftence, 
and  Manner  of  Exiftence. 


I  can  conceive  of  Nothing  elfe  that  can  be  meant  by  the 
Soul's  having  Power  to  caufe  and  determine  it's  own  Voli- 
tions, as  a  Being  to  whom  God  has  given  a  Power  of 
Adion,  but  this  j  that  God  has  given  Power  to  the  Soul, 
fometimes  at  leaft,  to  excite  Volitions  at  it's  Pleafure,  or 
according  as  it  chufes.  And  this  certainly  fuppofes,-  in  all 
fuch  Caics,   a   Choice   preceeding  all   Volitions    which  are 

thus 


Sedt.  V.      Thefe  Evaftons  imdertinent.      5 1 

thus  caufed,    even  the  very  firft  of  them.     Which  runs  into 
the  fore-mentioned  great  Abfurdity. 

Therefore  the  Activity  of  the  Nature  of  the  Soul  affords 
no  Rehef  from  the  Difficulties  which  the  Notion  of  a  Self- 
determining  Power  in  the  Will  is  attended  with,  nor  will  it 
help,  in  the  leaii,   it's  Abfurdities  and  Inconfiftences. 


I   . 


Section    V, 

Shewing^  that  if  the  Things  ajferted  in  thefc 
-Eva/tons  JJjould  be  fuppofed  to  be  true ^ 

they  are  altogether  imperti7unty  and  can  t 
\     help  the  Caufe  ^Arminian  Liberty  ;  And 

how    f  this  being  the  State  of  the  Cafe  ) 

Arminian  Writers  are  obliged  to  talk  in- 

confjiently. 

WHAT  was  lad  obferved  in  the  preceeding  Se(5Vion 
may  {hew,  not  only  that  the  adive  Nature  of  the 
Soul  can't  be  a  Reafon  why  any  AcSt  of  the  Will  is, 
or  why  it  is  in  this  Manner,  rather  than  another  ;  but  alio 
that  if  it  could  be  fo,  and  it  could  be  proved  that  Volitions 
are  contingent  Events,  in  that  Senfe,  that  their  Being  and 
Manner  of  Being  is  not  fix'd  or  determined  by  any  Caufe, 
or  any  Thing  antecedent  -,  it  would  not  at  all  ferve  the  Pur- 
pofe  of  Armimans^  to  eftablifh  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  ac- 
cording to  their  Notion  of  it's  Freedom,  as  confilting  in  the 
Will's  Determination  ofit'i  felf;  which  fuppofes  every  free 
Aa  of  the  Will  to  be  determined  by  fome  Ad  of  the  W^ill 
going  before  to  determine  it  ;  in  as  much  as  for  the  Will  to 
determine  a  Thing,  is  the  fame  as  for  the  Soul  to  determine 
a  Thing  by  Willing  ;  and  there  is  no  ^Vay  that  the  Will  can 
determine  an  A<51  of  the  Will,  than  by  xc77/;;z^  that  A6t  of 
the  Will,  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  chufing  it.  So  that 
here  muft  be  two  Ads  of  the  Will  in  the  Cafe,  one  goin^ 
before  another,  one  converfant  about  the  other,  and  the  lat- 
ter the  Objedt  of   the  former,   and    chofen   by   the  former. 

G  %  If 


52     Thefe  EvaJ^om  impertinent.     Pattll. 

If  the  Will  don't  c^ufe  and  determine  the  Act  by  Choice, 
it  don't  caufe  or  determine  it  at  all  ;  for  that  which  is  hot. 
determined  by  Choice,  is  not  determined  voluntarily  or' 
nx-iIUngly  :  And  to  fay,  that  the  Will  determines  fomething. 
>^/hich  the  Soul  don't  determine  willingly,  is  as  much  as  to 
fiy,  that  fomething  is  done  by  the  Will,  which  the  Soul 
don't  do  with  it's  Will. 

So  that  if  Armiman  Liberty  of  Will,  confifting  in  the 
Will's  determining  it's  own  Ads,  be  maintained,  the  old 
Abfurdity  and  Contradiction  muft  be  maintained,  that  every 
free  A61  of  Will  is  caufed  and  determined  by  a  foregoing  free 
Aa  of  Will.  Which  don't  confift  with  the  free  Aa's  anfing 
'yvithout  any  Caufe,  and  being  fo  contingent,  as  not  be  fix'd 
by  any  Thing  fore-going.  So  that  this  Evafion  muft  be  given 
i/p,  as  not  at  ail  relieving,  and  as  that  which,  inftead  of  fup- 
porting  this  Sort  of  Liberty,    diredly  deflroys  it. 

And  if  it  {hould  be  fuppofed,  that  the  Soul  determines  it's 
own  Acfts  of  Will  fome  other  Way,  than  by  a  foregoing 
A6t  of  Will  ;  ftill  it  will  not  help  the  Caufe  of  their  Liberty 
of  Will.  \{  it  determines  them  by  an  Act  of  the  Under- 
flanding,  or  fome  other  Power,  then  the  IVtll  don't  deter- 
mine it  J  elf ',  and  fo  the  S:lf-deter?nming  Power  of  the  Will  is 
given  up.  And  what  Liberty  is  there  exercifed,  according  to 
their  own  Opinion  of  Liberty,  by  the  Soul's  being  deter- 
mined by  fomething  befides  ifs  own  Choice  P  The  Acts  pf 
the  WilJ,  it  is  true,  may  be  directed,  and  effe(5laally  deter- 
mined and  lix'd  ;  but  it  is  not  done  by  the  Soul's  own  Will 
and  Pleafiire  :  There  is  no  Exercife  at  all  of  Choice  or  Will 
in  producing  the  Effect  ;  And  if  If^i/l  and  Choice  are  not 
exercifed  in  it,    how  is   the  Liberty  of  the  Will  exercifed  in  it  ? 

So  th  at  \ct  Jnnimans  turn  which  Way  they  pleafe  with  their 
Notion  of  Liberty,  confuting  in  the  Will's  determining  it's 
own  ASsy  their  Kotion  deftroys  it  felf.  If  they  hold  every 
free  Act  of  Will  to  be  determined  by  the  Soul's  own  free 
Choice,  or  foregqing  free  A6t  of  Will  5  foregoing^  either  in 
the  Order  of  Time,  or  Nature  ;  It  implies  that  grofs  Contra- 
diction, that  the  tirft  free  A<Si  belonging  to  the  Affair,  is  de- 
termined by  a  free  A(5t  which  is  before  it.  Or  if  they  fay 
thot  the  free  Acts  of  the  Will  are  determined  by  fome  other 
>^<:?  of  the  Soul,  and  not  an  ACt  of  Will  or  Choice,  Tl  is 
aifodefcroys  their  Notion  of  Liberty,  confining  in  the  A6ts 
of  the  Wiil  being  determined  by  the  fVill  it  felf  \  Or 
.  •       ■        if 


^ci:.V.    Arminians  talk  inconfiftently.    53 

if  they  hold   that  the  A6ls   of  the   Will   are    determined   by 
Nothing  at  all  that  is  prior  to  them,    but  that  they  are   contin- 

fent  in  that  Senfe,    that  they  are  determined  and  fixed   by  no 
'aufe  at  all  ;    this  alfo  deftroys  their  Notion  of  Liberty,    con- 
fifting  in  the  Will's  determining  it's  own  Ads. 

This  being  the  true  State  of  the  Jr?nwia7i  Notion  of  Li- 
berty, it  hence  coines  to  pafs,  that  the  Writers  that  defend 
it  are  forced  into  grofs  Liconfidences,  in  what  they  fay  upon 
this  Subje61:.  To  inftance  in  Dr.  JVhitby  ;  he  in  hisDifcourfe 
on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will,  *  oppofes  the  Opinion  of  the 
Cahinifis^  who  place  Man's  Liberty  only  in  a  Poiuer  of  doing 
what  He  w'lll^  as  that  wherein  they  plainly  agree  with  Mr. 
Hohbes.  And  yet  he  himfelf  mentions  the  very  fame  Notion 
of  Liberty,  as  the  Didate  of  the  Senfe  and  coinmon  Reafon  of 
Mankind^  and  a  Rule  laid  down  by  the  Light  of  Nature  ;  viz. That 
Liberty  is  a  Power  of  aofing  from  our  Selves^  or  DOING  WHAT 
WE  IflLL.  t  This  is  indeed,  as  he  fays,  a  Thing  agreable 
to  the  ^enfe  and  comrnon  R:afcn  of  Mank'.nd  ;  'and  therefore  'tis 
not  To  much  to  be  v^7ondered  at,  that  he  unawares  acknow- 
ledges it  agaiaft  himielf  :  For  if  Liberty  don't  confift  in  this, 
what  ejfe  can  be  deviled  that  it  fliould  confift  in  ?  If  it  be 
faid,  as  Dr.  Whitby  elfewhere  iniifts,  That  it  don't  only  con- 
fiil  in  Liberty  of  doing  zvhat  we  will^  but  alfo  a  Liberty  of 
Willing  without  Neceflity  ;  dill  the  Queftien  returns.  What 
does  that  Liberty  of  willing  without  Necefuty  coniift  in,  but 
in  a  Fovver  of  willing  as  we  pleafe^  without  being  impeded  by 
a  contrary  Neceillty  ?  or  in  other  Words,  A  Liberty  for  the 
Soul  in  it's  wiliing  to  acft  according  to  it's  own  Choice  P  Yea, 
this  very  Thing  the  fame  Author  feems  to  allow,  and  fup- 
pcfi  again  and  again,  in  the  Ufe  he  makes  of  Sayings  of  the 
Fathers,  whom  he  quotes  as  his  Vouchers.  Thus  he  cites 
thefe  Words  of  Origen,  which  he  produces  as  a  Teftimony 
on  his  Side  ;  j|  The  Soul  aSfs  By  HER  OJl^  CHOICE,  and 
it  is  free  for  her  to  incline  to  zvhat  ever  Part  SHE  WILL.  ,And 
thofe  Words  of  fujiin  Martyr  ;  %  ^'^^  Do^rine  of  the  ChrijVians 
is  this.  That  Nothing  is  dons  or  ftijfered  according  to  Fate,  but  that 
eim-y  Man  doth  Good  or  Evil  ACCORDING  TO  HIS  OWN 
FREE  CHOICE.  And  from  Eufebius,  thefe  Words  ;  4-  If 
Fate  be  ejlablifh'd,  Philofophy  and  Piety  are  overthrown.  —  Ail 
thefe  Things  depending   upon  the  NeceJJity  introduced  by   the    Stars^ 

and 

*  In  his  Book  on  the  five  Points,  2d  Edit.  P.  350,  35i,3>-- 
+  Ibid.  p.  325,  326.  jl  Ibid,  P.  342.  %  Ibid.  P.3  6o.  \Itid. 
^'  363- 


54  Arminians  talk  inconfiftently.    Part  II. 

md  not  upon  Meditation  and  Exertife  PROCEEDING  FROM 
OUR  Om^  FREE  CHOICE.  And  again,  the  Words- of 
Macaritis^  ||  God^  to  preferve  the  Liberty  of  Mali's  TVill^  Juffered 
their  Bodies  to  die^  that  it  might  he  IN  THEIR  CHOICE  to  turn 
to  Good  or  Evil. — They  who  are  aSied  by  the  Holy  Spirit^  are 
not  held  under  any  Nccejjity^  hut  have  Liberty  to  turn  themfelves^ 
^md  DO  WHAT  THEY  WILL   in   this  Life. 

Thus,  the  Do<5lor  in  EfFe6l  comes  into  that  very  No- 
tion of  Liberty,  which  the  Calvinijis  have  ;  which  he  at 
the  fame  Time  condemns,  as  agreeing  with  the  Opinion  of 
Wx.  HohbeSy  namely,  the  Soul's  Aciing  by  it's  oivn  Choice,  Aden's 
doing  Good  or  Evil  according  to  their  own  free  Choice^  Their  being 
in  that  Exertife  which  proceeds  from  their  own  free  Choice,  Having 
it  in  their  Choice  to  turn  to  Good  or  Evil,  and  doing  what  they  zvilL 
So  that  if  Men  exercife  this  Liberty  in  the  Acts  of  the  Will 
themfelves,  it  muft  be  in  exerting  A6ts  of  Will  as  they  will, 
or  according  to  their  own  free  Choice  ;  or  exerting  Acts  of  Will 
that  proceed  frcin  their  Choice.  And  if  it  be  fo,  then  let  every 
one  judge  whether  this  don't  fuppofe  a  free  Choice  going  be- 
fore the  free  kdi  of  Will,  or  whether  an  Acl:  of  Choice  don't 
go  before  that  A6t  of  the  Will  which  proceeds  from  it.  And 
if  it  be  thus  with  all  free  Ads  of  the  Will,  then  let  eveiy 
one  judge,  vv'hether  it  won't  follow^  that  there  is  a  free 
Choice  or  Will  going  before  the  firft  free  A61  of  the  Will 
exerted  in  the  Cafe.  And  then  let  every  one  judge,  whetlier 
this  be  not  a  Contradicftion.  And  finally,  let  every  one 
uidge  whether  in  the  Scheme  of  thefe  Writers  tliere  be  any 
rolfibility  of  avoiding  thefe  Abfurdities. 

If  Liberty  confifts,  as  Dr.  Whiiby  hinifelf  fays,  in  a  Man's 
doing  what  He  will ;  and  a  Man  exercifes  this  Liberty,  not 
only  in  external  A(5lions,  but  in  the  Ads  of  the  Will  'them- 
felves ;  then  fo  far  as  Liberty  is  exercifed  in  the  latter,  it 
confifts  in  willing  what  he  wills  :  And  if  any  fay  fo,  one  of 
thefe  two  Things  muft  be  meant,  either  i.  That  a  Man  has 
Power  to  Will,  as  he  docs  will  ;  becaufe  w^hat  he  wills,  he 
wills  ;  and  therefore  has  Power  to  will  what  he  has  Power 
to  will.  If  this  be  their  Meaning,  then  all  this  mighty  Con- 
troverfy  about  Freedom  of  the  Will  and  Self-determining 
Power,  comes  wholly  to  Nothing  ;  all  that  is  contended 
for  being  no  more  than  this,  That  the  Mind  of  Man  does 
>ijvhat  it  does,   and  is  the  Subjed  of  w^hat  it  is  the  Subjed  of, 

or 

X  Ibid.  369,  370.   . 


^QiN\.  Of  chujing  in  Things  indifferent,  55 

©r  that  what  is,  is  ;  wherein  None  has  any  Controverfy  v/ith 
them.  Or,  2.  The  Meaning  muft  be,  that  a  Man  has 
Power  to  will  as  he  J)leafes  or  chufcs  to  will  :  That  is,  he 
has  Power  by  one  A61  of  Choice,  to  chufe  another  ;  by  an 
antecedent  Ad  of  Will  to  chufe  a  confequent  A(5t  ;  and 
therein  to  execute  his  own  Choice.  And  if  this  be  their 
Meaning,  it  is  Nothing  but  Shuffling  with  thofe  they  difputc 
with,  and  baffling  their  own  Reafon.  For  ftill  the  Queftion 
returns,  wherein  lies  Man's  Liberty  in  that  antecedent  Adi 
of  Will  which  chofe  the  confequent  A61.  The  Anfwer  ac- 
cording to  the  fame  Principles  muft  be,  that  his  Liberty  in 
this  alio  lies  in  his  willing  as  he  would,  or  as  he  chofe,  or 
agreable  to  another  A(5t  of  Choice  preceeding  that.  And  fo 
the  Queftion  returns  in  infinitu?n^  and  the  like  Anfwer  muft  be 
made  in  infinitum  :  In  order  to  fupport  their  Opinion,  there 
muft  be  no   Beginning,  but  free   Ads  of  Will   muft  have 

•  been  chofen  by  foregoing  free  Ads  of  Will,  in  the  Soul  of 
every  Man,   without  Beginning  ;    and   fo  before  he   had  a 

'  Being,   from  all  Eternity. 


Section    VI. 

Concerning  theWilPs  determining  inT'hings 
which  are  perfeBly  indifferent,    in  the 
V  ,   J^iew  of  the  Mind. 

A  Great  Argument  for  Self-determining  Power,  is  the 
fuppofed  Experience  we  univerfally  have  of  an  Ability 
to  determine  our  Wills,  in  Cafes  wherein  no  prevail- 
ing Motive  is  prefented  :  The  Will  (as  is  fuppofed)  has 
It's  Choice  to  make  between  two  or  more  Things,  that  are 
perfedly  equal  in  the  View  of  the  Mind  ;  and  the  Will  is 
apparently  altogether  indifferent  ;  and  yet  we  find  no  Diffi- 
culty in  coming  to  a  Choice  ;  the  Will  can  inftantly  deter- 
mine it  felf  to  one,  by  a  fovereign  Power  which  it  has  over 
it  felf,  without  being  moved  by  any  preponderating  Induce- 
ment. 

Thus 


56  Of  chujing  in  Things  mdi&xQnt.  PartIL 

Thus  the  forementioned  Author  of  an  Effay  on  the  Freedom 
cfthe  Will  &c.  P.  25,  26,  27,  fuppofes,  ^'  That  there  are 
*'  many  Inftances,  wherein  the  Wiil  is  determined  neither 
"  by  prefcnt  Uneafinefs,  nor  by  the  greatefi:  apparent  Good, 
''  nor  by  the  laft  Didate  of  the  Underfiand  ng,  nor  by 
''  any  Thing  elfe,  but  meerly  by  it  feif,  as  a  Sovereign  Self- 
*'  determining. Power  of  the  Soui  ;  and  that  the  Soul  does 
"  not  will  this  or  that  A(5tion,  in  fome  Cafes,  by  any  other 
^'  Influence,  but  becaufe  it  will.  Thus  (fays  he)  I  can  turn 
*'  my  Face  to  the  South,  or  the  North  ;   I  can  point  with  my 

''  Finger -upward,    or  downward. And  thus,    in  fome  Ca- 

*'  fes,  the  Will  determines  it  felf  in  a  very  fovereign  Man- 
>*  ner,  becaufe  it  will,  without  a  Reafon  borrowed  from  the 
*'  Underftanding  :  and  hereby  it  diicovers.  it's  own  perfe6t 
*'  Power  of  Choice,  riling  from  within  it  felf,  and  free  from 
''  all  Influence  or  Reftraint  of  any  Kmd."  And  in  Pages  66, 
70,  ^73,  74.  This  Author  very  exprcfly  fuppofes  the  Will 
in  many  Cafes  to  be  determined  by  no  Motive  at  all^  and  aSls 
altogether  without  Motive,  or  Ground  oj  Preference,  —  Here  I 
would  obferve, 

I.  The  very  Suppofltion  which  is  here  made,  dire^lly  con- 
tradicSts  and  overthrows  it  felf.  For  the  Thing  fuppofed, 
wherein  this  grand  Argument  confifl:s,is.  That  among  feveral 
Things  the  Will  a6hial]y  chufes  one  before  another,  at  the 
fame  Time  that  it  is  perfectly  indiflferent  ;  which  is  the  very 
fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  the  Mind  has  a  Preference,  at  the 
fame  Time  that  it  has  no  Preference.  What  is  meant  can't 
be,  that  the  Mind  is  indifferent  before  it  comes  to  have  a 
Choice,  or  'till  it  has  a  Preference  ;  or,  which  is  the  fame 
Thing,  that  the  Mind  is  indifferent  until  it  comes  to  be  not 
indifferent.  For  certainly  this  Author  did  not  fuppofe  he 
had  a  Controverfy  with  any  Perfon  in  fuppofing  this.  And 
then  it  is  Nothing  to  his  Purpofe,  that  the  Mind  which 
chufes,  was  indifferent  once  ;  unlefs  it  chufes,  remaining  in- 
different ;  for  otherv^^ife,  it  don't  chufe  at  all  in  that  Cafe  of 
Indifference,  concerning  which  is  all  the  Qiief^ion.  Befides, 
it  appears  in  Fa6f,  that  the  Thing  which  this  Author  fup- 
pofes, is  not  that  the  Will  chufes  one  Thing  before  ano- 
ther, concerniiig  which  it  is  indifferent  before  it  chufes  ;  but 
alfo  is  indifferent  when  it  chufes  \  and  that  it's  being  otherwife 
than  indifferent  is  not  'till  afterwards,  in  Confequence  of 
'it's  Choice  ;  that  the  chofen  Thing's  appearing  preferable 
and  more  agrcable  than  anotherj  arifes  from  it's  Choice 
His  Words  are  fP.  30.J    *'  Where  the   Ob- 


Sed.VI.  Ofchujing  inThings  indifferent.   57 

*«  je(5ts  which  are  propofed,  appear  equally  fit  or  good,  the 
"  Will  is  left  without  a  Guide  or  Diredor  ;  and  therefore 
"  mull  make  it's  own  Choice,  by  it's  own  Determination  ;  it 
"  being  properly  a  Self-determining  Power.  And  in  fuch 
*<  Cafes  theWill  does  as  it  were  make  a  Good  to  it  felf  by  it's 
*'~  own  Choice,  /.  e.  creates  it's  own  Pleafure  or  Delight 
**  in  this  Self-chofen  Good.  Even  as  a  Man  by  feizing 
*'  upon  a  Spot  of  unoccupied  Land,  in  an  uninhabited 
*'  Country,  makes  it  his  own  Poffeffion  and  Property,  and 
*l  as  fuch  rejoyces  in  it.  Where  Things  were  indifferent 
"  before,  the  Will  finds  Nothing  to  make  them  more  agrea- 
**  ble,  confidered  meerly  in  themfelves  ;  but  the  Pleafure  it 
«  feels  ARISING  FROM  IT'S  OWN  CHOICE,  and  it's 
"  Perfeverance  therein.  We  love  many  Things  which  we 
«  have  chofen,  AND  PURELY  BECAUSE  W^E  CHOSE 
«  THEM." 

This  is  as  much  as  to  fay, that  we  firft  begin  to  prefer  many 
Things,  now  ceafmg  any  longer  to  be  indifferent  with 
Refpe6l  to  them,  purely  becaufe  we  have  prefer'd  and  chofen 

them  before. Thefe  Things   muil  needs  be  fpoken  incon- 

fiderately  by  this  Author.  Choice  or  Preference  can't  be 
before  it  felf,  in  the  fame  Inftance,  either  in  the  Order  of 
Time  or  Nature  :  It  can't  be  the  Foundation  of  it  {^iiy  or 
the  Fruit  or  Confequence  of  it  felf.  The  veryAdl  of  chufing 
one  Thing  rather  than  another^  is  preferring  that  Thing,  and 
that  is  fetting  a  higher  Value  on  that  Thing.  But  that  the 
'Mind  fets  an  higher  Value  on  oneThing  than  another,is  not, 
in  the  firil  Place,  the  Fruit  of  it's  fetting  a  higher  Value  on 
that  Thing. 

This  Author  fays,  P.  36.  "  The  Will  may  be  perfectly  In- 
f**  different,  and  yet  the  Will  may  determine  it  felf  to  chufe 
*'  one  or  the  other."  And  again  in  the  fame  Page,  "  I  am 
*'  entirely  indifferent  to  either  ;  and  yet  my  Will  may  de- 
*'  termine  it  felf  to  chufe."  And  again, ''Which  I  fhall  chufe 
*'  muft  be  determined  by  the  meer  A6t  of  my  Will."  If 
the  Choice  is  determined  by  a  meer  A€t  of  V/ili,  then 
the  Choice  is  determined  by  a  meer  A(fl  of  Choice.  And 
concerning  this  Matter,  vi%.  that  the  Ad  of  the  Will  it  felf 
is  determined  by  an  A6t  of  Choice,  this  Writer  is  exprefs,  in 
P.72.  Speaking  of  the  Cafe,  where  there  is  no  fuperiour  Fit- 
nefs  in  Objedls  prefented,  he  has  thefe  Words  :  "  There  it 
«  muft  aa  by  it's  own  CHOICE,  and  determine  it  k\i  as 
it  PLEASES."    Where  it  is  fuppofed  that  the  very    Deter- 

II  jmnation^ 


38       Of  the  Will's  determinhig      Part  II. 

mination^  which  is  the  Ground  and  Spring  of  the  WilFs  Ad, 
\%  Tin  KQi  oi  Choice  2iW^  Plea  jure  ^  wherein  one  A(5t  ,is  more 
agreable,  and  the  Mmd  better  pleafed  in  it  than  another  ; 
and  this  Preference^  and  fuperiour  Pleafednefs  is  the  Ground  of  " 
all  it  does  in  the  Cafe.  And  if  fo,  the  Mind  is  not  indiffe- 
rent when  it  determines  it  k\^,  but  had  rather  do  one  Thing 
than  another,  had  rather  determine  it  felf  one  Way  than 
another.  And  therefore  the  Will  don't  ad  at  ail  in  In- 
difference ;  not  fo  much  as  in  th^  firft  Step  it  takes,  or  the  " 
firft  Rife  and  Beginning  of  it's  ading.  If  it  be  poffible  foi* 
the  Underftanding  to  a6l  in  Indifference,  yet  to  be  fure  the 
Will  never  does  ;  becaufe  the  Will's  beginning  to  ad  is  the 
very  fame  Thing  as  it's  beginning  to  chufe  or  pr  fer.  And 
if  in  the  very  iirlt  Ad  of  the  Will,  the  Mind  prefers  fome- 
thing,  then  the  Idea  of  that  Thing  prefer'd,  does  at  that 
Time  preponderate,  or  prevail  in  the  Mind  ;  or,  which  is 
the  fame  Thing,  the  Idea  of  it  has  a  prevailing  Influence  on 
the  Will.  So  that  this  wholly  deftroys  the  Thing  fuppofed, 
'vix.  That  the  Mind  can  by  a  fovereign  Power  chufe  one  of 
two  or  more  Things,  which  in  the  View  of  the  Mind  are, 
in  every  Reiped,  pcrfedly  equal,  one  of  which  does  not  at 
all  preponderate,  nor  has  any  prevailing  Influence  on  the 
Mind  above  another. 

So  that  this  Author,  in  his  grand  Argument  for  the  Abi- 
lity of  the  Will  to  chufe  one  of  two,  or  more  Things, 
concerning  which  it  is  perfedly  indifferent,  does  at  the  fame 
Time,  in  Effed,  deny  the  Thing  he  fuppofes,  and  allows 
«nd  aflerts  the  Point  he  endeavours  to  overtlirow  ;  even  that 
the  Will,  in  chufing,  is  fubjed  to  no  prevailing  Influence 
of  the  Idea,  or  View  of  the  Thing  chofen.  And  indeed  it 
is  im;:)offibl&  to  offer  this  Argument  without  overthrowing  it  ; 
the  Thing  fuppofod  in  it  being  inconfiftent  with  it  felf, 
and  that  which  denies  it  felf.  To  fuppofe  the  Will  to  ad 
at  all  in  a  State  of  perfcd  Indifference,  either  to  determine 
it  felf,  or  to  do  any  'I^hing  elfej  is  to  affert  that  the  Mind 
chufe s  without  chufing.  To  fay  that  when  it  is  indifferent, 
it  can  do  as  it  pleafes,  is  to  fay  that  it  can  follow  it's  Plea- 
fure,  when  it  has  no  Pleafure  to  follow.  And  therefore  if 
there  be  any  Difficulty  in  the  Inftances  of  two  Cakes,  or  two 
Eggs  kc.  which  are  exactly  alike,  one  as  good  as  another  ; 
concerning  which  this  Author  iuppofes  the  Mind  in  Fad  has 
a  Choice^  and  fo  in  Puffed  fuppofes  that  it  has  a  Preference ; 
it  as  much  concern'd  Himfeif  to  folve  the  Difliculty,  as  it 
"does  thofe  whom  he  oppofes.     For  if  thefe  Inftances  prove 


Sed.VI.  in  Things  indifferent.  59 

any  Thing  to  his  Purpofe,  they  prove  that  a  Man  chufes 
without  Choice.  And  yet  this  is  not  to  his  Purpoie  ;  be- 
caufe  if  this  is  what  he  allerts,  his  own  Words  are  as  much 
^gainft  him,  and  do  as  much  contradidl  him,  as  the"* Words 
of  thofe  he  difputes  againft  can  do. 

2.  There  is  no  great  Difiicuhy  in  (liewing,  in  fuch  Inftan- 
ces  as  are  ailedged,  not  only  that  it  mhfi  needs  he  fo^  that  tlie 
Mind  muft  be  influenced  m  it's  Choice,  by  fomething  that  has 
a  preponderating  Influence  upon  it,  but  aUb  how  it  is  Jo. 
A  little  Attention  to  our  own  Experieace,  and  a  diftincft 
Confideration  of  the  Ads  of  our  own  Minds  in  fuch  Cafes, 
will  be  fuflicient  to  clear  up  the  Matter. 

Thus,  fuppoling  T  have  a  Chefs-board  before  me  ;  and 
becaufe  I  am  required  by  a  Superiour,  or  defired  by  a  Friend, 
■or  to  make  fome  Experiment  concerning  my  own  Ability  and 
Jyiberty,  or  on  fome  other  Coniideration,  I  am  determined 
-to  touch  fome  one  of  the  Spots  or  Squares  on  the  2oard  with 
,my  Finger  ;  not  being  limited  or  directed  in  the  firit  Propo- 
fal,  or  my  own  firfl:  Purpofe,  which  is  general,  to  any  one 
Jn  particular ;  and  there  being  nothing  in  the  Squares  in 
themfelves  confidered,  that  recommends  any  one  of  all  the 
fixty  four,  more  than  another  :  In  this  Cafe,  my  Mind  de- 
termines to  give  it  felf  up  to  what  is  vulgarly  called  Accident^  f 
;by  determining  to  touch  that  Square  which  happens  to  be 
^mofl:  in  View,  which  my  Eye  is  efpecially  upon  at  that  Mo- 
.ment,  or  which  happens  to  be  then  moll  in  my  Mind,  or 
.which  I  fliali  be  directed  to  by  fome  other  fuch-like  Accident. 
:Here  are  feveral  Steps  of  the  Mind's  proceeding  (tho'  all 
jmay  be  done  as  it  were  in  a  Moment)  the  firji  Step  is  it's 
.^^;z<?r<?/ Determination  that  it  will  touch  one  6f  the  Squares. 
'The  next  Step  is  another  general  Determination  to  give  it  felf 
'up  to  Accident,  in  fome  certain  Way  ;  as  to  touch  that 
•which  fhall  be  mofl  in  the  Eye  or  Mind  at  that  Time,  or  to 
fome  other  fuch-like  Accident.  The  third  and  laif  Step  ^is  a 
.^rtr//W<?r  Determination  to  touch  a  certain  individual  Spot, 
even  that  Square,  which,  by  that  Sort  of  Aocident  the  Mind 

H  2  has 


I  have  elfewhere  obferved  what  that  is  which  is  vulgarly  called 
Accident;  That  it  is  Nothing  akin  to  the  Arm'mian  metaphyseal 
Notion  of  Contingenccy  fomething  not  conneded  wuh  anyThirg 
foregoing  ;  Bat  that  it  is  fomething  that  comes  to  pafs  in  the 
Courle  of  Things,  in  fome  Affair  that  Men  arc  loncerned  in, 
unforqfeen,  and  not  owing  t<j  their  Defign. 


6o        Of  the  WilTs  determining     Part  II. 

has  pitched  upon,  has  adually  offered  it  felf  bevond  others. 
Now  'tis  apparent  that  in  none  of  thefe  feveral  Steps  does 
the  Mind  proceed  in  abfolute  Indifference,  but  in  each  of 
them  is  influenced  by  a  preponderating  Inducement.  So  it  is 
in  the/r/?  Siep  ;  The  Mind's  general  Determination  to  touch 
one  of  the  fixty  four  Spots  :  The  Mind  is  not  abfolutely  in- 
different whether  it  does  fo  or  no  :  It  is  induced  to  it,  for 
the  Sake  of  making  fome  Experiment,  or  by  the  Defire  of  a 
Friend,  or  fome  other  Motive  that  prevails.  So  it  is  in  the 
fccond  Step,  The  Mind's  determining  to  give  it  felf  up  to 
Accident,  by  touching  that  which  fhall  be  moft  in  the  Eye, 
or  the  Idea  of  which  (hall  be  moil  prevalent  in  the  Mind  &c. 
The  Mind  is  not  abfolutely  indifferent  whether  it  proceeds 
by  this  Rule  or  no  \  but  chufes  it,  becaufe  it  appears  at 
tiut  Time  a  convenient  and  requifite  Expedient  in  order 
to  fulhl  the  general  Purpofe  aforefaid.  And  fo  it  is  in  the 
third  and  laft  Step,  It's  detennining  to  touch  that  indivi- 
dual Spot  which  actually  does  prevail  in  the  Mind's  View. 
The  Mind  is  not  indifferent  concerning  this  ;  but  is  influ- 
enced by  a  prevailing  Inducement  and  Reafon  ;  which  is, 
that  this  is  a  Proi'ecution  of  the  preceeding  Determination, 
which  appeared  requifite,  and  was  hx'd  before  in  the  fecond 
Siep. 

Accident  will  ever  ferve   a  Man,   without  hindring  him  a 
Mmiciii,  in    fuch  a  Cafe.     It   will    always    be  fo    among  a 
Nii:;bcr  of  Objects  in  View,    one  will  prevail    in   the  Eye, 
or  n  Idea  beyond  others.     When  we  have  our  Eyes  open  in 
the  clear  Sun  -fnme,    many  Gbjeds  flrike   the   Eye   at   once, 
and  innumf  r.^ble  Images  may  be  at  once  painted  in  it  by  the 
Kays   of  Light  ;     but   the  Attention   of    the   Mind   is  not 
equal  to  feveral  of  them  at  once  ;  or  if  it  be,   it  don't  conti- 
nue fo  for  any  Time.     And  fo   it   is   with   Refped   to   the 
Ideas  Of   the  Mind   in   general    :     Several  Ideas    are  not  in 
equal  Strcn^^th  in  the  Mind's  View  and   Notice  at  once  ;  or 
at  icafl,Gon-t  remain  fo  for  any  fenfible  Continuance.     There  ! 
is  nothing  in  the  World    more  conftantly  varying,   than  the  \ 
Ideas  of  the  Mind  :     They    don't  remain  precifely     in  the 
fame  Str.te"  for  the  leaft  perceivable    Space   of  Time  :    as  is  ^ 
evident  by  this.  That   all  perceivable  Time   is  judged   and 
perceived  by    the    Mind  only  by  the  Succeffion   or   the   fuc-  J 
ceffive   Changes   of  it's  own   Ideas.      Therefore   while    the  J 
Views  or  Perceptions  of  the  Mind   remain    precifely   in    the  1 
fame  State,  there  is   no  perceivable  Space  or  Length  of  Time,  j 
tecaufe"  no  fenfible  Succeffion  at  all. 


aJ 


Sed.VI.  in  Things  indifferent.  6i 

As  the  A<5ls  of  the  Will,  in  each  Step  of  the  fore-men- 
tioned Proceedure,  don't  come  to  pafs  without  a  particular 
Caufe,  every  Ad  is  owing  to  a  prevailing  Inducement  ;  fo 
the  Accident,  as  I  have  called  it,  or  that  which  happens  in 
the  unfearchable  Courfe  of  Things,  to  which  the  Mind 
yields  it  felf,  and  by  which  it  is  guided,  is  not  any  Thing 
that  comes  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe  ;  and  the  Mind  in  de- 
termining to  be  guided  by  it,  is  not  determined  by  fomething 
that  has  no  Cauie  ;  any  more  than  if  it  determined  to  be 
guided  by  a  Lot,  or  the  calling  of  a  Die.  For  tho'  the  Die's 
falling  in  fuch  a  Manner  be  accidental  to  him  that  cafts  it, 
yet  none  will  fuppofe  that  there  is  no  Caufe  why  it  falls  as 
it  does.  The  involuntary  Changes  in  the  Succeffion  of  our 
Ideas,  tho'  the  Caufe  may  not  be  obferved,  have  as  much 
a  Caufe,  as  the  changeable  Motions  of  the  Motes  that  float 
in  the  Air  ,  or  the  continual,  infinitely  various,  fucceflive 
Changes  of  the  Unevenneiles  on  the  Surtacc  of  the  Water. 

There  are  two  Things  efpecially,  which  are  probably  th? 
Occafions  of  Confuiion  in  the  Minds  of  them  who  infift  up- 
on it,  that  the  Will  ads  in  a  proper  Indifference,  and  with- 
out being  moved  by  any  Inducement,  in  it's  Determinations 
in  fuch  Cafes  as  have  been  mentioned. 

I.  They  feem  to  miftake  the  Point  in  Queflion,  or  at  leaft 
not  to  keep  it  diflincSlly  in  View.  The  Queflion  they  difputc 
about,  is.  Whether  the  Mind  be  indifferent  about  the  Obje£fs 
prefented,  one  of  which  is  to  be  taken,  touch'd,  pointed  to 
&c.  as  two  Eggs,  two  Cakes,  which  appear  equally  good. 
Whereas  the  Queftion  to  be  confidered,  is,  Whether  the 
Perfon  be  indifferent  with  Refpedl  to  his  own  J^iom  ;  whe- 
ther he  don't,  on  fome  Confideration  or  other,  prefer  one 
Act  with  Refpedl  to  thefe  Obje6ts  before  another.  The 
Mind  in  it's  Determination  and  Choice,  in  thefe  Cafes,  is 
not  moll  immediately  and  diredlly  converfant  about  the 
ObjeSls  prefented  \  but  the  A£is  to  he  done  concerning  thefe  Ob- 
jeds.  The  Objects  may  appear  equal,  and  the  Mind  may 
never  properly  make  any  Choice  between  them  :  But  the 
next  A6t  of  the  Will  being  about  the  external  Adlions  to 
be  performed.  Taking,  Touching  &c.  thefe  may  not  ap- 
pear equal,  and  one  A6lion  may  properly  be  chofen  before 
another.  In  each  Step  of  the  Mind's  Progrefs,  the  Deter- 
mination is  not  about  the  Obje^ls,  unlefs  mdiredly  and  im- 
properly, but  about  the  Anions,  which  it  chufes  for  other 
Reafons  than  any  Preference  of  the  Objeds,  and  for  Rea- 
fons  not  taken  at  all  from  the  Objeds. 

There 


62  Of  chtifmg  in  Things  indifferent.  Part  II. 

Therp  is  no  NoceiTity  of  fuppofing,  that  the  Mind  does 
ever  at  all  properly  chii[e  one  of  the  Objefts  before  ano- 
ther J  either  before  it  has  taken,  or  afterwards.  Indeed  the 
Man  chufes  to /^?>^^  or  /^z^^/'  one  rather  than  another;  but 
not  becaufe  it  chufes  the  Thing  taken^  cv  touch' dy  but  from 
foreign  Confiderations.  The  Cafe  may  be  fo,  that  of  two 
Things  offered,  a  Man  may,  for  certain  Reafons,  chufe 
and  prefer  the  taking  of  that  which  he  undervcdues^  and 
chufe  to  negle6t  to  take  that  which  his  Mind  prefers,  Ii> 
fuch  a  Cafe,  chufmg  the  Thing  taken,  and  chufing  to  take, 
are  diverfe  :  and  fo  they  are  in  a  Cafe  where  the  Things 
prefented  are  equal  in  the  Mind's  Eileem,  and  neither  of 
them  preferred.  All  that  Fad  and  Experience  makes  evi- 
dent, is,  that  the  Mind  chufes  one  Adion  rather  than  ano- 
ther. And  therefore  the  Arguments  which  they  bring,  in 
order  to  be  to  their  Purpofe,  ought  to  be  to  prove  that  the 
Mind  chufes  the  A6lion  in  perfedt  Indifference,  with  Refpecl 
to  that  Action  \  and  not  to  prove  that  the  Mind  chufes  the 
A6tion  in  perfed  Indifference  with  Refpe6t  to  the  0hje5f  5 
which  is  very  poffible,  and  yet  the  Will  not  ad  at  all  with- 
out prevalent  Inducement,  and  proper  Preponderation. 

2.  Another  Reafon   of  Confufion  and    Diihcuity   in   this 
Matter,  feems   to  be,  not  diflinguilhing   between    a    general 
Indifference,  or  an  Indifference  with  Refped  to  what   is    to 
be  done  in  a  more  diilant  and  general  View  of  it,  and  a  par- 
ticular Indifference,  or  an  Indifference   with   Refped  to  the 
next  immediate  Ad,   view'd  with  it's  particular  and  prefent 
Circumftances.     A  Man  may  be  perfectly  indiffer-ent   with 
Refped  to  his  own  Aciions^    in  the  former  Refped  ;    and  yet 
not  in  the  latter.     Thus,  in  the  foregoing  Inftance  of  touch- 
ing one  of  the   Squares   of  a  Chefs-board  ;   when    'tis   firfl. 
propofed  that  I  fhould  touch   one  of  them,  I   may  be  per- 
fedly  indifferent  which  I  touch    ;     becaufe    as   yet  I  view 
the  Matter  remotely  and  generally,    being    but   in   the    firfl 
Step  of  the  Mind's  Progrefs  in  the  Affair.     But  yet,  when, 
I  am  adually  come  to  the  lafl  Step,  and  the  very  next  Thing 
to  be  determined  is,  which  is  to  be  touch'd,  having   already 
determined   that   I  will  touch   that    which  happens    to   be. 
mofl:  in  my  Eye  or  Mind,  and  my  Mind  .being  now  fix'd  on  \ 
a  particular  one,  the  Ad   of  touching  that,  confidered  thus  ^ 
immediately,    and  in   thefe   particular  prefent  Circumflances^ 
is  not  what  my  Mind  is  abfolutely  indifferent  about. 


Section 


Sedl.VII.     Of  Liberty  ^t/"  Indifference.    63" 


Section     VII. 

Concerning  the  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will 
confft'ing  in  Indifference. 

X  Tt  7  HAT  has  been  faid  in  the  foregoing  Section,  has  a 
\/  1/  Tendency  in  feme  Meafure  to  evince  theAbfurdity 
»  ^  of  the  Opinion  bf  fuch  as  place  Liberty  in  Indiffe- 
rence, .or  in  that  Equilibrium  whereby  the  Will  is  without 
all  antecedent  Determination  or  Bias,  and  left  hitherto  free 
from  any  prepoffeffing  Inclination  to  one  Side  or  the  other  ; 
that  the  Determination  of  the  Will  to  either  Side  may  be 
entirely  from  it  felf,  and  that  it  may  be  owing  only  to  it's 
own  Power,  and  that  Sovereignty  which  it  has  over  it  felf, 
that  it  goes  this  Way  rather  than  that.  || 

But  in  as  much  as  this  has  been  of  fuch  long  ftanding,  and 
,has  been  fo  generally  received,  and  fo  much  infilled  on  by 
Pelagians^  Semi-Pelagians^  Jefuits^  Socin'ianSy  Jrminians^  and 
others,  it  may  delerve  a  more  full  Confideration*  And 
therefore  I  ihall  now  proceed  to  a  more  particular  and  tho- 
rough Enquiry  into  thjs  Notion. 

But 

I  Dr.  Whithy,  and  fome  other  Arminiam^  make  a  Diftinftion  of  dif- 
ferent Kinds  of  Freedom  ;  one  of  God,  and  perfeft  Spirits  above; 
another  of  Perfons  in  a  State  of  Trial.  The  former  Dr.  Whlthy 
allows  to  confill  with  Necefliiy  ;  the  latter  he  holds  to  be  without 
Neceffity  :  And  this  latter  he  fuppofes  to  be  requifite  to  our  being 
the  Subje^ls  of  Praife  or  Difpraife,  Rewards  or  Punifhments,  Pre- 
cepts and  Prohibitions,  Promifes  and  Threats,  Exhortations  and 
Dehortations,  and  a  Covenant-Treaty.  And  to  this  Freedom  he 
fuppofes  Indifference  to  be  requifite.  In  Kis  Difcourfe  on  the  iivc 
Points,  P.  299, 300,  he  fays  ;  *'  It  is  a  Freedom  (fpeaking  of  a  Free- 
**  dom  not  only  from  Co-a61ion,but  from  NeceiTity)  requifite,as  we 
"  conceive,  to  render  us  capable  of  Trial  or  Probation,  and  to 
"  render  our  Anions  worthy  of  Praife  or  Difpraife,  and  our  Per- 
"  fons  of  Rewards  or  Punifhments."  And  in  the  next  Page,fpeak- 
5ng  of  the  fame  Matter,  He  fays,  "  Excellent  to  this  Purpofe, 
•*  are  the  Words  of  Mr.  l^horndike  :  We  fay  noty  that  Indifference  is 
*'  requifite  to  a' I  Freedom y  but  to  the  Freedom  of  Man  alone  in  this 
**  State  of  Trwvail  and  Froficience  :  theGround  of  <which  isGod's  Ten' 
*'  der  of  a  Treaty,  and  Conditions  of  Pe.jce  and  Reconcilement  to  fallen 
"  Man,  together  ^vith  thofe  Precepts  and  ProhibifionSj  thofe  Promifes 
'*  and  Threat Sf  thofe  'Exhortations  6*  Dihrtatiom,  it  is  er/orced'witiJ*  . 


I 


64  0/ Liberty  conftjiing        Part  II. 

Now  left  fomc  fhould  fuppofe  that  I  don't  underftand  thofe 
that  place  Liberty  in  Indifference,  or  (hould  charge  me  with 
mifreprefenting  their  Opinion,  I  would  fignify,  that  I  am 
fenfible,  there  are  fome,  who  when  they  talk  of  the  Liberty 
of  the  Will  as  confifting  in  Indifference,  exprefs  themfelves 
as  tho'  they  would  not  be  underftood  of  the  Indifference  of 
the  Inclination  or  Tendency  of  the  Will,  but  of,  I  know 
not  what.  Indifference  of  the  Soul's  Power  of  Willing  ;  or 
that  the  Will,  with  Refpe^  to  it's  Power  or  Ability  to  chufe, 
is  indifferent,  can  go  either  Way  indifferently,  either  to  the 
right  Hand  or  left,  either  a6t  or  forbear  to  a6t,  one  as  well 
as  the  other.  Tho'  this  feems  to  be  a  Refining  only  of 
fome  particular  Writers,  and  newly  invented,  and  which 
will  by  no  Means  confift  with  the  Manner  of  Expreffion  ufed 
by  the  Defenders  of  Liberty  of  Indifference  in  general. 
And  I  wi(h  fuch  Refiners  would  thoroughly  confider,whether 
they  diftinclly  know  their  own  Meaning,  when  they  make  a 
Diltindlicn  between  Indifference  of  the  Soul  as  to  it's  Power 
or  Ahiuty  of  Willing  or  Chufing,  and  the  Soul's  Indiffe- 
rence as  to  the  Preference  or  Choice  it  felf  ;  and  whether 
they  don't  deceive  themfelves  in  imagining  that  they  have 
any  diftin6f  Meaning  at  all.  The  Indifference  of  the  Soul 
as  to  it's  Ability  or  Power  to  Will,  muft  be  the  fame  Thing 
as  the  Indifference  of  the  State  of  the  Power  or  Faculty  of 
the  Will,  or  the  Indifference  of  the  State  which  the  Soul 
it  felf,  which  has  that  Power  or  Faculty,  hitherto  remains 
in,  as  to  the  Exercife  of  that  Power,  in  the  Choice  it  (hall 
by  and  by  make. 

But   not  to  infift  any    longer    on  the   Abftrufenefs   and 

Inexplicabienefs  of  this   Diftindion  ;  let  what  will    be   fup-  j 

pofed  concerning  the  Meaning  of  them  that  make  Ufe  of  it,  i 

thus  much    muft    at  leaft    be   intended  by  Anniniam^    when  j 

they  talk  of  ladiffersnce   as    effential   to  Liberty  of  Will,  .  if  ' 

they  intend  any  Thing,    in  any   Refpedt   to   their   Purpofe,  i 

^/z.  That  it  is  fuch  an  Indifference  as   leaves   the  Will  not  | 

determined  already  ;     but   free   from   actual   Poffeffion,  and  j 

vacant   of  Predetermination,     fo   far,     that   there    may   be  j 

Room  for  tlie  Exercife  of  the   ^  elf -determining  Power   of  the  i 

Will  ;   and  that  the  Will's  Freedom  confifts  in,  or  depends  1 

upon  this  Vacancy   and  Opportunity  that  is  left  for  the  Will  i 

it  felf  to  be  the  Determiner  of  the  A<ft  that  i;>  to  be  the  free  i 

A<51.  ] 

And  3 


Seft.VL  in  IndiiFerence.  65 

And  here  I  would  obferve  in  Xhtfrji  Place,  that  to  make 
out  this  Scheme  of  Liberty,  the  Indifference  mull  be  per-* 
fe£l  and  abfolute  ;  there  muft  be  a  perfect  Freedom  from  all 
antecedent  Prepondcration  or  Inclination.  Becaufe  if  the 
Will  be  already  inchned,  before  it  exerts  it's  own  fovereign 
Power  on  it  felf,  then  it's  Inclination  is  not  wholly  owing 
to  it  felf  :  If  when  two  Oppofites  are  propofed  to  the  Soul 
for  it's  Choice,  the  Propofal  don't  find  the  Soul  wholly  in  a 
State  of  Indifference,   then  it  is  not   found  in  a   State  of  Li-^ 

berty  for  meer  Self-determination. The  leaft  Degree  of 

antecedent  Bias  muft  be  inconfiftent  with  their  Notion  of 
Liberty.  For  fo  long  as  prior  Inclination  poffeffes  the  Will, 
and  is  not  removed,  it  binds  the  Will,  fo  that  it  is  utterly 
impoffible  that  the  Will  ffould  a6l  otherwife  than  agreably 
to  ft.  Surely  the  Will  can't  a6t  or  chufe  contrary  to  a  re- 
maining prevailing  Inclination  of  the  Will.  To  fuppofs 
otherwife,  would  be  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fuppofe,  that  the 
Will  is  inclined  contrary  to  it's  prefent  prevailing  inclination^ 
or  contrary  to  what  it  is  inclmed  to.  That  which  the  Will 
chufes  and  prefers,  that,  all  Things  confidered,  it  prepon- 
derates and  inchnes  to.  It  is  equally  impoffible  for  the 
Vv^iil  to  chufe  contrary  to  it's  own  remaining  and  prefent 
preponderating  Inclination,  as  'tis  to  prefer  contrary  to  it's 
own  prefent  Preference^  or  chufe  contrary  to  it's  own  prefent 
Choice.  The  Will  therefore,  fo  long  as  it  is  under  the 
Influence  of  an  old  preponderating  Inclination,  is  not  at 
Liberty  for  a  new  free  x^ct,  or  any  Act  that  (hall  now  be 
an  A61  of  Self-determination.  The  A<5t  which  is  a  Self- 
determin'd  free  A6t,  muft  be  an  A61  v/hich  the  Will  de- 
termines in  the  Poffeffion  and  Uib  of  fuch  a  Liberty,  as  con- 
fifts  in  a  Freedom  from  every  Thing,  which,  if  it  were 
there,  would  make  it  impoffible  that  the  Will,  at  that 
Time,  Ihould  be  othervvife  than  that  Way  to  which  it 
tends. 

If  any  one  fhould  fay,  there  Is  no  Need  "that  the  In- 
difference ftiould  be  perfect  ;  but  altho'  a  former  Inclina- 
tion and  Preference  ftill  remains,  yet,  if  it  ben't  very  ftron^ 
and  violent,  poffibly  the  Strength  of  the  Will  may  oppofc 
and  overcome  it  : 

This  is  grofty  abfur'd  ;  for  the  Strength  of  the  WilU  let 
it  be  never  (o  great,  does  not  at  all  enable  it  to  ad  one  Way, 
and  not  the  contrary  Way,  both  at  the  fame  Time.  It. 
gives  it  no  fuch  Sovereignty  and  Commaad,  aS'  to  eaufe  it 


66  OfUhcxiyofWill         Part  II. 

felf  to  prefer  and  not  to   prefer  at  the  fame   Time,    or   to 
chufe  contrary    to  it's  own  prefent  Choice. 

Therefore,  if  there  be  the  lead  Degree  of  antecedent  Pre- 
ponderation  of  the  Will,  it  mufl  be  perfedly  abolilhed, 
before  the  Will  can  be  at  Liberty  to  determine  it  k\i  the 
contrary  Way.  And  if  the  Will  determines  it  4clf  the 
fame  Way,  it  was  not  a  free  Determination^  becaufe  the 
Will  is  not  wholly  at  Liberty  in  fo  doing  :  It's  Deter- 
mination is  not  altogether /r^w  it  felf  but  ,it  was  partly  de- 
termined before,  in  it's  prior  Inclination  :  And  all  the  Free- 
dom the  Will  exercifes  in  the  Cafe,  is  in  an  Increafe  of  In- 
clination, which  it  gives  it  felf,  over  and  above  what  it  had 
by  foregoing  Bias  ;  fp  much  is  from  it  felf,  and  fo  much 
is  from  perfed  Indifference.  For  tho'  the  Will  had  a  pre- 
vious Tendency  that  Way,  yet  as  to  that  additional  Degree 
of  Inclination,  it  had  no  Tendency.  Therefore  the  previ- 
ous Tendency  is  of  no  Confideration,  with  Refpe<5l  to  the 
A61:  wherein  the  Will  is  free.  So  that  it  comes  to  the  fame 
Thing  which  was  faid  at  firft,  that  as  to  the  A6f  of  the  Will, 
wherein  the  Will  is  free,  there  muft  be  perfect  Indifferencey 
or  EquiUhriu7n. 

To  illudrate  this  ;  If  w^e  fhould  fuppofe  a  fovereign  Self- 
moving  Power  in  a  natural  Body  :  But  that  the  Body  is  in 
Motion  already,  by  an  antecedent  Bias  ;  for  Inilance,  Gra- 
vitation towards  the  Center  of  the  Earth  ;  and  has  one  De- 
gree of  Motion  already,  by  Vertue  of  that  previous  Ten- 
dency ;  but  by  it's  feif-moving  Power  it  adds  one  Degree 
more  to  it's  Motion,  and  moves  fo  much  more  fwiftly  to- 
wards the  Center  of  the  Earth  than  it  would  do  by  it's  Gra- 
vity only  :  It  is  evident,  that  all  that  is  owing  to  a  felf-mov- 
jng  Power  in  this  Cafe,  is  the  additional  Degree  of  Motion  ; 
and  that  the  other  Degree  of  Motion  which  it  had  from 
Gravity,  is  of  no  Coniideratien  in  the  Cafe,  don't  help  the 
Effe^ft  ot  the  free  felf-moving  Power  in  the  leaft  ;  the  EiTecl 
is  juH:  the  fame,  as  if  the  Body  had  received  from  it  itli 
one  Degree  of  Motion  from  a  State  of  perfe6t  Reft.  So  if 
we  Ihouid  fuppofe  a  felf-moving  Power  given  to  the  Scale  of 
a  Balance,  which  has  a  Weight  of  one  Degree  beyond  the 
oppofite  Scale  ;  and  Vv'e  afcribe  to  it  an  Ability  to  add  to  it 
it\i  another  Degree  of  Force  the  fame  Way,  by  it's  felf- 
moving  Power  ;  This  is  juft  the  fame  Thing  as  to  afvribe 
to  it  a  Power  to  give  it  felf  one  Degree  of  Preponderation 
Irom  a  pcrfed  Equilibrium  ^  and  fo  much  Power  as  the 
*'  Scale 


Sed.VII.      conjtjling  in  IndifFerence.       67 

Scale  has  to  give  it  felf  an  Over-balance  from  a  perfed  E- 
quipoife,  fo  much  felf-movlng  felf-preponderatina;  Power  it 
has,  and  no  more.  So  that  it's  free  Power  this  Way  is  al- 
ways to  be  meafured  from  perfe6t  Equilibrium. 

I  need  fay  no  m.ore  to  prove,  that,  if  Indifference  be 
effen  lal  to  Liberty,  it  mull:  be  perfe6l  Indifference  ;  and 
that  fo  far  as  the  Will  is  deftitute  of  this,  fo  far  it  is  defti- 
tute  of  that  Freedom  by  which  it  is  it's  own  M after,  and  in 
a  Capacity  of  being  it's  ov/n  Determiner,  without  being  at 
all  pafiive,  or  fubjed  to  the  Power  and  Sway  of  fomething 
elfe,  in  it's  Motions  and  Determinations. 

Having  obferved  thefe  Things,  let  us  now  tr^^  whether 
this  Notion  of  the  Liberty  of  Will  conliiling  in  Indiffe- 
rence and  Equilibrium,  and  the  Will's  Self-determination 
in  fuch  a  State,    be  not  abfurd  and  inconfiftent. 

And  here  I  would  lay  down  this  as  an  Axiom  of  undoubt- 
ed Truth  ;  That  every  free  Ad  is  do7ie  i:i  a  State  of  Freedom^  and 
not  only  after  fuch  a  State.  If  an  A6t  of  the  Will  be  an  A6t 
wherein  the  Soul  is  free,  it  mull  be  exerted  in  a  State  of 
Freedom^  and  in  the  Fime  of  Freedom.  It  Vs^ill  not  fuflice,  that 
the  Acl  immediately  follows  a  State  of  Liberty  ;  but  Li- 
berty muft  yet  contmue,  and  co-exift  with  the  Acl:  ;  the  Soul 
remaining  in  Poifeffion  of  Liberty.  Becaufe  that  is  the  No- 
tion of  a  free  Act  of  the  Soul,  even  an  A6t  wherein  the  Soul 
ufes  or  exercfes  Liberty.  But  if  the  Soul  is  not,  in  the  very 
I'ime  of  the  A61:,  in  the  Foffeffion  of  Liberty,  it  can't  at 
that  Time  be  in  the  Vfc  of  it. 

Now  the  Quedion  is,  whether  ever  the  Soul  of  Man  puts 
forih  any  Act  of  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  in  a  State  of  Li- 
berty, in  that  Notion  of  a  State  of  Liberty,  vi%.  as  implying 
a  State  of  Indifference  ;  or  whether  the  Soul  ever  exerts  an 
Act  of  Choice  or  Preference,  while  at  that  very  Time 
the  Will  is  in  a  perfe6t  Equilibrium,  not  inclining  one  Way 
more  than  another.  The  very  putting  of  the  Queftion  is 
fufficient  to  ftiew  the  Abfurdity  of  the  affirmative  Anfwer  : 
For  how  ridiculous  would  it  be  for  any  Body  to  infift,  that 
the  Soul  chufe?  one  Thing  before  another,  when  at  the 
very  fame  Inftant  it  is  perfectly  indifferent  with  Refpect  to 
each. !  This  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay^  the  Soul  prefers 
one  Thing  to  another,  at  the  very  fame  I'ime  that   it  has  no 

Preference. Choice    and  Preference  can  no  more  be  in  a 

I  2  S^'^^^ 


65  Of  Liberty  of  Will        Part  11.    \ 

State  of  Indifference,  than  Motion  can  be  in  a  State  of  Red, 
or  than  the  Preponderation  cf  the  Scale  of  a   Balance    can  be     j 
in  a  State  of  Equilibriunn,     Motion  may  be  the  next  Moment     | 
afterRell  ;  but  can't  co-exift  with  it,in  a7iy,^vtn  the  %^Part  of     ' 
it.   So  Choice  may  be  immediately  after  aState  of  Inditference,     | 
but  has  no  Co-exiftence  with  it  :    Even  the  very  Beginning  of    • 
it  is  not  in  a  State  of  Indifference.     And  therefore  if  this  be 
Liberty,  no  Acl  of  the  Will,  in  any   Degree,   is   ever   per- 
formed in  a  State   of  Liberty,    or   in   the  Time   of  Liberty.    . 
Volition  and  Liberty  are  fo  far  from  agreeing  together,   and 
being  effential  one  to  another,  that  they  are  contrary   one  to 
another,   and  one  excludes  and  deftroy?  the  other,   as    much 
as  Motion  and  Reft,   Light  and  Darknefs,  or  Life    h  Death. 
$0  that  tlie  Will  ads  not  at  all,    does  not  fo  much    a^  begin 
to  ad  in  the  Time  of  fuch  Liberty  :     Freedom   is   perfectly 
fit  an  End,    and   has  ceafed  to  be,  at   the    lirft    Moment    of 
Adion  ;    and  therefore  Liberty  can't   reach   the   Action,  to  I 
affecl,  or  qualify  it,  or  give  it  a  Denomination,  or  any  Part  of  | 
i|:,  any  more  than  if  it  had  ceafed  to  be  twenty  Years   before  | 
the  Adion  began.     The  Moment    that  Liberty  ceafes  to  be,   | 
it  ceafes  to  be  a  Qualihcation  of  any  Thing.     If  Light  and  ^ 
Darknefs  fucceed  one  another  inftantaneouily.  Light  qualifies    ; 
Nothing  after  it  is  gone  out,   to   make   any^   thing   lightfome   : 
or  bright,   any  more-  gt  the  firft  Moment  of  perfect  Darknefs,  J 
than   Months  or   Years  after.      Life  denominates  Nothing  | 
vital  at  the  lirft  Moment  of  perfect  Death.     So  Freedom,  if  it  ^| 
confifts  in,    or  implies  Indifference,  can  denominate  Nothing  '\ 
free,    at  the   firft  Moment  of  Preference   or  Preponderation.  i 
Therefore  'tis  manifeft,  that  no  Liberty  which  the  Soul  is  pof-  ; 
feffed  of,  or  ever  ufes,    in  any  of  it's  Acts  of  Volition,  con-  - 
fifts  in  Indifference  ;    and  that  the  Opinion  of   fuch    as    lup-  ' 
pofe,   that  Indifference  belongs  to  the  very  Effence  of  Liberty, 
is  to  the  higheft  Degree  abfurd  and  contradictory. 

If  any  one  ftiould  imagine,  that  this  Manner  of  arguing 
ing  is  Nothing  but  Trick  and  Delufion  ;  and  'to  evade  the 
Reafoning,  fliould  fay,  that  the  Thing  wherein  the  Will  ex- 
ercifes  it's  Liberty,  is  not  in  the  Act  of  Choice  or  Prepon- 
deraticn  it  felf,  but  in  determining  it  felf  t9  a  certain  Choice 
or  Preference  ;  That  the  Act  of  the  Will  wherein  it  is  free, 
iand  ufes  it's  own  Sovereignty,  conlifts  in  it's  caufing  or  de^ 
ter mining  the  Change  ox  Tranjnion  from  a  State  of  Indifference 
to  a  ccriain  Preference,  or  determining  to  give  a  certain^ 
Turn  to  the  Balance,  which  has  hitherto  been  even  ;  ancH 
t'lat  this  Ad  the  Will  exerts  in  a  State  of  Liberty,  or  while  '^ 
the  Will  yet  remains  in  Equilibrium,   and  perfect   Mafter  o' 


3 


Scd.VII.     conjifltng  in  Indifference.        69 

it  felf  : I  fay,   if  any   One  chufes  to  exprefs   his  Notion 

of  Liberty  after  this,    or  fome  fuch  Mjfnner,    let  us  fee  if  he 
can  make  out  his  Matters  any  better  than  before. 

What  is  afferted  is,  that  the  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  in 
perfect  Equilibrium,  without  Preference,  determines  to  change 
it  felf  from  that  State,  and  excite  in  it  felf  a  certain  Choice 
or  Preference.  Now  let  us  fee  whether  this  don't  come 
to  the  fame  Abfurdity  we  had  before.  If  it  be  fo,  that 
4he  Will,  while  it  yet  remains  perfedly  Indifferent,  deter- 
mines to  put  it  felf  out  of  that  State,  and  give  it  felf  a  cer- 
tain Preponderation  ;  Then  I  would  enquire,  whether  the 
Soul  don't  determine  this  of  Choice  ;  or  whether  the  Will's 
coming  to  a  Determination  to  do  fo,  be  not  the  fame  Thing 
as  the  Soul's  coming  to  a  Choice  to  do  fo.  If  the  Soul  don't 
determine  this  of  Choice,  or  in  the  Exercife  of  Choice, 
then  it  don't  determine  it  voluntarily.  And  if  the  Soul  don't 
determine  it  voluntarily,  or  of  it's  own  Will^  then  in  what 
Senfe  does  it's  Will  determine  it  ?  And  if  the  Will  don't 
determine  it,  then  hovs^  is  the  Liberty  of  the  Will  exercifed  in 
the  Determination  ?  What  Sort  of  Liberty  is  exercifed 
by  the  Soul  in  thofe  Determinations,  wherein  there  is 
no  exercife  of  Choice,  which  are  not  voluntary,  and  wherein 
the  Will  is  not  concerned  ?— -  But  if  it  be  allowed,  that  this 
Determination  is  an  Act  of  Choice,  and  it  be  infilled  on,  that 
the  Soul,  while  it  yet  remains  in  a  State  of  perfect  Indiffe- 
rence, chufes  to  put  it  felf  out  of  that  State,  and  to  turn  it 
felf  oneWay  ;  then  the  Soul  is  already  come  to  a  Choice,and 
chufes  that  Way.  And  fo  we  have  the  very  fame  Abfurdity 
which  we  had  before.  Here  is  the  Soul  in  a  State  of  Choice, 
and  in  a  State  of  Equilibrium,  both  at  the  fame  Time  :  the 
Soul  already  chufing  one  Way,  while  it  remains  in  a  State 
of  perfe6t  Indifference,  and  has  no  Choice  of  one  Way 
more  than  the  other.—-  And  indeed  this  Manner  of  talking, 
tho'  it  may  a  little  hide  the  Abfurdity,  in  the  Obfcurity  of 
Exprelhon,  is  more  nonfenfical,  and  increafes  the  Inconfift- 
cnce.  To  fay,  the  free  A61  of  the  Will,  or  the  A6t  which 
the  Will  exerts  in  a  State  of  Freedom  and  Indifference,  does 
not  imply  Preference  in  it,  but  is  what  the  Will  does  in 
Order  to  caufing  or  producing  a  Preference,  is  as  much  as  to 
fay,  the  Soul  chufes  (for  to  Will  and  to  Chufe  are  the  fame 
1^^  Thing)  without  Choice,  and  prefers  without  Preference,  in 
border  to  caufe  or  produce  the  Beginning  of  a  Preference,  or 
the  firfl:  Choice.  And  that  is,  that  the  firft  Choice  is  ex- 
pened  without  Choice,   in  order  to  produce  it  i^\L 


70     OflAh^xty'slyinginaPower   Part II. 

If  any,  to  evade  thefe  Things,  fhould  own,  that  a  State  of 
Liberty,  and  a  State  di  Indifference  are  not  the  fame,  and 
that  the  former  may  be  without  the  latter  ;  But  fliould  fay, 
that  Indifference  is  fcill  ejfential  to  the  Freedom  of  an  Act  of 
Will,  in  fome  Sort,  namely,  as  'tis  neceffary  to  go  imme- 
diately before  it  ;  It  being  efiential  to  the  Freedom  of  an  A6t 
of  Will  that  it  fhould  directly  and  nnmediately  'arife  out  of 
a  State  of  Indifference  :  ftill  this  Vvrili  not  help  the  Caufe  of 
JrmimanUihtviy^  or  make  it  confiftent  with  it  felf.  For  if 
the  AS.  fpnngs  immediately  out  of  a  State  of  Indifference, 
then  it  do's  not  arife  from  antecedent  Choice  or  Preference.  But 
if  the  A6t  arifes  directly  out  of  a  State  of  Indifi^rence,  with- 
out any  intervening  Choice  to  chufe  and  determine  it,  then 
the  Act  not  being  determined  by  Choice,  is  not  determined 
ty  the  Will  ;  the  Mind  exercife^  no  free  Choice  in  the 
Affair,  and  free  Choice  and  free  Will  have  no  Hand  in  the 
Determination  of  the  Act.  Which  is  entirely  inconfiilent 
with  their  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of  Volition. 

If  any  fnould  fuppofe,  that  thefe  Difficulties  and  Abfurdi- 
ties  may  be  avoidec^,  by  faying,  that  the  Liberty  of  the  Mind 
confifts  in  a  Power  X.o  fufpend  the  A6t  of  the  Will,  and  fo  to 
keep  it  in  a  State  of  Indifference^  'till  there  has  been  Oppor- 
tunity for  Confideration  ;  and  fo  Ihall  fay,  that  however 
Indifference  is  not  effential  to  Liberty  in  fuch  a  Manner,  that 
the  Mind  mufr  make  it's  Choice  in  a  State  of  Indifference, 
which  is.  an  Inconfiftency,  or  that  the  A6t  of  Will  mull 
fpring  immediately  out  of  Indifference  ;  yet  Indifference  may 
be  effential  to  the  Liberty  of  Acts  of  the  Will  in  thisRefpect  \ 
viz.  That  Liberty  confifts  in  a  Power  of  the  Mind  to  for- 
bear or  fufpend  the  A6t  of  Volition,  and  keep  the  Mind  in 
a  State  of  Indifference  for  the  prefent,  'till  there  has  been 
Opportunity  for  proper  Deliberation  :  I  fay,  if  any  one 
imagines  that  this  helps  the  Matter,  it  is  a  great  Miftake  :  It 
reconciles     no  Inconfiftency,      and    reiieves     no    Difficulty 

which  the  Affair  is  attended  with. For  here  the  following 

Things  muil  be  obferved, 

I.  That  \\\\s  fufpcnding  of  Volition,  if  there  be  properly  any 
fuch  Thing,  is  it  lelf  an  AS.  px  Volition.  If  the  A/Iind  de- 
termines to  fufpend  it's  A<ft,  it  determines  it  voluntarily  ;  it 
chufes,  on  fome  Confideration,  to  fufpend  it.  And  this 
Choice  or  Determination,  is  an  Act  of  the  Will  :  And  in- 
deed it  is  fuppofed  to  be  fo  in  the  very  Hypothefis  ;  for  'tis 
fuppofed,  that  the  Liberty  of  the  Will  confifls   in   it's  Power 

to 


Sed.VlI.  to  fufpend  Volition.  7 1 

to  do  thus,  and  that  it's  doing  it  is  the  very  Thing  wherein 
the  TVill  exercifes  it's  Liberty.  But  how  can  the  Will  exercife 
Liberty  in  it,  if  it  ben't  an  A(5l  of  the  Will  ?  The  Liberty 
of  the  Will  is  not  exercifed  in  any  Thing  but  what  the  Will 
does. 

2.  This  determining  to  fufpend  a6ting  is  not  only  an  A61 
of^the  Will,  but  'tis  fuppoled  to  be  the  only  free  Act  of 
the  Will  ;  becaufe  it  is  laid,  that  this  is  the  Thing  wherein  the 
Liberty  of  the  TVill  confi/h.—^ ow  if  this  be  fo,  then  this  is 
all  the  Ad  of  Will  that  we  have  to  confider  in  this  Contro- 
verfy,  about  the  Liberty  of  Will,  and  in  our  Enquiries, 
wherein  the  Liberty  of  Man  confifts.  And  now  the  fore- 
mentioned  Difficulties  remain  :  the  former  Qiieftion  returns 
upon  us  ;  z'iz.  Wherein  confifts  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  in 
thofe  ASis  wherein  it  is  free  ?  And  if  this  Adt  of  determining 
a  Sufpenfion  be  the  only  A(5t  in  which  the  Will  is  free,  then 
wherein  confifts  the  Will's  Freedom  with  Refpe6l  to  this  A6t 
of  Sufpenfion  ?  And  how  is  Indifference  eflential  to  this  A61  ? 
The  Anfwer  muft  be,  according  to  what  is  fuppofed  in  the 
Evalion  under  Confideration,  That  the  Liberty  of  the  Will 
in  this  Kdi  of  Suipenfton,  conftfts  in  a  Power  to  fufpend  even 
this  A61:,  'till  there  has  been  Opportunity  for  thorough  Deli- 
beration. But  this  will  be  to  plunge  dirediy  into  the  grofleft: 
Nonienfe  :  for  'tis  the  A6t  of  Sufpenfion  it  felf  that  we  are 
fpeaking  of  ;  and  there  is  no  Room  for  a  Space  of  Delibe- 
ration and  Sufpenfion,  in  order  to  determine  whether  we 
will  fufpend  or  no.  For  that  fuppofes,  that  even  Sufpenfion 
it  felf  may  be  deier'd  :  V/hich  is  abfurd  ;  for  the  very  de-  ' 
ferring  the  Determination  of  Sufpenfton,  to  confider  whe- 
ther we  will  fufpend  or  no,  will  be  actually  fufpending.  For 
during  the  Space  of  Sufpenfion,  to  confider  whether  to  fuf- 
pend, the  Ad  is  ipfofa^o  fufpended.  There  is  no  Medium 
between  fufpending  to  ad,  and  immediately  ading  ;  and 
therefore  no  Poffibility  of  avoiding  either  the  one  or  the  other 
one  Moment ;  and  fo  no  Room  for  Deliberation  before  we 
do  either  of  them. 

And  befides,  this  is  attended  with  ridiculous  Abfurdity 
another  Way  :  For  now  it  is  come  to  that,  that  Liberty  con- 
I  lifts  wholly  in  the  Mind's  having  Power  to  fufpend  it's  Deter- 
I  mination  whether  to  fufpend  or  no  ;  that  there  may  be 
I  Time  for  Confideration,  whether  it  be  beft  to  fufpend.  And 
if  Liberty  confifts  in  this  only,  then  this  is  the  Liberty  under 
u  Confideration  ;  We  have  to  enquire  uov/,    how  Liberty  with 


72         Of  fufp^nding  F'oluion.        Part  II.    \ 

Refpe(5l  to  this  A6t  of  fufpending  a   Determination  of  Suf-  '] 

penfion,    confifts    in   Indifr'ercnce,     or     how  Indifference   is  |^ 

cfiential  to  it.     The  Anfwer,   according  to  the  Hypothtfis  we  ^ 

are  upon,  mud  be,   that   it  confifts  in  a  Power  oi  fufpending  ■} 

even  this  laft  mentioned  A6t,  to  have  Time  to  confider  whe-  ^ 

ther  to  fufpend  that.     And   then   the  fame  Difficulties  and  IfS 

Enquiries  return  over  again  with  Refpe6l  to  that  ;   and   fo  on  .c 

forever.     Which,   if  it  would  ihew  any  Thing,  would   fhew  ^ 

only  that  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as  a  free  A(5f.     It  drives  the  i 

Exercife  of  Freedom  back  in  hifiniium  3    and  that  is  to  drive  j 

it  out  of  the  World.  | 

And  befides  all  this,  there  is  a  Delufion,  and  a  latent  grofs  .  'i 
Contradidion  in  the  Affair  another  Way  ;  in  as  much  as  in  1 
explaining  how,  or  in  what  Refpedt  the  Will  is  free  with  I 
Pvcgard  to  a  particular  A6f  of  Volition,  'tis  faid,  that  it's 
Liberty  confifts  in  a  Power  to  determine  to  fufpend  that  ASiy  j 
"which  places  Liberty  not  in  that  Act  of  Volition  which  the '  \ 
Enquiry  is  about,  but  altogether  in  another  antecedent  h.$i,  \ 
Which  contradicts  the  Thmg  fuppofed  in  both  the  Queftion  \ 
and  Anfwer.  The  Quefi:ion  is,  wherein  confifts  the  Mind's  i 
Liberty  in  any  -particular  A^  of  Volition  ?  And  the  Anfwer,  in  | 
pretending  to  fliew  wherein  lies  the  Mind's  Libert)  in  that  I 
ASi^  in  Effe6t  fays,  it  don't  lie  in  that  Ad  at  all,  but  in  ano-  -< 
ther,  vi%,  a  Volition  to  fufpend  that  A£i.  And  therefore  the  ,ii 
Anfwer  is  both  contradidor)',  and  altogether  impertinent  and  3 
befide  the  Purpofe.  For  it  don't  fhew  wherein  the  Liberty  { 
of  the  Will  confifts  in  the  A6t  in  Qiieftion  ;  Inft:ead  of  that,  J 
it  fuppofes  it  don't  confift  in  that  Act  at  all,  but  in  another  t 
diftin6t  from  it,  even  a  Volition  to  fufpend  that  A6t,  and  take  >] 
Time  to  condder  of  it.  And  no  Account  is  pretended  to  be;  )i 
given  wherein  the  Mind  is  free  with  Refpedi  to  that  A6t,  \ 
wherein  this  Anfwer  fuppofes  the  Liberty  ef  the  Mind  in-  1 
deed  confifts,  w'z.  the  Ad  of  Sufpenfion,  or  of  determining,  ^ 
the  Sufpenfion.  / 


On  the  whole,  'tis  exceeding  manifefl:,  that  the  Liberty  of  i 
the  Mind  docs  not  confjft  in  Indifference,  and  that  Indiffe-  ^ 
rence  is  not  effential  or  neceffary  to  it,  or  at  all  belonging  to  »1 
it,  as  the  Arjninians  fuppofe  ;  that  Opinion  being  full  of  No-  C 
thing  but  Abfurdity  and  Seif-Contradidion.  t 


S  E  C  T  1^1 


T 


5e(3:.VlIL  Of  Liberty  without  ^CQt{^ity .  73 

Section    VIIL 

Concerning  the  fuppofed  Liberty  of  the  Will^ 
as  oppofite  to  all  Neceffity. 

ilS  a  Thing  chiefly  infifted  on  by  Arminians^  In  this 
Controverfy,  as  a  Thing  moft  important  and  effen- 
tial  in  human  Liberty,  that  Volitions,  or  the  A<:^ts  of 
the  Will,  are  contingent  Events  ;  underftanding  Contingence  as 
oppofite,  not  only  to  Conilraint,  but  to  all  Neceffity.  There- 
fore I  would  particularly  confider  this  Matter.     And 

1.  I  would  enquire,  w^hether  there  is,  or  can  be  any  fuch 
Thing,  as  a  Volition  which  is  contingent  in  fuch  a  Senfc, 
as  not  only  to  come  to  pafs  without  any  Neceffity  of  Con- 
ftraint  or  Co-adion,  but  alfo  without  a  Necejfity  of  Confequence^ 
or  an  infallible  Conne6tion  with  any  Thing  foregoing. 

2.  Whether,  if  it  were  fo,  this  would  at  all  help  the  Caufe 
of  Liberty. 

L  I  would  coniider  whether  Volition  is  a  Thing  that  ever 
does,  or  can  come  to  pafs,   in  this  Manner,   contingently. 

And  here  it  muft  be  remembred,  that  it  has  been  already 
(hewn,  that  Nothing  can  ever  come  to  pafs  without  a  Caufe, 
or  Reafon  why  it  exiils  in  this  Manner  rather  than  another  5 
and  the  Evidence  of  this  has  been  particularly  applied  to 
the  A(5ts  of  the  Will.  Now  if  this  be  fo,  it  wuU  demon- 
ftrably  follow,  that  the  Atfls  of  the  Will  are  never  contingent, 
or  without  Neceffity,  in  the  Senfe  fpoken  of  j  in  as  much  as 
thofe  Things  which  have  a  Caufe,  or  Reafon  of  their  Exift- 
ence,  muft  be  connected  with  their  Caufe.  This  appears  by 
the  following  Confiderations. 

I.  For  an  Event  to  have  a  Caufe  and  Ground  of  it's  Ex- 
iftence,  and  yet  not  to  be  conneded  with  it's  Caufe,  is  art 
Inconfiftence.  For  if  the  Event  ben't  connected  With  the 
Caufe,  it  is  not  dependent  on  t'e  Caufe  ;  it's  Exift- 
ence  is  a«  it  were  ioofe  from  it's  Influence,  and  may  at- 
tend it,  or  may  not  ;  it  being  a  meer  Contingence,  whe- 
ther it  follows  or  attends  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe, 
Qr  not  :     And  that  is  the  fame  Thing  as  not  to  be  depen- 

K  dent 


74        0/  thefuppofed  Liberty        Part  II. 

dent  on  it.  And  to  fay,  the  Event  is  not  dependent  on  it's 
Caufe,  is  abfurd  :  'Tis  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  it  is  not  it's 
Caufe,  nor  the  Event  the  Effe6t  of  it  :  For  Dependence  on 
the  Influence  of  a  Caufe,  is  the  very  Notion  of  an  Eftea.  If 
there  be  no  fuch  Relation  between  one  Thinj^  and  another, 
confiding  in  the  Connecftion  and  Dependence  of  one  Thing 
on  the  Influence  of  another,  thea  it  is  certain  there  is  no 
fuch  Relation  between  them  as  is  fignified  by  the  Terms 
Caufe  and  Effed.  So  far  as  an  Event  is  dependent  on  a  Caufe, 
2nd  conne6ted  with  it,  fo  much  Caufahty  is  there  in  the  Cafe, 
and  no  more.  The  Caufe  does,  or  brings  to  pafs  no  more  in 
any  Event,  than  is  dependent  on  it.  If  we  fay,  the  Con- 
necftion  and  Dependence  is  not  total,  but  partial,  and  that  the 
EfFe(5l,  tho'  it  has  fome  Connection  and  Dependence,  yet  is 
not  entirely  dependent  on  it  ;  That  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to 
fay,  that  not  all  that  is  in  theEvent  is  an  EfFe6t  of  that  Caufe, 
but  that  only  Part  of  it  arifes  from  thence,  and  Part  fome 
other  Way. 

2.  If  there  are  fome  Events  which  are  not  necefl^arily  con- 
nected with  their  Caufes,  then  it  will  follow,  that  there  are 
fome  Things  which  come  to  pafs  without  any  Caufe,  contra- 
ry to  the  Suppofition.  For  if  there  be  any  Event  which  was 
not  necefl^arily  conneded  with  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe  un- 
der fuchCircumftances,then  it  was  contingent  whether  it  would 
attend  or  follow  thelnfluence  of  theCaufe,orno  ;  It  might  have 
followed,  and  it  might  not,  when  the  Caufe  was  the  fame, 
it's  Influence  the  fame,  and  under  the  fame  Circumftances. 
And  if  fo,  why  did  it  follow,  rather  than  not  follow  ?  There, 
is  no  Caufe  or  Reafon  of  this.  Therefore  here  is  fome- 
thing  without  any  Caufe  or  Reafon  why  it  is,  viz.  the  follow- 
ing of  the  Effe<5l  on  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  with  which 
it  was  not  necefliurily  conneded.  If  there  be  a  necefl^ary 
ConnecSiion  of  the  Effed  on  any  Thing  antecedent,  then  we 
may  fuppofe  that  fom^times  the  Event  will  follow  the  Caufe, 
and  fomctimes  not,  when  the  Caufe  is  the  fame,  and  in 
every  RefpeCl:  in  tlie  fame  State  h  Circumftances.  And  what 
can  be  tiie  Caufe  and  Reafon  of  this  flrange  Phenomenon, 
even  this  Diveriity,  that  in  one  Inftance,  the  ElTecl  ftiould 
follow,  in  another  not  ?  'Tis  evident  by  the  Suppofition, 
that  this  is  wholly  without  any  Caufe  or  Ground.  Hare  is. 
fometiiing  in  the  prefent  Manner  of  the  Exiflence  of  Things, 
and  State  of  the  World,  that  is  abfolutely  without  a  Caufe. 
Which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition,  and  contrary  to  what 
has  beea  before  demonfcrated. 

P  To 


Seil.VIIL       without  all  Neceffity.  75 

3.  To  fuppofe  there  are  fome  Events  which  have  a 
Caufe  and  Ground  of  their  Exiftence,  that  yet  are  not  ne- 
cefTarily  connected  with  their  Caufe,  is  to  fuppofe  that  they 
have  a  Caufe  which  #not  their  Caufe.  Thus  ;  If  the  EiFeA 
be  not  necellarily  connected  with  the  Caufe,  with  it's  Influ- 
ence,  and  influential  Circumftances  ;  then,  as  I  obferved 
before,  'tis  a  Thing  poflible  and  fuppofable,  that  the  Caufe 
may  fometimes  exert  the  fame  Influence,  under  the  fame 
Circumrtances,  and  yet  the  Eff;:6l  not  follow.  And  if  this 
aduaily  happens  in  any  Inftance,  this  Inflance  is  a  Proof,  in 
Fad,  that  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe  is  not  fuflicient  to  pro- 
duce the  Effe6l.  For  if  it  had  been  fuilicient,  it  would  have 
done  it.  And  yet,  by  the  Suppofition,  in  another  Inflance, 
the  fame  Caufe,  with  perfecStly  the  fame  Influence,  and 
when  all  Circumflances  which  have  any  Influence,  are  the 
fame,  it  Wc^i /J//^w<?J  with  the  Eftecl.  By  which  it  is  mani- 
fell,  that  the  Effe6t  in  this  lafl:  Inftance  was  not  owing  to 
the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  but  mufl:  come  to  pafs  fome 
other  Way.  For  it  was  proved  before,  that  the  Influence 
of  the  Caufe  was  not  fufficient  to  produce  the  Effe^l.  And 
it  it  was  not  fufficient  to  produce  it,  then  the  Produdion 
of  it  could  not  be  ov/ing  to  that  Influence,  but  mud  be 
owing  to  fomcthing  elfe,    or  owing  to  Nothing.     And  if  the 

^pffedt  be  not  owing  to  the  Influence  of  the  Caufe,  then  it 
is  not  the  Caufe.  Which  brings  us  to  the  Contradidion, 
of  a  Caufe,  and  no  Caufe,  that  which  is  the  Ground  and 
Reafon  of  the  Exiflence  of  a  Thing,  and  at  the  fame  Time 
is   not   the   Ground   and  Reafon  of  it's  Exiftence,     nor  is 

1  fuiEcient  to  be  fo. 

If  the  Pvlatter  be  not  already  fo  plain  as  to  render  any 
further  Reafoning  upon  it  impertinent,  I  would  fay,  that 
I  that  which  feems  to  be  the  Caufe  in  the  fuppofed  Cafe,  can 
j  be  no  Caufe  ;  it's  Power  and  Influence  having,  on  a  full 
Trial,  proved  infuflicient  to  produce  fuch  an  Effect  :  and  it 
it  be  not  fufiicient  to  produce  it,  then  it  don't  produce  it. 
To  fay  otherwife,  is  to  fay,  there  is  Power  to  do  that  which 
there  is  not  Power  to  do.  If  there  be  in  a  Caufe  fufficient 
Power  exerted,  and  in  Circumftances  fufficient  to  produce  an 
Effed,  and  fo  the  EfFecl:  be  adually  produced  at  one  Time  ; 
Thefe  Things  all  concurring,  will  produce  the  Efl^ed  at  ail 
Times.  Andfo  we  may  turn  it  the  other  Way  ;  That  which 
proves  not  fufficient  at  one  Time,  cannot  be  fufficient  at 
another,  with  precifely  the  fame  influential  Circumftances. 
And  therefore  if  the  EfFed  follows,  it  is  not  owing  to  that 

K  2  Cauie  ; 


' 


76   Of  the  Connexion  of  the  Will  Part  II. 

Caufe  ;  imlefs  the  different  Time  be  a  Circumftance  which 
has  Influence  :  But  that  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition  ;  for 
'tis  fuppofed  that  all  Circumftances  that  have  Influence,  are 
the  fame.  And  befides,  this  would  l^to  fuppofe  the  Time 
to  be  the  Caufe  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition  of 
the  other  Thing's  being  the  Caufe.  But  if  meerly  Diverfity 
of  Time  has  no  Influence,  then  'tis  evident  that  it  is  as 
much  of  an  Abfurdity  to  fay,  the  Caufe  was  fufficient  to 
produce  the  Effed  at  one  TiAie,  and  not  at  another  ;  as  to 
fay,  that  it  is  fufiicient  to  produce  the  Effe6t  at  a  certain 
Time,  and  yet  not  fuflicient  to  produce  the  fame  EffecT:  at 
that  fame  Time. 

On  the  whole,  it  is  clearly  manifefl,  that  every  Effe6t  has 
a  neceflary  Connexion  with  it's  Caufe,  or  with  that  wliich 
is  the  true  Ground  and  Reafon  of  it's  Exifl;ence.  And 
therefore  if  there  be  no  Event  without  a  Caufe,  as  was 
proved  before,  then  no  Event  whatfoever  is  contingent  in 
the  Manner  that  Arminians  fuppofe  the  free  Ads  of  the  Will 
to  be  contingent. 


Section     IX. 

Of  theQonn^&xow  of  the  ASts  of  the  Will 
with  the  DiBates  of  the  Undcrftanding. 

!f 

IT  is  manifeft,   that  the   Ads   of  the   Will   are    none  of  i 

them  contingent  in   fuch  a   Senfe  as  to  be   without  all  ■• 

Necelfity,     or  fo   as   not   to  be   neceflary   with   a   Ne-  i 

(reflity  of  Confequence  and  Connection  ;   becaufe   every  Ad  ' 

of  the  Will  is  fome  Way  conneded  with  the  Underfl:anding,  j 
^nd  is  as  the  greateft  apparent  Good  is,in  the  Manner  which 
has  already  been  explained  ;   namely,   that  the   Soul   always     ^ 
wills  or  chufes  that  which,  in  the  prefent  View  of  the  Mmd, 
confiderecj  in  the  whole  of  that  View,    and   all  that  belongs     : 

to  it,  appears  mofl:  agreable.     Becaufe,  as  was   obferved   be-  'I 

fore.  Nothing  is  more  evident  than  that,  when  Men  ad  vo-  i< 

hintarily,  ^nd  do  what  they  pleafe,  then    they   do   what  -ap-  v 

pears  racft  agreable  to  thejji  ^  and  to  fay  otherwife,  would  ; 

be'  f] 


Sed.  IX.       with  the  Underftanding.        77 

be  as  much  as  to  affirm,  that  Men  don't  chufe  what  ap- 
pears to  fuit  them  beft,  or  what  feems  moft  pleafmg  to 
them  ;  or  that  they  don't  chufe  what  they  prefer.  Which 
brings  the  Matter  to  a  Contradi6tion. 

As  'tis  very  evident  in  it  felf,  that  the  A<5ls  of  the  Will 
have  fome  Connection  with  the  Dilates  or  Views  of  the 
Underftanding,  fo  this  is  allowed  by  fome  of  the  chief  of 
the  Arminian  Writers  :    Particularly   by  Dr.  Whitby  and  Dr. 

Samuel  Clark. Dr.  Turnbull^    tho'  a  great  Enemy  to   the 

Do6tnnc  of  NecefTity,  allows  the  fame  Thing.  In  his 
Chriftian  Phihjophy  (P.  196.)  He  with  much  Approbation 
cites  another  Philofopher,  as  of  the  fame  Mind,  in  thefc 
Words  ;  "  No  Man  (fays  an  excellent  Philofopher)  fets 
"  himfelf  about  any  Thing,  but  upon  fome  View  or  other, 
"  which  ferves  him  for  a  Reafon  for  what  he  does  ;  and 
"  whatfoever  Faculties  he  employs,  the  Underftanding,  with 
"  fuch  Light  as  it  has,  well  or  ill  informed,  conftantly 
''  leads  ;  and  by  that  Light,  true  or  falfe,  all  her  operati"\fe 
"  Powers  are  dire6ted.  The  Will  it  felf,  how  abfolute  and 
"  incontroulable  foever  it  may  be  thought,  never  fails  in 
'*  it's  Obedience  to  the  Didates  of  the  Underftanding. 
"  Temples  have  their  facred  Images  ;  and  we  fee  what  In- 
"  fiuence  they  have  always  had  over  a  great  Part  of  Man- 
"  kind  ;  Bui  in  Truth,  the  Ideas  and  Images  in  Men's 
"  Minds  are  the  invilible  Powers  that  conftantly  govern 
**  them  ;  and  to  thefe  they  all  pay  univerfally  a  ready  Sub- 
«  million." 

But  whether  this  be  in  a  juft  Confiftence  with  Themfelves, 
and  their  own  Notions  of  Liberty,  I  defire  may  now  be  im- 
partially confidered. 

Dr.  Whitby  plainly  fuppofes,  that  the  A6ls  and  Determina- 
tions of  the  Will  always  follow  the  Uriderftanding's  Appre- 
henfion  or  View  of  the  greateft  Good  to  be  obtain'd,  or  Evil 
to  be  avoided  ;  or  in  other  Words,  that  the  Determinations 
of  the  Will  conftantly  and  infallibly  follow  thefe  two  Things 
in  the  Underftanding  :  i.  The  Degree  of  Good  to  be  obtained, 
and  Evil  to  be  avoided,  propofed  to  the  Underftanding, 
and  apprehended,  viewed,  and  taken  Notice  of  by  it. 
2.  The  Degree  of  the  Underftanding s  VieWy  Notice  or  Appre- 
hcnfion  of  that  Good  or  Evil  ;  which  is  increafed  by  Atten- 
•  tion  and  Confideration.  That  this  is  an  Opinion  he  is  ex- 
ceeding peremptory  in  (  as  he  is  in  every  Opinion  which  he 
maintains  in  his  Gontroverfy  wuh  the  Calvinijis)  with  Dif- 

dain. 


78   Of  the  Connteion  of  the  Will   Part  II. 

dain  of  the  contrary  Opinion,  as  abfurd  and  felf-contra- 
di^tor)',  will  appear  by  the  following  Words  cf  his,  in  his 
Difcourfe  on  the  five  Points.* 

"  Now,  'tis  certain,  that  what  naturally  makes  the  Un- 
"  derftanding  to  perceive,  is  Evidence  propofed,  and  appre- 
«^  hended,  confidered  or  adverted  to  :  for  Nothing  elfe  can 
"•  be  requifite  to  make  us    come   to  the    Knowledge    of  the 

"  Truth. Again,  what  makes  the  Will  chufe,  is   fome- 

"  thing  approved  by  the  Underftanding ;  and  confequently 
"  appearing  to  the  Soul  as  Good.  And  whatfoever  it  re- 
"  fufeth,  is  fomething  reprefented  by  the  Underftanding, 
"  and  fo  appearing  to  the  Will,  as  Evil.  Whence  all  that 
"  God  requires  of  us  is,  and  can  be  only  this  ;  to  refufe  the 
"  Evil,  and  chufe  the  Good.  Wherefore,  to  fay  that  Evi- 
«■'  dence  propofed,  apprehended  and  confidered,  is  not  fuffi- 
"  cient  to  make  the  Underftanding  approve  ;  or  that  the 
*'  greateft  Good  propofed,  the  greateft  Evil  threatned,  \^'hen 
"  equally  believ'd  and  refleded  on,  is  not  fufficient  to  en- 
"  gage  the  Will  to  chufe  the  Good  and  refufe  the  Evil,  is 
"  in  Efred  to  fay,  that  which  alone  doth  move  the  Will  to  chufe 
'«  or  to  refufe^  is  not  fufficient  to  engage  it  fo  to  do  ;  which 
<•'  being  ccntradiaory  to  it  felf,  muft  of  NecefTity  be  falfe. 
*'  Be  it  then  fo,  that  we  naturally'  have  an  Averfation  to 
"  the  Truths  propofed  to  us  in  the  Gofpel  ;  that  only  can 
"  make  us  indifpofed  to  attend  to  them,  but  cannot  hinder 
"  our  Convidion,   when  we  do  apprehend  them,   and  attend 

"  to  them. Be  it,  that  there  is  in  us  alfo  a  Renitency   to 

*<  the  Good  we  are  to  chufe  ;  that  only  can  indifpofe  us  to 
*'  believe  it  is,  and  to  approve  it  as  our  chiefeft  Good.  Be 
"  it,  that  we  are  prone  to  the  Evil  that  we  fliould  decline  ; 
«'  that  only  can  render  it  the  more  difficult  for  us  to  be- 
"  lieye  it  is  the  worft  of  Evils.  But  yet,  what  we  do  really 
*'  believe  to  he  our  chiefiji  Good^  willjiill  'be  chofen  ;  and  what  we 
"  apprehend  to  he  the  zvorjl  of  Evils ^  will,  zvhilfl  we  do  continue 
"  under  that  Ccnvi£lion,  be  refufed  by  la.  It  therefore  can  be 
"  only  requifite,  in  order  to  thefe  Ends,  that  the  good  Spi- 
"  rit  fhould  fo  illuminate  our  Underftandings,  that  we  at- 
"  tendmg  to,  and  confidering  what  lies  before  us,  fhould 
•'  apprehend,  and  be  convinced  of  our  Duty  ;  and  that  the 
*'  Bleffings  of  the  Gofpel  (hould  be  fo  propounded  to  us,  as 
"  that  we  may  difcern  them  to  be  our  chiefeft  Good  ;  and 
"  the  Miferies  it  threatcneth,  fo  as  we  qwy  be  convinced 
"  they  are  the  worft  of  Evils  s  that  we  may  chufe  the  one, 
"  and  refufe  the  other."  Here 

*  Edit.  2d  P.  211,  212,  213. 


Seft.IX.      "With  the  Underftanding.  79 

Here  let  it  be  obferved,  how  plainly  and  peremptorily  it  is 
afferted,  that  the  greatejl  Good  propofed,  and  the  great>iji  Evil 
threatned^  when  equally  believed  and  rcfie5led  on,  is  fufficient  tj 
engage  the  Will  to  chufe  the  Good,  and  refiife  the  Evil,  and  is  that 
alone  which  doth  move  the  Will  to  chufe  or  to  refufe  ;  and  that  it  is. 
contradiSfory  to  it  felf,  to  fuppofe  otherwife  ;  and  therefore  nmft  of 
NeceJJity  he  falfe  ;  and  then  ivhat  ive  do  really  believe  to  be  our  chief- 
ejl  Good  willjTill  he  chofen,  and  what  we  apprehend  to  he  the  worfl 
9 f  Evils,  will,  whilj}  we  continue  under  that  Conviclion,  be  refufed 
by  us.  Nothing  could  have  been  faid  more  to  the  Purpofe, 
fully  to  fignify  and  declare,  that  the  Determinations  of  the 
Will  muft  evermore /ollow  the  Illumination,  Convi6lion  and 
Notice  of  the  Underftanding,  with  Regard  to  the  greateft 
Good  and  Evil  propofed,  reckoning  both  the  Degree  of 
Good  and  Evil  underftood,  and  the  Degree  of  Underftand- 
ing, Notice  and  Conviction  of  that  propofed  Good  and  Evil  ; 
and  that  it  is  thus  neceffarily,  and  can  be  otherwife  in  no  In- 
ftance  :  becauie  it  is  afferted,  that  it  implies  a  Contradidion, 
to  fuppofe  it  ever  to  be  otherwife. 

I  am  fenfible,the  Do6lor's  Aim  in  thefe  Aftertions  is  againlr 
the  CalviniJIs  ;  to  ftiew,  in  Oppofition  to  them,  that  there  is 
no  Need  of  any  phyfical  Operation  of  the  Spirit  of  God  on 
the  Will,  to  change  and  determine  that  to  a  good  Choice, 
but  that  God's  Operation  and  Afliftance  is  only  moral, 
fuggefting  Ideas  to  the  Underftanding  ;  which  he  fuppofes  to 
|r  be  enough,  if  thofe  Ideas  are  attended  to,  infallibly  to  ob- 
tain the  End.  But  whatever  his  Defign  was.  Nothing  can 
more  dire6tly  and  fully  prove,  that  every  Determination  of 
the  Will,  in  chufing  and  refufing,  is  neceffary  ;  directly  con- 
trary to  his  own  Notion  of  the  Liberty  of  the  Will.  For  if 
tlie  Determination  of  the  Will,  evermore,  in  this  Manner, 
follows  the  Light,  Convidion  and  View  of  the  Underftand- 
ing, concerning  the  greateft  Good  and  Evil,  and  this  be  that 
alone  which  moves  the  Will,  and  it  be  a  ContradicSlion  to 
fuppofe  otherwife  ;  then  it  is  neceffarily  fo,  the  Will  neceffarily 
follows  this  Light  or  View  of  the  Underftanding,  not  only 
in  fome  of  it's  Ads,  but  in  every  A6t  of  chufing  and  refu- 
fing. So  that  the  Will  don't  determine  it  felf  in  any  one  of 
it's  own  A6ls  ;  but  all  it's  A6ls,  every  A61  of  Choice  and  Re- 
fufal,  depends  on,  and  is  neceffarily  conneded  with  fome  an- 
tecedent Caufe  ;  which  Caufe  is  not  the  Will  it  felf,  nor  any 
A6t  of  it's  own,  nor  any  Thing  pertaining  to  that  Faculty, 
but  fomething  belonging  to  another  Faculty,  whofe  Ads  go 
before  the  Will,  in  all  it's  Ads,  and  govern  and  determine 
them  every  one. 

Here, 


So     Of  the  Connexion  of  the  Will  Part  II, 

Here,  if  it  (hould  be  replied,  that  altho'  it  be  true,  that 
according  to  the  Dodor,  the  final  Determination  of  the  Will 
always  depends  upon,  and  is  infallibly  conneded  with  the 
Ijnderftanding's  Convi(5lion,  and  Notice  of  the  greateft 
Good  ;  yet  the  Ads  of  the  Will  are  not  neceffary  ;  becaufe 
that  Convidion  and  Notice  of  the  Underftanding  is  firft  de- 
pendent  on  a  preceeding  A61  of  the  Will,  in  determining  to 
attend  to,  and  take  Notice  of  the  Evidence  exhibited  ;  by 
which  Means  the  Mind  obtains  that  Degree  of  Convi6tioa 
which  is  fufficient  and  tffedual  to  determine  the  confequent 
and  ultimate  Choice  of  the  Will  ;  and  that  the  Will  with 
Regard  to  that  preceeding  A6t,  whereby  it  determines  whe- 
ther to  attend  or  no,  is  not  neceffary  ;  and  that  in  this,  the 
Liberty  of  the  Will  confifis,  that  when  God  holds  forth 
fufficient  objedive  Light,  the  Will  is  at  Liberty  whether  to^ 
command  the  Attention  of  the  Mind  to  it. 

Nothing  can  be  more  weak  and  inconfiderate  than  fuch  a 
Reply  as  this.  For  that  preceeding  Ad  of  the  Will,  in  de-y 
termining  to  attend  and  confider,  ftill  is  an  A£i  of  the  Will, 
(it  is  fo  to  be  fure,  if  the  Liberty  of  the  Will  confifts  in  it,  as 
is  fuppofed)  and  if  it  be  an  Ad  of  the  Will,  it  is  an  Ad 
of  Choice  or  Refufal.  And  therefore,  if  what  the  Dodor 
afferts  be  true,  it  is  determined  by  fome  antecedent  Light  iri 
the  Underftanding  concerning  the  greateft  apparent  Good  or 
Evil.  For  he  afferts,  it  is  that  Light  which  alone  doth  ?tiove  the 
Will  to  chufe  or  refufe.  And  therefore  the  Will  muft  be  moved 
by  that  in  chufing  to  attend  to  the  objedive  Light  offered,  in 
order  to  another  confequent  Ad  of  Choice  :  fo  that  this  Ad 
is  no  lefs  neceffary  than  the  other.  And  if  we  fuppofe  ano- 
ther Ad  of  the  Will,  ftill  preceeding  both  thefe  mentioned,  to 
determine  both,ftill  that  alfo  muft  be  an  Ad  of  the  Will,&  an 
Ad  of  Choice  ;  and  fo  muft,by  the  famePrinciples,be  infallibly 
determin'd  by  fome  certain  Degree  of  Light  intheUnderftanding 
concerning  the  greateft  Good.  And  let  us  fuppofe  as  many 
Ads  of  the  Will,  one  preceeding  another,  as  we  pleafe,  yet 
they  are  every  one  of  them  neceffarily  determined  by  a  cer- 
tain Degree  of  Light  in  the  Underftanding,  concerning  the^ 
greateft  and  moft  eligible  Good  in  that  Cafe  ;  and  fo,  not 
one  of  them  free  according  to  Dr.  Whith/s  Notion  of  Free- 
dom. And  if  it  be  faid,  the  Reafon  why  Men  don't  attend 
to  Light  held  forth,  is  becaufe  of  ill  Habits  contracted  by 
evil  Ads  committed  before,  whereby  their  Minds  are  in- 
difpofed  to  attend  to,  and  confider  of  the  Truth   held   forth 

tg 


j  Sed.IX.      with  the  Underftandlng.         8i 

to  them  by  God,  the  Difficulty  is  not  at  all  r.voided  :  fiili 
:  the  Queftion  returns,  What  determined  the  -  Will  in  thofe 
^  preceeding  evil  A6ts  ?  It  mufl,  by  Dr.  IVhitbys  Principles, 
ftill  be  the  View  of  the  Underftandlng  concerning  the 
greateft  Good  and  Evil.  If  this  View  of  the  Underllanding 
be  that  alone  which  doth  move  the  Will  to  chufc  or  refufe^  as  the 
i  Do6lor  aflerts,  then  every  Acl  of  Choice  or  Refit fal^  from  a 
i  Man's  tirft  Exiftence,  is  moved  and  determined  by  thisView  j 
and  this  View  of  the  Underftandlng  exciting  and  governing 
the  Ad,  muft  be  before  the  A6t  :  And  therefore  the  Will  is 
neceftarily  determined,  in  every  one  of  it'sAcls,  from  a  Man's 
firftExiftence,by  a  Caufe  befide  theWill,  &  a  Caufethat  don't 
proceed  from,or  depend  on  any  A6t  of  the  Will  at  all.  Which 
at  once  utterly  abohfties  the  Dodor's  whole  Scheme  of  Li- 
berty of  Will  ;  and  he,  at  one  Stroke,  has  cut  the  Sinews 
of  all  his  Arguments  from  the  Goodnefs,  Righteoufnefs, 
Faithfulnefs  and  Sincerity  of  God,  in  his  Commands,  Pro- 
mifes,  Threatnings,  Calls,  Invitations,  Expoftulations  ; 
\  which  he  makes  Ufe  of,  under  the  Heads  of  Reprobation, 
Eledion,  Univerfal  Redemption,  fufficient  and  effedual 
Grace,  and  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  of  Man  ;  and  has 
enervated  aad  made  vain  all  thofe  Exclamations  againft: 
the  Dodrine  of  the  Calvinijls^  as  charging  God  with  mani- 
feft  Unrighteoufnefs,  Unfaithfulnefs,  Hypocrify,  Fallaci- 
oufnefs,  and  Cruelt}' ;  which  he  has  over,  and  over,  and  over 
again,  numberlefs  Times  in  his  Book. 

Dr.  Samuel  Clark^  in  his  Demonftration  of  the  Being  and 
Attributes  of  God,  f  to  evade  the  Argument  to-  prove  the 
NeceiTity  of  Volition,  from  it's  necelTary  Connexion  with  the 
laft  Di6tate  of  the  Underftandlng,  fuppofes  the  latter  not 
to  be  diverfe  from  the  Act  of  the  Will  it  feif.  But  if  it  be 
fo,  it  will  not  alter  the  Cafe  as  to  the  Evidence  of  the  Ne- 
ceffity  of  the  Ad:  of  the  Will.  If  the  Didate  of  the  Under- 
ftandlng be  the  very  fame  with  the  Determination  of  the 
Will  or  Choice,  as  Dr.  Clark  fuppofes,  then  this  Determi- 
nation is  no  Fruit  or  Effe6i  of  Choice  :  And  if  fo,  no  Liberty 
of  Choice  has  any  Hand  in  it :  As  to  ^Volition  or  Choice,  it 
is  neceftary  ;  That  is.  Choice  can't  prevent  it.  If  the  iaft 
Dictate  of  the  Underftandlng  be  the  fame  with  the  Deter- 
mination of  Volition  it  felf,  then  the  Exiftence  of  that  De- 
termination muft  be  neceffary  as  to  Volition  ;  in  as  much 
as  Volition  can  have  no  Opportunity  to  determine  whether 
it  ihall  exift  or  no,   it  having  Exiftence  already  before  VoJi- 

L  tioa 

^  Mt.  6.  P.  93. 


82    Of  the  Conn&daon  of  the  TFill  Part  II. 

tion  has  Opportunity  to  determine  any  Thing.  It  is  it  felf 
the  very  Rile  and  Exiftence  of  Volition.  But  a  Thing,  af- 
ter it  exilfs,  has  no  Opportunity  to  determine  as  to  it's  own 
Exiftence  -,   it  is  too  late  for  that. 

If  Liberty  confifts  in  that  which  Armmiam  fuppofe,  wz. 
in  the  Will's  determining  it's  own  A6ts,  having  free  Oppor- 
tunity, and  being  without  all  NecefTity  ;  This  is  the  lame 
as  to  fay,  that  Liberty  confifts  in  the  Soul's  having  Power 
and  Opportunity  to  have  what  Determmations  of  the  Will 
it  pleales  or  chufes.  And  if  the  Determinations  of  the  Will, 
and  the  laft  Di6tates  of  the  Underftanding  be  the  fame 
Thing,  then  Liberty  confifts  in  the  Mind's  having  Power  to 
have  what  Di6tates  of  the  Underflanding  it  pleafes,  having 
Opportunity  to  chufe  it's  own  Dictates  of  Underflanding. 
But  this  is  abfurd  j  for  it  is  to  make  the  Determination  of 
Choice  prior  to  the  Di6late  of  Underftanding,  and  the 
Ground  of  it  ;  which  can't  confifl  with  the  Di&ate  of  Un- 
derftanding's  being  the  Determination  of  Choice  it  felf. 

Here  is  no  Way  to  do  in  this  Cafe,  but  only  to  recur  to 
the  old  Abfurdity,  of  one  Determination  before  another, 
and  the  Caufe  of  it  ;  and  another  before  that,  determining 
that  ;  and  fo  on  in  infinitum.  If  the  laft  Dictate  of  the  Un- 
derftanding be  the  Determination  of  the  Will  it  felf,  and  the 
Soul  be  free  with  Regard  to  that  Dictate,  in  the  Arminian 
Notion  of  Freedom  ;  then  the  Soul,  before  that  Di6tate  of 
it's  Underftanding  exifts,  voluntarily  and  according  "to  it's 
own  Choice  determines,  in  every  Cafe,  what  that  Didate 
of  the  Underftanding  ftiall  be  ;  otherwife  that  Di6late,  as  to 
the  Will,  is  neceiTary  \  and  the  Ads  determined  by  it,  muft 
ahb  be  neceflary.  So  that  here  is  a  Determination  of  the 
Mind  prior  to  that  Dictate  of  the  Underftanding,  an  A(5l  of 
Choice  going  before  it,  chufing  and  determining  what  that 
Di6tate  of  the  Underftanding  (hall  be  :  and  this  preceeding 
Aa  of  Choice,  being  a  free  Aa  of  Will,  muft  alio  be  the 
fame  with  another  laft  Didtate  of  the  Underftanding  :  And 
if  the  Mind  alfo  be  free  in  that  Di6tate  of  Underftanding,  that 
muft  be  determined  ftill  by  another  ^    and  fo  on  forever. 

Befides,  if  the  Dictate  of  the  Underftanding,  and  De- 
termination of  the  Will  be  the  fame,  this  confounds  the  Un- 
derftanding and  Will,  and  makes  them  the  fame.  Whether 
they  be  the  fame  or  no,  I  will  not  now  difpute  ;  but  only 
would  obferve,  that  if  it  be  io^   and  the   Arminian  Notion  of 

Liberty 


J 


Sed.IX.       with  the  Underftanding.         83 

Liberty  confifts  in  a  Self-determining  Power  in  the  Under- 
ftanding, free  of  all  Neceflity  ;  being  independent,  unde- 
termined by  any  Thing  prior  to  it's  own  Acfts  and  Determi- 
nations ;  and  the  more  the  Underftanding  is  thus  indepen- 
dent, and  fovereign  over  it's  own  Determinations,  the  more 
free.  By  this  therefore  the  Freedom  of  the  Sou',  as  a  moral 
Agent,  muft  confift  in  the  Independence  of  the  Underftand- 
ing on  any  Evidence  or  Appearance  of  Things,  or  any 
Thing  whatfoever  that  ftands  forth  to  the  View  of  the  Mind, 
prior  to  the  Underftanding's  Determination.  And  what  a 
Sort  of  Liberty  is  this  !  conlifting  in  an  Ability,  Freedom 
and  Eafmefs  of  judging,  either  according  to  Evidence,  or  a- 
gainft  it  ;  having  a  fovereign  Command  over  it  felf  at  all 
Times,  to  judge,  either  agreably  or  difagreably  to  what  is 
plainly  exhibited  to  it's  own  View.  Certainly,  'tis  no  Li- 
berty that  renders  Perfons  the  proper  Subjeds  of  perfwafive 
Reafoning,  Arguments,  Expoftulatlons,  and  fuch  i.ke  moral 
Means  and  Inducements.  The  Ufe  of  which  with  A4ankind, 
is  a  main  Argument  of  the  Armimans^  to  defend  their  Notion 
of  Liberty  without  all  NecelTity.  For  according  to  this, 
the  more  free  Men  are,  the  lefs  they  are  under  the  Govern- 
ment of  fuch  Means,  lefs  fubjedt  to  the  Power  of  Evidence 
and  Reafon,  and  more  independent  on  their  Influence,  in 
their  Determinations. 

And  whether  the  Underftanding  and  Will  are  the  fame  or 
no,  as  Dr.  Clark  feems  to  fuppofe,  yet  in  order  to  maintain 
^he  Arminian  Notion  of  Liberty  without  Necelfity,  the  free 
Will  is  not  determined  by  the  Ln'-'erftandin^^-,  nor  neceftarily 
connected  w  th  the  Underftanding  ;  and  the  further  from 
iuch  Connection,  the  greater  the  Freedom.  And  when 
the  Liberty  is  full  and  compleat,  the  Determinations  of  the 
Will  have  no  Connexion  at  all  with  the  Dictates  of  the 
Underftanding.  And  if  fo,  in  vain  are  all  Applications  to 
the  Underftanding,  in  order  to  induce  to  any  free  vertuous 
Ad  ;  and  fo  in  vain  are  all  Inftrudions,  Counfels,  Invitati- 
ons, Expoftulations,  and  all  Arguments  &  Perfwafives  what- 
soever :  For  thefe  are  but  Applications  to  the  Underftanding, 
and  a  clear  and  lively  Exhibition  of  the  Objects  of  Choice 
to  the  Mind's  View.  But  if,  after  all,  the"  Will  muft  be 
ifelf-d^termined,  and  independent  on  the  Underftanding,  to 
what  Purpofe  are  Things  thus  reprefented  to  the  Underftand- 
ing, in  order  to  determine  the  Choice  ? 


Section 


84  ABs  of  the  Will  PartIL 

Section     X. 

Volitio7t  neceffarily  conneEiedwith  the  Influ-- 
ence  <?/ Motives ;  %mth  particular  Ohfer-- 
nations  on  the  great  Inconfifience  of  Mr. 
Chubb's  Afertions  andReafonings^  about 
the  Freedc7n  of  the  WilL 

THAT  every  Act  of  the  Will  has  fome  Caufe,  and  con- 
fequently  (by  what  has  been  already  proved)  has  a 
neceiTary  Connexion  with  it's  Caufe,  and  fo  is  ne- 
Ccflary  by  a  Neccffity  of  Conne61:ion  and  Confequence,  is 
evident  by  ihis,  That  every  Ad  of  the  Will  whatfoever,  is  • 
excited  by  fome  Motive  :  Which  is  manifeft,  becaufe,  if  the 
Will  or  Mind,  in  willing  and  chufing  after  ^he  Manner  that 
it  does,  is  Excited  fo  to  do  by  no  Motive  or  Inducement, 
then  it  has  no  End  which  it  prcpofes  to  it  felf,  or  purfues 
in  fo  doing  ;  it  aims  at  Nothing,  and  feeks  Nothing,  And 
if  it  feeks  Nothing,  then  it  don't  go  after  any  Thing,  or  ex- 
ert any  Inclination  or  Preference  towards  any  Thing. 
Which  brings  the  Matter  to  a  Contradjclion  ;  Becaufe  for 
the  Mind  to  will.fomething,  and  for  it  to  go  after  fomething 
by  an  A61  of  Preference  and  Inclination,  are  the  fameThing, 

But  if  every  Acft  of  the  Will  Is  excited  by  a  Motive,  then 
that  Motive  is  the  Caufe  of  the  A61  of  the  Will.  If  the  Ads 
of  the  Will  are  excited  by  Motives,   then  Motives    are   the 

Caufes   of    their   being   excited  ;     or,     which   is  the   fame  'i 

Thing,  the  Caufe  of  their  being  put  forth   into  A6t   and  Ex-  '\ 

iftenc^.     And  if  fo,  the  Exiftence  of  the  A<5ls  of  the  Will  is  i 

properly  the  Effect   of  their  Motives.     Motives  do  Nothing  ;j 

as  Motives  cr  Inducements,   but  by  their  Influence  ;'   and  fo  3 

much  as  is  done  by  their  Influence,   is   the  EfFe6t    of  them,  j 

For  that  is  the  Notion  of  an  Efled,  fomething  that  is  bro*t  i 

to  pafs«by  the  Influence  of  another  Thing.  \ 

A 
And  if  Volitions  are  properly  the  EfFe^s  of  their  Motives,  :^ 
then  they  are  neceffarily  conneded  with  theirMotives.  Every  i 
Effect  and  Event  being,  as  was  proved  before,  neceflarily  \ 
connected  with  that  which  is  the  proper  Ground  and  Reafon  i( 
of  it's  Exiflencc.     Thus  it  is  tnanifeft^  that  Volition  is  ne-  \ 

ceflary,  i 


Sed.X.        conneEled  with  Mo\\vt^.  85 

ceflary,  and  is  not  from  any  Self-determining  Power  in  the 
Will  :  The  Volition  which  is  caufed  by  previous  Motive  and 
Inducement,  is  not  caufed  by  the  Will  exercifmg  a  fovereign 
Power  over  it  felf,  to  determine,  caufe  and  excite  Volitions 
in  it  felf.  This  is  not  confiftent  with  the  Will's  ading  in  a 
State  of  Indifference  and  Equilibrium,  to  determine  it  felf  to 
a  Preference  ;  for  the  Way  in  wl^ich  Motives  operate,  is  by 
biafTmg  the  Will,  and  giving  it  a  certain  Inclination  or  Pre-. 
ponderation   one  Way. 

Here  it  may  be  proper  to  obferve,'that  Mr.  Chubby  in  his 
Colle6lion  of  Tra6ts  on  various  Subjects,  has  advanced  a 
Scheme  of  Liberty,  which  is  greatly  divided  againft  it  felf, 
and  thoroughly  fubverfive  of  it  felf  ;   and  that  many  Ways. 

I.  He  is  abundant  in  afTerting,  that  the  Will,  in  all  it's 
A(5fs,  is  influenced  by  Motive  and  Excitement  ;  and  that 
this  is  the  previous  Ground  and  Reafon  of  all  it's  Acts,  and 
that  it  is  never  otherwife  in  any  Inftance.  He  fays,  ('P.262.^ 
No  JSlion  can  take  Place  without  fome  Motive  to  excite  it.  And 
in  P. 26 3.  Volition  cannot  take  Place  without  fome  PREVIOUS  Rea- 
fon  or  Motive  to  induce  it.  And  in  P.  3 10.  A£lion  would  not  take 
Place  zuithout  fome  Reafon  or  Motive  to  induce  it  ;  it  being  abjurd  to 
fuppofe.^that  the  aSiive Faculty  would  be  exerted  without  JomePREVI- 
OUS  Reajon  to  difpofe  the  Mind  to  Adion.  So  alfo  P.  257.  And 
he  fpeaks  of  theleThings  as  VN^hat  we  may  be  abfolutely  certain 
■  of,  and  which  are  the  Foundation,  the  only  Foundation  we 
have  of  a  Certainty  of  the  moral  Perfe6tions  of  God.  P. 252, 
253»  254,  255,  261,  262,  263,  264. 

And  yet  at  the  fame  Time,  by  his  Scheme,  the  Influence 
of  Motives  upon  us  to  excite  to  Action,  and  to  be  actually  a 
Ground  of  Volition,isf^w/^^2/^«^  on  the  Volition  or  Choice  of  the 
Mind.  For  he  very  greatly  infifts  upon  it,that  in  all  freeA6tions, 
before theMind  is  the  Subje<5t  of  thofe  Volitions  whichMotives 
excite,  it  chufes  to  be  fo.  It  chufes  whether  it  will  comply 
with  the  Motive,  which  prefents  it  felf  in  View,  or  not  ;  and 
when  various  Motives  are  prefented,  it  chufes  which  it  will 
yield  to,  and  which  it  will  rejed.  So  P.  256.  Every  Man  has 
Power  to  a5i.,  or  to  refrain  from  a£iing  agreably  with^  or  contrary 
to.,  any  Motive  that  prefents.  P.  257.  Every  Man  is  at  Liberty  it 
ff^,  or  refrain  from  a£iing  agreably  with^  or  contrary  to.,  what   each 

§f  thefe  Motives^  conftderedfingly^    would  excite  him  to. Man  has 

^Power^    and  is  as  much  at  Liberty  to  rejeSf   the   Motive   that  does 
^revaily  as  he  has  Power ^   and  is  at  Liberty  to  reje^  thofe  Motives 

ibsS 


86    Inconjtfience  of  Mr.  C\mh\ys    Part  II. 

that  do  not.  And  foP.310,  311.  hi  order  to  conji'itute  amoral 
Jgent^  it  is  neceffary^  that  he  Jhould  have  Power  to  aSi^  or  to  re- 
frain from  a^ingy  upon  fuch  moral  Motives  as  he  pleafes.  And  to 
the  like  Purpole  in  many  other  Places.  According  to  thefe 
Things,  the  Will  ads  lirft,  and  chuies  or  refufes  to  com- 
ply with  the  Motive  that  is  prefented,  before  it  falls  under 
it's  prevailing  Influence  :  And  'tis  iirfl  determined  by  the 
Mind's  Pleafure  or  Choice,  what  Motives  it  will  be  induced 
bvj   before  it  is  induced   by  them. 

Nowjhow  can  thefe  Things  hang  together  ?  How  can  the 
Mind  firfl:  ad,  and  by  it's  Ad  of  Volition  and  Choice  determine 
what  Motives  (hall  be  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of  it's  Volition 
and  Choice  f  For  this  fuppofes,  the  Choice  is  already  made, 
before  the  Motive  has  it's  EfFed  ;  and  that  the  Volition  is  al- 
ready exerted,  before  the  Motive  prevails,  fo  as  adually  to  be 
the  Ground  of  the  Volition  ;  and  makes  the  prevailing  of  the 
Motive,  the  Confequence  of  the  Volition,  which  yet  it  is  the 
Ground  of.  If  the  Mind  has  already  chofen  to  comply  with 
a  Motive,  and  to  yield  to  it's  Excitement,  it  doa't  need  to 
yield  to  it  after  this  :  for. the  Thing  is  effeded  already,  that 
the  Motive  would  excite  to,  and  the  Will  is  before-hand 
with  the  Excitement  ;  and  the  Excitement  comes  in  too  late, 
and  is  needlefs  and  in  vain  afterwards.  If  the  Mind  has 
already  chofen  to  yield  to  a  Motive  which  invites  to  a  Tiling, 
that  implies  and  in  Fad  is  a  chufing  the  Thing  invited  to  ; 
and  the  very  Ad  of  Choice  is  before  the  Influence  of  the 
Motive  which  induces,  and  is  the  Ground  of  the  Choice  ; 
the  Son  is  before-hand  with  the  Father  that  begets  him  : 
The  Choice  is  fuppofed  to  be  the  Ground  of  that  Influence 
of  the  Motive,  which  very  Influence  is  fuppofed  to  be  the 
Ground  of  the  Choice.  And  fo  Vice  verfa.  The  Choice  is 
fuppofed  to  be  the  Confequence  of  the  Influence  of  ^-the  Mo- 
tive, which  Influence  of  the  Motive  is  the  Confequence  of 
that  very  Choice. 

And  befidesjif  the  Will  ads  firfl:  towards  the  Motive  before 
k  falls  under  it's  Influence,  and  the  prevailing  of  the  Motive 
■upon  it  to  induce  it  to  ad  and  chufe,  be  the  Fruit  and  Con- 
fequence of  it's  Ad  and  Choice,  then  how  is  the  Motive  a 
PREVIOUS  Ground  and  Reafon  0}  the  AB  and  Choice^  fo  that 
in  the  Nature  of  the  Things^  Volition  cannot  take  Place  without  fc?ne 
PREVIOUS  Reafon  and  Motive  to  induce  it  ,  and  that  this  Ad 
is  confequent  upon,  and  follows  the  Motive  ?  WhichThings 
Mr.  Ch'uhb  often  aflerts,  as  of  certain  and  undoubted  Truth. 

So 


SccSl.X.       Scheme  of  Liberty^  &€•  87 

So  that  the  very  fame  Motive  is  both  previous  and  confequent^ 
both  before  and  after,  both  the  Ground  and  Fruit  of  tkc 
very  fame  Thing  ! 

II.  Agreable  to  the  fore-mention'd  inconfiftent  Notion  of 
the  Will's  tirll  acting  towards  the  Motive,  chufmg  whether 
it  will  comply  with  it,  in  order  to  it's  becoming  a  Ground  of 
the  Will's  acting,  before  any  A6t  of  Volition  can  talc^ 
Place,  Mr.  Chubb  frequently  calls  Motives  and  Excitements 
to  the  Action  of  the  Will,  the  pajftve  Ground  or  Reafon  of  that 
Adion.  Which  is  a  remarkable  Phrafe  ;  than  which  I  pre- 
fume  there  is  none  more  unintelligible,  and  void  of  diftincS: 
and  confident  Meaning,  in  all  the  Writings  of  Duns^  Scotus, 
or  Thomas  Jquinas.  When  he  reprefents  the  Motive  to 
Adion  or  Volition  as  paflive,  he  muil  mean— pafTive  in  that 
Affair,  or  paflive  with  Refpe6l  to  that  A6tion  which  he 
fpeaks  of;  otherwife  it  is  Nothing  to  his  Purpofe,  or  relating 
to  the  Delign  of  his  Argument  ;  He  mull  mean  (if  that 
can  be  called  a  Meaning)  that  the  Motive  to  Volition  is  firil 
acfted  upon  or  towards  by  the  Volition,  chufing  to  yield  to  it, 
making  it  a  Ground  of  A6lion,  or  determining  to  fetch  it's 
Influence  from  thence  ;  and  fo  to  make  it  a  previous 
Ground  of  it's  own  Excitation  and  Exiftence.  Which  is 
the  fame  Abfurdity,  as  if  one  fliould  fay,  that  the  Soul  of 
Man,  or  any  other  Thing  fliould,  previous  to  it's  exifting, 
chufe  what  Caufe  it  would  come  into  Exiftence  by,  and 
fhould  ad  upon  it's  Caufe,  to  fetch  Influence  from  thence, 
to  bring  it  into  Being  ;  and  fo  it's  Caufe  fliould  be  a  paflive 
Ground   of  it's  Exiftence  ! 

Mr.  Chubb  does  very  plainly  fuppofe  Motive  or  Excitement 
to  be  the  Ground  of  the  Being  of  Volition.  He  fpeaks  of  it  as 
the  Ground  or  Reafon  of  the  EXERTION  of  an  A61  of 
the  Will,  P.  391,  &  392.  and  exprefly  fays,  that  Volition 
cannot  TAKE  PLaCE  without  fome  previous  Ground  or  Mq- 
live  to  induce  it^  P.  363.  And  he  fpeaks  of  the  Acft  as  FROM 
the  Motive^  and  FROM  THE  INFLUENCE  of  the  Motive^ 
P.  352.  and  from  the  Influence  that  the  Motive  has  on  the 
Man,  for  the  PRODUCTION  of  an  ASiion,  P.  317.  Certain- 
ly, there  is  no  Need  of  multiplying  Words  about  this  ; 
'Tis  eafily  judged,  whether  Motive  can  be  the  Ground  of 
Volition's  being  exerted  and  taking  Place,  fo  that  the 
very  Produdion  of  it  is  from  the  Influence  of  the  Motive, 
and  yet  the  Motive,  before  it  becomes  the  Ground  of  the 
Volition,   is  palfive,  or  a6ted  upon   by  the  Volition.     But 

this 


88     Inconftjience  of  Mr.  CtmWs   Part  II. 

this  I  will  fay.  That  a  Man  who  infifts  fo  much  on  Clear- 
nefs  of  Meaning  in  others,  and  is  fo  much  in  blaming 
their  Confufion  and  Inconfiftence,  ought,  if  he  was  able,  to 
have  explained  his  Meaning  in  this  Phrafe  of  p^j^^f  GV^z/W 
ef  ASiioTiy  fo  as  to  (hew  it  not  to  be  confufed  and  incon- 
iiftent. 

If  any  fhould  fuppofe,  that  Mr.  Chubby  when  he  fpeaks  of 
Motive  as  a  pajfive  Ground  of  J^fion^  don't  mean  palTive 
with  Regard  to  that  Volition  which  it  is  the  Ground  of,  but 
fome  other  antecedent  Volition  (tho'  his  Purpofe  and  Ar- 
gument, and  whole  Difcourfe,  will  by  no  Means  allow  of 
fuch  a  Suppoiition)  yet  it  would  not  help  the  Matter  in  the 
leaft.  For,  (i.)  If  we  fuppofe  there  to  be  an  A6t  of  Volition 
or  Choice,  by  which  the  Soul  chufes  to  yield  to  the  Invi- 
tation of  a  Motive  to  another  Volition,  by  which  the  Soul 
chufes  fomething  elfe  ;  both  thefe  fuppofed  Volitions  are  in 
Effect  the  very  fame.  A  Volition,  or  chufmg  to  yield  to 
the  Force  of  a  Motive  inviting  to  chufe  fomething,  comes  to 
juft  the  fame  Thing  as  chufing  the  Thing  which  the  Mo- 
tive invites  to,  as  I  obferved  before.  So  that  here  can  be  no 
Room  to  help  the  Matter,  by  a  Diftin6tion  of  two  Volitions. 
(2.)  If  the  Motive  be  pallive  with  Reiped,  not  to  the  fame 
Volition  that  the  Motive  excites  to,  but  one  truly  diftindt 
and  prior  5  yet,  by  Mr.  Chubb.,  that  prior  Volition  can't 
take  Place,  without  a  Motive  or  Excitement,  as  a  previous 
Ground  of  it's  Exiftence.  For  he  infifts,  that  //  is  ahfurd  to 
fuppofe  any  Volition  fl?ould  take  Place  without  fome  previous 
Motive  to  induce  it.  So  that  at  laft  it  comes  to  juft  the  fame 
Abfurdity  :  for  if  every  Volition  muft  have  a  previous  Mo- 
tive, then  the  very /ry?  in  the  whole  Series  muft  be  excited 
by  a  previous  Motive  ;  and  yet  the  Motive  to  that  firft  Vo- 
lition is  paffive  ;  but  can't  be  paflive  with  Regard  to  ano- 
ther antecedent  Volition,  becaufe,  by  the  Suppofition,  it  is 
the  very  firft  :  Therefore  if  it  be  paflive  with  Refpecft  to 
any  Volition,  it  muft  be  fo  with  Regard  to  that  very  Vo^ 
lition  that  it  is  the  Ground  of,    and  that   is  excited  by  it. 

III.  Tho'  Mr.  Chubb  aflerts,  as  above,  that  every  Volition 
has  fome  Motive,  and  that,  in  the  Nature  of  the  Thing.,  n$ 
Volition  can  take  Place  without  fome  Motive  to  induce  it  \  yet  he 
aflerts,  that  Volition  does  not  always  follow  the  ftrorg:ft  Mo- 
tive ;  or  in  other  Words,  is  not  governed  by  any  laperiour 
Strength  of  the  Motive  that  is  follov^^ed,  beyond  Motives  to 
the  contrary,   previous  to  the    Volition  it  feif.      His  own 

Words, 


Scd.X.         Scheme  of  Liberty y  Uc.  89 

Words,?.  258,  are  as  follows  :  "  Tho'  with  regard  to  phyfi- 
*'  cal  Caufes,  that  which  is  ftrongeft  always  prevails, 
<•  yet  it  is  otherwife  with  regard  to  moral  Caufes.  Of 
"  thefe,  fometimes  the  ftronger,  fometimes  the  weaker, 
*'  prevails.  And  the  Ground  of  this  Difference  is  evident, 
*'  namely,  that  what  we  call  moral  Caufes,  flriclly  fpeak- 
''  ing,  are  no  Caufes  at  all,  but  barely  paffive  Reafons  0^ 
*'  or  Excitements  to  the  A<5fion,  or  to  the  refraining  from 
*'  a(5ting  :  which  Excitements  we  have  Power,  or  are  at 
«  Liberty  to  comply  with  or  reje6t,  as  I  have  fhewed  above." 
And  fo  throughout  the  Paragraph,  he,  in  a  variety  of 
Phrafes,  infifls,  that  the  Will  is  not  always  determined  by  the 
ftrongeft  Motive,  unlefs  by  ftrongeft  we  prepofteroully  meaa 
adually  prevailing  in  the  Event  ;  which  is  not  in  the  Mo- 
tive, but  in  the  Will  5  but  that  the  Will  is  not  always  de- 
termined by  the  Motive  which  is  ftrongeft,  by  any  Strength 
previous  to  the  Volition  it  felf.  And  he  elfewhere  does  a- 
bundantly  affert,  that  the  Will  is  determined  by  no  fuperiouf 
Strength  or  Advantage  that  Motives  have,  from  any  Conftitu- 
tion  or  State  of  Things,  or  any  Circumftances  whatfoever, 
previous  to  the  adual  Determination  of  the  Will.  And  in- 
deed his  whole  Difcourfe  on  human  Liberty  implies  it,  his 
whole  Scheme  is  founded  upon  it. 

But  thefe   Things  cannot   ftand  together. There  is 

fuch  a  Thing  as  a  Diverfity  of  Strength  in  Motives  to  Choice, 
previous  to  the  Choice  it  felf.  Mr.  Chuhb  himfelf  fuppofes^ 
that  they  do  previoiifly  invite^  h^duce^  eix'ite  and  difpofe  the  Mind 
to  ASfion.  This  implies,  that  they  have  fomething  in  them- 
felves  that  is  inviting,  fome  Tendency  to  induce  and  difpofe 
to  Volition,  previous  to  Volition  it  itlL  And  if  they  have 
in  themfelves  this  Nature  and  Tendency,  doubtlefs  they  have 
it  in  certain  limited  Degrees,  which  are  capable  of  Diver- 
fity ;  and  fome  ha\'^  it  in  greater  Degrees,  others  in  lefs  ; 
and  they  that  have  moft  of  this  Tendency,  conlidered  with 
all  their  Nature  and  Circumftances,  previous  to  Volition, 
they  are  the  ftrongeft  Motives  ^  and  thofe  that  have  leaft,  are 
the  weakeft  Adotives. 

Now  if  Volition  fometimes  don't  follow  the  Motive  v/hich 
is  ftrongeft,  or  has  moft  previous  Tendency  or  Advantage,  ail 
Things  confidered,  to  induce  or  excite  it,  but  follows  the 
"Weakeft,  or  that  which  as  it  ftands  previoufty  in  the  Mind'» 
View,  has  leaft  Tendency  to  induce  it  ;  herein  the  Will  ap- 
parently a6ts  wholly  without  Motive,  without  any  previous 
keafon  to  difpofe  the  Mind  to  it,  contrary  to  what  the  fani:; 

M  AutU.oif 


90    Inconjipnce  of  Mr.  Chuhh\    Part  II.. 

Author  fuppofes  The  Aa  wherein  the  Will  muft  proceed 
Whout  previous  Motive  to  induce  it,  is  the  Act  ■  of  prefer- 
ring the  weakert  Motive.  For  how  abfurd  is  it  to  fayf  The 
Mind  fees  previous  Reafon  in  the  Motive,  to  pre/er  that 
-Mot  ve  before  the  other  ;  and  at  the  fame  Time  to  fuppofe,  - 
that  there  is  Nothing  m  the  Motive,  in  it's  Nature,  State,  or 
any  Circumftances  of  it  whatfoever,  as  k  (lands  in  the  pre- 
vious View  of  the  Mind,  tliat  gives  it  any  Preference  :  but 
on  the  contrary  the  other  Motive  that  ftands  in  Comprtition 
with  It,  in  all  thefe  Refpeas,  has  moft  belonging  to  it,  tha" 
IS  inviting  and  moving,  and  has  moft  of  a  Tendency  to 
Choice  and  Preference  ?  This  is  certainly  as  much  as  o 
Z'aa'VpT'""'  G'-o^nd  and  Reafon  in  the  Motive  for 
the  Aa  of  1-reterence,  and  yet  no  previous  Reafon  for  it.  Bv 
theSuppofition  astoall  that  is  m  the  two  rival  Motives 
which  tenas  to  Preference,  previous  to  the  Aa  of  Preference, 
It  IS  not  m  tnat  which  is  prefer'd,  but  wholly  ,n  the  other  • 
becaufe  appearing  fupenour  Strength,    and  all  appearing  Pre- 

Aa  of  1  reference  is  from  ^rmWx  Ground,  and  Reafin  in  the 
Motive  which  IS  preferred.  But  are  thefe  Thines  confiftent  ? 
Can  there  be  previous  Ground  in  a  Thing  for  an  Event 
that  takes  Place,  and  yet  no  previous  Tendency  in  it  to  that 
Event?  If  one  Thing  folio  .vs  another,  without  any  previ- 
ous 7  endency  to  it  s  following,  then  I  fhould  think"  it  very- 
piain,  that  it  lollows  it  without  any  Manner  of  previous  Rea- 
fon why  It  fhould  follow. 

Yea,  in  this  Cafe,  Mr.  Chulb  fuppofes,  that  the  Event 
follows  an  Antecedent  or  a  previous  Thin;.,  as  the  Ground' 
oi  it  s  txiftence,  not  only  that  has  no  Tendmcy  to  it,  but  a 
cmtrary  Tendency  1  he  Event  is  the  Preference  which  the 
Mind  gives  to  that  Motive  which  is  weaker,  as  it  ftands  in 
the  previous  View  of  the  Mind  ;  the  immediate  Antecedent 
IS  the  View  the  Mind  has  of  the  two  rival  Motives  con- 
junaiy  ;  m  which  previous  View  of  the  Mind,  all  the  Pre- 
terablenefs  or  prev.ous  Tendency  to  Preferenoe,  is  fuppofed 
to  be  on  the  other  Side  or  in  the  contrary  Motive  ;  and  alt 
the  Lnworthmef^  of  Preference,  and  fo  previous  Tendency 
to   Comparative  Neglecl,   R.yeaion  or  Undervaluing,   is  on 

It-  i'^%'^'"'^f  P"'*^"'''^  '■     ^"'ly<^t  '"*is  Viev?  of  the 
Mind  js  fuppofed  to  be  the  previom  Ground  or  Reafon  of  this    • 
Aa  or  Prererence,  exciting   itf  and  diffofmg    the  Mnd  to   it. 
\'vhich,   I  leave  the  Reader  to  judge,   whether   it   be  abfurd- 
or  not.     It  It  be  not,  then  it  is  not  abfurd  to  fay,  that   the  \ 

previous 


Sed.X.  Scheme  of  Libefy^  ^c.  91 

i)revioiis  Tendency  of  an  Antecedent  to  a  Confequent,  is  the 
Ground  and  Reafon  why  that  Confequent  docs  not  follow  ; 
^nd  the  Wart  of  a  previous  Tendency  to  m  Event,  yea,  a 
Tendency  to  the  Contrary^  is  the  true  Ground  and  Reafon 
^hy  that  Event  does  follow. 

An  Aa  of  Choice  or  Preference  is  a  comparative  ^  Aa, 
jwherein  the  Mind  ads  with  R.eference  to  two  or  moreThings 
that  are  compared,-  and  fiand  in  Competition  in  the  Mind's 
View.  If  the  Mind,  in  this  comparative  A6t,  prefers  that 
which  appears  inferiour  in  the  Comparifon,  then  the  Mind 
herein  ads  abfolutely  without  Motive,  or  Inducement,  or 
any  Temptation  whatfcever.  Then,  if  a  hungry  Man  has 
the  Offer  of  two  Sorts  of  Food,  both  which  he  finds  an  Ap- 
petite to,  but  has  a  ftronger  Appetite  to  one  than  the  other  ; 
and  there  be  no  Circumftances  or  Excittm.ents  whatfoever  in 
the  Cafe  to  induce  him  to  tske  either  one  or  the  other,  but 
meerly  his  Appetite  :  If  in  the  Choice  he  makes  between 
them,  he  chufes  that  which  he  has  leaft  Appetite  to,  and 
refuies  that  to  which  he  has  the  ilrongeft  Appetite,  this  is 
a  Choice  made  abfolutely  without  previous  Motive,  Excite- 
ment, Reafon  or  Temptation,  as  much  as  if  he  were  perfectly 
without  ali  Appetite  to  either  :  Becaufe  his  Volition  in 
this  Cafe  is  a  comparative  A6f,  attending  and  following  a 
comparative  \  iew  of  the  Food  which  he  chufes,  viewing  it 
as  related  to,  and  compared  with  the  other  Sort  of  Food,  in 
which  View  his  Preference  has  abfolutely  no  previous 
Ground,  yea,  is  againft  all  previous  Ground  and  Motive. 
And  if  there  be  any  Principle  in  Man  from  v/hence  an  Act 
of  Choice  may  arife  after  this  Manner,  from  the  fame 
Principle  Volition  may  arife  wholly  without  Motive  on  ei- 
ther Side.  If  the  Mind  in  it's  Volition  can  go  beyond  Mo- 
tive, then  it  can  go  without  Motive  :  for  when  it  is  be- 
yond the  Motive,  it  is  out  of  the  Reach  of  the  Motive, 
,  out  of  the  Limits  of  it's  Influence,  and  fo  without  Motive. 
If  Volition  goes  beyond  the  Strength  and  Tendency  of  Mor 
tive,  and  efpecially  if  it  goes  againit  it's  Tendency,  this 
dciiionftrates  the  Independence  of  Volition  or  Motive. 
And  if  fo,  no  Reafon  can  be  given  for  what  Mr.  ChiM 
fo  often  afferts,  even  that  in  the  Nature  of  Things  Volition 
,  cannot  take  Place  without   a   Motive    to   induce  it. 

If  the  mod  High  fliould  endow   a  Balance  with  Agency 

or  A6tivity  of  Nature,  in  fuch    a  Manner,  that  when   une- 

quaiWeights  are  put  into  the  Scales,  it's  Agency  could  enable 

'    .  M  2  .1^ 


92     Inconjijlence  of  Mr.  Chubb's   Part  11. 

it  to  caufe  that  Scale  to  defcend  which  has  the  lead  "Weight, 
and  fo  to  raife  the  greater  Weight  ;  this  would  clearly  de- 
jnonftrate,  that  the  Motion  of  the  Balance  do's  not  depend 
on  Weights  in  the  Scales,  at  lead  as  much,  as  if  the  Ba- 
lance fhould  move  it  felf,  when  there  is  no  Weight  in  ei- 
ther Scale.  And  the  Acftivity  of  the  Balance  which  is 
Sufficient  to  move  it  felf  againft  the  greater  Weight,  muft 
certainly  be  more  tlian  fufficient  to  move  it  when  there  is 
no  Weight  at  all. 

Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes,  that  the  Will  can't  ftir  at  all  without 
fome  Motive  ;  and  alfo  fuppofes,  that  if  there  be  a  Motive 
to  one  Thing,  and  none  to  the  Contrary,  Volition  will  in- 
fallibly follov/  that  Motive.  This  is  vertually  to  fuppofe  an 
entire  Dependence  of  the  Will  on  Motives  :  If  it  were  not 
wholly  dependent  on  them,  it  could  furely  help  it  felf  a  httle 
•without  them,  or  help  it  felf  a  little  againft  a  Motive,  with- 
out help  from  the  Strength  and  Weight  of  a  contrary  Mo- 
tive. And  yet  his  fuppofing  that  the  Will,  when  it  has  be- 
fore it  various  d|>porite  Motives,  can  ufe  them  as  it  pleafes, 
and  chufe  it's  own  Influence  from  them,  and  negledl  the 
ftrongefl:,  and  follow  the  weakeft,  fuppofes  it  to  be  wholly 
independent  on  Motives. 

It  further  appears,  on  Mr.  Chubvs  Suppofition,  that  Vo- 
lition muft  be  without  any  previous  Ground  in  any  Motive, 
thus  :  If  it  be  as  he  fuppofes,  that  the  Will  is  not  deter- 
mined by  any  previous  fuperiour  Strength  of  the  Motive, 
but  determines  and  chufes  it's  cwn  Motive,  then,  when  the 
rival  Motives  are  exactly  equal  in  Strength  and  Tendency  to 
induce,  in  all  Refpedfs,  it  may  follow  either  ;  and  may  in 
fuch  a  Cafe,  fom.etimes  follow  one,  fometimes  the  other. 
And  if  fo,  this  Diverfity  which  appears  between  the  A6l« 
of  the  Will,  is  piaiply  without  previous  Ground  in  either 
of  the  Motives  ;  for  all  that  is  previoully  in  the  Motives,  is 
fuppofed  precifely  and  perfe6f ly  the  fame,  without  any  Di- 
verfity whatfoever.  Now  perfed  Identity,  as  to  all  that  is 
previous  in  the  Antecedent,  can't  be  the  Ground  and  Rea- 
fon  of  Diverfity  in  the  Confequent.  Perfect  Identity  in  the 
pround  can't  bp  a  Reafon  why  it  is  not  followed  with  the 
fame  Confequence.  And  therefore  the  Source  of  this  Diver- 
fity of  Confequen<;e  muft  be  fought  for  eifewhere. 

And  laftly,  it  may  be  obferved,  that  however  Mr.  Chubb 
^oes  much  infift  that  no  Volition  can  tgke  Fiace  without 

fome 


I 


Sed.X.         Scheme  of  Liberty y  8cc.  93 

fome  Motive  to  induce  it,  which  previoufly  difpofes  the 
Mind  to  it  ;  yet,  as  he  alfo  iniifts  that  the  Mind  without 
Reference  to  any  previous  fuperiour  Strength  of  Motives, 
picks  and  chufes  for  it's  Motive  to  follow  ;  He  himfelf  here* 
in  plainly  fuppofes,  that  with  Regard  to  the  Mind's  Prefe- 
rence of  one  Motive  before  another,  it  is  not  the  Motive 
that  difpofes  the  Will,  but  the  Will  difpofes  it  felf  to  fol- 
low the  Motive. 

IV.  Mr.  Chubb  fuppofes  NecelTity  to  be  utterly  inconfill- 
cnt  with  Jgtncy  ;  and  that  to  fuppofe  a  Being  to  be  an  Agent 
in  that  which  is  neceiTary,  is  a  plain  Contradiction.  P. 311. 
And  throughout  his  Difcourfes  on  the  Subjed  of  Liberty,  he 
fuppofes,  that  NecelTity  cannot  confift  with  Agency  or  Free- 
dom ;  and  that  to  fuppofe  otherwife,  is  to  make  Liberty  and 
NepelTity,  A6tion  and  Paffion,  the  fame  Thing.  And  fo  he 
feems  to  fuppofe,  that  there  is  no  A6tion  ftriclly  fpeaking, 
but  Volition  ;  and  that  as  to  the  Effects  of  Volition  in 
Body  or  Mind,  m  themfelves  confidered,  being  neceiTary, 
they  are  faid  to  be  free,  only  as  they  are  the  Etfe6ts  of  an 
A61  that  is  not  neceiTary. 

And  yet,  according  to  him.  Volition  it  felf  is  the  Eff^ 
if  Volition  ;  yea,  every  A(5t  of  free  Volition  :  and  therefore 
every  Adl  of  free  Volition  muft,  by  what  has  now  been  ob  • 
ferved  from  Him,  be  neceflary.  That  every  A(5t  of  free 
Volition  is  it  felf  the  Effect  of  Volition,  is  abundantly  fup- 
pofed  by  Him.  In  P.  341,  he  fays,  "  If  a  Man  is  fuch  a 
*'  Creature  as  I  have  above  proved  him  to  be,  that  is,  if  he 
"  has  in  him  a  Power  or  Liberty  of  doing  either  Good  or 
"  Evil,  and  either  of  thefe  is  the  Subject  of  his  own  free 
"  Choice,  fo  that  he   might,    IF    HE    HAD   PLEASED, 

.  *^  have  CHOSEN  and  done  the  contrary." Here  He  fup- 
pofes, all  that  is  Good  or  Evil  in  Man  is  the  EfFecft  of  his 
Choice  ;  and  fo  that  his  good  or  evil  Choice  it  felf  is  the 
Effect  of  his  Pleafure  or  Choice,  in  thefe  Words,  He  might 
if  he  had  PLEASED^  have  CHOSEN  the  contrary.  So  in  P.356. 
"  Tho'  it  be  highly  reafonable,  that  a  Man  fhould  always 
"  chufe  the  greater  Good,  —yet  he  may,  if  he  PLEASE, 
"  CHUSE  oltherviife."  Which  is  the  fame  Thing  as  if  he 
had  faid,  He  may^  if  he  chufes^  chufe  otherwife.  And  then  he 
goes  on,  "—  that  is,  he  may,  if  he  pieafes^  chufe  what  is 
good  for  himfelf  &c."  And  again  in  the  fame  Page,  "  The 
^  Will  is  not  confined  by  the  Underftanding   to   any  parti- 

.,  "  cular  Sort  of  Ggod,  whether  greater  or   lefs  -,   but  is  at 

"  Liberty 


94     Inconftjlence  of  Mr.  Chubb's    Part  IL 

**  Liberty  to  chufe  what  Kind  of  Good  it  pleafes."—!^  there 
be  any  Meaning  in  thele  laft  Words,"  the  Meaning  mull  be 
this',  that  the  Will  is  at  Liberty  to  chufe  what  Kind  of  Good  it 
chujes  to  chufe  ;  fuppofing  the  A61  of  Choice  it  felf  deter- 
mined by  an  antecedent  Choice.  The  Liberty  Mr.  Chubb 
fpeaks  of,  is  not  only  a  Man's  having  Power  to  move  his 
Body  agreably  to  an  antecedent  Ad  of  Choice,  but  to  ufe 
or  exert  the  Faculties  of  his  Soul.  Thus,  in  P.  379.fpeaking 
of  the  Faculties  of  his  Mind,  he  fays,  "  Man  has  Power,and 
*'  is  at  Liberty  to  neglect  thefe  Faculties,  to  ufe  them  aright, 
*'  or  to  abufe  them,  as  he  pkafesy  And  that  he  fuppofes  an 
Adi  of  Choice^  or  Exercife  of  Pleafure,  properly  dijflincl 
fromy  and  antecedent  to  thofe  Ads  thus  chofen,  directing, 
commanding  and  producing  thii  chofen  Ads,  and  even  the 
Ads  of  Choice  themfelves,  is  very  plain  in  P.  283.  "  He 
"  can  command  his  JSfions  ;  and  herein  confifts  his  Liberty  ; 
"  He  can  give  or  deny  himfelf  that  Pleafure  as  he  plcafesS* 
And  P.  377.  "  It  the  Adions  of  Men  —  are  not  the  Pror- 
*'  dzice  of  a  free  Choice^  or  Eledion,  but  fpring  from  a  Neceffity 

"  of  Nature, he  cannot   in  Reafon  be  the  Objed  of  Re- 

"  ward  or  Punifhment  on  their  Apcount.  Whereas,  if 
*'  Adion  in  Man,  whether  Good  or  Evil,  is  the  Produce  of 
*'  Will  or  f-ee  Choice  ;  fo  that  a  Man  in  either  Cafe,  had  it 
«'  in  his  Power,  and  was  at  Liberty  to  have  CFIOSEN  the 
"  contrary,  he  is  the  proper  Objed  of  Reward  or  Punifli- 
*'  ment,  according:  as  he  CHUSES  to  behave  Himfelf." 
Here  in  thefe  laft  Words,  be  fpeaks  of  Liberty  ofCHUSING, 
according  as  he  CHUSES,  So  that  the  Behaviour  which  he 
fpeaks  of  as  fubjed  to  his  Choice,  is  his  chuftng  it  iQ\{^  as 
"well  as  his  external  Condud  confequent  upon  it.  And 
therefore  'tis  evident,  he  means  not  only  external  AdionSjbut 
the  Ads  of  Choice  themfelves,  when  he  fpeaks  of  all  f-ee 
Jaions^  as  the  PRODUCE  of  free  Choice,  And  this  is  abun- 
dantly  evident  in  what  he  fays  in  P.  372^  &  373. 

Now  thefe  Things  imply  a  twofold  great  Abfurdity  and 
Inconfiftence. 

I.  To  fuppofe,  as  Mr.  Chubb  plainly  does,  that  every 
free  Ad  of  Choice  is  commanded  by^  and  is  the  Produce  of 
free  Choice^  is  to  fuppofe  the  firft  free  Ad  of  Choice  belong- 
ing to  the  Cafe,  yea,  the  firft  free  Ad  of  Choice  that 
ever  Man  exerted,  tohtthe  Produce  of  an  antecedent  Ad 
of  Choice.  But  I  hope  I  need  not  labourat  all  to  convince 
my  Readers,  that  'tis  an  Abfurdity  to  fay,  the  very  firji  Ad 
is  the  Produce  of  another  Ad  that  went  befon  it. 

2.  If 


I  Sed.X.       Scheme  of  Liberty ^  &c.  95 

I 

i      2.  If  it  were  both  pofTible  and  real,  as  Mr.  Chicbh  infifts, 

T  ^  that  every  free  A<51  of  Choice   were  the  Produce  or  the  EfFe(5t 

of '  a    free  A(5t   of  Choice   ;     yet   even  then,     according  to 

his  Principles,  no  one  A61  of  Choice  would  be  free,  but  every 

one  neceriary  ;   becaufe,  every  Ad  of  Choice  being  the  Effect 

of  a    foregoing  Ad,  every   Ad  would    be  necelTarily  con- 

'j  neded  with   that  foregoing  Caufe.     For   Mr.  Chubb   himfelf 

I  fays?  P-  3^9-  "  When  the  Self-moving  Power   is   exerted,   it 

"  becomes  the  neceilary  Caufe  of  it's  Effeds." — So  that  his 

\    Notion  of  a  free  Ad,  that  is  rewardable   or  punifhable,    is  a 

y  Heap  of  Contradictions.     It   is  a  free  Act,    and  yet,  by   his 

I  own  Notion  of  Freedom,  is  neceflary  ;    and  therefore  by  him 

|j  it  is  a  Contradidion,  to  fuppofe   it  to  be  free.     According   to 

jit  him,  every  free  Ad  i$^he  Produce   of  a   free  Act  ;    fo  that 

there  mull  be  an  infinite  Number  of  free  Ads  in  Succeffion, 

without  any  Beginning,    in  an  Agent  that  has   a  Beginning. 

And    therefore   here   is    an   infinite  Number   of   free  Ads, 

every  one   of  them  free  ;    and  yet  not  any  one  of  them  free, 

i  but  every  Ad   in  the  whole  infinite  Chain   a  neceflary  EfFed. 

I'!  All  the  Ads  are  rewardable  or  punifliable,    and  yet  the  Agent 

I  cannot,  in  Reafon^be  the  Objed  of  Reward  or  Punilhment,on 

I  Account  of  any  one  of  thefe  Adions.     He   is  adivc  in  them 

all,  and  paffive  in  none  ;   yet  adive  in  none,   but  pafTive  in 

t|  all,  b'r. 

M;  V.  Mr.  Chubb  does  moft  flrenuoufly  deny,  that  Motives 
are  Caufes  of  the  Ads  of  the  Will  ;  or  that  the  moving 
Principle  in  Man  is  moved^  or  caufed  to  be  exerted  by  Motives.. 
His  Words  P.  388  &  389.  are,  "  If  the  moving  Principle  in 
«  Man  is  MOVED,  or  CAUSED  TO  BE  EXERTED, 
''  by  Ibmething  external  to  Man,  zvh'ich  all  Motives  are^  then, 
"  it  would  not  be  a  Self-moving  Principle,  feeing  it  would  be 
"  moved  by  a  Principle  external  to  it  felf.  And  to  fay,  that  a 
"  Self-moving  Principle  is  MOVED,  or  CAUSED  TO  BE 
"  EXERTED,  by  a  Caufe  external  to  it  felf,  is  abfurd  and 
*'  a  Contradidion  &c."— And  in  the  next  Page,  'tis  particu- 
larly and  largely  infifted,  that  Motives  are  Caufes  in  no  Cafe, 
that  they  are  meerly  pajfftve  in  the  ProduSlion  of  Aciion^  arid  havd 
no  Caitjality  in  the  ProduSiion  of  it,  —  no  Caufality,  to  be  the  Caufe 
$fthe  Exertion  of  the  Will. 

Now  I  defire  it  may  be  confidered,  how  this  can  pollibly 
confifis  with  what  he  fays  in  other  Places.  Let  it  be  noted 
here, 

I.Mr. 


96     Inconfiftence  of  Mr.  Chubb's     Part  II. 

1.  Mr.  Chuhh  abundantly  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  Ex- 
mtements  of  the  J^'s  of  the  Will ;  and  fays,  that  Motives  d» 
excite  Volition,  and  induce  it,  and  that  they  are  necelTary  to 
this  End  ;  that  in  the  Reafo?i  and  Nature  of  Things,  Folition  can- 
not take  Place  without  Motives  to  excite  it.  But  nov/  if  Motives 
excite  theWill,  they  move  it ;  and  yet  he  fays, 'tis  abiurd  to  fay, 
the  Will  is  moved  by  Motives.  And  again  (if  Language  is 
of  any  Significancy  at  all)  If  Motives  excite  Vohtion,  then 
they  are  the  Cauje  of  it's  being  excited  ;  and  to  caufe  Voh- 
tion  to  be  excited,  is  to  cauie  it  to  be  j>ut  forth  or  exerted^  - 
Yea,  Mr.  Chubb  fays  himfelf,  P.  317.  Motive  is  neceffary 
to  the  Exertion  of  the  adive  Faculty.  To  excite,  is  pofitively 
to  do  fomething  ;  and  certainly  that  which  does  fomtthing,  is 
the  Caufe  of  the  Thing  done  by  it.  To  create,  is  to  caufe  to 
be  created  ;  to  make,  is  to  caufe  to  be  made ;  to  kill,  is  to 
caufe  to  be  killed  ;  to  quicken,  is  to  caufe  to  be  quickened  ; 
and  to  excite,  is  to  caufe  to  be  excited.  To  excite,  is  to  be  a 
Caufe,  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe,  not  meerly  a  negative 
Occafion,  but  a  Ground  of  Exiftence  by  pofitive  Influence. 
The  Notion  of  exciting,  is  exerting  Influence  to  caufe  the 
Effe6t  to  arife  or  corne  forth  into  Exifl:ence. 

2.  Mr.  Chubb  himfelf,  P.  317,  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  the 
Ground  and  Reafon  of  Adion  BY  INFLUENCE,  and  BY 
PREVAILING  INFLUENCE.  Now,  what  can  be  meant 
by  a  Caufe,  but  fomething  that  is  the  Ground  and  Reafon  of 
a  Thing  by  it's  Influence,  an  Influence  that  is  prevalent  and 
.fo   efFedual  ? 

3.  This  Author  not  only  fpeaks  of  Motives  as  the  Ground 
and  Reafon  of  A6tion,  by  prevailing  Influence  ;  but  exprefly 
oUhQir  Influence  as  prevailing  FOR  THE  PRODUCTION 
of  an  A6tion,  in  the  fame  P.  317  :  which  makes  the  Incon- 
fiflency  fliill  more  palpable  and  notorious.  The  Produ^iow 
of  an  Eifect  is  certainly  the  Caufmg  of  an  EfFedf  ;  and  pro- 
du^ive  Influence  is  cnufal  Influence,  if  any  Thing  is  ;  And 
that  which  has  this  Influence  prevalently,  fo  as  thereby  to 
become  the  Ground  of  another  Thing,  is  a  Caufe  of  that 
Thing,  if  there  be  any  fuch  Thing  as  a  Caufe.  This  In- 
fluence, Mr,  Chubb  fays,  Motives  have  to  produce  an  Action ; 
and  yet  he  fays,  'tis  abfurd  i.nd  a  Contradidion,  to  fay  they 
are  Caufes. 

4.  In  the  fame  Page,  He  once  and  again  fpeaks  of  Mo- 
tives as  difpofmg  the  Agent  to  Adtion,  by  their  'influence.     His 

Words 


,jSed.X.        Scheme  of  Liberty^  he.  97 

Words  are  thefe  :  "  As  Motive,  which  takes  Place  in  ther 
*'  Underftandmg,  and  is  the  Produ6l  of  IntelHgence,  is 
«  NECESSARY  to  Adion,  that  is,  to  the  EXERTION  of 
*«  the  adive  Faculty,  becaufe  that  Faculty  would  not  be  ex- 
<«  erted  without  Ibme  PREVIOUS  REASON  to  DISPOSE 
*'  the  Mind  to  A6tion  ;  fo  from  hence  it  plainly  appears, 
*'  that  when  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  difpojed  to  one  A6lion  ra- 
<'  ther  than  another,  this  properly  fignifies  the  PREVAIL- 
«  ING  INFLUENCE  that  one  Motive  has  upon  a  Man 
«  FOR  THE  PRODUCTION  of  an  Aaion,  or  for  the 
*'  being  at  Reft,  before  all  other  Motives,  for  the  Prodw^ion 
**  of  the  contrary.  For  as  Motive  is  the  Ground  and  Rea- 
*«  fon  of  any  Adion,  fo  the  Motive  that  prevails,  DISPOSES 
*'  the  Agent  to  the  Performance  of  that  Adion." 

Now,  if  Motives  difpofe  the  Mind  to  Adion,  then  they 
caufe  the  Mind  to  be  ctfpofed  ;  and  to  caufe  the  Mind  to  be 
difpofed,  is  to  caufe  it  to  be  willing  ;  and  to  caufe  it  to  be 
willing,  is  to  caufe  it  to  will  ;  and  that  is  the  fame  Thing 
as  to  be  the  Caufe  of  an  A61  of  the  Will.  And  yet  this 
fame  Mr.  Chubb  holds  it  to  be  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  Motive  to  be 
a  Caufe  of  the  Ad  of  the  Will. 

And  if  we  compare  thefe  Things  together,  we  have  here 
again  a  whole  Heap  of  Inconfiftences.  Motives  are  the  previous 
Ground  and  Rcafon  of  the  A(5ts  of  the  Will  ;  yea,  the  necejfary 
Ground  &  Reafon  of  their  Exertion,  tvithout  which  they  zuiil  'not 
be  exerted,  and  cannot  in  the  Nature  of  Things  take  Place  ;  and 
they  do  excite  thefe  A6ts  of  the  Will,  and  do  this  by  a  pre^ 
vailing  Influence  ;  yea,  an  Influence  which  prevails  for  the  Pro-' 
duSiion  of  the  A5t  of  the  Will,  and  for  the  difpoftng  of  the  Mind 
to  it  :  And  yet  'tis  abfurd,  to  fuppofe  Motive  to  be  a  Caufe  of  an 
A6t  of  the  Will,  or  that  a  Principle  of  Will  is  moved  or 
caufed  to  be  exerted  by  it,  or  that  it  has  any  Caufality  in  the  Pro- 
du£tion  of  it,  or  any  Caufality  to  be  the  Caufe  of  the  Exertion  of 
the  Will 

A  due  Confideration  of  thefe  Things  which  Mr.  Chubb  has 
advanced,  the  ftrange  Inconfiftences  which  the  Notion  of  Li- 
berty confifting  in  the  Will's  Power  of  Self-determination 
void  of  all  Ncceffity,  united  with  that  Dictate  of  common 
Senfe,  that  there  can  be  no  Volition  without  a  Motive,  drove 
him  into,may  be  fufficient  to  convince  us,that  it  is  utterly  im- 
poffible  ever  to  make  that  Notion  of  Liberty  confiftent  with 
the  Influence  of  Motives  in  Volition.     And  as  it  is  iU  a  man- 

N  t^-^T 


98       GOD  certamly  foreknows     Part  II  • 

ner  felf-evldent,  that  there  can  be  no  A6t  of  Will,  Choice 
or  Preference  of  the  Mind,  without  fome  Motive  or  Induce- 
ment, fomething  in  the  Mind's  View,  which  it  aims  at, 
feeks,  inclines  to,  and  goes  after  ;  fo  'tis  moll  manifeft, 
there  is  no  fuch  Liberty  in  the  Univerfe  as  Arrninlatis  inlift 
on  ;   nor  any  fuch  Thing  poliibie,   or  conceivable. 


Section    XL 

77je  Evidence  of  GOD' s  certain  Foreknow- 
ledge of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents. 

THAT   the  A(5ls  of  the  Wills  of  moral  Agents  are  not 
contingent  Events,  in  that  Senfe,   as   to  be  without   all 
Necellity,  appears  by  God's  certain  Foreknowledge   of 
fuch  Events. 

In  handhng  this  Argument,!  would  in  the/?;/?  Place  prove, 
that  God  has  a  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  voluntary  A(5ts 
of  moral  Agents  ;  and  fecondly^  Ihew  the  Confequence,  or 
how  it  follows  from  hence,  that  the  Volitions  of  moral  A- 
gents  are  not  contingent,  fo  as  to  be  without  NecelTity  of 
Connedtion  and  Confequence. 

First,  I  am  to  prove,  that  God  has  an  abfolute  and  cer* 
tain  Foreknowledge  of  the  free  Acftions  of  moral  Agents. 

One  would  think,  it  fhould  be  wholly  needlefs  to  enter  on 
fuch  anArgument  with  any  that  profefs  themfelves  Chriilians  : 
But  fo  it  is  ;  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  free  A6ts 
of  moral  Agents,  is  denied  by  fome  that  pretend  to  believe 
the  Scriptures  to  be  the  Word  of  God  ;  and  efpecially  of 
late.  I  therefore  Ihall  confider  the  Evidence  of  fuch  a  Pre- 
fcience  in  the  moit  High,  as  fully  as  the  defigned  Limits  of 
this  EiTay  will  admit  of ;  [fuppo  mg  my  felf  herein  to  have 
lo  do  with  fuch  as  own  the  Truta  of  the  Bible. 

Arg.  I.  Myfi'/?  Argument  fliall  be  taken  from  God's 
Prediclicn  of  fuch  Events  Here  I  would  in  the  firft  Place 
iay  down  thefe  tv/o  Things  as  Axioms. 

(I.)  If 


kii 


Se5:.XI.   the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.    99 

(i.)  If  God  don't  foreknow.  He  can't  foretell  fuch  Events  ; 
that  is,  He  can't  peremptorily  and  certainly  foretell  thtm. 
If  God  has  no  more  than  an  uncertain  Guefs  concernixng 
Events  of  this  Kind,  then  He  can  declare  no  more  than  an 
uncertain  Guefs.  Politively  to  foretell,  is  to  profefs  to  fore- 
know, or  to  declare  pofitive  Foreknowlege. 

(2.)  If  God  don't  certainly  foreknow  the  future  Volitions 
of  moral  Agents,  then  neither  can  He  certainly  foreknow 
thofe  Events  which  are  confequent  and  dependent  on  thefe 
Volitions.  The  Exiiience  of  the  one  depending  on  the 
Exii^ence  of  the  other,  the  Knowledge  of  tlie  Exiilence  of 
the  one  depends  on  the  Knowledge  of  the  Exigence  of  the 
other  i   and  the  one  can't  be  more  certain  than  the  other. 

Therefore,  how  many,  how  great,  and  how  extenfive  fo- 
cver  the  Confcquences  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents 
may  be  ;  tho'  they  Ihould  extend  to  an  Alterat'on  of  the  State 
of  Things  through  the  Univerfe,  and  ih.cJ.d  be  continued 
in  a  Series  of  fucceffive  Events  to  all  Eternity,  and  fliould 
in  the  Progrefs  of  Things  branch  forth  into  an  infinite  Num- 
ber of  Series,  each  of  tnem  going  on  in  an  endlefs  Line  or 
Chain  of  Events  ;  God  muft  be  as  ignorant  of  all  thefe  Con- 
fcquences, as  He  is  of  the  Volition  w^hence  they  firft  take 
their  Rife  :  All  thefe  Events,  and  the  whole  State  of  Things 
depending  on  them,  how  important,  extenfive  and  vaft  fo-^ 
ever,  mult  be  hid  from  him. 

Thefe  Pofitions  being  fuch  as  I  fuppofe  none  will  deny,  I 
now  proceed  to  obfer\^e  the  following  Things. 

I.  Men's  moral  Condu6l  and  Qualities,  their  Vertues 
■  and  Vices,  their  Wickednefs  and  good  Pra6tice,  Things  re- 
wardable  and  punifhable,  have  often  been  foretold  by  God. — 
Pharaoh's  moral  Conduct,  in  refufing  to  obr.y  G:  ci  s  Com- 
mand, in  letting  his  People  go,  was  foretold.  God  fays  to 
Mofesy  Exod.  iii.  19.  /  am  fur e^  that  the  King  ^  Egypt  zvill  not 
let  you  go.  Here  God  profelTes  not  only  to  guefs  at,  but  to 
know  Pharaoh's  future  Difobedience.  In  Chap.  vii.  4.  God 
fays,  But  Pharaoh  JJjall  not  hearken  unto  you  ;  that  I  may  lay 
mine  Hand  upon  Egypt,  &c.  And  Chap.  ix.  30.  Mofcs  fays  to 
Pharaoh,  As  for  thee^  and  thy  Servant Sy  I  KNOW  that  ye  zviil 
not  fear  the  Lord.  See  alfo  Chap.  xi.  9.  —  The  moral  Con- 
duct of  Joftahy  by  Name,  in  his  zealoufly  exerting  himfelf  iri 
Oppofition  to  Idolatr)',  in  particular  Awts  oi  his,  was  ffiretold 

N  2  above 


I  CO     GOD  certainly  foreknows     Part  II. 


li 


above  three  Hundred   Years  before   he  was   born,    and   the 

Prophecy  feal'd   by  a  Miracle,    and   renewed    and    confirm-  ■\ 

ed  by  the  Words  of  a  fecond  Prophet,    as  what  furely  would  i 

not  fail,  I  K^ngs  xiii.  i,— -6,  32.      This   Prophecy  was    alfo  1 

in  EfFe6t  a  Predidion  of  the  moral  Condud   of  the  People,  1 

in  upholding  their  Schifmatical    and  Idolatrous  Worfhip  'till  i 

that  Time,  and  the  Idolatry   of  thofe   Priefts   of   the   high  ! 

Places,   which  it  is   foretold  Jofiah  fhould   offer   upon   that  ti 

Altar  oi  Bethel.— Micaiah  foretold  the  foclifh  and  fmful  Con-  J 

<lu6f  of  Jhab^    in  refufing    to  hearken   to  the  Word   of  the  & 

Lord   by  him,   and   chufing   rather   to  hearken   to  the  falfe  % 

Prophets,  in  going  to  Raymth-Gilwd  to  his  Ruin,    i  Kings  xxi.  }! 

20,-— 22.— The  moral  Condud   of  Hazael  was  foretold,    in  i 

that  Cruelty  he  (hculd    be  guilty  of  ;   on  which  Hazael  fays,  ^  | 
IP^hat.,  is  thy  Servant  a  Dog^   that  he  fnould  do  this  Thing!     The*} 

Prophet  fpeaks  of  the  Event  as  what  he  knew,  and  not  what  t 

he  conjeclured.     2  Kings  viii.  12.  I  know  the  Evil  thou  wilt  do  \ 

f4nto  the  Children  of  Ifrael  :  Thou  wilt  dafo  their  Children^   and  rip  \ 

tip  their  Women  with  Child. The  moral  Condud  of  Cyrus  is  ! 

foretold,  long  before  he  had  a  Being,  in   his  Mercy  to  God's  « 

People,    and  Regard  to  the  tiue  God,    in  turning  the    Capti-  - 

vity  of  the  Jews^    and  promoting  the  building  of  the  Tem-  \ 

pie.     Ifai.  xJiv.28.  ^  Ixv.  13.    Compare  2  C/?r^«.  xxxvi. 22,23.  * 

and   Ezrai.  i,--^..  — _    How    many   Inftances  of  the   moral  \ 

Condu6l  of  the  Kings  of  the  Norths' South.,  particular  Inftances  '  i 

oi  the  Wicked  Behaviour  of  the  Kings  of  Syria  and  Egypt.,   are  \ 

foretold    in  the  xith  Chap,   o^  Daniel  ?      Their  Corruption,  ii 

Violence,  Robbery,  Treachery,  and  Lies.     And  particularly,  , 

how  much  is  foretold  of  the  horrid  Wickednefs  of   Antiochusy  , 

jEpiphajies.,    called  there  a  vile  Perjhi^  inftead  of  Epiphanes,   or  ' 

Illuftrious.     In  that  Chapter,  and  alfo  in  Chap.  viii.  ver.9,— »  ^ 

14,23,  to  the  End,   are  foretold  his  Flattery,  Deceit  and  Lies,  j 

his  having  his  Heart  fet  to  do  Mifchief.,  and  fet   againjl   the  holp  ' 

Covenant^    his  dejiroying  and  treading  lender  Foot    the   holy  People ,  , 

\n  a  marvellous  Manner,    his    having  Indignation  again)}  the  holy  i 

Covenant^  fetting  his  Heart  agalnft    it,    and  confpiring  againji  ity  \ 

his  polluting  the   San£fuary  of  Strength.,    treading   it   under   Footy  \ 

taking  away  the  daily  Sacrifice.,  and  placing   the  Abomination    that  \ 

maketh  deflate  ;   his  great  Pride,   magnifying  Jmnfelf  againji  Gody  \ 

and    uttering  marvellous  Blafphemies   againji  Him.,    'till    God    in  j 

Indignation  jhould  dejiroy  hi?nl    Withal    the    moral    Condu6l  of  'j 

the  Jews.,  on  Occai'ion  of  his  Perfecution,  is  predided.     'Tis  i 

foretold,    that    he  fmdd  corrupt  many   by  Flatteries.,  Chap.   xi.  j 

t2,— 34.     But  that  others    fhould   behave    with   a   glorious  i 

/Ojiftancy  and  Fortitude,  in  Oppofitlon  to  him,    ver.  32^,^  ; 

A"1j 


Sed.XI.  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,   i  o  i 

And  that  fome  good  Men  (hould  fall,  and  repent,  ver.  35. 
Chriil  foretold  Peter's  Sin,  in  denying  his  Lord,  with  it's  Cir- 
cumftances,  in  a  peremptory  Manner.  And  fo,  that  great 
Sin  of  Judas^  in  betraying  his  Mafter,  and  it's  dreadful  and 
eternal  Puniihment  in  Hell,  was  foretold  in  the  like  pofitive 
Manner.  Matth.  xxvi.  21, — 25.  and  parallel  Places  in  the 
other  Evangelifts. 

.  2.  Many  Events  have  been  foretold  by  God,  which  were 
confequent  and  dependent  on  the  moral  Conduct  of  parti- 
cular Perfons,  and  were  accomplifhed,  either  by  their  ver- 
tuous  or  viciousAdions.— Thusjthe  Children  of  Ifrael's  going 
down  into  Egypt  to  dwell  there,  was  foretold  to  Abraham^ 
Gen.  XV.  which  v>^as  brought  about  by  the  WickedneCs  of 
Jofeph's  Brethren  in  felling  him,  and  the  Wickednefs  of  Jo- 
Jeph's  Miflrefs,  and  his  own  fignal  Vertue  in  reiifting  her 
Temptation.  The  Accomplifhment  of  the  Thing  preiigur'd 
in   Jofeph\  Dream,    depended   on  the  fame   moral   Condu6t^ 

fothmris  Parable  and   Prophecy,   y/^^^^i  ix.  €5, 20.  was 

accompiifhed  by  the  wicked  Condud  of  Ahimekch^  and  the 
Men  of  Sheche7n.     The  Prophecies  againft  the  Houfe  of  El'iy 

1  Sam.  Chap.  ii.  &  iii.  were  accompiifhed  by  the  Wickednefs 
of  Doeg  the  Edomite^  in  accufmg  the  Priefts  ;  and  the  great 
Impiety,  and  extreme  Cruelty  of  Saul  in  deftroying  the 
Priefts  atA^^!^.   i  Sa?n.xKU.-  —  Natha7i''s  Prophecy  2ig2im{i David, 

2  Sam.  xii.  11,12.  was  fulhl'd  by  the  horrible  Wickednefs  of 
Jbfalom^  in  rebelling  againft  his  P'ather,  feeking  his  Life, 
and  lying  with  his  Concubines  in  the  Sight  of  the  Sun.  ,  The 
Prophecy  againft  iS.?/^;7z^«,  i  Kings  xi.  11,— 13.  was  fulfil'd 
by  JerQboa7ns  Rebellion  and  Ufurpation,  which  are  fpoken 
of  as  his  Wickednefs,  2  C/;r(?w.xiii.5,6.  compare  ver.18.  The 
Prophecy  againft  Jeroboam's  Family,  i  Kings  xiv.   was  fulfil'd 

'  by  the  Confpiracy,  Treafon,  and  cruel  Murders  of  Baajha,, 
2  Kings  XV.  27,  &c.  The  Predications  of  the  Prophet  Jehu 
againft  the  Houfe  of  Baa/ha^  i  Kings  xvi.  at  the  Beginning, 
were  fulfil'd  by  the  Treafon  and  Parricide  of  Zimri^  i  Kings 
xvi.  9, 13,  20. 

3.  How  often  has  God  foretold  the  future  moral  Condudl 
of  Nations  and  Peoples,  of  Numbers,  Bodies,  and  Suc- 
ceffions  of  Men  ;  with  God's  judicial  Proceedings,  and 
many  other  Events  confequent  and  dependent  on  their 
Vertues  and  Vices  ;  which  could  not  be  foreknown,  if 
the  Volitions  of  Men,  wherein  they  a6ted  as  moral  Jgefits^ 
had  not  been  forefeen  I   The  future  Cruelty  of  the  Egyptians 

in 


^n 


102      GOD  certainly  foreknows    Part  II. 

in  opprefTing  Ifrael^  and  God's  judging  and  punching  them 
for  it,  was  foretold  long  before  it  came  to  pafs.  Gen,  xv. 
13,  14.  The  Continuance  of  the  Iniquity  of  the  Amorites^ 
and  the  Increafe  of  it  until  it  Jhould  be  fully  and  they  ripe, 
for  Deftrudion,  was  foretold  above  four  Hundred  Years  be^ 
fore-hand,  Gen.  xv.  16.  J^,  vii.  6,  7.  The  Prophecies  of 
the  Deftru(5lion  of  Jerufalem^  and  the  Land  of  Judah^  were 
abfolute  ;  2  Kingi  xx.  17,-19.  Chap,  xxii.  15,  to  the  End. 
It  was  foretold  in  Hezekiah's  Time,  and  was  abundantly  in- 
fifted  on  in  the  Book  of  the  Prophet  Ifaiah^  who  wTote  No- 
thing after  Hezekiah's  Days.  It  was  foretold  in  Jofiah' sTimCy 
in  the  Beginnir^  of  a  great  Reformation,  2  Kings  xxii.  And 
it  is  manifeft  by  innumerable  Things  in  the  Predidions  of 
the  Prophets,  relating  to  this  Event,  it's  Time,  it's  Cir- 
cumftances,  it's  Continuance  and  End  ;  the  Rtturn  from 
the  Captivity,  the  Reftoration  of  the  Temple,  City  &  Land, 
and  many  Circumftances,  and  Confequences  of  That ;  I  fay, 
thefe  fliew  plainly,  that  the  Prophecies  of  this  great  Event 
were  abfolute.  And  yet  this  Event  was  connected  with,  and 
dependent  on  two  Things  in  Men's  moral  Conduct  :  firft,  the 
injurious  Rapine  and  Violence  of  the  King  of  Babylon  and 
his  People,  as  the  efficient  Caufe  ;  which  God  often  fpe^ks 
of  as  what  he  highly  refented,  and  would  feverely  punifli  ; 
and  2dly,  The  final  Obftinacy  of  the  Jews,  That  great  E- 
vent  is  often  fpoken  of  as  fufpended  on  this.  Jer.  iv.  i.&  v.  i, 
vii.  I5— 7.  xi.  I,— 6.  xvii.  24,  to  the  End.  xxv.  1,-7, 
xxvi.  I,— 8.  13.  &  xxxviii.  17,18.  Therefore  this  Deftruc- 
tion  and  Captivity  could  not  be  foreknown,  unlefs  fuch  a 
moral  Conduct  of  the  Chaldeans  and  Jews  had  been  fore- 
known. And  then  it  was  foretold,  that  the  People  Jhould  be 
finally  ohflinate^    to   the    Deftruction  and  utter  Defolation  of 

the  City  and  Land.  Ifai^  vi.  9, 11.  Jer,  i,  18,  19.  vii.  27, 

— 29.  Ezek.  in,  7.  &  xxiv.  13,  14. 

The  final  Obftinacy  of  thofe  Jews  who  were  left  in  the 
Land  of  Ifrael^  and  who  afterwards  went  down  into  Egypt^^  in 
their  Idolatry  and  Rejection  of  the  true  God,  was  foretold  by 
God,  and  the  Prediaion  confirmed  with  an  Oath.  Jer,  xliv. 
26,27.  And  God  tells  the  People,  Ifai,  xlviii.3.4, — 8.  that  he 
had  predided  thofe  Things  which  Ihould  be  confequent  on 
their  Treachery  and  Obftinacy,  becaufe  he  knew  they  would 
be  obftinate  ;  and  that  he  had  declared  thefe  Things  before- 
hand, for  their  Convi^^ion  of  his  being  the  only  trueGod,  Gft. 

The 


Sed*XI.  the  Volitions  6f  moral  Agents,  ic^ 

The  Deftru6lion  of  Babylon^  with  many  of  the  Circumftan* 
ces  of  it,  was  fore-told,  as  the  Judgment  of  God  for  the  ex- 
ceeding Pride  and  Haughtinefs  of  the  Heads  of  that  Monar- 
chy, Nebuchadnezzar,  and  his  Succeflbrs,  and  their  wickedly 
dellroying  other  Nations,  and  particularly  for  their  exalting 
themfelves  againft  the  true  God  and  his  People,  before  any 
of  thefe  Monarchs  had  a  Being  ;  Ifai.  Chap,  xiii,  xiv,  xlvii  : 
Compare  Habbak.  ii.  5,  to  the  End,  and  Jer.  Chap,  I.  and  ii. 
That  Babylon's  Deftrudion  was  to  be  a  Reco?npencey  according  to 
the  Works  of  their  own  Hands,  appears  by  "Jer,  xxv.  14.-—  The 
Immorality  which  the  People  of  Babylon,  and  particularly  her 
Princes  and  great  Men,  were  guilty  of,  that  very  Night  that 
the  City  was  deftroyed,  their  Revelling  and  Drunkennefs  at 
Beljhaz-zar's  Idolatrous  Feaft,   was  foretold,  Jer,  Ii.  39,  57. 

The  Return  of  the  Jews  from  tlie  Babyhnijh  Captivity  is 
often  very  particularly  foretold,  with  many  Circumftances, 
and  the  Promifes  of  it  are  very  peremptory  ;  Jer,  xxxi.  35, 
— 40.  and  xxxii.  6,  —  15,  41,-44.  and  xxxiii.  24,-26. 
And  the  very  Time  of  their  Return  was  prefixed  ;  Jer,  xxv. 
II,  12.  andxxix.  10,11.  2  Lhron.  xxxvi.  21.  Ezek.  iv.  6.  and 
Dan,  ix.  2.  And  yet  the  Prophecies  reprefent  their  Return 
as  confequent  on  their  Repentance.  And  their  Repentance  it 
felf  is  very  exprefly  and  particularly  foretold,  Jer.  xxix.  12, 
13,14.  xxxi.8,9,18,— 31.  xxxiii.  8.  1.4,5.  ^2;^>^.vi.8,9,io.vii. 
16.  xiv.  22,  23.  and  xx.  43,  44. 

It  was  foretold  under  the  old  Teftament,  that  the  Meffiah 
(hould  fufFer  greatly  through  the  Malice  and  Cruelty  of  Men  j 
as  is  largely  and  fully  fet  forth,  Pfal.  xxii.  applied  to  Chrift 
in  the  New  Teftament,  Matt,  xxvii.  35,  43.  Luke  xxiii.  34. 
Joh.  xix.  24.  Heb.  ii.  iiz.  And  likewife  in  Pfal.  Ixix.  which, 

I  it  is  alfo  evident  by  the  New  Teftament,  is  fpoken  of  Chrift  ; 
John  XV.  25.  vii.  5,  &c.    and  li.  17.  Rofn.  xv.  3.  Matt,  xxvii. 

i  34,  48.  Mark  XV.  23.  John  xix.  29.  The  fame  Thing  is  alfo 
foretold,  Ifai.  liii.  &  1.  6.  &  Mic.  v.  i.  This  Cruelty  of 
Men  was  their  Sin,  and  what  they  a6ted  as  moral  Agents.  It 
was  foretold,  that  there  ftiould  be  an  Union  of  Heathen  and 
Jezvijh  Rulers  againft  Chrift,  Pfal.  ii.  i,  2.  compar'd  with 
J^s  iv.  25, 28.     It  was  foretold,  that  the  Jews  ftiould  ge- 

;Snerally  rejed  and  defpife  the  Mefliah,  Ifai.  xlix.  5,  6,  7.  and 

•  Jiii.  1—3.  Pfalm,  xxii.  6,  7.  and  Ixix.  4,  8,  19,  20.  And  it. 
■was  foretold,  that  the  Body  of  that  Nation  ftiould  be  reje<5led 
in  the  Mefliah's  Days,  from  .being  God's  People,  for  their 
Obftinacy  in  Sin  ;  Ifai,  xlix.  4 — 7.  and  viii.  14,  I5>  i6.  com- 

pare4 


I ©4      GOD  certainly  iorthiiow^     PartIL  J 

pared  with  Rom.x.ig.  and//^/.lxv.  at  the  beginning,  compared  {) 

with  Rom.  x.  20,  21.   .  I:  was  foretold,  that  Chrift  fhould  be  j' 

rejedted  by  the  chief  Priefts  and  Rubers  among  thtjeivs,  Pfalm  \ 
cxviii.  22.  compared  with  Matth.  xxi.  42.   Atls  iv.  11.  i  Fet» 

ii.  4,  7.  ,! 

Chrift  himfelf  foretold  his  being  delivered   into  the  Hands  '  ia{ 

of  the  Elders,    chief  Priefts  and  Scribes,  and  his  being  cruel-  j 

J)  treated  by  them,    and  condemned  to  Death  ;    and  that  he  d 

by  them  fhould  be  delivered  to  the  Gentiles  \  and  that  He  fhould  jj) 

be  Wi7fi<?^,  and  fcourged^    2Lnd  crucified^    [Matt.xvi,    21.   &  xx.  ♦: 

17,—- 19.    Luke  IX.    22.  John  viii.  28.)     and    that   the  Peo-  | 

pie  fliould  be  concerned  in  and  contenting  to  his  DeathjfLw^^  ^ 

XX.  13,-18.)  efpecially  the  Inhabitants  of  yerujalcm  \    Luke  | 

xiii.  33,-  —35.     He  foretold,  that  the  Difciples   fhould   ail  be  i 

offended  becaufe  of  Knn  that  Nigiit  that   he  was   betrayed,  \ 

and  fhould   forfake   Him   ;     Matt.  xxvi.  31.    John  xvi.   32.  % 

He   foretold   that  He   fhould   be   rejeded  of    that  Genera-  I 

tion,    even  the   Body   of  the  People,    and  that  they  fhould  | 

continue  obilinate,to  their  Ruin  j  Matt.  xii.  45.  xxi. 33,— 42.  . 

and  xxii.  i, 7.   Luke  xiii.  16,  21,24.  ^'^^^^  25.  xix.  14,  27, 

41, — 44.  XX.  13,- — 18.  and  xxih,  345—39- 

As  it  was  foretold  in  both  old  Teflament  and  new,  that 
the  Jews  fliould  rejed:  the  MefFiah,  fo  it  was  foretold  that  the 
Gentiles    fliould   receive   Him,     and   fo   be  admitted  to   the 

Privileges  of  God's  People  j  in  Places  too  many   to  be  now  \ 

particularly  mentioned.     It  was  foretold    in  the  Old    Tefta-  % 

ment,that  the  Jews  fhould  envy  the  Gentiles  on  thisAccount;  | 

Deut.  xxxii.  21.  compared  with  Rom.  x.  19.      Chrifl   Himfelf  r 

often  foretold,  that   the   Gentiles   would   embrace   the   true  , 

Religion,   and  become  his  Followers  and  People  ;    Matth.mii,  i,; 

10,11,12.  x;d.  41,— 43.  and  xxii,  8,-— 10.  Lukex\Yi.i%.   xiv,  |" 

16,-24.  and  XX.  i5.  John  x.  16.  He  alfo  foretold   the  Jewi  \ 

Envy  of  the  Gentiles  on  this  Occafion  j    Matt.  xx.  12, — 16.  | 

Luke  XV.  26,to  the  End.     He  foretold,  that  they  fhould  conti-  '1 

nue  in  this  Oppofition  and  Envy,    and  fnouid  manifeft   it  in  1 

cruel   Perfecutions  of    his  Followers,     to    their    utter  De-  I 

flrudion  ;  Mctt.  xxi.  33,-42.  xxii.  6.  and  xxiii.  34, 39.  \ 

Luke  xi.  49, --5 1.     The  Jews  Obftinacy  is   alio  foretold,  A^s  % 

xxii.  18.     Chnfl  often  toretold   the   great   Perfecutions   his  I 

Followers  fhould  meet  with,  both    from  Jews   and    Gentiles  ;  * 

Matt.  X.  165—18,21,  22,  34,-36.  and  xxiv.  9.  Mark  xiii.  9.  ^ 

Luke  X.  3.  xii.  II,  49)— 53.  and  xxi.  12,16,17.  John  xv.   18,.  I 

—21.  and  xvi.  1,-4.  20,-22,33.      ^^   foretold   the   Mar-  I 

tyrdoi»  h 


Seft.XI.  the  Volitims  of  moral  Agents.  105 

tyrdom  of  particular  Perfons  ;  Matt.  xx.  23.  Job.  xiii.  36^ 
and  xxi.  18,  19,22.  He  foretold  the  great  Succefs  of  the 
Gofpel  in  the  City  of  Samaria^  as  near  approaching  j  which 
afterwards  was  fulfilled  by  the  Preaching  of  Philips  Toh.  iv, 
35,-38.  He  foretold  the  Rifing  of  many  Deceivers,  after 
his  Departure,  Alatt.  xxiv.  4,  5,  11.  and  the  Apoftacy  of 
many  of  his  profefs'd  Followers  j   Matth.  xxiv*  10,— -i 2, 

The  Perfecutions,  which  the  Apoftle  Paul  was  to  meet  with 
in  the  World,  were  foretold  ;  ASis  ix.i6.— -xx-23.  ^  xxi.  11. 
I'he  Apoftle  fays  to  the  Chriftian  Ephefians,  ASis  xx. 29,30.  / 
know^  that  after  my  Departure  Jhall  grievous  TVolves  enter  in  anwng 
you^  7iot  [paring  the  Flock  :  Alfo  of  your  own  f elves  Jhall  Men  artfe^ 
fpeaking  perverfe  Things^  to  draw  away  Dtfciples  after  them^ 
The  Apoftle  fays,  He  knew  this  ;  but  he  did  not  know  it,  if 
God  did  not  know  the  future  Actions  of  moral  Agents. 

4.  Unlefs  God  foreknows  the  future  A<5ls  of  moral  Agents^ 
all  the  Prophecies  we  have  in  Scripture  concerning  the  great 
Antichrijlian  Apoftacy  ;  the  Rife,  Reign,  wicked  Qualities 
and  Deeds  of  the  Man  of  Sin,  and  his  Inftruments  and  Ad- 
herents ;  the  Extent  and  long  Continuance  of  his  Domi- 
nion, his  Influence  on  the  Minds  of  Princes  and  others, 
to  corrupt  them,  and  draw  them  away  to  Idolatry,  and  other 
foul  Vices  ;  his  great  and  cruel  Perfecutions  ;  the  Behaviour 
of  th&  Saints  under  thefe  great  Temptations,  &c.  &c.  I  fay, 
unlefs  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  are  forefeen,  all  thefe 
Prophecies  are  uttered  without  knowing  the  Things  foretold, 

.  The  Predi6tions  relating  to  this  great  Apoftacy  are  all  of  a 
moral  Nature,  relating  to  Men's  Vertues  and  Vices,and  their 
Exercifes,  Fruits  and  Confequences,  and  Events  dependino* 
on  them  ;  and  are  very  particular  ;  and  moft  of  them  often 
repeated,  with  many  precife  CharaaeriftickSjDefcriptionSjand 
Limitations  of  Qualities,  Condu6i:,.  Influence,  EfFeds,  Ex- 
tent, Duration,  Periods,  Circumftances,  final  Iflue,  &c. 
which  it  would  be  very  long  to  mention  particularly.  And 
to  fuppofe,  all  thefe  are  predided  by  God  without  any  cer- 
tain Know^ledge  of  the  future  moral  Behaviour  of  free  Ar- 
gents,  would  be  to  the  utmoft:  Degree  abfurd, 

5.  Unlefs  God  foreknows  the  future  A<5ls  of  Men's  Wills, 
and  their  Behaviour  as  moral  Agents,  all  thofe  great  Things 
which  are  foretold  in  both  Old  Teftament  and  New  con- 
•erning   the  Eredion,   Eftabliftiment,  and   univerfal    Extent 

O  •f 


io5     GOD  certainly  foreknows     Part  II,    f 

of   the  Kingdom   of  the    Msjfiah^  ■  were  predicted    and  pro-      | 
mifed   while  God   was  in  Ignorance  whether   any   of  thefe 
7^hings  would  come    to  pafs  or  no,    and   did  but  guefs   at 
them.     For   that  Kingdom  is  not   of  this   World,    it   don't 
confill  in  Things  external,    but  is  within  Men,    and  confifts    ■ 
in   the  Dominion  of  Vertue  in  their  Hearts,    in    Righteouf- 
nefs,    and  Peace,    and  Joy  in   the  Holy  Gholl  ;   and  in  thefe 
Things   made  manifeft  in  Pra6lice,  to  the  Praife   and  Glory 
of  God.     The  MefTiah  came  to  jave  Men  from  their  Sim^  and 
deliver  them    from   their   fpiritual   Ene7mes  ;     that  they  ?mght 
ferve  Hi?n  in  Righteoufnefs   and  HoUnefs   before  Him  :    He  gave 
Himfelf  for  us,    that  he  might  redeem  us  from  a/hlniqtiity,  and  pu- 
rify unto  Hunfelf  a  peculiar  People^   zealous  of  good  Works.     And 
therefore   his    Succefs  confifts   in  gaining  Men's    Hearts    to 
Vertue,    in  their   being  made    God's  willing  People   in  the  Day 
of  his  Power.     His  Conqueft  of  his  Enemies    confifts   in  his 
vi6lory   over  Men's   Corruptions     and    Vices.      And  fuch 
Succefs,   fuch  Victory,    and  fuch  a  Reign  and  Dominion  is 
often   exprefty  foretold  :    That   his    Kingdom  foall    fill   the 
Earth  ;    that   all  People,  Nations  and  Languages  'fl)ould  ferve  and 
obey  Him  ;    and  fo,   that  all  Nations  Jlwuld  go    up  to  the  Momi-     , 
iain  of  the  Houfe    of  the   Lord,     that   He  might    teach  them  his  -  ■^ 
JVays,    and  that  they  ?mght  walk  in  his  Paths  :  And  that  all  Men    '^ 
fhould  he  drawn   to  Chri/i,    and  the  Earth  be  full  of  the   Know-      \ 
ledge   of  the  Lord  (by  which,   in  the    St)de    of  Scripture,    is     ^ 
iTieant  true  Vertue  and  Religion)   as  the  JVaters  cover  the  Seas  ;     ; 
that  God's  Law  Jhoidd  be  put  into  Men^s  inward  Parts,  and  ivrit-     ij 
ten  in  their  Hearts  \    and  that  God's   People  Jhould  be  all   Righ^  ,  \., 
teoiis,  &c.  &c.  'i 

A  very  great  Part  of  the  Prophecies   of  the  Old  Tefta-     ■[ 

ment  is  taken  up  in   fuch  Predictions  as  thefe. And  here    5 

I  would  obleiTe,  that  the  Prophecies  of  the  univerfal  Preva-  ..^ 
lence  of  the  Kingdom  of  the  Meftiah,  and  true  Religion  of 't^ 
Jefus  Chrift,  are  delivered  in  the  moft  peremptory  Mann'er, '  ^ 
and  confirmed  by  the  Oath  of  God.  Ifai.  xlv.  22,to  theEnd,  ^1 
Look  to  me,  and  he  ye  faved,  all  the  Ends  of  the  Earth  j  for  1  am  '  m 
God,  and  there  is  none  elfe.  1  have  SWORN  by  my  Self,  the  ^ 
JVord  is  gone  out  of  7ny  Mouth  in  Righteoufnefs,  and  fljall  not  re-  ^ 
turn,  that  unto  Me  every  Knee  Jhall  bow  ;  and  every  Tongue  Jhatl  ^ 
fwear,  SURELY,  Jhall  one  fay,  in  the  Lord  have  I  Righte-  ^  ♦] 
oufmfs  and  Strength  :-  even  to  Him  fljall  Men  come  &c.  But  here  ): 
this  peremptory  Declaration,  and  great  Oath  of  the  moft  ^ 
High,  are  delivered  with  fuch  mighty  Solemnity,  to  Things  y 
which  God  did  not  know,  if  He  did  not  certainly  forefee  the  J 
Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  ^'1 

And|| 


'  Sed.XI.  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  107 

And  all  the  Prediaions  of  Chrift  and  his  Apoftles,  to  the 
like  Purpofe,  muft  be  without  Knowledge  :  As  thofe  of  our 
Saviour  comparing  the  Kingdom  of  God  to  a  Grain  of 
Muftard-Seed,  growing  exceeding  great,  from  a  fmali  Begin- 
ning ;  and  to  Leaven,  hid  in  three  Meafures  of  Meal,  'till 
the  whole  was  ieaven'd,  &c.— And  the  Prophecies  in  the  E- 
piftles  concerning  the  Reftoration  of  the  Nation  of  the  Jev^s 
to  the  true  Church  of  God,  and  the  bringing  in  the  Fulnefs 
of  the  Gentiles  ;  and  the  Prophecies  in  all  the  Revelation  con- 
cerning the  glorious  Change  in  the  moral  State  of  the  World 
of  Mankind,  attending  the  Dedru^tion  of  Antichrift,  the 
Kingdoms  of  the  World  becoming  the  Kingdoms  of  our  Lord  and 
of  his  Chrijl  ;  and  it's  being  granted  to  the  Cimrch  to  be  arrayed 
in  that  fine  Linncn,  white  and  clean ^  which  is  the  Righteoufnejs  of 
Saints  J  Sec. 

CoroL  I.  Hence  that  great  Promife  and  Oath  of  God  to 
Abraha??u  Ifaac  and    Jacobs    io  much  celebrated    in    Scripture, 

.  both  in  the  Old  Teftament  andNev/,  namely,  TJmt  in  their 
Seed  all  the  Nations  a7id  Families  of  the  Earth  fooidd  be  blcffed^ 
mull  be  made  on  Uncertainties,  if  God  don't  certainly  fore- 
know the  Vohtions  of  moral  Agents.  For  the  Fulfilment 
of  this  Promife  cpnfiils  in  that  Succefs  of  Chrift  in  theWork 
of  Redemption,  and  that  Setting  up  of  his  fpiritual  Kingdom 
over  the  Nations  of  the  World,  which  has  been  fpoken  of. 
Men  are  blejfedin  Chriji   no  otherwife  than   as  they   are  bro't 

^to  acknowledge  Flim,  trull  in  Him,  love  and  ferve  Him, 
as   is  reprefented  and  predi^led  in   Pfal.  Ixxii.  ii.  All  Kings 

'Jhallfall  down  bfore  Him  ;  all  Nations  pall  ferve  Him.  With 
ver.  17.  Men  fnall  be  bleffed  in  Him  \  all  Nations  foail  call  him 
BleJJed.  This  0?X\\  to  J^^coh  znd  Jbraham  \s  fulhiled  in  fub- 
duing  Men's  Iniquities  ;  as  is  implied  in  that  of  the  Pro- 
phet Aiicah,  Chap.  vii.  19,20. 

CoroL  2.  Hence  alfo  it  appears,  That  fird:  Gofpel-Pro'^^/if^ 
that  ever  was  made  to  Mankind,  that  great  Predic5tion  of 
the  Salvation  of  the  Meffiah,  and  his  Vii5lory  over  Sat(7ti^ 
made  to  our  firft  Parents,  Gen.  iii.  15.  if  there  be  no  certain 
Prefcience  of  the  Volitions  of  m.oral  Agents,  mull  have  no 
better  Foundation  than  Conjecture.  For  ChriiVs  Viclory 
over  Satan  confifts  in  Men's  being  faved  from  Sin,  and  in 
the  Vidory  of  Vertue  and  Kolincrs,  over  that  Vice  and 
Wickednefs,  which  Satan  by  his  Temptation  I'as  Intioduced, 
and  wherein  his  Kino;dom  confiits. 

02  6:  If 


ic8      GOD  certainly  foreknows    Part  II* 

6.  If  it  be  fo,  that  God  has  not  a  Prefcience  of  the  future 
A^^ions  of  moral  Agents,  it  will  follow,  that  the  Prophecies 
of  Scripture  in  general  .are  without  Fore-knowledge.  For 
Scripture-Prophecies,  almoft  all  of  them,  if  not  univerfally 
without  any  Exception,  are  either  Predictions  of  the  Adings 
and  Behaviours  of  moral  Agents,  or  of  Events  depending 
on  them,  or  fome  Way  comiecfted  with  them  ;  judicial  Dif- 
penfations.  Judgments  on  Men  for  their  Wickednefs,  or  Re- 
wards of  Vertue  and  Righteoufnefs,  remarkable  Manifefta- 
tions  of  Favour  to  the  Righteous,  or  Manifeftations  of  fo- 
vereign  Mercy  to  Sinners,  forgiving  their  Iniquities,  and 
magnifying  the  Riches  of  divine  Grace  ;  or  Difpenfations  of 
Providence,  in  fome  Refpe6t  or  other,  relating  to  the  Condu6t 
of  the  Subjetfts  of  God's  moral  Government,  wifely  adapt- 
ed thereto  ;  either  providing  for  what  fhould  be  in  a  future 
State  of  Things,  through  the  Volitions  and  voluntary  Acti- 
ons of  moral  Agents,  or  confequent  upon  them,  and  regu- 
lated and  ordered  according  to  them.  So  that  all  Events 
that  are  foretold,  are  either  moral  Events,  or  other  Events 
which  are  conuedled  with,  and  accommodated  to  moral 
JE  vents  r 

That  the  Predi(5tions  of  Scripture  in  general  muft  be  with-r 
out  Knowledge,  if  God  don't  forefee  the  Volitions  of  Men, 
will  further  appear,  if  it  be  confidered,  that  almoft  ail  E- 
vents  belonging  to  the  future  State  of  the  World  of  Man- 
kind, the  Changes  and  Revolutions  which  come  to  pafs  iij^ 
Empires,  Kingdoms,  and  Nations,  and  all  Societies,  depend 
innumerable  Ways  on  the  A6ts  of  Men's  Wills  ;  yea,  on  an 
innumerable  Multitude  of  Millions  of  Millions  of  Volitions 
of  Mankind,  Such  is  the  State  and  Courfe  of  Things  in 
the  World  of  Mankind,  that  one  fmgle  Event,  which  ap- 
pears in  it  felf  exceeding  inconfiderabie,  may  in  the  Pro- 
grefs  and  Series  of  Things,  occafion  a  SuccelTion  of  the 
greateft  and  moft  important  and  extenfive  Events  ;  caufing 
the  State  of  Mankind  to  be  vaftly  different  from  what  it 
would  otherwife  have  been,   for  all  fucceeding  Generations. 

For  Inftance,  the  coming  into  Exiftence  of  thofe  particu- 
lar Men,  who  have  been  the  great  Conquerors  of  the  World, 
"which  under  God  have  had  the  main  Hand  in  all  the  con- 
fequent State  pf  the  World,  in  all  after-Ages  ;  fuch  as 
Nebuchadnezzar^  Cyrus ^  Alexander ^  Pompey,  Julius  Cefar^  &c. 
undoubtedly  depended  on  many  Millions  of  Acts  of  the 
Will,  which  followed,  and  were  occafion'd  one  by  ano- 
ther, ■ 


'Se<9:.  XL  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.    109 

ther,  in  their  Parents.  And  perhaps  moft  of  thefe  Volitions 
depended  on  Milhons  of  Volitions  of  Hundreds  and  Thou- 
fands  of  others,  their  Contemporaries  of  the  fame  Genera- 
tion j  and  moft  of  thefe  on  Millions  of  Millions  of  Voliti- 
ons of  others  in  preceedmg  Generations.—-  As  we  go  back, 
ftill  the  Number  of  Volitions,  which  were  fome  Way  the 
Occafion  of  the  Event,  multiply  as  the  Branches  of  a  River, 
'till  they  come  at  laft,  as  it  were,  to  an  infinite  Number. 
This  Will  not  feem  ftrange,  to  any  one  who  well  confiders  the 
Matter  ;  if  we  recollect  what  Philoibphers  tell  us  of  the  in- 
numerable Multitudes  of  thofe  Things  which  are  as  it  were 
the  Principia^  or  Stamina  VHee^  concerned  in  Generation  ; 
the  Animakula  in  Semine  majculo^  and  the  Ova  in  the  Womb 
of  the  Female  ;  the  Impregnation,  or  animating  of  one  of 
thefe  in  Diftindion  from  all  the  reft,  muft  depend  on  Things 
infinitely  minute,  relating  to  the  Time  and  Circumftances  of 
the  Adf  of  the  Parents,  the  State  of  their  Bodies,  i^c, 
which  muft  depend  on  innumerable  foregoing  Circum- 
fiances  and  Occurrences  ;  which  muft  depend,  infi- 
nite Ways,  on  foregoing  A6ls  of  their  Wills  ;  which  are 
occafioned  by  innumerable  Things  that  happen  in  the 
Courfe  of  their  Lives,  in  which  their  own,  and  their  Neigh- 
bour's Behaviour,  muft  have  a  Hand,  an  infinite  Number 
of  Ways.  And  as  the  Volitions  of  others  muft  be  fo  many 
Ways  concerned  in  the  Conception  and  Birth  of  fuch  Men  ; 
fo,  no  lefs,  in  their  Prefervation,  and  Circumftances  of  Life, 
their  particular  Determinations  and  A6tions,  on  which  the 
great  Revolutions  they  were  the  Occafions  of,  depended.  As 
for  Inftance,  When  the  Confpirators  in  Ferfia^  againft 
the  Aiagi^  were  confulting  about  a  Succeflion  to  the  Empire, 
it  came  into  the  Mind  of  one  of  them,  to  propofe,  that  he 
whofe  Horfe  neighed  firft,  when  they  came  together  the 
next  Morning,  fhould  be  King.  Now  fuch  a  Thing's  com- 
ing into  his  Mind,  might  depend  on  innumerable  Incidents, 
wherein  the  Volitions  of  Mankind  had  been  concerned. 
But  in  Confequence  of  this  Accident,  Darius^  the  Son  of 
Hifafpes^  was  King.  And  if  this  had  not  been,  probably 
his  Succeflbr  would  not  have  been  the  fame,  and  all  the 
Circumftances  of  the  Ferfian  Empire  might  have  been  far 
otherwife.  And  then  perhaps  Alexander  might  never  have 
conquered  that  Empire.  And  then  probably  the  Circum- 
ftances of  the  World  in  all  fucceeding  Ages,  might  have 
been  vaftly  otherwife.  I  might  further  inftance  in  many 
•ther  Occurrences  j   fuch  as  thofe  on  which  depended  Alex- 

^ndcr's 


f 


1 1  o     GOD  certainly  foreknows      Part  11. 

€mder\  Prefervatlon,  in  the  many  critical  Jundlures  of  his 
Life,  wherein  a  fmall  Trifle  would  have  turned  the  Scale 
againft  him  -,    and  the  Prefervation   and  Succefs  of  the    Ro^ 

man  People,  in  the  Infancy  of  their  Kingdom  and  Common-  { 

Wealth,and  afterwards  ;  which  all  the  fucceeding  Changes  ia  iJ 

their  State,     and  the  mighty  Revolutions     that   afterwards'  ] 

came  to  pafs  in  the  habitable  World,  depended  upon.     But  \ 

thefe  Hints   may  be  fufficient  for  every  difcerning  confide-  \ 

rate  Perfon,  to  convince  him,  that  the  whole  State   of  the  | 

World  of  Mankind,  in  all  Ages,  and  the  very  Being  of  every  J 

Perfon  who   has  ever  lived  in   it,    in    every  Age,  fmce  the  "\ 

Times    of    the  ancient  Prophets,   has    depended    on  more  i 

Volitions,  or  Ads   of  the   Wills  of  Men,     than  there  are  \ 

Sands  on  the  Sea-flioar.  I 


And  therefore,  unlefs  God  does  mofl:  exactly  and  perfedl-  \ 
ly  forefee  the  future  Acts  of  Men's  Wills,  all  the  Pre-,.  1 
didions  which  he  ever  uttered  concerning  David^  Hezekiahy  ^ 

^ojiah^  Nehuchadnezxary  Cyrus ^  Alexander  ;    concerning'  the  four  \ 
lonarchies,  and  the  Revolutions  in  them  ;  and  concerning  ij 
all  the  Wars,  Commotions,  Vidories,  Profperities  and  Cala- 
mities, of  any  of  the  Kingdoms,  Nations,  or  Communities 
of  the  World,  have  all  been  without  Knowledge. 

So  that,  according  to  this  Notion  of  God's  not  forefeeing 
the  Volitions  and  free  Ac5lions  of  Men,  God  could  forefee 
Nothing  pertaining  to  the  State  of  the  World  of  Mankind  \\ 
in  future  Ages  ;  not  fo  much  as  the  Being  of  one  Perfon  | 
that  fhould  live  in  it  ;  and  could  foreknow  no  Events,  but  I 
only  fuch  as  He  would  bring  to  pafs  Himfelf  by  the  extra-  t 
ordinary  Interpofition  of  his  immediate  Power  ;  or  Things,  i^ 
which  fhould  come  to  pafs  in  the  natural  material  World,  J 
by  the  Laws  of  Motion,  and  Courfe  of  Nature,  wherein  i)| 
that  is  independent  on  the  A6lions  or  Works  of  Mankind  :  :| 
That  is,  as  he  might,  like  a  very  able  Mathematician  and  1^ 
Aftronomer,  with  great  Exadnefs  calculate  the  Revolutions  1( 
of  the  heavenly  Bodies,  and  the  greater  Wheels  of  the  | 
Machine  of  the  external  Creation.  i; 

And  if  we  clofely  confider  the  Matter,  there  will  appear- : if 
Reafon  to  convince  us,  that  he  could  not  with  any  abfo-  q 
lute  Certainty  forefee  even  thefe.  As  to  the  FirJ}^  namely  I 
Things  done  by  the  immediate  and  extraordinary  Interpo-  | 
fition  of  God's  Power,  thefe  can't  be  forefeen,  unlefs  it  can  1 
be  forefeen  when  there  fhall  be  Qccafion  for  fuch  extraordi-  ^ 

nary 


Sed.XI.  the  Voltttons  of  moral  Agents,  in 

nary  Interpofition.  And  that  can't  be  forefeen,  unlefs 
the  State  of  the  moral  World  can  be  forefeen.  For 
whenever  God  thus  interpofes,  it  is  with  Regard  to  the  State 
of  the  moral  World,requiring  fuch  Divine  Interpofition.  Thus 
God  could  not  certainly  fore  fee  the  univerfal  Deluge,  the 
Calling  of  Abraham^  the  Deftru^lion  of  ^odom  and  Gomorrah^ 
the  Plagues  on  Egypt^  and  IfraeH  Redemption  out  of  it,  the 
expelling  the  feve^n  Nations  of  Canaan^  and  the  bringing 
Ifracl  into  that  Land  ;  for  thefe  all  are  reprefented  as  con- 
ne6led  with  Things  belonging  to  the  State  of  the  moral 
World.  Nor  can  God  foreknow  the  moft  proper  and  con- 
venient Time  of  the  Day  of  Judgment,  and  general  Con- 
flagration \  for  that  chiefly  depends  on  the  Courfe  &  State 
of   Things  in  the  moral  World. 

Nor,  Secondly^  can  w^e  on  this  Suppofition  reafonably  think, 
that  God  can  certainly  forefee  v/hat  Things  fliall  come  to 
pafs,  in  the  Courfe  of  Things,  in  the  natural  and  material 
World,  even  thofe  which  in  an  ordinary  State  of  Things 
might  be  calculated  by  a  good  Aftronomer.  For  the  moral 
World  is  the  End  of  the  natural  World ;  and  the  Courfe 
of  Things  in  the  former,  is  undoubtedly  fubordinate  to  God's 
Defigns  with  Refped  to  the  latter.  Therefore  he  has  ktn 
Caufe,from  Regard  to  the  State  of  Things  in  the  moral  World, 
extraordinarily  to  interpofe,  to  interrupt  and  lay  an  Arrell:  on 
the  Courfe  of  Things  in  the  natural  World  ;  and  even  in 
the  greaterWheelsof  it's  Motion  ;  even  fo  as  to  flop  the  Sun  in 
it's  Courfe.  And  unlefs  he  can  forefee  the  Volitions  of  Men, 
and  fo  know  fomething  of  the  future  State  of  the  moral 
World,  He  can't  know  but  that  he  may  ftill  have  as  great 
Occafion  to  interpofe  in  this  Manner,  as  ever  He  had  :  nor 
can  He  forefee  how,  or  when,  He  fliall  have  Occafion 
\  thus  to  interpofe. 

Corol.  I .  It  appears  from  the  Things  w^hich  have  been  ob- 
Iferved,    that  unlefs  God  forefees  the  Volitions  of  moral  A- 

gents,  that  cannot  be  true  which  is  obferved  by  the  Apoftle 
\ja7nes^  Act.  xv.   1 8.  Known  unto  God  are  all  his  frorks  from  the 

Beginning  of  the  World. 

Corol.  2.  It  appears  from  what  has  been  obferved,that  unlefs 
jGod  foreknows  theVolitions  of  moral  Agents,  all  the  Prophe- 
cies of  Scripture  have  no  better  Foundation  than  meer  Con- 
jecture ;   and  That.,    in  moft   Inftahces,    a   Conje6lure  which 
muft  have  the  utmoft  Uncertainty  j  depending  on  an  innu- 
merable 


112      GOD  certainly  foreknows     Part  II.    | 

merable,   and  as   it   were  infinite.   Multitude   of  Volitions,  j 

which  are  all,  even  to  God,uncertain  Events  :  However,thefe  ' 

Prophecies  are  delivered  as    abfolute  Predidtions,   and   very  ; 

many  of  them  in  the  moft  pofitive  Manner,  with  Affeverati-  i 

®ns  J    and   fome  of  them  with  the  molt  folemn  Oaths.  \ 

CoroL  3.  It  alfo  follows  from  what  has  been  obferved,  ^  ,■ 
that  if  this  Notion  of  God's  Ignorance  of  future  Volitions  I 
be  true,  in  vain  did  Chrift  fay  (after  uttering  many  great  I 
and  important  Predidions,  concerning  God's  moral  King-  j 
dom,and  Things  depending  on  Men's  moral  Adions)  Matth,  | 
xxiv.  35.  Heaven  and  Earth  Jhall pafs  aivay  j  but  my  JVords  Jhdl  -  J 
v.ot  pafs  away,  i 

CoroL  4.  From  the  fame  Notion  of  God's  Ignorance,  it  j 
would  foiloWjthat  in  vain  has  God  himfelf  often  ipoken  of  the 
Predictions  of  his  Word,  as  Evidences  of  his  Foreknowlege ; 
and  fo  as  Evidences  of  that  which  is  his  Prerogative  as  GOD, 
and  his  peculiar  Glory,  greatly  diftinguifhing  Him  from  all 
other  Beings  ;  as  in  Ifai,  xli.  22—26.  xliii.  9,10.  xliv.  8. 
xlv.  21.  xlvi.  10.   &  xlviii.  14. 

I 
Argum.  II.  If  God  don't  foreknow  the  Volitions  of  mo-;| 

ral  Agents,  then  he  did  not  foreknow  the  Fall  of  Man,  nor 
of  Angels,  and  fo  could  not  foreknow  the  great  Things 
which  are  mifequent  on  thefe  Events  ;  fuch  as  his  fending; 
his  Son  into  the  World  to  die  for  Sinners,  and  all  Things 
pertaining  to  the  great  Work  of  .  Redemption  3  all  the 
Things  which  were  done  for  four  Thoufand  Years  before 
Chrift  came,  to  prepare  the  Way  for  it ;  and  the  Incarnation, 
Life,  Death,  Refurre6lion  and  Afcenfion  of  Chrift  5  and  the 
fetting  Him  at  the  Head  of  the  Univerfe,  as  King  of  Hea- 
ven and  Earth,  Angels  and  Men  ;  and  the  fetting  up  his  < 
Church  and  Kingdom  in  this  World,  and  appointing  Him ;; 
the  Judge  of  the  World  ;  and  all  that  Satan  fliould  do  in 
the  World  in  Oppofition  to  the  Kingdom  of  Chrift  :  And 
the  great  Tranfadioas  of  the  Day  of  Judgment,  that  Men 
and  Devils  fliall  be  the  Subje6ls  of,  and  Angels  concerned 
in  J  they  are  all  what  God  was  ignorant  of  before  the  Fall., 
And  if  fo,  the  following  Scriptures,  and  others  like  them, 
muft  be  without  any  Meaning,  or  contrary  to  Truth.  Eph. 
i.  4.  Jc  cor  ding  as  he  hath  chofen  us  in  Him  before  the  Foundation  of 
the  World,  i  Pet.  i.  20.  IVho  verily  was  fore-ordained  before  the 
Foundation  of  the  World.  2  Tim.  i.  g.  Wloo  hath  faved  us^  and 
called  us  with  an  holy  CaUin'g  ,     not  according  fQ  our  Works ^    hut 

according 


Seft.  XI .  the  ToUtions  of  moral  Agents.  113 


\accordmg  to  his  own  Purpofe^  and  Grace^  which  was  given  us  in 
Chrijl  Jefus  before  theWorld  began.  So,  Eph.  iii.  1 1 .  (fpeaking  of 
the  Wildom  of  God  in  the  Work  of  Redemption)  according 
to  the  eternal  Furpofe  zvhich  he  purpofed  in  Ch7iji  Jefus.  Tit.  1.2. 
In  hope  of  eternal  Life^  which  Gody  that  ■  cannot  lie,  pro?mfed  before 
the  World  began.     Rom.  viii.  29.  IVhom  he  did  foreknozv^them  he 

'  alfo  did  ptedcjVinate.^  &c.  i  Pet.  i.  1,  EleSly  acco?'ding  to  the  Fore- 
knowledge  of  God  the  Father. 

If  God  did  not  foreknow  the  Fall  of  Man,  nor  the  Re- 
demption by  Jefus  Chrift,  nor  the  Volitions  of  Man  fmcc 
I  the  Fall  ;  then  He  did  not  foreknow  the  Saints  in  any  Senfe  ; 
•\  neither  as  particular  Perfons,  nor  as  Societies  or  Nations  ; 
i  either  by  Election,  or  meer  Forefight  of  their  Vertue  or  good 
I  Works  ;  or  any  Forefight  of  any  Thing  about  them  relating 
;  to  their  Salvation  ;  or  any  Benefit  they  have  by  Chrift,  or 
]  any  Manner  of  Concern  of  their's  with  a  Redeemer. 

V  Arg.  III.  On  the  Suppofition  of  God's  Ignorance  of  the 
-future  Volitions  of  free  Agents,  it  will  follow,  that  God 
tnuft  in  many  Cafes  truly  repent  what  He  has  done,  fo  as 
properly  to  wifti  He  had  done  otherwife  :  by  Reafon  that 
the  Event  of  Things,  in  thofe  Affairs  which  are  moft  impor- 
tant, vi%.  the  Affairs  of  his  moral  Kingdom,  being  uncer- 
tain and  contingent,  often  happens  quite  otherwife  than  he 
was  aware  beforehand.  And  there  would  be  Reafon  to  un- 
derftand  That,  in  the  moft  literal  Senfe,  in  Gen.  vi.  6.  It 
repented  the  Lord^ihat  he  had  made  Man  on  the  Earth^and  it  grieved 
%im  at  his  Heart.  And  that,  i  Sam.  xv.  ir.  contrary  to 
that.  Numb,  xxiii.  19.  God  is  not  the  Son  of  Man,  that  he ^ 
-flmuld  repent.  And,  I  Sam.  xv.  15,  29.  Alfo  the  Sti'ength  of 
Ifrael  will  not  lie,  nor  repent  :  for  he  is  not  a  Man  that  he  Jhould 
repent.  Yea,  from  this  Notion  it  would  follow,  that  God 
is  liable  to  repent  and  be  grieved  at  his  Heart,  in  "a  literal 
Senfe,  continually  ;  and  is  always  expofed  to  an  infinite 
Number  of  real  Difappointments,  in  his  governing  the 
World  ;  and  to  manifold,  conftant,  great  Perplexity  and 
Vexation  :  But  this  is  not  very  coniiftent  with  his  Title  of 
Gcd  over  all,  bleffed  for  evermore  ;  \vhich  reprefents  Him  as 
poffelTed  of  perfe6l,  conftant  and  uninterrupted  Tranquillity 
-and  Felicity,  as  God  over  the  Univerfe,  and  in  his  Manage- 
•ment  of  the  Affairs  of  the  World,  as  fupreme  and  univer- 
Xal  Ruler.     See  Rom.  i.  25.  ix.  5.  2  Cor^  xi,  31.  i  Ti?}i.\'\.  15. 

P  Arg* 


,j  14    GOD  certainly  foreknows     Part  IL 

Arc.  IV.  It  will  alfo  follow  from  this  Notion,  that  as 
God  is  liable  to  be  continually  repenting  what  He  has  done ; 
fo  He  muft  be  expofed  to  be  conftantly  changing  his  Mind  and 
lntcntions,as  to  his  future  Condudt  ;  altering  his  Meafures,re- 
iinquiihing  his  old  Defigns,  and  forming  new  Schemes  &  Pro- 
jedions.  For  his  Purpofes,  even  as  to  the  main  Parts  of  his 
Scheme,  namely,  fuch  as  belong  to  the  State  of  his  moral 
Kingdom,  muft  be  always  liable  to  be  broken,  thro'  want 
of  Forefight ;  and  He  muft  be  continually  putting  his  Syftem 
to  rights,  as  it  gets  out  of  Order,  through  the  Contin- 
gence  of  the  Adions  of  moral  Agents  :  He  muft  be  a  Being, 
who,  inftead  of  being  abfolutely  immutable,  muft  necefTa- 
rily  be  the  Subjed  of  infinitely  the  moft  numerous  Ads  of 
Repentance,  and  Changes  of  Intention,  of  any  Being  what- 
foever  ;  for  this  plain  Reafon,  that  his  vaftly  extenfive 
Charge  comprehends  an  infinitely  greater  Number  of  thofe 
Things  which  are  to  Him  contingent  and  uncertain.  In 
fuch  a  Situation,  He  muft  have  little  elfe  to  do,  but  to  mend 
broken  Links  as  well  as  he  can,  and  be  re6tifying  his  dif-^ 
jointed  Frame  and  difordered  Movements,  in  the  beft^ Man- 
ner the  Cafe  will  aUow.  The  fupream  Lord  of  all  Things 
muft  needs  be  under  great  and  miferable  Difadvantages,  in 
governing  the  World  which  He  has  made,  and  has  the  Care 
of,  through  his  being  utterly  unable  to  find  out  Things 
of  chief  Importance,  which  hereafter  ftiall  befal  his  Syftem  ; 
which  if  He  did  but  know.  He  might  make  fegfonable  Pro- 
vifion  for.  In  many  Cafes,  there  may  be  very  great  Neceflity 
that  He  ftiouid  make  Provifion,  in  the  Manner  of  his  order- 
ing and  difpofing  Things,  for  fome  great  Events  which 
are  to  happen,  of  vaft  and  extenfive  Influence,  and  endlefs 
Confequence  to  the  Univerfe  ;  which  He  may  fe.e  after- 
wards, when  it  is  too  late,  and  may  wifti  in  vain  that  He 
had  known  beforehand,  that  He  might  have  ordered  his 
Affairs  accordingly.  And  it  is  in  the  Power  of  Man,  on 
thefe  Principles,  by  his  Devices,.  Purpofes  and  Adions, 
thus  to  difappoint  God,  break  his  Meafures,  make  Him  con- 
tinually to  change  his  Mind,  fubjedt  Him  to  Vexation,  and 
bring  Him  into  Confufion. 

But  how  do  thefe  Things  confift  with  Reafon,  or  with  the 
Word  of  God  ?  Which  reprefents,  that  all  God's  JVorkSy 
all  that  He  has  ever  to  do,  the  whole  Scheme  and  Series 
of  his  Operations,  are  from  the  Beginn'mg  perfectly  in  hiS 
View  ;  and  declares,  that  whatever  Devices  and  Defigns  are 
,  in  the  Hearts  of  Men^  the  Counfel  cf  the  Lord  is  that  which 
/hail  Jlandy    and  the  Thouo^hts  of  hii  Heart  to    ail  Generations, 

Prov. 


Sedt.XI.  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents.  115 

Prov.  xix,  21.  Pfal.  xxxiii.  lO,  ll.  And  that  which  the  Lord 
of  Ho/is  hath  purpofed^  none  J})all  difannul^  Ifai.  xiv.  27.  And 
that  he  cannot  be  fruftrated  in  one  Defign  or  Thought^  Job  xlii.2. 
And  that  what  God  doth^  it  Jhall  he  forever^  that  Nothing  can  be  put 
to  it,  or  taken  fro?n  it,  Eccl.  iii.  14.  The  Stabihty  and  Per- 
petuity of  God's  Counfels  are  expreily  fpoken  of  as  con- 
nected  with  the  Foreknowledge  of  God,  Lai.  xlvi.  10.  De- 
claring the  End  from  the  Beginning,  and  from  ancient  Ti'mes  the 
Things  that  are  not  yet  done  3  faying.  My  Counfel  flmll  ftand^ 
and  I  will  do  all  my  Pleafure.  —  And  how  are  thefe  Things 
confluent  with  what  the  Scripture  fays  of  God's  Immu- 
tabjhty,  which  reprefents  Him  as  without  Variahlencfs,  or 
(hadow  of  Turning',  and  fpeaks  of  Him  moil  particularly  as 
unchangeable  with  Regard  to  his  Purpoles.  Mai.  iii.  6.  lam 
the  Lord ;  /  change  not  ;  therefore  ye  Sons  of  Jacob  are  not 
confumed.  Exod.  iii.  14.  /  AM  THAT  I  AM,  Job  xxiii. 
13,  14.  He  is  in  one  Mind  \  and  who  can  turn  Him  ?  And  what 
his  Soul  defireth,  even  that  he  doth  :  fir  he  performeth  the  Thing 
that  is  appointed  for  me. 

Arc.  V.  If  this  Notion  of  God's  Ignorance  of  tJie  future 
Volitions  of  moral  Agents  be  thoroughly   confidered  in    it's 
Confequences,  it  will  appear  to  follow  from  it,  that  God^after 
he  had  made  the  World,    was  liable  to  be   wholly  frujirated 
^^/V  £«^  in  the  Creation  of  it  ;    and   fo   has   been   in  like 
Manner  liable  to  be  fruftrated  of  his   End   in   all   the   great 
Works  He  hath  wrought.     'Tis   manifeft,  the  moral  World 
is  the  End  of  the  natural   :     The   reft  of  the   Creation  is 
but  an  Houfe  which  God  hath  built,  with  Furniture,  for  mo- 
ral Agents  :    And  the  good  or  bad  State  of  the  moral  World 
depends   on    the   Improvement  they  make   of  their   natural 
•  Agency,    and   fo  depends   on  their   Volitions.     And  there- 
fore,   if  thefe    can't    be    forefeen   by  God,     becaufe   they 
^re  contingent,    and    fubjedt   to   no  Kind  of  NecelTity,  then 
the  A.ffairs'of  the  moral  World  are  liable  to  go  wrong,  to  any 
aflignable  Degree  ;   yea,  liable  to  be  utterly  ruined.      As  on 
this  Scheme,  it  may  v/ell  be   fuppofed  to   be   literally   faid, 
when  Mankind,    by   the   Abufe    of    their  moral   Agency, 
became  very  corrupt  before  the   Flood,    that  the  Lord  repented 
that  he   had  made  Man    on  the   Earth,     and  it  grieved    Hi?n 
at   his   Heart  ;    fo,     when  He     made  the  ,  Univerie,     He 
rdid    not   know  but  that  he   might  be  fo  difappointed  in  it, 
that  it  might   grieve  Him  at  his  Heart  that  he  had  made  it. 
It  a<5tually  proved,  that   all  Mankind   became  fmful,    and    a 
very  great  Part  of  the  Angels  apoftatifed  ;  And   liow   could 

P  2  Goi 


Ii6        C^r/^/;^  Foreknowledge      Part  11.  i 

God  know  before-hand,  that  all  of  them  would  not  ?  And  , 
how  could  God  know  but  that  all  Mankind,  notwith- 
Aanding  Means  ufed  to  reclaim  them,  being  ftill  left  to  the 
Freedom  of  their  own  Will, would  continue  in  their  Apofta- 
cy,  and  grow  worfe  and  worfe,  as  they  of  the  Old  World 
before  the  Flood  did  ? 

According  to  the  Scheme  I  am  endeavouring  to  confute, 
neither  the  Fall  of  Men  nor  Angels,  could  be  forefeen,  and 
God  mufl  be  greatly  difappointed  in  thefe  Events  ;  and  fo 
the  grand  Scheme  and  Contrivance  for  our  Redemption, 
and  deftroyjng  the  Works  of  the  Devil,  by  the  Mefliah,  and 
all  the  great  Things  God  has  done  in  the  Profecution  of 
thefe  Defigns,  muft  be  only  the  Fruits  of  his  own  Difap- 
pointment,  Snd  Contrivances  of  his  to  mend  and  patch  up, 
as  well  as  he  could,  his  Syftem,  which  originally  was  all 
very  good,  and  perfedlly  beautiful  ;  but  was  mar'd,  broken^ 
and  confounded  by  the  free  Will  of  Angels  and  Men. 
And  ftill  he  muft  be  liable  to  be  totally  difappointed 
^  fecond  Time  :  He  could  not  know,  that  He  Ihould 
have  his  defired  Succefs,  in  the  Incarnation,  Life, 
Death,  Refurredion  and  Exaltation  of  his  only  begot- 
ten Son,  and  other  great  Works  accomplifhed  to  reftore  the 
St-ate  of  Things  :  He  could  not  know  after  all,  whether 
there  would  adually  be  any  tolerable  Meafure  of  Reftora- 
tion  ;  for  this  depended  on  the  free  Will  of  Man.  There 
has  been  a  general  great  Apoftacy  of  almoft  all  the  Chriftian 
World,  to  that  which  was  worfe  than  Heathenifm  ;  which 
continued  for  many  Ages.  And  how  could  God,  without 
forefeeing  Men's  Volitions,  know  whether  ever  Chriftendom 
would  return  from  this  Apoftacy  ?  And  which  way  could  He 
tell  before-hand  how  foon  it  would  begin  ?  TheApoftle  fays, 
jt  began  to  work  in  his  Time  ;  and  how  could  it  be  known 
how  far  it  would  proceed  in  that  Age  ?  Yea,  how  could 
it  be  known  that  the  Gofpel,  whigh  was  not  effedual  for 
the  Reformation  of  the  Jews^  would  ever  be  eftedlual  for 
the  turning  of  the  Heathen  Nations  from  their  Heathen 
Apoilacy, which  they  had  been  confirmed  in  for  fo  many  Ages? 

'Tis  reprefcnted  often  in  Scripture,  that  God  who  made 
the  World  for*  Himfelf,  and  created  it  for  his  Pleafure, 
would  infallibly  obtain  his  End  in  the  Creation,  and  in  all 
his  Works  \  that  as  all  Things,  are  of  Him,  io  they  would 
all  be  to  Him  ;  and  that  in  the  final  IfTue  of  Things,  it 
would  appear  that  He  is  thefrjfy  and  tk  hfi.    Rev.  xxi.  6, 

And 


Se£t.  XII.        infers  fome  Neceffity •        117 

And  he  faid  unta  me^  It  is  done.  I  am  Alpha  and  Omega  ^  theBeginning 
and  the  End^  the  firjl  and  the  lafi.  But  thefe  Things  are  not 
confiftent  with  God's  being  fo  liable  to  be  disappointed  in 
all  his  Works,  nor  indeed  with  his  failing  of  his  End  in 
any  Thing  that  He  has  undertaken,   or  done. 


Section    XII. 

GO  Us  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  future 
Volitions  of  moral  Agent s^  inconfijlent 
withfuch  a  Contingence  ofthofe  Volitions^ 
as  is  without  all  Neceffity. 


HAVING  proved,   that  GOD    has   a   certain   and   in- 
fallible  Prefcience  of  the  Ads  of  the  Will  of  moral 
Agents,  I   come  now,   in   the :  Second  Place,   to"  (heW 
the  Confequence  ,   to  fhew  how  it  follows  from  hence,    that 
thefe  Events   are   necejfary^   with  a   NecefTity   of  Connedtign 
or  Confequence. 

The  chief  Armlnian  Divines,  fo  far  as  I  have  had  Oppor- 
tunity to  obferve,  deny  this  Confequence  ;  and  affirm,  that 
if  fuch  Foreknowledge  be  allowed,  'tis  no  Evidence  of  any 
Neceffity  of  the  Event  foreknown.  Now  I  defire,  that  this 
Matter  may  be  particularly  and  thoroughly  enquired  into. 
I  cannot  but  think,  that  on  particular  and  full  Conlideration, 
it  may  be  perfecStly  determined,  whether  it  be  indeed  fo, 
or  not. 

*      In  order  to   a   proper  Confideration  of  this    Mattfer,    I 
would  obferve  the  following  Things. 

I.  'Tis  very  evident,   with  regard  to   a  Thing  whofe   Ex- 
"iftence  is   infallibly  and  indiffolubly   conneded   with  fome- 
thing  which  already  hath,   or  has  had  Exiftence,   The  Ex- 
iftence  of  that  Thing  is  necefTary.     Here  may  be  noted, 

^  I.  I 


li8        €Vr/^/>2 Foreknowledge     PartIL    I 

1.  I  obferved  before,  in  explaining  the  Nature  of  Neceflity,  ^ 
that  in  Things  which  are  paft,  their  paft  Exiftence  is  now  \ 
necelTary  :  having  already  made  fure.  of  Exiftence,  'tis  too  \ 
late  for  any  PolTibility  of  Alteration  in  that  Refpedl  :  'Tis  ; 
now  impomble,  that  it  Ihould  be  otherwife  than  true,  that  i 
that  Thing  has  exifted.  ,: 

2.  If  there  be  any  fuch  Thing  as  a  divine  Foreknowledge     ; 
of  the  Volitions  of  free  Agents,   that  Foreknowledge,  by  the 
Suppofition,   is  a  Thing  which  already   has,    and   long  ago 
had  Exiftence  ;    and  fo,  now  it's  Exiftence   is   neceffary  ;   it 

is  now  utterly  impoffible  to  be  otherwife,  than  that  this  Fore  • 
knowledge  fhould  be,  or  ftiould  have  been. 

3.  'Tis  alfo  very  manifeft,  that  thofe  Things  which  are 
indiftblubly  conne<5led  with  other  Things  that  are  neceftary, 
are  Themfelves  neceftary.  As  that  Propofition  whofe  Truth 
is  neceftarily  connedcd  with  another  Propofition,  which  is 
neceflarily  true,  is  itfelf  neceftarily  true.  To  fay  other- 
wife,  would  be  a  Contradiction  ;  it  would  be  in  Effe6l  to 
fay,  that  the  CoJine(5tion  was  indiftbluble,  and  yet  was  not 
fo,  but  might  be  broken.  If  That,  whofe  Exiftence  is  in- 
diflblubly  conneded  with  fomething  whofe  Exiftence  is  now 
neceftary,  is  it  felf  not  neceftar)^,  then  it  may  pojjjbly  mi  exifl, 
notwithftanding  that  indiftbluble  Connexion  of  it's  Exift- 
ence.— Whether  the  Abfurdity  ben't  glaring,  let  the  Rea- 
der judge. 

4.  'Tis  no  lefs  evident,  that  if  there  be  a  full,  certain 
and  infallible  Foreknowledge  of  the  future  Exiftence  of  the 
Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  then  there  is  a  certain  infallible 
and  indiftbluble  Conneaion  between  thofe  Events  and  that 
Foreknowledge  ;  and  that  therefore,  by  the  preceeding  Ob- 
fervations,  thofe  Events  are  neceftary  Events  ;  being  infal- 
libly and  indiffolubly  conneded  with  that  whofe  Exiftence 
already  is,  and  fo  is  now  neceftary,  and  can't  but  have  been. 

To  fay,  the  Foreknowledge  is  certain  and  infallible,and  yet  ■ 
the  Connexion  of  the  Event  with  that  Foreknowledge  is 
not  indiftbluble,  but  diffoluble  and  fallible,  is  very  abfurd. 
To  affirm  it,  would  be  the  fame  Thing  as  to  affirm,  that 
there  is  no  neceftary  Conne(5tion  between  a  Propofition's- 
being  infallibly  known  to  be  true,  and  it's  being  true  in*- 
deed.  So  that  it  is  perfedly  demonftrable,  that  if  there  be 
any  infallible  Knowledge  of  future  Volitions,  the  Event  is 

mcejlary  j 


Sedt.XII.      infers /ome  Ncccnity.  119 

necejary  •/  or,  in  other  Words,  that  it  is  impojjthle  but  the 
Event  Ihould  come  to  pafs.  For  if  it  ben't  impoflible 
but  that  it  may  be  otherwife,  then  it  is  not  impoflible  but 
that  the  Propofition  which  affirms  it's  future  coming  to 
pafs,  may  not  now  be  true.  But  how  abfurd  is  that,  on  the 
Suppofition  that  there  is  now  an  intalUble  Knowledge  (  i.  c. 
Knowledge  which  it  is  impoflible  ihould  fail)  that  it  is  true. 
There  is  this  Abfurdity  in  it,  that  it  is  not  impoflible  but 
that  there  now  ihould  be  no  Truth  in  that  Propofition, 
which   is  now  infalUbly   known  to  be  true. 

II.  That  no  future  Event  can  be  certainly  foreknown, 
whofe  Exifl:ence  is  contingent,  and  without  all  NeceiTity, 
may  be  proved  thus  ;  'Tis  impoflible  for  a  Thing  to  be 
certainly  known  to  any  Intellecfl  without  Evidence.  To 
fuppofe  otherwife,  implies  a  Contradi6lion  :  Becaufe  for  a 
Thing  to  be  certainly  known  to  any  Underftanding,  is  for 
it  to  be  evident  to  that  Underftanding  :  And  for  a  Thing 
to  be  evident  to  any  Underftanding,  is  the  fame  Thing,  as 
for  that  Underftanding  to  fee  Evidence  of  it  :  But  no  Un- 
derftanding, created  or  increated,  can  fee  Evidence  where 
there  is  none  :  For  that  is  the  fame  Thing,as  to  fee  that  to 
be,  which  is  not.  And  therefore,  if  there  be  any  Truth 
which  is  abfolutely  without  Evidence,  that  Truth  is  abfo- 
lutely  unknowable,  infomuch  that  it  implies  a  Contradidtion 
to  fuppofe  that  it  is  known. 

But  if  there  be  any  future  Event,  whofe  Exiftence  is 
contingent,  without  all  Neceflity,  the  future  Exiftence  of 
that  Event  is  abfolutely  without  Evidence,  li  there  be  any 
Evidence  of  it,  it  muft  be  one  of  thefe  two  Sorts,  either 
Self- Evidence^  or  Proof ;  for  there  can  be  no  other  Sort  of 
Evidence  but  one  of  thefe  two  ;  an  evident  Thing  muft  be 
fither  evident  r«  ;V  y^^,  or  evident  in  fomething  elfe  \  that  is, 
evident  by  Connexion  with  fomething  elfe.  But  a  future 
Thing,  whofe  Exiftence  is  without  all  NeceiTity,  can  have 
neither  of  thefe  Sorts  of  Evidence.  It  can't  be  Self-evident : 
For  if  it  be,  it  may  be  now  known  by  what  is  now  to 
be  feen  in  the  Thing  it  felf  ;  either  it's  prefent  Exiftence, 
or  the  NeceiTity  of  it's  Nature  :  But  both  thefe  are  con- 
trary to  the  Suppofition.  It  is  fuppofed,  both  that  the 
Thing  has  no  prefent  Exiftence  to  be  feen  ;  and  alfo 
that  it  is  not  of  fuch  a  Nature  as  to  be  neceiTa- 
rily  exiftent  for  the  future  :  So  that  it's  future  Ex- 
iftence is  not  Self-evident.  And  fecondly^  neither  is  there 
V  any 


I20        CenaJn  Fovdknowhdgt      Part  IL   j 

any  Prdof,    or  Evidetice   in   any  Thing  elfe,    or  Evidence   of  ! 

Connexion  with  fomething  tMt   that  is  evident  \   For  this  j 

alfo  is  contrary  to    the  Suppolition.     'Tis   fuppofed,   that  J 

there  is  now   Nothing  exiftent,  with  which   the  future  Ex-  | 

iftence  of   the  contingent  Event   is  conne(5ted.     For   fuch  a  j 

Connexion  defiroys   its   Contingence^    and  fuppofes  Neceflity.  i 

Thus  'tis  dernonftratedjthat  there  is  in  the  Natvwe  of  Things  | 

abfoltitely    n6   Evidence    at   all  of  the   future  Exiftence  of  ; 

that  Event,   v>fhich   is   contingent,  without   all  Neceflity    (if  | 

any  fuch  Event   there  be)  neither  Self-Evidence   nor   Proof,  j 

And  therefore   the  Thing  in  Reality   is    not  evident  ;    and  1 

fo   can't  be   fefcn   to   be   evident^    or,    which  is    the   fame  \ 
Thing,   can't  be  known. 

Let  us  confider  this  in  an  Example.  Suppofe  that  fivfe 
Thoufand  feven  Hundred  and  fixty  Years  ago,  there  w^ag  j 
Sio  other  Being  but  the  divine  Being  ;  and  then  this  3 
World,  or  fome  particular  Body  or  Spirit,  all  at  once  S 
flarts  out  of  Nothing  into  Being,  and  takes  on  it  felf  a  \ 
particular  Nature  and  Form  ;  all  in  abfolute  Conti?igence,  \ 
without  any  Concern  of  God,  or  any  other  Caufe,  in  the  I 
Matter  ;  without  any  Manner  of  Ground  or  Reafon  of  | 
it's  Exiftence  ;  or  any  Dependence  upon,  or  Connection  j 
at  all  with  any  Thing  foregoing  i  I  fay,  that  if  this  be  ^ 
fuppofed,  there  was  no  Evidence  of  that  Event  before-  x 
hand.  There  was  no  Evidence  of  it  to  be  feen  in  the  fi 
Thing  it  felf ;  for  the  Thing  it  felf,  as  yet,  was  not.  And  \ 
there  w^as  no  Evidence  of  it  to  be  feen  in  any  Thing  elfe  ;  ; 
for  Evidence  in  fomething  elfe,  is  Connexion  with  fomethingr  | 
elfe  :  But  fuch  Connexion  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition.  I 
There  was  no  Evidence  before,  that  this  Thing  would  hap- -i 
pen-,  for  by  the  Suppofition,  there  was  no  Reafon  why  zV'i 
fhoidd  happen,  rather  than  fomething  elfe,  or  rather  than  ii 
Nothing.  And  if  fo,  then  all  Things  before  were  exactly  .1 
equal,  and  the  'fame,  with  Refpe6t  to  that  and  other  pofli-  'il 
ble  Things  ;  there  was  no  Preponderation,  no  fuperiour  0 
Weight  or  Value  5  and  therefore  Nothing  that  could  be  i 
of  any  Weight  or  Value  to  determine-  any  Underftanding.  | 
The  Thing  was  abfolutely  without  Evidence,  and  abfo- 1 
lutely  unknowable.  An  Increafe  of  Underftanding,  or  of  I 
the  Capacity  of  Difcerning,  has  no  Tendency,  and  mak6s  % 
no  Advance,  to  a  difcerning  any  Signs  or  Evidences  of  it,  1 
let  it  be  increafed  never  fo  much  ;  yea,  if  it  be  increafed  jI 
infinitely.  The  Increafe  of  the  Strength  of  Sight  may  have  i 
a  Tendency  to  enable  to  difcera  the  Evidence    which   is| 

farP 


Sed.  XIL     i7ifers  fom^  Neceflity.        121 

far  off,  and  very  much  hid,  and  deeply  involved  in  Clouds 
and  Darknefs  ;  but  it  has  no  Tendency  to  enable  to  difcerri 
Evidence  where  there  is  none;  If  the  Sight  be  infinitely 
ftrong,  and  the  Capacity  of  Difcerning  infinitely  great,  it 
will  enable  to  fee  all  that  there  is,  and  to.  fee  it  perfe(5lly, 
and  with  Eafe  ;  yet  it  has  no  Tendency  at  all  to  enable  a 
Being  to  difcern  that  Evidence  which  is  not  ;  But  on  the 
contrary,  it  has  a  Tendency  to  enable  to  difcern  with  great 
Certainty  that  there  is  none. 

III.  To  fuppofe  the  future  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  not 
to  be  necelTary  Events  ;  or,  which  is  the  fame  Thing,  Events 
which  it  is  not  impoflible  but  that  they  may  not  com«  to 
pafs  ;  and  yet  to  fuppofe  that  God  certainly  foreknows 
them,  and  .knows  all  Things  ;  is  to  fuppofe  God's  Know- 
f  ledge  to  be  inconfiftent  with  it  felf.  For  to  fay,  that  God 
certainly,  and  without  all  Conjedure,  knows  that  a  Thing 
will  infallibly  be,  which  at  the  fame  Time  he  knows  to  be 
fo  contingent^  that  it  may  polTibly  not  be,  is  to  fuppofe  his 
Knowledge  inconfiftent  with  it  felf  5  or  that  one  Thing 
that  he  knows  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  another  Thing 
that  he  knows.  'Tis  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  He  now 
knows  a  Propofition  to  be  of  certain  infallible  Truths 
which  he  knows  to  be  of  contingent  uncertain  Truth,,,  If 
a  future  Volition  is  fo  without  all  Neceflity,  'that  there  is  no- 
thing hinders  but  that  it  may  not  be,  then  the  Propofitioni 
which  afferts  it's  future  Exiftence,  is  fo  uncertain,  that  there 
is  Nothing  hinders  but  that  the  Truth  of  it  may  entirely 
fail.  And  if  God  knows  all  Things,  He  knows  this  Pro- 
pofition to  be  thus  uncertain.  And  that  is  inconfiftent 
v/ith  his  knowing  that  it  is  infallibly  true  5  and  fo  incon-* 
fiftent  with  his  infallibly  knowing  that  it  is  true.  If  the 
Thing  be  indeed  contingent,  God  views  it  fo,  and  judges 
it  to  be  contingent,  if  he  views  Things  as  they  are.  If  the 
Event  be  not  neceftary,  then  it  is  poffible  it  may  never  be  : 
And  if  it  be  pofllble  it  may  never  be,  God  knows  it  may 
poifibly  never  be  ;  and  that  is  to  knov/  that  the  Propofition 
which  affirms  it's  Exiftence,  may  poflibly  not  be  true ;  and 
that  is  to  know  that  the  Truth  of  it  is  uncertain  ;  which 
furely^  is  inconfiftent  with  his  knowing  it  as  a  certain 
Truth.  If  Volitions  are  in  Themfelves  contingent  Events, 
without  all  Neceffity,  then  'tis  no  Argument  of  Perfection 
of  Knowledge  in  any  Being  to  determine  peremptoril)r 
that  they  will  be  ;  but  on  the  contrary,  an  Argument  of 
Jgnorance  and  Miftake   :      Becaufe  it  would  argue,    that 

Q^  he 


12  2  Foreknowledge  infersNeceJftty^zxX,  11, 

he  fuppofes  that   Propofition  to  be  ccT-tain,    which  in  it's 
own  Nature,   and  ail   Things   conf.dered,   is   uncertain  and 
contingent.     To  fay  in  fuch   a  Cafe,   that   God   may   hav« 
Ways  of  knowing   contingent   Events   which   we  can't  con- 
ceive of,  •  is  ridi;:ulous  ;   as    much    fo,    as   to  fay,  that  God; 
may  know  Contradictions  to  be  true,   for  ought  we   know,, 
or   that  he  may  know  a  Thing  to   be   certain,    and   at  thei 
fame  Time  know  it  not  to  be   certain,   tho'  we   can't  con- 
ceive how  ;  becaufe   he    has  Ways   of  knowing,  which  we^ 
can't  comprehend. 

Coroh  I.  From  what  has  been  obferved  it  is  evident,  that 
tlie  abfolute  Decrees  of  God  are  no  more  inconfiftent  with 
human  Liberty,  on  Account  of  any  Neceffity  of  the  Event 
which  follows  from  fuch  Decrees,  than  the  abfolute 
Foreknozvledge  of  God.  Becaufe  the  ConnecSlion  between 
the  Event  and  certain  Foreknowledge,  is  as  infallible  and 
indlflbluble,  as  between  the  Event  and  an  abfolute  Decree. 
That  is,  'tis  no  more  impollible  that  the  Event  and  Decree 
fhould  not  agree  together,  than  that  the  Event  and  abfolute 
Knowledge  fhould  difagree.  The  Conne6lion  between  thcl 
Event  &Foreknowledge  is  abfolutelyperfe6l,by  theSuppofition:] 
becaufe  it  it  is  fuppofed,  that  the  Certainty  and  Infallibility 
of  the  Knowledge  is  abfolutely  perfed.  And  it  being  fo, 
the  Certainty  can't  be  increafed  ;  and  therefore  the  Con- 
ne<5tion  between  the  Knowledge  and  Thing  known,  can't  be 
mcreafed  ;  fo  that  if  a  Decree  be  added  to  the  Foreknow- 
ledge, it  don't  at  ail  increafe  the  Connection,  or  make  it 
more  infallible  and  indiffoluble.  If  it  were  not  fo,  the 
Certainty  of  Knowledge  might  be  increafed  by  the  Ad-' 
dition  of  a  Decree  ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition, 
v/hich  is,  that  the  Knovv^ledge  is  abfolutely  perfed,  or  per- 
fect to  the  higheft  polTible  Degree. 


There  is  as  much  of  an  ImpoflibiHty  but  that  the  Things  (1 
which  are  infallibly  foreknown,  ihould  be,  or  (which  is  the  i 
fame  Thin'<)  as  great  a  NecelTity  of  their  future  Exiftence,  .^ 
as  if  the  Event  were  already  written  down,  and  was  known,', 
and  read  by  all  Mankind,  thro'  all  preceeding  Ages,  and  j 
there  were  the  mod  indiffoluble  and  perfeA  Conne<5tion  i 
poffible,  between  the  Writing,  and  the  Thing  vmtten.i 
In  fuch  a  Cafe,  it  would  be  as  impoflible  the  Event  ihould  i 
fail  of  Exigence,  as  if  it  had  exifted  already  ;  and  a ;; 
Decree  cau't  make  aa  Event  furer  or  more  neceffary  than  ^ 
this. 

And.i 
i 


Seca.XII.      as  much  as  a  Decree.  123 

And  therefore,  if  there  be  any  fuch  Foreknowledge,  as 
it  has  been  proved  there  is,  then  Neceffity  of  Conneaion 
land  Confequence,  is  not  at  all  inconfiftent  with  any  Li- 
berty which  Man,  or  any  other  Creature  enjoys.  And 
from  hence  it  may  be  infer'd,  that  abfolute  Decrees  of 
God,  which  don't  at  all  increafe  the  Neceffity,  are  not  at  all 
•inconfiftent  with  the  Liberty  which  Man  enjoys,  on  any 
Ifuch  Account,  as  that  they  make  the  Event  decreed  neceffary, 
•fand  render  it  utterly  impoffible  but  that  it  (hould  come  to 
pafs.  Therefore  if  abfolute  Decrees  are  inconfiftent  with 
Man's  Liberty  as  a  moral  Agent,  or  his  Liberty  in  a  Statas 
of  Probation,  or  any  Liberty  v.^hatfoever  that  he  enjoys,  it 
is  not  on  Account  of  any  Neceffity  which  abfolute  De- 
crees infer. 

Dr.  Wh'ithy  fuppofes,  there  is  a  great  Difference  between 
God's  Foreknowledge,  and  his  Decrees,  with  Regard  to 
Neceffity  of  future  Events.  In  his  Difcourfe  on  the  five 
Points,  P.  474,  5ct.    He  lays,    '^  God's   Prefcience   has  no 

''  Influence  at  all    on  our  Adions. Should  God  (fays  be) 

*'  by  immediate  Revelation,  give  me  the  Knowledge  of  the 
"  Event  of  any  Man's  State  ^or  Actions,  would  my  Know- 
"  ledge  of  them  have  any  Infmence  upon  his  Acflifins  ? 
*'  Surely  none  at  all.- — Our  Knowledge  doth  not  affecl 
"  the  Things  w^e  know,  to  make  them  more  certain,  or 
"  more  future,  than  they  would  be  without  it.  Now  Fore- 
"  knowledge  in  God  is  Knowledge.  As  therefore  Know- 
*'  ledge  has  no  Influence  on  Things  that  are,  fo  neither  has 
*'  Foreknowledge  on  Things  that  ihall  be.  And  confe- 
*'  quently,  the  Foreknowledge  of  any  Action  that  would  be 
"  otherwife  free,  cannot  alter  or  diminlfti  that  Freedom. 
*'  Whereas  God's  Decree  of  Ele6lion  is  powerful  &  adive, 
*'  and  comprehends  the  Preparation  and  Exhibition  of  fuch 

*'  Means,    as  ftiall  unfruft.rably  produce  the  End. Hence 

"  God's  Prefcience  renders  no  Actions  neceflary."  And  to 
this  Purpofe,  P.  473.  he  cites  Origen^  where  he  fays,  GocVs 
Prefcience  is  not  the  Cauje  of  Thhigs  future^  hut  their  being  fu- 
ture is  the  Caufe  of  God's  Prefcience  that  they  will  be  :  And 
Le  B/anCy  where  he  fays.  This  is  the  truejf  RefoJutiGn  of  this 
Difficulty  y  that  Prefcience  is  not  the  Caufe  that  Things  are  future  \ 
hut  their  being  future  is  the  Caufe  they  are  forcfeen.  In  like 
Manner  Dr.  Clark^  in  his  Demonftration  of  the  Being  and^ 
Attributes  of  God,  P.  95,  —  99.  And  the  Author  of 
the  Freedom  of  IVilU  in  God  and  the  Creature^  fpeaking  to  the 
like   Purpofe  with    Dr.  IVhitby^    reprefents    Foreknowledge  as 

Q  2  having 


I 

124  Foreknowledge  infer sNeceJftty  Part  11.  j 

having  no  mor^  hifluence  on  Things  known^   to   make  them  mcejjar^^  \ 
than  Jfter-Knouikedge^f   or  to  that  Purpqfe.  . 

To  all  which  I  would  fay  ;  That  what  is  faid  about 
Knowledge,  it's  not  having  Influence  on  the  Thing  knowii- 
to  make  it  necefiary,  is  Nothing  to  the  Purpofe,  nor  does 
It  in  the  leaft  ^fFecfl  the  foregoing  Reafoning.  Whether 
^refcience  be  the  Thing  that  ?nakes  the  Event  neceflary  or  no, 
It  alters  not  the  Cafe.  Infallible  Foreknowledge  may  prov^ 
the  Neceflity  of  the  Event  foreknown,  and  yet  not  be  the 
Thing  which  caufes  the  Neceflity.  If  the  Foreknowledge  be 
abfolute,  this  proves  the  Event  known  to  be  neceflary,  or 
proves  that  'tis  impoffible  but  that  the  Event  fliould  be, 
by  fome  Means  or  other,  either  by  a  Decree,  or  fome 
other  Way,  if  there  be  any  other  Way  :  Becaufe,  as  was  faid 
before,  'tis  abfurd  to  fay,  that  a  Proportion  is  known  to 
t)e  certainly  and  infallibly  true,  which  yet  may  poflibly  prove 
not  true. 

The  whole   of  thp  feqming  Force  of  this  Evafion  lies  in 
this  ;    that,  in   as  much    as  certain    Foreknowledge    don't 
caufe   an  Event  to  be  neceflary,  as  a  Decree  does  ;   therefor^ 
it  don\  prove  it  to  be  neceflary,  as  a  Decree  does.     But  there 
is  n»  Force  in  this  arguing  :    For  it  is   built  wholly   on  this 
Suppofltion,   that  Nothing   can  prove^  ox   he  an  Evidence  of  a 
Thing's  being   neceflary,   but  that   which   has  a   coufal  In- 
fluence to  make  it  fo.      But   this  can   never  be  'maintained. 
li  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the   future   exifl:ing  of  an   E- 
yent,  be   not  the  Thing  which  firft  makes   it  impoflij^le  that 
it   fhould  fail  of  Ej^illence  ;   yet  it  may,  and  certainly  does 
demonjh-ate^  that  it   is  impoflible    it   fliould  fail  of  it,    how- 
ever ^'that  Impollibility   comes.      If  Foreknowledge   .be   not 
the  Caufe,  but  the  Effe6t  of  this  Impofllbility,   it  may  prove 
that  there  is  fuch  an  Impoflibility,   as  much  as  if  it  were  the 
Caufe.      It    is   as    fl:rong  arguing   from   the  Effec5l   to   the 
Caufe,  as  from  the  Caufe  to  the  Eff'edt.     'Tis  enough,   that  "j 
an  Exiftence  which  is  infallibly  foreknown,  cannot  fail,  whe- 
ther that  I;npoflibility  arifes  from  the   Foreknowledge,   or  is  J 
prior  to  it.     'Tis  as  evident,  as  'tis  pofllble  any  Thing  fliould/j 
be,    that    it   is   impoffible    a    Thing    which    is    infallibly:; 
known  to  be  true,    fliould  prove  not   to  be  true  ;    therefore^ 
there  is  a  Nccejjiiy    that  it  fliould  be  otherwife  ;    whether  the ,' 
Knowledge  be  the  C^ufe  of  this  Neceflity,  or  the  NeceffityS 
the  Caufe  of  the  Knowledge. 

All  certain  Knowledge,  whether   it  be  Foreknowledge   or^ 
After-Knowledge,    or  concomitant  Knov/ledge,  proves  the 

Thing 


Sed.XII.        as  much  as  a  Decree.        125 

vThing  known  now  to  be  necefTary,  by  fome  Means  or  other ; 
or  proves  that  it  is  impoffible  it  fliould  now  be  other- 
wife  than  true.  —  I  freejy  allow,  that  Foreknowledge  don't 
prove  a  Thing  to  be  necefTary  any  more  than  After-Know- 
ledge :  But  then  After-knowledge  which  is  certain  &  infalli- 
ble, proves  that  'tis  now  become  impoffible  but  that  the 
Propofition  known  (hould  be  true.  Certain  After- Knowledge 
proves  that  it  is  now,  in  the  Time  of  the  Knowledge,  by 
fome  Means  or  other,  become  im-pofllble  but  that  the  Propo- 
fition which  predicates  paft  Exiflence  on  the  Event,  fiiould 
be  true.  And  fo  does  certain  Foreknowledge  prove,  that 
now,  in  the  Time  of  the  Knowledge,  it  is  by  fome  Means 
or  other,  become  impoffible  but  that  the  Propofition  which 
predicates  future  Exiftence  on  the  Event,  fhould  be  true. 
The  Neceffity  of  thie  Truth  of  the  Propofitions,  confiding 
in  the  prefent  Impoffibility  of  the  Non-exiflence  of  the  Event 
affirmed,  in  both  Cafes,  is  the  immediate  Ground  of  the 
certainty  of  the  Knowledge  ;  there  can  be  no  Certainty  of 
Knowledge  without  it. 

There  mufl  be  a  Certainty  in  Things  themfelves,  before 
they  are  certainly  known,  or  (which  is  the  fame  Thing j 
known  to  be  certain.  For  Certainty  of  Knowledge  is  no- 
thing elfe  but  knowing  or  difcerning  the  Certainty  there  is 
in  the  Things  themfelves  which  are  known.  Therefore 
there  mufl  be  a  Certainty  in  Things  to  be  a  Ground  of  Cer- 
tainty of  Knowledge,  and  to  render  Things  capable  of  be- 
ing known  to  be  certain.  And  this  is  Nothing  but  the  Ne- 
celfity  of  the  Truth  known,  or  it's  being  impoffible  but  that 
it  fhould  be  true  ;  or,  in  other  Words,  the  firm  and  infalli- 
ble Connexion  between  the  Subjed  and  Predicate  of  the 
Propofition  that  contains  that  Truth.  All  Certainty  of 
Knowledge  confifts  in  the  View  of  the  Firmnefs  of  that 
Connection.  So  God's  certain  Foreknowledge  of  the  fu- 
ture Exiflence  of  any  Event,  is  his  Vfcw  of  the  firm  and  in- 
difToluble  Connection  of  the  Subject  and  Predicate  of  the 
iPropofition  that  afHrn;s  it's  future  Exiflence.     The  Subject  is 

.  ^hat  poffible  Event  ;  the  Predicate  is  it's  future  exifling  : 
But  if  future  Exiflence  be  firmly  and  indifTolubly  connected 
with  that  Event,   then   the  future   Exiflence   of  that   Event 

.  is  necefTary.  If  God  certainly  knows  the  future  Exiflence 
of  an  Event  which  is  wholly  contingent,  and  may  poffibiy 
never  be,  then  He  fees  a  firm  Connection  between  a  Sub- 
ject and  Predicate  that  are  not  firmly  connected  ;     which  is 

.  a  Contradiction, 

r 


] 


J  26  FoTcknowhdgcmfersNeceJ^fj,  Pai-tll, 

I   allow  what  Dr.   Whlthy  fays     to   be  true.     That  meer  ^ 

Knowledge  don^t  affe5i  the  Thing  knowriy    to   make  it  more   certain  i 

mr  more  future.     But  yet,   I  fay,    it  fuppofes   and  proves   the  | 

Thing  to  be  already^  both  future,  and  certain  ;  i.  e.  necefla-  1 

rily  future.     Knowledge  of  Futurity,  fuppofes  Futurity  ;   and  I 

2  certain  Knowledge  of  Futurity,  fuppofes   certain  Futurity,  an-  j 

tecedent  to  that   certain  Knowledge.     But   there  is  no  other  \ 

certain   Futurity  of  a  Thing,    antecedent  to  Certainty   of  j 

Knowledge,  than  a  prior  Impoflibility    but  that  the   Thing  j 

Ihould   prove   true  ;   or    (which  is    the  fame  Thing^  the  I 

Neceffity  of  the  Event.  I 

I  would  obferve  one  Thing  further  concerning  this  Mat-  |J 

ter,   and   it   is   this;    That  if  it  be   as   thofe  foremention'd  | 

Writers   fuppofe,   that   God's    Foreknowledge    is    not    the  | 

Caufe,  but  the  EfFe6t  of  the   Exiftence  of  the  Event  fore-  I 

known  ;  this   is  fo  far  from  (hewing  that  this  Foreknowledge  'i 

don't  infer  the  Neceffity  of  the  Exiftence  of  that  Event,  that  .j 

It  rather  fhews  the  contrary  the  more  plainly.     Becaufe  it  t 

Ihews  the  Exiftence  of  the  Event  to  be  fo  fettled  U  firm,  that  ;': 

it  is  as  if  it  had  already  been  ;  in   as   much  as  in   Effect  it  'i 

adtualiy  exifts  already  ;     it's  future    Exiftence    has  already  *i 

had   a<5hial   Influence  and  Efficiency,    and  has  produced  an  Effect,  \ 

viz.  Prefcience  :      The   Effedt   exifts   already  ;    and  as   the  j^ 

EfFe(5l  fuppofes  the  Caufe,   is  connc6ted  with  the  ^aufe,  and  -  ! 

depends  entirely  upon  it,  therefore   it  is   as  if  the  future  E-  .( 

vent,   which  is  the  Caufe,  had  exifted  already.     The  Effedt  '^ 

is   firm  as  poffible,    it  having  already  the  Pofteffion  of  Ex-  j 

iftence,   and  has  made  fure  of  it.      But  the  Effed  can't  be  \ 

more  firm  and   ftable  than  it's  Caufe,   Ground  and  Reafon.  I 

The  Building  can't  be  firmer  than  the  Foundation.  r 

To  illuftrate  this  Matter,  let  us  fuppofe  the  Appearances  } 

and  Images  of  Things  in  a  Glafs  ;  for  Inftance,  a  refledling  "\ 

Telefcope   to   be   the* real  Effects   of    heavenly  Bodies  (at  J 

a  Diftance,     and     out  of  SightJ    which     they  referable  :  |J 

If  it   be  fo,  then,   as   thefe  Images  in  the  Telefcope  have  A 

had   a    paft    a6tual    Exiftence,    and  it   is   become   utterly  \ 

impoffible   now   that    it     fhould    be  otherwife    than    that  ^ 

they  have  exifted  ;    fo  they   being  the   true  Effe<5ls  of  the  3 

heavenly   Bodies   they  referable,   this  proves  the  exifting  of  ? 

thofe   heavenly  Bodies   to   be   as   real,  infallible,   firm   and  I 

neceffary,  as  the  exifting  of  thefe  Eff*e(5ls  ;    the  one   being  ^ 

connected   with,   and   wholly  depending    on   the  other. ' 

Now  let  us  fuppofe  future  Exiitences  fome  Way  or  other  >;< 


Scd.XII.      as  much  as  a  Decree.       127 

to  have  Influence  back,  to  produce  Efre<5ls  before-hand, 
and  caufe  exadl  and  perfefl  Images  of  themfelves  in  a  Glafs, 
a  Thoufand  Years  before  they  exift,  yea,  in  all  preceed- 
ing.  Ages  ;  But  yet  that  thefe  Images  are  real  Effe6ls  of 
thefe  future  Exiftences,  perfectly  dependent  on,  and  con- 
necSted  with  their  Caufe  ;  thefe  Effects  and  Images,  having 
already  had  adual  Exiftence,  rendring  that  Matter  of  their 
Exifting  perfedly  firm  and  ftable,  and  utterly  impoffiblc 
to  be  otherwife  ;  this  proves  in  like  Manner  as  in  the 
other  Inftance,  that  the  Exiftence  of  the  Things  which 
are  their  Caufes,  is  alfo  equally  fure,  firm  and  neceffary  ; 
and  that  it  is  alike  impoffible  but  that  they  fhould  be,  as 
if  they  had  been  already,  as  their  Effeds  have.  And  if 
inftead  of  Images  in  a  Glafs,  we  fuppofe  the  antecedent 
EfFedts  to  be  perfedl  Ideas  of  them  in  the  divine  Mind, 
which  have  exifted  there  from  all  Eternity,  which  are  as 
properly  EfFe6ls,  as  truly  and  properly  conne<5led  with  their 
Caufe,  the  Cafe  is  not   altered. 

Another  Thing  which  has  been  faid  by  fome  Armlmans^ 
to  take  ofiT  the  Force  of  what  is  urged  from  God's  Pre- 
fcience,  againft  the  Contingence  of  the  Volitions  of  moral 
Agents,  is  to  this  Purpofe  ;  "  That  when  we  talk  .of 
*'  Foreknowledge  in  God,  there  is  no  ftri6i:  Propriety  in 
"  our  fo  Speaking  ;  and  that  altho'  it  be  true,  that  there  is 
"  in  God  the  moft  perfed  Knowledge  of  all  Events  from 
*'  Eternity  to  Eternity,  yet  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as 
"  before  and  after  in  God,  but  He  fees  all  Things  by 
"  one  perfed  unchangeable  View,  without  any  SuccelTion." 
To  this   I   anfwer, 

1.  It  has  been  already  fhewn,  that  all  certain  Knowledge 
proves  the   Necefllty  of  the  Truth  known  ;  whether   it  be 

before^  after^  or  at   the  fame  Time, Tho'   it   be  true,   that 

there  is  no  Succeffion  in  God's  Knowledge,  and  the  Manner 
of  his  Knowledge  is  to  us  inconceivable,  yet  thus  much 
we  know  concerning  it,  that  there  is  no  Event,  pad, 
prefent,  or  to  come,  that  God  is  ever  uncertain  of ;  He 
never  is,  never  was,  and  never  will  be  without  *infallible 
Knowledge  of  it  ;  He  always  fees  the  Exiftence  of  it 'to 
be   certain  and  infallible.      And  as  he  always   kts  Things 

ft  as  they  are  in  Truth  ;  hence  there  never  is  in  Reality 
.  ;  ^)  Thing  contingent  in  fuch  a  Senfe,  as  that  pofTibly  it 
may  happen  never  to  exift.  If,  ftridly  fpeaking,  there  is  no 
Foreknowledge  in  God,   'tis  becaufe  thofe  Things  which 

are 


128        CVr/^/»  Foreknowledge       Part II.   I 

i 

are  future  to  us,  are  as  prefent  to  God,  as  if  they  already  ; 

had  Exiftence  :    and  that  is  as  much  as  to   fay,  that  future  j 

Events   are   always   in    God's  View  as    evident,  clear,  fure  i 

and   neceflary,    as   if  they   already  were.      If  there  never  is  3 

a  Time  wherein  the  Exigence   of  the  Event  is  not  prefent  I 

with  God,  then  there  never  is   a  Time  wherein  it  is  not  j 

as   much   impoffible   for   it  to  fail  of  Exiftence,   as   if  it's  \ 

Exiftence  were  prefent,  and  were  already  come  to  pafs.  ] 

I 

God's  viewing  Things  fo  perfedlly  and  unchangeably   as  u 

that  there  is  no  Succeflion  in  his   Ideas   or  Judgment,   don't  •  \ 

hinder  but  that  there  is  properly  now,  in  the  Mind  of  God,  \ 

a  certain   and  perfe<5l  Knowledge  of  the   moral   Actions   of  ' 

Men,  which  to   us  are  an  Hundred  Years  hence  :    yea  the  1 

Obje6lion  fuppoles   this  ;    and   therefore  it  certainly   don't  1 

hinder  but   that,  by   the   foregoing   Arguments,   it  is   now  ; 

impoffible  thefe  moral  A<5lions  fliould  not  come  to  pafs.  \ 

We  know,  that  God  knows  the  future  voluntar}'  Anions  j 
of  Men  in  fuch  a  Senfe  before-hand,  as  that  he  is  able  par-  * 
ticularly  to  declare,  and  foretell  them,  and  write  them,-  :; 
or  caufe  them  to  be  written  down  in  a  Book,  as  He  often  1 
has  done  j  and  that  therefore  the  neceffary  Connedlion  | 
which  there  is  between  God's  Knowledge  and  the  Event*) 
known,  does  as  much  prove  the  Event  to  be  neceffary  \ 
before-hand,  as  if  the  divine  Knowledge  were  in  the  fame  ^ 
Senfe  before  the  Event,  as  the  Prediction  or  Writing  is.  i 
If  the  Knowledge  be  infallible,  then  the  Expreffion  of  it  in  i 
the  written  Prediction  is  infallible  5  that  is,  there  is  an  i 
infallible  Connedion  between  that  written  Predidion  and  i 
the  Event.  And  if  fo,  then  it  is  impoffible  it  iliould  i 
ever  be  otherwife,  than  that  that  Prediction  and  the  Event  i 
IhouW  agree  :  And  this  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  ^ 
'tis  impoffible  but  that  the  Event  fhould  come  to  pafs  :  | 
and  this  is   the   fame   as  to  fay,    that   it's    commg   to  pafs   i 

is  neceffary. So  that   it  is  manifeft,   that   there  being   no '  > 

proper  Succeffion  in  God's  Mind,  makes  no  Alteration  "4 
as  to  the  Neceffit)^  of  the  Exiftence  of  the  Events  which  | 
God   knows.     Yea,  < 


2,  This  is   io   far  from  weakening  the  Proof,  which  has 
been  given   of  the  Impoffibility  of  the  not   coming  to  pafs  i 
of  future  Events  known,   as  that   it  eftablifties   that  whereia  'li 
the   Strength    of    the    foregoing    Arguments    confifts,   and.  « 
fhQVt's  the  Clearnefs  of  the  Evidence.        For,  J 

(I.)  The  I 


Sedl.XII.     infers  fome  NecdTity.         129 

I      (ij  The   very  Reafon  why  God's  Knowledge  is   with- 

i  out   SuccelTlon,    is,  becaufe   it   is  ablblutely  perfecl,   to    the 

I  higheft   pofTible   Degree    of  Clearnefs   and  Certainty   :    all 

i  Things,   whether   paft,   prefent  or    to  come,   being  view'd 

I  with  equal  Evidence   and   Fulnefs  ;    future    Things   being 

\  htn  with  as    much  Clearnefs,   as    if  they   were    prefent  ; 

the   View  is  always  in   abfolute   Perfedion  ;    and  abfolute 

!  conftant    Perfedion    admits    of    no  Alteration,  and   fo   no 

I  SuccefTion  ;    the  adual  Exiftence  of  the  Thing  known,  don't 

at  all   increafe,    or    add   to   the  Clearnefs  or    Certainty   of 

lithe  Thing  known  :    God  calls  the  Things  that  are  not,  as 

tho'   they  were   ;    they    are   all  one    to    Him  as  if    they 

[had   already  exifled.      But  herein   coniifts   the    Strength  of 

the  Demonftration  before   given,  of  the  ImpoiTibility  of  the 

I  not  exifting  of  thofe   Things  whofe  Exiftence  God  knows  ; 

('That  it  is   as   impolTible  they  fhould  fail  of  Exiftence,  as  if 

itheyexifted  already.     This  Objedion,  inftead  of  weakening 

jthis  Argument,  fets   it   in  the   cleareft  and  ftrongeft  Light  ; 

for   it   fuppofes   it  to   be   fo   indeed,   that  the  Exiftence  of 

future  Events  is   in  God's  View   fo   much   as  if  it   already 

had  been,  that  when  they  come  actually  to  exift,  it  makes 

not   the   leaft    Alteration    or     Variation   in    his    View     or 

Knowledge   of  them. 

(2.)  The  Objedlon  is  founded  on  the  Immutability  oi  Go6!^ 
Knowledge  :  For  'tis  the  Immutability  of  Knowledge  makes 
his  Knowledge  to  be  without  SucceiTion.  But  this  moft 
diredly  and  plainly  demonftrates  the  Thing  I  infift  on, 
^vz.that  'tis  utterly  impoffible  the  known  Events  fhould 
fail  of  Exiftence.  For  if  that  were  pollible,  then  it  would 
be  poliible  for  there  to  be  a  Change  in  God's  Knowledge 
and  View  of  Things.  For  If  the  knov/n  Event  ftiouid 
fail  of  Exiftence,  and  not  come  into  Being,  as  God  expefted, 
then  God  would  fee  it,  and  fo  would  change  his  Mind^ 
and  fee  his  former  Miftake  ;  and  thus  there  would  be 
Change  and  SuccefTion  in  his  Knowledge.  But  as  God  is 
immutable,  and  fo  it  is  utterly  and  infinitely  impoffible 
that  his  View  fhould  be  changed  ;  fo  'tis,  for  ,the  fame' 
Reafon,  juft  fo  impoffible  that  the  fore-known  Event  fhould 
not  exift  :  And  that  is  to  be  impoffible  in  the  higheit 
iDegree  :  and  therefore  the  contrary  is  neceflary.  Nothing 
[is  more  impoffible  than  that  the  immutable  God  fhould 
[be  changed,  by  the  SuccefTion  of  Time  ;  ^who  compre- 
Ikends  aU  Things,  from  Eternity  to  Eternityj   in  one,  moft: 

R.  perfect 


130  Forcknowlege/jrw^j  NeceJJtty.  Part II, 

perfed,   and  unalterable  View  ;    fo   that  his   whole   eternal 
Duration  is  Vitoe  interminabilis^  tota^fimul^  &  perfe£ia  Pojpjfto,    . 

On  the  whole,  I  need  not  fear  to  fa}S  that  there  is  no 
Geometrical  Theorem  or  Propolition  whatfoever,  more  capa-. 
ble  of  ftri(5t  Demonftration,  than  that  God's  certain  Pre- 
fcience  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  is  inconfiftent  with 
fuch  a  Contingence  of  thefe  Events,  as  is  without  all 
Neceflity ;  and  fo  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Arminian  Notion 
of  Liberty. 

Cord.  2.  Hence  the  Dodrine  of  the  Calvinifis^  concerning 
the  abfoliite  Decrees  of  God,  does  not  at  all  infer  any 
more  Fatality  in  Things,  than  will  demonftrably  follow  froii\ 
the  Doclrine  of  moft  Arminian  Divines,  who  acknowledge 
God's  Omnifcience,  and  univerlal  Prefcience.  Therefore 
all  ObjecStions  they  make  againft  the  Doclrine  of  the  Calvijiijlsy 
as  implying  Hobbes's  Do6lrine  of  Neceflity,  or  the  Stoicd. 
Dodrine  of  Fate,  lie  no  more  againft  the  Dodlrine  of 
Cahinijis,  than  their  own  Do6lrine  :  And  therefore  it  ^on't 
become  thofe  Divines,  to  raife  luch  an  Out-cry  againft  the 
Cakinijis,  on  this  Account. 

CoroL  3.  Hence^  all  arguing  from  Neceflity,  againft  the 
Do6tnne  of  the  Inability  of  unregenerate  Men  to  perform 
the  Conditions  of  Salvation,  and  the  Commands  of  God; 
requiring  fpiritual  Duties,  and  againft  the  Calviniftic  Dodrine 
of  efficacious  Grace  ;  I  fay,  all  Arguings  of  Arminiam 
(fuch  of  'em  as  own  God's  Omnifcience)  againft  thefe 
Things,  on  this  Ground,  that  thefe  Doarines,  tho'  they 
don't  fuppofe  Men  to  be  under  any  Conftraint  orCoadion, 
yet  fuppofe  'em  under  NecefiTity,  with  Refpeft  to  their  moral 
Aclions,and  thofe  Things  which  are  required  of 'em  in  Order 
to  their  Acceptance  with  God  j  and  their  arguing  againft 
t^ie  Neceflity  of  Men's  Volitions,  taken  from  the  Reafo- 
iiablenefs  of  God's  Commands,  Promifes,  and  Threatnings,, 
and  the  Sincerity  of  his  Counfels  and  Invitations  ;  and  all 
Objedions  againft  any  Doctrines  of  the  Cahiynjh  as  being 
inconfiftent  with  human  Liberty,  becaufe  they  infer  NecelFity ; 
I  fay,  all  thefe  Arguments  and  Objections  muft  fall  to 
the  Ground,  and  be  juftly  efteem'd  vain  and  frivolous, 
as  coming  from  them  -,  being  maintain'd  in  an  Inconflftence 
with  themfelves,  and  in  like  Manner  levelled  againft  their  own 
Doahne,   as   againft  the  Doctrine  of  the   Qalvmifls, 

Section 


Section     XIIL 

Whether  weftippofe  the  Folitions  of  moral 
Agents  to  be  conneEied  with  any  Xhing 
antecede7tty  or  not ^  yet  they  mujl  be  ne- 
ceffary  in  fuch  a  Senfe  as  to  overthrow 
Arminian  Liberty. 


EVERY    Aa  of  the  Will  has  a  Caufe,  or  it   has  not. 
If  it  has   a  Caufe,   then,     according     to     what    has 
already   been  demonftrated,   it   is  not  contingent,  but 
neceflary  \    the   EfFe<5t:  being  neceffarily  dependent  and  con- 
fequent  on  it's    Caufe  ;    and   that,  let   the  Caufe  be   what 
it  will.      If    the   Caufe  is  the   Will   itfelf,    by    antecedv^nt 
A6ts  •chufmg   and  determining  ;      ftill    the     determined    and 
canfed   Ad   muft    be   a   neceflary  Effea.       The     Aa   that 
is   the   determined  Effea   of  tl\e  foregoing  Aa  which  is  it's 
Caufe,  can't  prevent  the  Efficiency  of  it's  Caufe  ;   but  mull 
be  wholly   fubjea    to    it's   Determination    and   Command, 
as   much    as   the  Motions   of  the  Hands  and  Feet  :    The 
confequent   commanded   Aas   of    the   Will   are     as  paflive 
and  as  neceffary,  with  Refpea  to  the  .antecedent  determining 
Aas,  as   the   Parts  of  the    Body     are     to     the    Vohtions 
"Which  determine   and    command  them.      And  therefore,  if 
all  the   free  Aas   of  the  Will    are     thus,    if  they    are  all 
-determined   Effeas,   determined  by   the  Will   it   felf,   that 
is,    determined    by    antecedent  Choice,   then    they  are   all 
•  neceflary  ;  they  are   all  fubjec^  to,    and   decifively   fixed  by 
the  foregoing  Aa,    which   is   their  Caufe  :     Yea,   even  the 
determining  Aa  it  felf  ;    for  that  muft  be  determined  and 
fixed  by   another  Aa,   preceding  that,   if  it  be   a   free  and 
voluntary  Aa  ;    and  fo  muft   be  neceflary.     So  that  by  this 
all   the  free  Ads  of  the   Will   are   neceflfary,   and   can't  be 
free   unlefs  they  are   neceflary  :     Becaufe  they  can't  be  free, 
according  to  the  Arminian  Notion  of  Freedom,  unlefs   they 
are   determined  by  the   Will  ;    which  is  to  be    determined 
by   antecedent   Choice  ;    which  being   their   Caufe,  proves 
■  'em  nebeflTary,      And  yet  they  fay,  NeceflTity  is  utterly  incon- 

R  2  iiftent 


132  Both  NeceJJlty  &^  Conttngence  Part  II.  ] 

fiflent  with  Liberty.     So  that,   by   their  Scheme,   the  A6ls  \ 

oi  the   Will  can't   be   free  unlefs   they  2X^   neceflary,   and  ; 
yet  cannot  be  free  if  they  be  ^ssm-  neceflary  ! 

I 

But  if   the  other  Part  of  the   Dilemma  be  taken,   and  j 

it   be   affirm'd  that    the    free  A6ts  of  the   Will   have   no  1 

Caufe,    and  are   connected   with  nothing    whatfoever    that  \ 

go^s  before  them   and  determines  them,  in  order  to  maintain  \ ; 

their   proper   and   abfolute   Contingence,   and  this  fliould  b«  I 

allowed   to   be  poffible   ;    ftill   it   will  not  ferve  their  Turn.  I 

For  if  the  VoUtion  comes  to   pafs  by  perfect  Contingence,  ] 
and  without  any  Caufe   at   all,   then   it   is   certain,  no  A(5t 

of  the  Will,  no   prior  Ad  of  the  Soul  was   the  Caufe,  no"  I 

Determination  or  Choice  of    the   Soul,   had    any   Hand   in  \ 

it.     The  Will,  or  the  Soul,  was  indeed  the  Subject  of  what  \ 

happened  to  it  accidentally,  but   was   not  the  Caufe.     The  i 

Will   is   not   active   in   caufmg  or  determining,   but  purely  ;■ 

the  palTive  Subject  ^   at  leaft   according   to  their  Notion  of  \ 

A6lion   and   Paflion.      In  this    Cafe,   Contingence    does  as  1 

much   prevent  the  Determination  of  the  Will,   as  a  proper  ' 

Caufe  ;  and  as  to  the  Wil],   it   was  neceflary,   and  could  be  .| 

po   otherwife.      For   to  fuppofe  that   it   could    have^  been  i 

©therwife,   if  the  Will   or  Soul    had   pleafed,   is   to  fuppofe  \ 

that  the  Ad  is   dependent  Qn  fome  pnor  A6t   of  Choice  or  \\ 

Pleafure  ;    contrary  to  what   now  is  fuppofed  :    Jt  is  to  fup-  1 

pofe   that   it   might  have  been   otherwife^  if  it's  Caufe  had  \ 

made  it   or   ordered   it   otherwife.      Eut   this  dpn't  agree  to  \ 

it's   having   no  Caufe   or  Orderer  at   all.      That   muft   be  -' 

neceflary  as   to   the   Soul,  which  is   dependent  on  no  free  ij 

A6t  of  the  Soul  ;     But  that  which  is  without  a  Caufe,  is  de-  > 

pendent  on  no  free  A6t  of  the  Soul  :    bccaufe,  by   the  Sup-  • 

pofition,  it   is  dependent  on  Nothing,  and  is  conneded  with  1 

Nothing.     In  fuch  a  Cafe,  the  Soul  is   neceflarily  fubjeded"  J 

to  what  Accident:  brings    to  pafs,  from   Time   to  Time,   as  . 

much  as   the  Earth,     that     is   inadive,   is  neceflarily   fub-  j 

jected   to   what  falls  upon   it.      But   this  don't  confift  with  ! 

the  Armnicin  Notion  of  Liberty,  which  is  the  Will's  Power  ' 

of  determming  it  fclf  in   it's  own    Ads,   and  being  wholly  j 

adive  in  it,   without  Pafllvenefs,   and  without   being  fubjed  '\ 

to  Neccirity.--—  Thus,  Contingence  belongs  to  the  Armini^n  ' 

Notion  of  Liberty,   and   yet   is   inconfiftent  with  it.  \ 

I   would  here   obferve,   that  the  Author   of   the  EJfay  on  \ 

the   Freedc?n   of   Will^   in    God  and  the  Creature^    Page  76,  77.  \ 

^iivs    as   follows;,    "  The  Word  Chance  always  means   forrie-  j 

'                                '                                                 '*'  thins:  ' 


Seft.XIII.  inco?tJiJI^ wi^^hxmm. Liberty .  133 

*'  thing  done  without  Defign.  Chance  and  Defign  ftand 
"  in  dire6t  Oppofition  to  each  other  :  and  Chance  can 
*«  never  be  properly  applied  to  the  Ads  of  the  ^yiil, 
«  which  is  the  Spring  of  all  Defign,  and  which  defigns 
*«  to  chufe  whatfoever  it  doth  chufe,  whether  there  be  any 
<*=  fuperiour  Fitnefs  in  the  Thing  which  it  chufes,  or  no  -, 
**  and  it  defigns  to  determine  it  felf  to  one  Thing,  where 
.  *'  two  Things  perfedlly  equal  are  propofed,  meerly  becaufe  it 
*'  will."  But  herein  appears  a  very  great  Inadvertence  in  this 
Author.  For  if  the  IVill  be  the  Spring  of  all  Defign^  as  he 
fays,  then  certainly  it  is  not  always  the  EffeSl  of  Defign  -, 
and  the  A61s  of  the  Will  themfelves  muft  fometimes  come 
to  pafs  when  they  don't  fprmg  from  Defign  \  and  confe- 
quently  come  to  pafs  by  Chance,  according  to  his  own 
Definition  of  Chance.  And  if  the  Will  defigns  to  chiije  what- 
foever  it  does  chufe y  2.n6.  defigns  to  determine  it  felf  as  he  fays, 
then  it  defigns  to  determine  all  its  Defigns.  Which 
carries  us  back  from  one  Defign  to  a  foregoing  Defign 
determining  that,  and  to  another  determining  that  ;  and 
fo  on  in  infinitum.  The  very  firft  Defign  muft  be  the 
J£fFe6l  of  foregoing  Defign,  or  elfe  it  muft  be  by  Chance, 
in   his   Notion  of  it. 

Here  another  Alternative  may  be  propofed,  relating  to 
the  Conne(5\ion  of  the  Acts  of  the  Will  with  fomething 
foregoing  that  is  their  Caufe,  not  much  unlike  to  the  other  ; 
which  is  this  :  Either  human  Liberty  is  fuch  that  it  may 
iwell  ftand  with  Volitions  being  neceffarily  connected  with 
the  Views  of  the  Underftanding,  and  fo  is  confiftent  with 
Necelfity  ;  or  it  is  inconfiftent  with,  and  contrary  to  fuch 
a  Connection  and  Neceflity.  The  former  is  diredly  fub- 
<verfive  of  the  Arininian  Notion  of  Liberty,  confifting  in  Free- 
dom from  all  Neceflity.  And  if  the  latter  be  chofen,  and  it 
be  faid,  that  Liberty  is  inconfiftent  with  any  fuch  neceflary 
Connection 'of  Volition  with  foregoing  Views  of  the  Under- 
ftanding, it  confifting  in  Freedom  from  any  fuch  NecelTity 
of  the  Will  as  that  would  imply  ;  then  the  Liberty  of 
the  Soul  confifts  (in  Part  at  leaft)  in  the  Freedom  from 
Reftraint,  Limitation  and  Government,  in  it's  a6tings,  by  the 
Underftanding,  and  in  Liberty  and  Liabienefs  to  aCl  contrary 
to  the  Underftanding's  Views  and  Dictates  :  and  confe- 
quently  the  more  the  Soul  has  of  this  Difengagednefs,  in 
it's  acting,  the  more  Liberty.  Now  let  it  be  confidered 
what  this  brings  the  noble  Principle  of  human  Liberty  to, 
particularly  when  it  is  poflefiTed  and  enjoyed  in  it's  Perfection, 


1 
134  P^rmim^iri  Liberty  inc^^^         Part  II.  \ 


viz.  a  full  and  perfe(5l  Freedom  and  Liablenefs  to  a6^  t' 
altogether  at  Random,  without  the  leaft  Conne6tion  with,  t 
Of  Reftraint  or  Government  by,  any  Di6late  of  Reafon,  \ 
or  any  Thing  whatfoever  apprehended,  confidered  or  viewed  ^ 
by  the  Underftanding  ;  as  being  inconfiftent  with  the  full  i! 
and  perfect  Sovereignty  of  the  Will  over  it's  own  Deter- 
minations.  The    Notion    Mankind    have   conceived   of  j 

Liberty,  is  fome  Dignity  or  Privilege,  fomething  worth  j 
claiming.  But  what  Dignity  or  Privilege  is  there,  in  being 
given  up  to  fuch  a  wild  Contingence  as  this,  to  be  per-» 
fe<5lly  and  conftantly  liable  to  a6t  unintelligently  and  un- 
reafonably,  and  as  much  without  the  Guidance  of  Un- 
handing, as  if  we  had  none,  or  were  as  deftitute  of 
Perception  as  the  Smoak  that  is  driven  by  the  Wind  ! 


*w*  "^o^  **J0/*  %o^  *w  "^y  ^^  %v*  %iv*  v^  "w*  ^4^  ^{v*  *vft^  ^c/*  w*  'w  <^ 


PARxi 


w^^^s^sss^s^ssi^d^^s^^^'s^^^s^^m  I 


i 


(    '35    ) 


PART     III. 

Wherein  is  enquired^  whether  any  fuch 
Liberty  of  Will  as  Arminians  hold^  be 
neceffary  to  Moral  Agency,  Vertue 
and  Vice,  Praise,  and  Dispraise, ^c. 


S  E-C  T  I  o  N      I. 

god's  moral   Excellency  neceffary^    yet 
vertuous  and  praife-worthy. 


*•  Tf  AVING  confidered  the  firji  Thing  that  was  propofed 
^  I  '■  1  to  be  enquired  into,  relating  to  that  Freedom  of  Wili 
'*-  -■•  which  Arminians  maintain  j  namely,  Whether  any 
fuch  Thing  does,  ever  did,  or  ever  can  exift,  or  be  con- 
ceived of  ;  I  come  now  to  the  fecond  Thing  propofed  to  be 
the  Subjed  of  Enquiry,  'viz.  Whether  any  fuch  Kind  of 
Liberty  be  requifite  to  moral  Agency,  Vertue  and  Vice,  Praife 
and  Blame,  Reward  and  Puniihment,  i^c. 

I  fhall  begin  with  fome  Confideration  of  the  Vertue  and 
Agency  of  the  Supream  moral  Agent,  and  Fountain  of  all 
Agency  and  Vertue. 


Dr.  IVhithy^  in  his  Difcourfe  on  the  five  Points,  P.  14.  fays, 
*'  If  all  human  Actions  are  neceffary.  Virtue  and  Vice  mud 
*^  be  empty  Names  \  wc  being  capable  of  Nothing  that  is 

*^  blame- 


136  God' smor^lExctWency necejfarj^  Pa.IlI 

''  blame-worthy,  or  deferveth  Praife  ;  For  who  can  blame 
'^  a  Perfon  for  doing  only  what  he  could  not  help,  or  judge 
*^'  that  he  deferveth  Praife  only  for  what  he  could  not  avoid  ?'* 
To  the  like  Purpofe  he  fpeaks  in  Places  innumerable  ;  efpe- 
cially  in  his  Difcourfe  on  the  Freedom  of  the  Will ;  conftantly 
maintaining,  that  a  Freedcm  tiot  only  from  Coa^ion^  but  Necejfity^ 
is  abfolutely  requifite,  in  order  to  Adions  being  either  wor- 
thy of  Blame,  or  deferving  of  Praife.  And  to  this  agrees,  as 
is  well  known,  the  current  Dodrine  of  Arminlan  Writers  ; 
who  in  general  hold,  that  there  is  no  Vertue  or  Vice,  Reward 
or  Punifhment,  nothing  to  be  commended  or  blamed,  with- 
out this  Freedom.  And  yet  Dr. //^/^/%,  P.  300,  allows,  that 
God  is  without  this  Freedom  ;  And  Arminians^  fo  far  as  I 
have  had  Opportunity  to  obferve,  generally  acknowledge, 
that  Gojd  is  necelTarily  holy,  and  his  Will  neceflarily  deter- ' 
mined  to  that  which  is  good. 

So  that,   putting  thefe  Things  together,  the  infinitely  holy 
God,    who  always  ufed  to  be    efteemed  by  God's  People,  not 
only  vertuous,   but  a  Being   in  whom  is    all   pofTible  Vertue, 
and  every  Vertue  in  the  moft  abfolute  Purity   and  Perfedion, 
and  in  infinitely  greater  Brightnefs    and  Amiablenefs    than  in 
any  Creature  ;    the  moft  perfed:  Pattern  of  Vertue,   and  the   I 
Fountain  from  whom  all  others  Vertue  is  but  as  Beams  from   i 
the  Sun  ;    and  who  has  been  fuppofed  to   be,    on   the   Ac-    '}■ 
count  of  his  Vertue   and   Holinefs,   infi.nitely   more  worthy  jj 
to  be   efteemed,   loved,     honoured,    admired,    commended,   \ 
extoli'd   and  praifed,  than  any  Creature   ;    and   He   who  is   \ 
thus  every  where  reprefented  in  Scripture  ;  I  fay,   this  Being, 
according  to  this  Notion  of  Dr.  IPlokhy^  and  other  Ar7nhnans^ 
has  no  Vertue  at  all  j    Vertue,  when  afcribed  to  Him,  is  but 
ah  empty  Name  ;    and    he  is  deferving  of  no  Commendation  or 
Praife  ;  becaufe  he  is  under  Neceflity,  He  can*t   avoid  being 
holy  and  good  as  he  is  ;  therefore  no  Thanks  to  him  for  it. 
It  feems,  the  Holinefs,  Juftice,  Faithfulnefs,  &c.  of  the  moft 
High,   muft  not  be  accounted  to  be  of  the  Nature  of  that 
which  is   vertuous  and  praife -worthy.     They  will  not   deny, 
that  thefe  Things  in  God  are  good  ;    But   then  we  muft  un- 
derftand  them,   that  they  are  no  more  veftuous,    or  of  the 
Nature  of  any  Thing  commendable,    than  the  Good  that  is 
in  sny  other  Being  that  is  not  a  moral  Agent  ;   as  the  Bright^ 
nefs  of  the  Sun,   and  the  Fertility  of  the  Earth  are  good,  but 
not  vertuous,  becaufe  thefe  Properties   are  neceflary  to  thel<5 
Bodies,  and  not  the  Fruit  of  Self- determining.  PoiYer. 

Ther9 


:! 


Seft.I.  j'^/ Vertuous  &^  Praife-worthy.  137 

There  needs  no  other  Confutation  of  this  Notion  of  God's 
not  being  vertuoiis  or  praife -worthy,  to  Chriftians  ac- 
[quainted  with  the  Bible,  but  only  ftating  and  particularly 
reprefenting  of  it.  To  bring  Texts  of  Scripture,  wherein 
God  is  reprefented  as  in  every  Refpedt,  in  the  higheft 
Manner  vertuous,  and  fupreamly  praife-worthy,  would  be 
endlefs,  and  is  altogether  needlefs  to  fuch  as  have  beea 
brought  up  under  the  Light  of  the  Gofpel. 

.    It  were  to  be  wifhedj  that  Dr.  IVhitby,    and  other   Divines 
I  of  the  fame  Sort,   had  explain'd  themfelves,  when  they  havci 
afferted  that   That  which   is   neceflary,    is   not   deferuing  of 
Praife  ;    at  the  fame  Time  that  they  have  own'd  God's  Per- 
fedlion  to  be  necefTary,  and  fo  in  EiFe6t   repi'efented  God  as 
not  deferving  Praife*     Certainly,     if  their  Words   have   any 
Meaning  at  all,    by  Praife^   they  muft  mean   the  Exercife  of 
jT^imony  of  fome  Sort  of  Efteem,  Refpe<5t,   or  honourable 
jRdgard.     And  will  they  then  fay>   that  Men   are   worthy   of 
I  that  Efteem,  Refpe6l,   and  Honour  for   their  Vertue,   fmali 
land  imperfect  as  it  is,  which  yet  God  is  not  worthy  of^  for  his 
[infinite  Righteoufnefs,  Holinefs,  and  Goodnefs  ?     If  fo,   it 
I  muft  be  becaufe  of  fome  Sort  of  peculiar  Excellency   in  the 
jvi^rtuous  Man,   which  is  his  Prerogative,   wherein   he  really 
has    the  Preference  ;    fome  Dignity,  that  is    entirely  diftin- 
iguifti'd  from  any  Excellency,  Amiablenefs  or  Honourablenefs 
in  God  ;     not   in   Imperfe6tion  and   Dependance,     but   in 
Pre-eminence  ;   which  therefore  he  don't  receive  from  God, 
inor  is  God  the  Fountain  or  Pattern  of  it ;   nor   can  God,   in 
that  Refpe6t,  ftand  in  Competition  with  him,  as  the  Obje<£t  of 
Honour  and  Regard  ;    but  Man  may  claim  a  peculiar  Efteem, 
Commendation  and  Glory,  that  God  can  have  no  Pretenfion^ 
!to.     Yea,  God  has  no  Right,   by  vertue  of  his  necelTary  Ho- 
linefs, to  intermeddle  with  that  grateful  Refpe(5l   and  Praife, 
idue  to  the  vertuous  Man,  who  chufes  Vertue,  in  the  Exercife 
of  a   Freedom  ad  utruinque  ;  any  more  than  a  precious  Stone, 
which  can't  avoid  being  hard  and  beautiful. 

And  if  it  be  fo,  let  it  be  explained  what  that  peculiar 
I  Refped  is,  that  is  due  to  the  vertuous  Man^  which  differs 
I  in  Nature  and  Kind,  in  fome  Way  of  Pre-eminence,  from 
\  all  that  is  due  to  God.  What  is  the  Name  or  I>efcription 
I  of  that  peculiar  Affedlion  ?  Is  it  Efteem,  Love,  Admiration^, 
Honour,  Praife,  or  Gratitude  ?  The  Scripture  every  where 
:  reprefents  God  as  the  higheft  Objea  of  all  thefe  :  there  we 
j  read  of  the  $quI' s  imgnfying  the  Lord^  of  hv'wg  Hhn  mth  all  the 
i  .  ■       "  S  Hearty 


138    Concerning  GOXy^  Vertue.    Part  III. 

Hearty  with  all  the  Soul^wlth  all  theMind^  ^  with  all  the  Strength  ; 
admiring  him,  and  his  righteous  A^s^  or  greatly  regarding  them, 
as  marvellous  ^  wonderful ;  honouring^  glorifying^  exalting^  extolling^ 
blefpng^  thanking^  and  praifing  Him  ;  giving  unto  Him  all  the  Glory 
of  the  Good  which  is  done  or  received,  rather  than  unto 
Men  ;  that  no  Flejh  Jhould  glory  in  his  Prefence  j  but  that  He 
fl-iould  be  regarded  as  the  Being  to  whom  all  Glory  is  due. 
What  then  is  that  Refpea  ?  What  Pairion,AfFeaion,  or  Ex- 
ercife  is  it,  that  Arminians  call  Praife^  diverfe  from  all  thefe 
Things,  which  Men  are  worthy  of  for  their  Vertue,  and 
which  God  is  not  worthy  of,   in  any  Degree  ?  ';t 

If  that  Neceflity  which  attends  God's  moral  Perfedions 
and  Actions,  be  as  inconfiftent  with  a  Being  worthy  of 
Praife,  as  a  Necefllty  of  CoacStion  ;  as  is  plainly  implied  in 
or  inferred  from  Dr.  Ulnthys  Difcourfe  ;  then  why  fhould. 
we  thank  God  for  his  Goodnefs,  any  more  than  if  He  were 
forced  to  be  good,  or  any  more  than  we  ftiould  thank  one 
of  our  Fellow-Creatures  who  did  us  Good,  not  freely,  and 
of  good  Will,  or  from  any  Kindnefs  of  Heart,  but  from  meer 
Compulfion,  or  extrinfecal  Neceflity  ?  Arminians  fuppofe, 
that  God  is  neceflarily  a  good  and  gracious  Being  :  for  this 
they  make  the  Ground  of  fome  of  their  main  Arguments 
againft  many  Dodrines  maintain'd  by  Calvinijls  :  They  fay, 
thefe  are  certainly  falfe,  and  it  is  i?npaffible  they  fhould  be  true,: 
becaufe  they  are  not  confident  wqth  the  Goodnefs  of  God.l 
This  fuppofes,  that  it  is  impoffible  but  that  God  fhould  be 
good  :  for  if  it  be  fpofuble  that  He  fhould  be  otherwife, 
then  that  ImpofTibihty  of  the  Truth  of  thefe  Dodrines  ceafes, 
according  to  their  own  Argument. 


\ 


That  Vertue  in  God  is  not,  in  the  moft  ;^roper  Senfe^tft 
rewardcible^  is  not  for  Want  of  Merit  in  his  moral  Perfedi- J 
ons  and  Actions,  fufncient  to  deferve  Rewards  from  hisli 
Creatures  ;  but  becaufe  He  is  infinitely  above  all  Capacity ;)ii 
of  receiving  any  Reward  or  Benefit  from  the  Creature  :  HeH 
is  already  infinitely  and  unchangeably  happy,  and  we  can'tn 
be  profitable  unto  Him.  But  flill  he  is  worthy  of  our  fupreamj4 
Benevolence  for  his  Vertue  ;  and  would  be  worthy  of  ontk 
Beneficence,  which  is  the  Fruit  and  ExprefTion  of  Benevo-^^ 
lence,  if  our  Goodnefs  could  extend  to  Him.  If  God  de- 1| 
fervcs  to  be  thanked  and  praifed  for  his  Goodnefs,  He  wouldrt' 
for  the  fame  Reafon,  deferve  that  we  fhould  alfo  requite  his|i 
Kindnefs,  if  that  were  poffible.  TVhat  Jhall  I  render  to  thtV 
Lord  for  all  his  Benefits  f  is   the  natural  Language  of  Thank-| 

fulnefs 


Seft.II.   Chn{\' s  Oh^dicncG  mcejfarj.    139 

fulnefs  :  and  (o  far  as  in  us  lies,  it  is  our  Duty  to  recompenfc 
God's  Goodnefs,  and  render  again  according  to  Benefits  received. 
And  that  we  might  have  Opportunity  for  fo  natural  an  Ex- 
preflion  of  our  Gratitude  to  God,  as  Beneficence,  notwith- 
ftanding  his  being  infinitely  above  our  Reach  j  He  has  ap- 
pointed others  tobe  his  Receivers,  and  to  ftand  in  his  Stead, 
as  the  Objeas  of  our  Beneficence  ;  fuch  are  efpecially  our 
indigent  Brethren. 


Section     II. 

Ths  AEis  of  the  Will  of  the  human  Soul  of 
Jesus  Christ  neceflarily  holy,jj^^/ ^r^/^ 
vertuGus^  praife-worthyy  rewardable^  6cc. 


ir  Have  already  confidered  how  Dr.  Whithy  infifis  upon  it, 
I  that  a  Freedom,  not  only  from  Coadion,  but  Necefiity, 
#  is  requifde  to  either  Vertue  or  Vice^  Praife  or  Dijpraife^  Reward 
or  Funijlmient.  He  alfo  infifis  on  the  fame  Freedom  as  abfo- 
h^tely  requifite  to  a  Perfon's  being  the  Subject  of  a  Lav;^  ot 
Precepts  or  Prohibitions  \  in  the  Book  before  mentioned  (P.  301, 
!^3i4,  328,  339,  940,  341,  342,  347,  361,  373,410.;  And  of 
'  Pro7ni/es  znd  Threatnings  (P.  298,  301,  305,  311,  339,  34G, 
363.)    And  as  requifite  to  a  State  of  Trial,  (P.  297,  &c.) 

Now  therefore,  with  an  Eye  to  thefe  Things,  I  would  en- 
quire into  the  moral  Condud  and  Pra<5lice  of  our  Lord  Jei'us 
Chrift,  which  he  exhibited  in  his  human  Nature  here,  in 
his  State  of  Humiliation,  And  Firj}^  I  would  (hew,  that  his 
■  hoJy  Behaviour  was  necejfary  ;  or  that  it  was  impcfftble  it 
!  (liculd  be  otherwife,  than  that  He  iliould  behave  himfelf 
holily,  and  that  he  fliould  be  perfectly  holy  in  each  indivi- 
dualAdt  of  his  Life.  And  Secondly^  t\\2it  his  holy  Behaviour' 
was  properly  of  the  Nature  of  Vertue^  and  was  zvorthy  of 
Praife  ;  and  that  He  was  the  Subject  of  Lawy  Pi'ecepis  o>- 
Commands^  Projnifes  and  Rewards  \  and  that  he  was  in  a  State 
of  Trial 
i-  S  2  I.  It 


140    TieJS?so/t&eWi[\o(Chna,    P.III. J 

I.   It  was  impojftbk^  that  the  A(5ls  of  the  Will  of  the  human 
Soul  of  Chrift  Ihould,   in  any  Inftance,  Degree  or   Circum-   1 
fiance,  be  otherwife  than   holy,    and  agreable  to   God's  Na- 
ture and  Will.     The  following  Things  make  this  evident, 

I.  God  had  promifed  fo  effedually  to  preferve  and  uphold  j 
Him  by  his  Spirit,  under  all  his  Temptations,  that  he  ihould  1  | 
not  fail  of  reaching  the  End  for  which  He  came  into  the  \ 
World  ;  —which  he  would  have  fail'd  of,  had  he  fallen  intg  A 
Sin.  We  have  fuch  a  Promife,  Ifai.  xlii.  1,2,3,4.  Behold  my  ^\ 
Servant^  wham  I  uphold  ;  mine  EleSi^  in  whom  my  Soul  dellghteth  ,\  \ 
I  have  put  my  Spirit  uponHim  :  He  Jhall  bring  forth  Judgment  to  the 
Gentiles  :  He  Jhall  not  cry^nor  lift  up^nor  caufe  hisVoice  to  be  heard  in 

the  Street. He  Jhall  bring  forth  Judgment  unto  Truth.    He  Jhall 

not  fail ^  nor  be  difcouragedy    till  he  have  fet  Judgment  in  the  Earth  ; 
end  the  Ifles  Jhall  wait  for  his  Lqiv.     This    Promife   of   Chrift's 
having  God's  Spirit  put  upon  Him,   and  his    not  crying  and 
lifting  up  his  Voice  &c.  relates  to  the  Time  of  ChrilVs  Ap- 
pearance on  Earth  ;   as  is  manifeft  from  the   Nature   of  the 
Promife,   and   alfo  the  Application   of  it  in  the  New  Tefta- 
ment,  Matth.  12,  18.    And  the  Words  imply   a   Promife   of 
his  being  fo  upheld  by  God's   Spirit,  that  he  (hpuld  be   pre- 
ferved  from  Sin  ;    particularly  from  Pride   and   Vain-glory, 
and  from  being   overcome  by  any   of   the  Temptations  he 
ihould  be  under  to  affe6t  the  Glory  of  this  World  ;   the  Pomp  ) 
of  an  earthly  Prince,  or  the  Applaufe  and  Praife  of  Men  :  and  I 
that  he  Ihould  be  fo  upheld,  that  he   fhould  by   no  Means  1 
fail  of  obtaining  the  End  of  his  coming  into   the  World,   of  ( 
bringing  forth  Judgment  unto  Victory,    and   eftalplilhing   his 
Kingdom  of  Grace  in  the   Earth.—  And  in   the   following 
Verfes,  this  Promife  is  conf  rmed,   with  the  greateft  imagina- 
ble Solemnity.     Thus  faith   the   LORD^  HE   that   created  the 
Heavens^  andjlretched  them  out  ;    Tie  that  fpread forth  the  Earthy 
arid  that  which  ccmeth  out  of  it  ;    He  that  giveth  Breath  unto  the  ■■. 
People  upon  it^    and  Spirit  to  them    that  tualk  therein  :   I  the  Lord  ^ 
have  called  Thee  in  Righteoufnefs^   and  will  hold  thine  Hand  ;    and  • 
will  keep  Thee^  and  give  Thee  for  a  Covenant  of  the  People,  for  a  . 
Light  of  the  Gentiles,  to  open    the  blind  Eyes,  to  briyig  out  the  Pri'  ■ 
f oners  from  the  Prijon,    and  thein    that  Jit  in  Darknefs  out   of  the } 
'Prijm-Eloufe.     1  am  JEHOVAH,  that  is  my  Name,  kc. 

Very  parallel  with  thefe  Promifes  is  that,  Tfai.  xlix.  7,  8,9. 
which  alio  has  an  apparent  Refpect  to  the  Time  of  Chrift's 
Humiliation  on  Earth.     Thus  faith  the   Lord,  the   Redeemer  of 
liraelj  and  his  hdy  Oncy  to  Him  whom  Man  defpifeth^   to  Hirti 


Se<9:.II.  neceflarily  ^^/^'.  X41 

whom  the  Nation  akhorreth^  to  a  Servant  of  Riders  j  Kings  fljalt 
fie  and  arifi^  F rimes  alfo  jfimll  luorjhip  ;  becaifi  of  the  Lord  'that  is 
i  faithful,  and  the  holy  One  of  Ifrael,  and  He  jhall  choofe  Thee. 
!  Thus  faith  the  Lord^  In  an  acceptable  Time  have  I  heard  Thee  ;  in 
I  a  Day  of  Salvation  have  I  helped  Thee  ;  and  I  will  preferve 
\  Thee,  and  give  thee  for  a  Covenant  of  the  Peopky  to  ejlablijh 
fhe  Earthy  &c. 

And  in  Ifai.  I.  5 9.    w^  have   the   Meffiah   expre fling 

his  Aflurance,  that  God  would  help  Him,  by  fo  opening 
his  Ear,  or  inclining  his  Heart  to<Tod's  Commandments, 
that  He  (hould  not  be  rebellious,  but  (hould  perfevere^ 
I  and  not  apoftatife,  or  turn  his  Back  :  That  through  God's 
Help,  He  ftiouM  be  immovable,  in  a  Way  of  Obedience^ 
\inder  the  great  Trials  of  Reproach  and  Suffering  he  (hould 
meet  with  ;  fetting  his  Face  like  a  Flint  :  So  that  He  knev/ 
He  (hould  not  be  aihamed,  or  fruilrated  in  his  Defign  ; 
and  finally  (hould  be  approved  and  juftiiied,  as  having  done 
his  Work  faithfully. '  The  Lord  hath  opened  mine  Ear  ;  fo  that 
J  was  not  rebellious  y  neither  turned  away  rny  Back  :  I  gave  my 
Back  to  the  Smiters,  and  my  Cheeks  to  them  that  plucked  off  the 
Hair  ;  /  hid  not  my  Face  from  Shame  and  Spitting.  For  the 
Lord  God  will  help'  me  ;  therefore  jhall  I  not  be  confounded  :  there- 
fore have  I  fet  my  Face  as  a  Flint,  and  1  know  that  I  Jhall 
not  be  a  foamed.  He  is  near  that  juflifeth  me  ;  who  will  contend 
with  me  f  Let  us  fland  together.  Who  is  mine  Adverfary  ? 
Let  him  come  near  to  me.  Behold  the  Lord  God  will  help  me  : 
who  is  He  that  fcall  condemn  ?ne  ?  Lo,  they  Jhall  all  wax  old 
as  a  Garment y  the  Moth  Jhall  eat  them  up, 

2.  The  fame   Thing   is   evident  from    all   the   Promifes 

which    God     made    to  the   Melfiah,  of   his  future  Glory, 

Kingdom,  and  Succefs,   in   his   Office  and    Charader   of   a 

j  Mediator  :    which  Glory  could  not  have  been   obtained,  if 

his  Holinefs  had    fail'd,    and   he  had   been  guilty  of  Sin. 

God's  abfolute  Promife  of   any    Things   makes   the  Things 

promifed   mceffaryy    and  their  failing  to  take  Place  abfolutely 

t  impojfible  :  and  in  like   Manner   it  makes   thofe  Things  ne- 

I  cefTary,  on  which   the  Thing  promifed  depends,  and  without 

which  it   can't  take  Effe6l.     Therefore   it   appears,  that   it 

I  was  utterly   impoilible  that   Chrill's     Holinefs     (hould   fall, 

i  from   fuch  abfolute  Promifes  as   thofe,    Pfal.  ex.  4.  The  Lord 

j  hath  fworny  and  will  not  repent.  Thou  ar't  a  Priejl  forever,  after  the 

\  Order  of  Melchizedek.     And  from  every   other  Promife   in 

I  that  Pialm,  contaiAe^  in  each  Verfe  of  it.     And  Pfal.  ii.  6^  7. 


142    Tl^e  ABs  oJtheW^  of  Chrift,    P.III.    i 

1  will  declare  the  Decree  r    The  Lord  hath  faid  unto   7ne^  Thou      \ 
mi  my   Son^  this  Day  have  I  begotten  Thee  :  JJk  of  Me,    and  /     ' 
'wUl  give  Thee   the  Heathen  for  thine  Inheritance,  &c.    Pfal.  xlv. 
3,  4>  &c.  Gird  thy  Sivord  on  thy  Thigh,   O  mojl  Mighty,  with  thy     \ 
Glory  and  thy  Majejly  ;  and  in  thy  Majejiy  ride  profperonjly.     And     1 
fo  every   Thing   that   is   faid   from  thence  to   the  End  .of 
the  Pfalm.     And  thofe  Promifes,    Ifai,  lii.  13,  14,  15.  &  Hii.     ! 
10,  II,  12.    And  all  thofe  Promifes  which  God  makes  to  the     1 
Mefliah,  of  Succefs,  Dominion  and  Glory  in  the  Charader  of 
Redeemer,  in  Ifai.  Chap.  xhx. 

3.  It  was  often  promifed  to  the  Church  of  God  of  old, .  , 
for  their   Comfort,  that  God   would  give  them  a  righteous^ 
finlefs  Saviour.     Jer.  xxiii.  5,6.  Behold,  the  Days  come,  faith  the 
Lord,  that  I  tvill  raife  up  unto  David  a  righteous  Branch  ;    and  a 
King  Jloall  reign  and  profper,  andfiall  execute  ^Judgment  and  Jujlict 
in  tlye  Earth,     In  his  Days  jliall  Judah  he  faved,  aJid  Ifraei  Jhall 
dwell  fafely.     And  this  is  the  Narne  whereby  He  Jhall  be  called.  The    h 
Lord  ourRighteoifnefs,    So,Jer.xxxiii.— /  will  c^ufe  the  Branch  of  \\ 
Righteoufnefs  to  grow  i^p  unto  David  ;    a^id  He  Jhall  execute  fudg-    y 
ment   and  Righteoufnejs    in  the  Land.    Ifai.   ix,  6,  7.  For  unto  us 
a  Child  is  born  ; JJpon  the  Throne  of  David    and  of  his  King- 
dom, to   order   it,  and  to  eftablijh  it  with  f:! dement   andfuJliceT, 
from  h^nceforth^  even  fcre^ier  :    The  Zeal  of  the  Lord  of  Ho/Is  will 
do  this.  Chap.  xi.  at  the  Beginning.    There  JJ^all  come  forth  a  ^ 
Rod  out  of  the  Stem  of  Jeffe,  and  a  Branch  Jhall  grow  out  of  his  " 
Roots  -y    and  the  Spirit  of  the   Lord  Jhall  reft   upon  Him,~-T-  The 
Spirit  of  Knowledge,  and  of  the  Fear  of  the  Lord  : — IVith  Righ- 
teoifnej's  Jhall  He  judge  the  Poor,   and  reprove  with  Equity ;-—- 1 
Righteoufnefs  pall  be   the  Girdle   of  his  Loins,   ajid  Faithfuhiefs. 
the  Girdle  of  his   Reins.     Chap.  lii.  13.    My   Servant  Jliall  deal 
prudently.  Chap.  iiii.  9.  Becaufe  He  had  done  no  Fiolcnce,  neither  h 
was  Grille  found  in  his  Mouth.     If  it  be  impoffible,  that  thefe   li 
Promifes  fhould  fail,  and  it  be  eafier  for  Heaven  and  Earth  to   pi 
pafs  aw^ay,   than  for  one  Jot  or  Tittle  -of  thefe  Promifes  of  |d 
God  to  pafs  away,  then  it   was  impoflible   that  Chrift  fhould 
commit  any  Sin.     Chrift   himfelf  fignified,   that   it  was  im- 
poflible but   that  the  Things  which  were  fpoken  concerning 

Him  fliould  be  fulfilled.  Luk.  xxiv.  44. That  all  Things  mufi 

be  fulfilled,  which  were  written  in  the  Law  of  Mofes,  and  in 
the  Prophets,  and  in  the  Pjalnis  concerning  Me.  Mat.  xxvi.  53,  54. 
Bui  how  then  Jhall  the  Scripture  be  fulfJlcd,  that  thus  it  muji  be  ? 
Mark  xiv.  49.    But  the  Scriptures  muji  be  fulfilled.     And  fo  the 

Apoftle,   ht\.  i.  163  17, This  Scripture  mufi  nmls  have  been 

fulfillecL 

4-  A^i 


Sed.II.  neceflai-ily  holy.  14.3 

4.  All  the  Promifes  which  were  made  to  the   Church  of 
old,    of  the  Meffiah  as'  a  future  Saviour,  from  that  made 
to   our  firft  Parents  in  Paradife,  to  that  which  was  delivered 
by  the  Prophet  Malachl^   {hew  it  to  be  impoffible  that  Chrift 
fhould  not  have  perfevered  in  perfecSt  Holinefs.     The   antient 
Predictions  given   to   God's   Church,    of  the   Meffiah  as  a 
Saviour,  were  of  the  Nature  of  Promifes  ;    as  is  evident  by 
the  Predictions  themfelves,    and  the  Manner  of  delivering 
them.     But  they  are  exprefly,  and  very  often  called  Prbmifcs 
in   the  New-Teftament  ;    as  in   Luke  i.  54,  55,  72,  73.  Ads 
I  xiii.  32,  33.  Rom,  i.  i,  2,  3.  &  Chap.  xv.  8.  Heh.  vi.  i-^^  &c« 
Thefe  Promifes  were  often  made  with  great  Solemnity,  and 
confirmed  with  an  Oath  ;  as  in  Gen.  xxii.  16.  17.    By  my  f elf 
have  I  Jworriy  faith  the  Lord^  that  in  hleffing^   I  will  hlefs  thee^  and 
in  multiplying^  I  will  multiply  thy  Seed,  ai  the  Stars  of  Heaven,  mid 
as  the  Sand  which  is  upon  the  Sea-Shore  :— —  And  in   thy  Seed  JhaU 
i  all  the  Nations  of  the  Earth  be  hleffed.     Compare  Luke  i.  72,73, 
land   Gal.  iii.  8,  15,  16.      The  Apoftle   in   Heh.  vi.  17,  18. 
fpeaking  of  this   Promife  to  Abraham,  fays^    IVherein  God  wil- 
!  ling  more  abundantly  to  foew  to  the  Heirs  of  Promife   the   Imniuta-' 
bility    of  his  Couifel,    confirmed    it  by  an    Oath   ;     that  by   tW9 
IMMUTABLE  Things,   in  which   it  was    IMPOSSIBLE  fir 
God  to   lie,     he   might  have    Jlrong  Conflation,  —     In   which 
Words,    the  Neceffity  of  the  Accompiilbment,   or    (which  is 
the  fame  Thing)  the  Impojfihility  of  the  contrary,  is  fully  de- 
clared.    So  God  confirmed  the  Promife   of  the  great  Salva- 
I  tion  of  the  MelTiah,  made  to  David,  by  an  Oath  ;  Pfal.Ixxxix* 
j  3?  4'  I  have  made  a  Covenant   with   my  Chofen,     I  have  fwom 
I  Unto  David  my  Servant  ;    Thy  Seed  will  I  ejiablijh  for  ever,  a7id 
\  build  up  thylhrone  to  all' Generations.     There  is   Nothing  that 
is  fo  abundantly  fet  forth  jin  Scripture,    as  fure  and   irrefra- 
!  gable,   as  this  Promife  and  Oath  to  David,     See  PfaLlxxxix^ 
34>  355  36.       2  Sam.  xxiii.  5.       Ifai.  Iv.    3.     ASf,  ii.  29,  30, 
J  ,and  xiii.  34.     The  Scripture  exprefly  fpeaks  of  it   as  utterly 
1  impojjible   th^t  this  Promife  and   Oath   to   David,  concerning 
\  the  everlafting  Dominion  of  the  Meffiah  of  his  Seed,  fhould 
I  fail.     Jer.  xxxiii.   15,  &c.  In  thofe    Days,    and  at  that  Time,    I 

f  will  caufe  the  Branch  of  Righteoujhefs  to  gj'oiu  up  unto  David. 

For  thus  faith  the  Lord,    David  fiall  never  want   a  Man   to  fit 

upon    the  Throne   of  the  Houfe   o/Ifrael. ver.  20,  21.  If  you 

can  break  my  Covenant  of  the  Day,  and  my  Covenant  of  the  Nighty 
and  that  thert  f/mdd  not  he  Day  and  Niglt  in  their  Seafon  ;  then 
may  alfo  my  Covenant  be  broken  with  David  my  Servant,  that  He 
JJjoul'l  not  have  a  Sen  to    reign  upon  his  Throne,     So    in  ver.  25^ 

26. Thus  abundant  is  the  Scripture  in  reprefenting  how 

i?npolftbU 


144-  1ley4£isoftheWi\\o^C\in9iy   P.III. 

impojfible  it  was,  that  the  Promifes  made  of  Old  concerning 
the  great  Salvation  and  Kingdom  of  the  MefTiah  ftiould 
fail  :  Which  implies,  that  it  was  impoffible  that  this  Meffiah, 
the  fecond  Jdam^  the  promifed  Seed  of  Ahrahamf  and  o{  David^ 
ffcould  fall  from  his  Integrity,   as  the  firft  Jdam  did. 

5.  All  the  Promifes  that  were  made  to  the  Church  of  God 
under  the  Old  Teftament,  of  the  great  Enlargement  of  the 
Church,  and  Advancement  of  her  Glory,  in  the  Days  of 
the  Gofpel,  after  the  Coming  of  the  Meffiah  ;  the  Increafe- 
of  her  Light,  Liberty,  Holinefs,  Joy,  Triumph  over  her 
Enemi2s,c5V.  of  which  fo  great  a  Part  of  the  Old  Tefta- 
ment  ccnfifts  ;  which  are  repeated  fo  often,  are  fo  varioufly 
exhibited,  fo  frequently  introduced  with  great  Pomp  and  So- 
lemnity, and  are  fo  abundantly  fealed  with  typical  and  fym- 
bolical  P^eprefcntations  j  I  fay,  all  thefe  Promites  imply, 
that  the  Meffiah  (hould  perfed  the  Work  of  Redemption  j 
and  this  implies,  that  he  fhould  perfevere  in  the  Work 
"which  the  Father  had  appointed  Him,  being  in  all  Things 
conformed  to  his  Will.  Thefe  Promifes  were  often  confirm- 
ed by  an  Oath.  (See  Ifat.  liv.  9.  with  the  Context;  Chap. 
Ixii.  18.)  And  it  is  reprefented  as  utterly  impoffible  that 
thefe  Promifes  (hould  fail.  {Ifai.  xlix.  15.  with  the  Con- 
text, Chap.  liv.  10.  with  the  Context  ;  Chap.  li.  4, — 8.  Chap. 
xl.  8.  with  the  Context.)  And  therefore  it  was  impojfible,  that 
the  Meffiah  (liould  fail,  or  commit  Sin. 

6.  It  was  impGjJlhky  that  the  Meffiah  fhould  fail  of  perfe- 
vering  in  Integrity  and  Holinefs,  as  the  firft  Adam  did, 
becaiife  this  would  have  been  inconfiftent  with  the  Pro- 
mifes which  God  made  to  the  bleffed  Virgin,  his  Mother, 
and  to  her  Hufband  ;  implying,  that  He  Jhould  Jave  his  People 
from  their  Sins^  that  God  would  give  Him  the  Throne  of  his  Fa- 
ther  David,  that  He  jhould  reign  over  the  Houfe  of  Jacob  for^ 
ever  \  and  that  of  Ins  Kingdom  there  fmdd  he  no  End.  Thefe 
Promifes  were  fure,  and  it  was  impoff.ble  they  fliould  fail. 
And  therefore  the  Virgin  Mary.,  in  trufting  fully  to  them, 
adted  reafonably,  having  an  immovable  Foundation  of  her 
Faith  ;  as  Elifaheth  obferves,  ver.  45.  And  hlejjed  is  fhe  that 
heiieveth  ;  for  there  J]:>all  be  a  Performance  of  ihofe  Things  which 
were  told  her  from   the  Lord. 

7.  That  it  fliould  have  been  poffible  that  Chrift  (hould 
fin,  and  fo  fail  in  the  Work  of  our  Redemption,  does  not 
confilt  with  the  eternal  Piurpofe  and   Decree  of  God,'  reveal'd 


Sed.II.  neceffarily  holy.  145 

i  in  the  Scriptures,  that  He  would  provide  Salvation  for  fallen 
I  Man  in  and  by  Jefus  Chrift,  and  that  Salvation  fhould  be 
i  offered  to  Sinners  through  the  Preaching  of  the  Gofpel. 
Such  an  abfolute  Decree  as  this  Armlniam  don't  deny. 
Thus  much  at  lead  fout  of  all  Controverfy)  is  implied  in  fuch 
,  Scriptures,  as  i  Cor.  ii.  7.  £/,f.  i.  4,  5.  and  Ch.  iii.  9,  10,  11. 
I  Fet.  i.  19,  20.  Such  an  abfolute  Decree  as  this,  Armlniam 
allow  to  be  fignified  in  thefe  Texts.  And  the  Armlnmn 
Ele6tion  of  Nations  and  Societies,  and  general  Ele6tion 
of  the  Chriftian  Church,  and  conditional  Ele6tiGn  of  parti- 
cular Perfons,  imply  this.  God  could  not  decree  before  the 
Foundation  of  the  World,  to  fave  all  that  fhould  believe 
in,  and  obey  Chrift,  unlefs  he  had  abfolutely  decreed  that 
Salvation  fhould  be  provided,  and  effedually  wrought  out 
by  Chrift.  And  fmce  (as  the  Armlniam  themfelves  ftrenu- 
oufly  maintain)  a  Decree  of  God  infers  Necejftty  ;  hence 
it  became  necejfary  that  Chrift  ftiould  perfevere,  and  actually 
work  out  Salvation  for  us,  and  that  He  fhould  not  fail  by 
the  Commiffion  of  Sin. 

■  8.  That  it  fnould  have  been  pofTible  for  Chrift's  Ho- 
linefs  to  fail,  is  not  confiftent  with  what  God  pro- 
mifed  to  his  Son  before  all  Ages.  For,  that  Salvation 
fhould  be  offered  to  Men  thro*  Chrift,  and  beftowed  on 
all  his   faithful  Followers,   is    what   is    at  leaft   implied  in 

1;  that  certain  and  infallible  Promife  fpoken  of  by  the  Apoftle, 
Tit.  i.    2.  In  hope  of  eternal  Life  ;    which  God^    that  cannot  Ile^ 

f  promlfed  before  the  TVorld  be'ga?i.     This  don't   feem   to   be   con- 

I  troveitei  by  Armlniam.  * 

9,  That  it  ftiould  be  pofTible  for  Chrift  to  fail  of  doing 
his  Father's  Will,    is   inconftftent   with  the   Promife   made 

t  to  the  Father  by  the  Son,  by  the  Logos  that  was  with  the 
Father  from  the  Beginning,  before  he  took  the  human 
Nature  :  as  may  be  feen   in  Pfal.  xl.  6,7,  8.  (compar'd  with 

'the  Apoftle's  Interpretation,  Heb,  x.  5,-9.  )  Sacrifice  and 
Offering  thou  did  ft  not  defer  e  :  mine  Ears  hajl  thou  opened.,  (or 
tored  ;)  Burnt-Offering  a7id  Sln-Offerlng  Thou  hafe  not  required., 
Then  f aid  /,  X^,  I  come  :  In  the  Volume  of  the  Book  It  Is  written 
•f  me^  I  delight  to  do  thy  IFill.,  O  my  God.,  and  thy  Law  Is  with- 
in  my  Heart.  Where  is  a  manifeft  Allufion  to  the  Cove- 
nant which  the  willing  Servant,  who  ioved  his  Mafter's  Ser- 
vice,  made  with  his  Mafter,   to  be  his  Servant   for  ever,  on 

T  UiQ 

*  See  Dr.  ffhl/hy  on  the  five  Points,  P.  48,  49,  ;c^ 


14-6   TheASisoftheWi\\oiC\in9i,  Partlll. 

the  Day  wherein  he  had  his    Ear  bored  ;    which  Covenant 
was  probably  inferted  in   the   publick.  Records,    called   the 

Volume  of  the  Book^  by  the  Judges,  who   were  called  to   take  -I 

Cognizance  of  the  Tranfadtion  i      Exod,  xxi.     If  the  Logosy  \ 

who.  was  with  the  Father,  before  the  World,  and  who  made  ': 

the  World,   thus  engaged  in  Covenant  to  do  the  Will  of  the  :' 

Father  in  the  human  Nature,  and  the  Promife,  was  as  it  were  4 
recorded,   that  it  might  be  made   fure,  doubtlefs   it  was    im-,^v 

pofftble  that  it  (hould  fail  j  and  fo    it   was  impojftble  that  Chrift  ^ 

fhould  fail  of  doing  the  Will  of  the  Father  in   the   human  u 

Nature.  ^ 

ro.  If  it  was  poflible  for  Chrift  to  have  failed  of  doing 
the  Will  of  his  Father,  and  fo  to  have  failed  of  effedually 
working  out  Red(?inption  for  Sinners,  then  \^\t  Salvation  of 
all  the  Saints,  who  were  faved  from  the  Beginning  of  the 
World,  to  the  Death  of  Chrift,  was  not  built  on  a  firm 
Foundation.  The  Mefliah,  and  the  Redemption  which  He 
was  to  work  out  by^  his  Obedience  unto  Death,  was  the. 
Foundation  of  the  Salvation  of  all  the  Pofterity  of  fallen 
Man,  that  ever  were  faved.  Therefore,  if  when  the  Old- 
Teftament  Saints  had  the  Pardon  of  their  Sins,  and  the  Fa- 
vour of  God  promifed  them,  and  Salvation  beftawed  upon 
them,  ftiil  it  was  poflible  that  the  Mefliah,  when  he  came, 
might  commit  Sin,  then  all  this  was  on  a  Foundation  that 
was  not  firm  and  ftable,  but  liable  to  fail  j  fomething  which 
it  was  poflible  might  never  be.  God  did  as  it  Vv'ere  truft 
to  what  his  Son  had  engaged  and  promifed  to  do  in  future  . 
Time  ;  and  depended  fo  much  upon  it,  that  He  proceeded 
actually  to  fave  Men  on  the  Account  of  it,  as  tho'  it  had  been 
already  done.  But  this  Truft  and  Dependance  of  God,  on 
the  Suppofltion  of  Chrift's  being  liable  to  fail  of  doing  his 
Will,  was  leaning  on  a  Staff  that  was  weak,  and  might- 
pollibly  break.  The  Saints  of  old  trufted  on  the  Promifes" 
of  a  future  Redemption  to  be  wrought  out  and  compieated 
by  the  Melfiah,  and  built  their  Comfort  upon  it  :  Abraham 
^aw  Chrift's  Day  and  rejoyccd  j  and  he  and  the  other  Pa- 
triarchs died  in  the  Faith  of  the  Promife  of  it.  (  Hcb.x\.ii^,) 
But  on  this  Suppofltion,  their  Faith  and  their*  Comfort,  and 
their  Salvation,  was  built  on  a  moveable  fallible  P'oundation  ; 
Chrift  was  not  to  them  a  tried  Stone,  a  fure  Foundation  ;  as. 
in  7/?//.  xxviii.  i6.  Da-vid  cniixoXy  refted  on  the  Covenant  of 
God  with  him,  concerning  the  future  glorious  Dominion  aiVd 
Salvationof  theiVIefflah,of  his  Seed  ;  fays, it  was  all  hisSahationy 
and  all  his  D£ fin  ;  and  comfort;;  himfclf  that  this  Covenant  was 

an 


Seca.II.  neceffarily  ic?^.  147 

an  everlafting  Covenant^  ordered  in  all  Things  and  fure^  2  Sam. 
xxiii.  5.  But  if  Chrift's  Vertue  might  fail,  he  was  miftaken  :. 
his  great  Comfort  was  not  built  fo  fure,  as  he  thought  it 
was,  being  founded  entirely  on  the  Determinations  of  the 
Free-Wiil  of  Chrift's  human  Soul  ;  which  was  fubje6l  to  no 
NeceiFity,  and  might  be  determined  either  one  Way  or  the 
other.  Alfo  the  Dependance  of  thofe  who  looked  for  Re- 
demption in  Jerufalcm^  and  waited  for  the  Confolation  of 
Ifrael^  [Luh  ii.  25.  &  38.)  and  the  Confidence  of  the  Difci- 
pies  of  Jefus,  who  forfook  all  and  followed  Him,  that  they 
might  enjoy  the  Benefits  of  his  future  Kingdom,  was  built 
on  a  fandy  Foundation. 

.11.  The  Man  Chrift  Jefus,  before  he  had  finifhed  his 
Courfe  of  Obedience,  and  while  in  the  midil  of  Tempta- 
tions and  Trials,  was  abundant  in  pofitively  predicting  his 
own  future  Glory  in  his  Kingdom,  and  the  Enlargement  of 
his  Church,  the  Salvation  of  the  Gentiles  through  Him  &c. 
and  in  Promifes  of  Bleffings  he  would  beftow  on  his  true 
Difciples  in  his  future  Kirip;dom  ;  on  which  Promifes  he  re- 
quired the  full  Dependence  of  his  Difciples.  (Jjh.  xiv.). 
But  tlie  Difciples  would  have  had  no  Ground  for  fuch  De- 
pendance, if  Chrift  had  been  liable  to  fail  in  his  Work  : 
And  Chrift  Himfelf  would  have  been  guilty  of  Prefumption, 
in  fo  abounding  in  peremptory  Promifes  of  great  Things, 
which  depended  on  a  nieer  Contingence  ;  nji-z.  the  Determi- 
nations of  his  free  Will,  confifting  in  a  Freedom  ad  iitrnm- 
^ue^  to  either  Sin  or  Holinefs,.  ftanding  in  Indifference,  and 
incident,  in  Thoufands  of  future  Inilances,  to  go  either  one 
I  Way  or  the  other. 

Thus  it  is  evident,  that  it  was  impofflble  that  the  Ac5\s  cf 
the  Will  of  the  human  Soul  of  Chrift  Ihould  be  otherwife 
than  holy,  and  conformed  to  the  Will  of  the  Father ;  or,  u\ 
ibther  Words,    they  were   neceflarily  fo  conformed. 

I  have  been  the  longer  in  the  Proof  of  this  Matter,  it  being 
a  Tiling  denied  by  feme  of  the  greateft  Arminhuis^  hy EpJfcopius 
in  particular  ;  and  becaufe  I  look  upon  It  as  a  Point  ck-ariyand 
abfolutely  determining  the  Controverfy  between  Caivi?ii/h  and 
Jrjnimans^  concerning  the  Nccefftty  of  fuch  a  Freedom  ot 
Will  as  is  infifted  on  by  the  latter,  in  order  to  moral  Agen- 
cy, Vertue,  Command  or  Prohibition,  Promife  or  Thi ear- 
ning, Reward  or  Punilhment,  Praife  or  Difpraife,  Ment  or 
Demerit.         I  now  therefore  proceed, 

T  2  •  ][,  To 


148  Christ's  Righteoufnefs 

II.  To  confider  whether  Christ,  in  his  holy  Behaviour 
on  Earth,  was  not  thus  a  moral  Agent ^  fubje<St  to  Commandi^ 
Proynifes^  &c. 

Dr.  JVhitby  very  often  fpeaks  of  what  he  calls  a  Freedom 
0d  utriimllbet^  without  NecefTity,  as  requifite  to  Law  and  Com- 
mands  ;  and  fpeaks  of  Neceflity  as  entirely  inconfiftent  with 
JnjunSfions  and  Prohibitions,  But  yet  we  read  of  Chrift's  being 
the  Subjedl  of  the  Commands  of  his  Father,  Joh,  x,  18, 
and  XV.  10.  And  Chrift  tells  us,  that  every  Thing  that  He 
faid^  or  did^  was  in  Compliance  with  Com?nandments  he  had  re- 
ceived  of  the  Father  ;  Joh.  xii,  49,  50.  h  xiv.  31.  And  we  I 
often  read  of  Chrift's  Obedience  to  his  Father's  Commands, 
Rom.  V.  19.     Fhil  ii,   18.     Heh.  v.  8. 

The  foremention'd    Writer  reprefents   Promifes  offered  as 
Motives  to  Perfons  to  do  their  Duty,    or   a  being  moved  and  in- 
duced by  Prc?nifes^   as  utterly  inconfiftent  with   a  State  wherein 
perfons  have  not  a  Liberty  ad  utrumlibet^   but   are   neceftarily 
determined  to  one.     (See   particularly,  P.  298.  &  31 1.)    But 
the  Thing  which  this  Writer  afferts,   is   demonftrably  falfe, 
if  the  Chriftian  Religion  be  true.    If  there  be  any  Truth    in 
Chriftianity   or  the  holy   Scriptures,   the  Man  Chrift  Jefus 
had  his  Will  infallibly,   unalterably   and  unfruftrably   deter- 
mined to  Good,    and  that  alone  ;  but  yet  he   had    Promifes 
of  glorious  Rewards  made  to  Him,    on  Condition  of  his  per- 
fevering  in,  and  perfe(5>ing   the  Work   which   God  had   ap- 
pointed  Him  ;     Ifai,  hii.  10,  11,  12.    Pfal.  ii.    &  ex.     Ifai^ 
xlix.  7,  8,  9.—  In  Luke  xxii.  28,  29.    Chrift   fays  to  his  Dif- 
ciples,  Te  are  They  which  have  continued  with    me    in  my  Tempta^ 
tions  y    and  I  appoint  unto  you   a  Kingdom^  as  my  Father  hath  ap-* 
poirited  unto  ?ne.     The  Word    moft  properly   fignifies    to  ap- 
point by  Covenant,orPromife.     The  plainMeaning  of  Chrift's 
V/ords  is  this  :     "  As  you  have  partook  of  my  Temptations 
^^  andTrials,and  have  been  ftedfaft,  &  have  overcome  ;  I  pro- 
^'  mife  to  make  youPartakers  of  my  Rewardjand  to  give  you  a 
"^^  Kingdom  ;   as  the  Father   has   promifed   me  a  Kingdom 
*<  for  continuing  ftedfaft,   and   overcoming  in  thofe  Trials/* 
And  the  Words  are  well  explained   by  thofe  in  Rev.   iii.  21^ 
To  hi?n.  that  overomicth^   will  I  grant  to  fit  with  me  in  my  Throne\ 
^ven  as  I  alfo  overcame^    and  am  jet  down  with  my   Father  in    his 
Throne,     And  Chrift  had  not  only  Promifes   of  glorious  Suc- 
ct:is    and  Rewards   made  to  his    Obedience   and   Sufferings, 
tut  the  Scriptures  plainly  reprefent  Fiim  as   ufing  thefe   Pro- 
luilcs  ioi'  Motives  and  Inducements  to  obey  and  fuffer  ;     and 

particulajcly 


Sed.II.    Pratfe-worthy^rewardable^t^c.  149 

particularly  that  Promife  of  a  Kingdom  which  the  Father 
had  appointed  Him,or  fitting  with  theFather  on  his  Throne  ; 
as  in  Heb.  xii.  i,2-  Let  us  lay  afide  every  Weighty  and  the  Sin 
which  doth  eafly  befet  us^  and  let  us  run  with  Patience  the  Race 
that  is  Jet  before  uSy  looking  unto  Jefus^  the  Author  and  Finijher 
of  our  Faith  ;  who  for  the  Joy  that  was  fet  before  Him^  endured 
the  Crofs^  defpifing  the  Shame,  and  is  fet  down  on  the  right  Hand 
1  of  the  Throne  of  God. 

And  how  ftrange  would  it  be  to  hear  any  Chriftian  aflert, 
that  the  holy  and  excellent  Temper  and  Behaviour  of  Je- 
fus  Chrifl,  and  that  Obedience  which  he  performed  under 
fuch  great  Trials,  was  not  vertuous  or  P7-aife-worthy  ;  becaufe 
his  Will  was  not  free  ad  utrumque,  to  either  Holinefs  or  Sin, 
but  was  unalterably  determin'd  to  one  ;  that  upon  this  Ac- 
count, there  is  no  Vertue  at  all,  in  all  Chrift's  Humility, 
Meeknefs,  Patience,  Charity,  Forgivenefs  of  Enemies,  Con- 
tempt of  the  World,  Heavenly-mindednefs,  Submiffion  to 
the  Will  of  God,  perfed  Obedience  to  his  Commands, 
(tho'  He  was  obedient  unto  Death,  even  the  Death  of  the 
Crofs)  his  great  Compaifion  to  the  AfHicSted,  his  unparai- 
lel'd  Love  to  Mankind,  his  Faithful nefs  to  God  and  Man, 
under  fuch  great  Trials  •,  his  praying  for  his  Enemies,  even 
when  nailing  Him  to  the  Crofs  ;  That  Vertue^  when  applied 
to  thefe  Things,  is  but  an  empty  Name  ;  That  there  was  no 
Merit  in  any  of  thefe  Things  ;  that  is,  that  Chrift  was  wor^ 
I  thy  of  Nothing  at  all  on  the  Account  of  them,  worthy  of  no 
I  Reward,  no  Praife,  no  Honour  or  Refpe6t  from  God  or 
Man  ;  Becaufe  his  Will  was  not  indifferent,  and  free  either 
to  thefe  Things,  or  the  Contrary  ;  but  under  fuch  a  ftrong 
Inclination  or  Bias  to  the  Things  that  were  excellent,  as 
made  it  impojfihle  that  he  fliould  chufe  the  contrary  ;  That 
upon  this  Account  (to  ufe  Dr.  Whitby  s  Language)  //  would 
he  fenfibly  umeafonable  that  the  human  Nature  fhould  be  re- 
warded for  any  of  thefe  Things. 

According  to  this  Doctrine,  That  Creature  who  is  evi- 
dently fet  forth  in  Scripture  as  the  Firji-born  of  every  Crea^ 
ture,  as  having  iyi  all  Things  the  Pre-eminence,  and  as  the  high- 
eft  of  all  Creatures  in  Vertue,  Honour,  and  Worthinefs  of 
Efteem,  Praife  and  Glory,  on  the  Account  of  his  Vertue,  is 
lefs  worthy  of  Reward  or  Praife,  than  the  very  leaft  of  Saints  ; 
yea,  no  more  worthy  than  a  Clock  or  meer  Machine,  that  is 
purely  palfr/e,  and  moved  by  natural  Neceflity. 


1 50      Christ's  Rightcoufncfs       Part  III.  l! 

If  we  judge  by  fcriptural  Reprefentatlpns  of  Things,  wc  j 
have  Reafon  to  fuppofc,  that  Chrift  took  on  him  our  Na-  ^ 
ture,  and  dwelt  witji  us  in  this  World,  in  a  fuffering  t 
State,  not  only  to  fatisfy  for  our  Sins  ;  but  that  He,  being  i 
in.  our  Nature  and  Circumilances,  and  under  our  Trials,  '  < 
might  be  our  moft  fit  and  proper  Example,  Leader  and  '  u 
Captain,  in  the  Exercife  of  glorious  and  vidorious  Ver-'  p 
tue,  and  might  be  a  vifible  Inftancc  of  the  glorious  End  ;,c 
and  Reward  of  it  -,  That  we  might  fee  in  Him  the  ui 
Beauty,  Amiablenefs,  and  true  Honour  and  Glory,  and  |j 
exceeding  Benefit  of  that  Virtue,  which  it  is  proper  for  us  | 
human  Beings  to  pra6life  ;  and  might  thereby  learn,  and  la 
be  animated,  to  feck   the   like  Glory  and  Honour,   and  to  [i 

obtain  the    like   glorious   Reward.      See  Heb.  ii.    9, 14,  m 

•with  V.  8,9.  and  xii,  i,  2,  5.  Joh.  xv.  10.  Rom.xin.  17.  j| 
2  Tim,  ii.  II.  12.  I  Pet.  ii.  19,20.  &  iv.  13.  But  if  there  \l 
was  Nothing  of  any  Vertue  or  Merit,  or  Worthinefs  of  any  :j 
Reward,  Glory,  Praife  or  Commendation  at  all,  in  all  that  !>; 
He  did,  becaufe  it  was  all  necefiary,  and  He  could  not  ^1 
help  it  ;  then  how  is  here  any  Thing  fo  proper  to  animate  i 
and  incite  us,  free  Creatures,  by  patient  Continuance  in  it 
well-doing,  to  feck  for  Honour,  Glory,  and  Vertue  ?  ^ 

God  fpcaks  of  Himfelf  as  peculiarly  well-pleafed  with  ;i 
the  Righteoufnefs  of  this  Servant  of  his.  Ifai.  xlii.  21.  Thg  ■•i 
Lord  is  well  pleafed foj-  his  Righteoufnefs  fake.  The  Sacrifices  of  ]\ 
old  are  fpoken  of  as  a  fweet  Savour  to  God,  but  the  Obe-  [3 
dience  of  Chriil:    as  far  more   acceptable  than    they.      Pfal.  fi 

xl.  6,  7.  Sacrifice  and  Offering  Thou   iiidjl  not   defire  : Aline  |.j 

Ear   haji   Thou   opened    [as    thy    Servant    performing    willing 
Obedience  j]   Burnt -Off'ering  and  Sin-Offering  hnji   thou  not  re- 
quired :    Then  f aid  /,  Lo^  I  co?ne  [as  a  Sei-vant   that  chearfully 
anfwers  the  Calls  of  his  Mafter  :]    I  delight  to  do   thy  Will,,  O 
my  God,    and  thy  Law  is  ivithin  mine  Heart,     Matth.  xvii.  5.   p 
This  is    my  lelo'ved  Son,     in   whom    I  am    well-pleafed.'       And'  > 
Chrift   tells  us    exprefly,     that  the   Father  loves   Him    for  tl 
that  wonderful  Inftance  of  his   Obedience,     his   voluntarily  |' 
yielding  himfelf  to  Death,   in  Compliance  with  the  P'ather's   P 
Command.  Joh.  x.   17,  18.  Therefore   doth  my  Father  love  me^    i 

lecaufe  I  lay  down  my  Life  : No  Man  taketh  it  from  me  ;   J 

hut  1  lay  it  down  of  my  felf This   Command7nent   received  I  of 

iny  Father, 

And   if  there  was  no  Merit   in  Chrift's  Obedience   unto 
Death,     if    u  was  not  worthy  of  Piaife,   and  of  the  moft 

glorious 


Sc(3:.II.  Praife-worthy^rewardaMe^^c.^  i  5I' 

glorious    Rewards,    the    heavenly   Hods    were   exceedingly 
miftaken,  by  the  Account  that  is  given  of  them,  in  Rev.  v. 
%,— 12.— The  four  Beafls  and  the  four  and  twenty  Elders  fell, 
dozun  before  the  Lamb^  .  having  every  one  of   them    Harps^     mid 

golden  Fials  full  of  Odours  ; Jnd  they  Jiing  a  new  Song^  fay- 

ing, .  Thou   art   JFORTHT  to    take   the    Btok^    and  to    open  the 

Seals  thereof ',    for  Thou  waji  Jlain^ And  I  beheld,    and  1 

heard  ike  Voice  of  many  Jngels  round  about  the  Throne^  and  the  ■ 
Beafls^  and  the  Riders,  and  the  Number  of  the?n  was  ten  Ihoufand- 
Times  ten  Thoufand,  and  Thoufands  of  Tlmfands,  faying  with  a  loud 
Voice,  WORTHY  is  the  Lamb  that  was  Jlain,  to  receive  Power^, 
and  Riches,  and  IVifdom, .  and  Strength,  and  Honour,  and  Glory^ 
md  Blejfmg, 

,  Chrifl  fpeaks  of  the  eternal  Life  which  He  was  to  re* 
ceive,  as  the  Reward  of  his  Obedience  to  the  Father's  Com-i 
mandments.  Joh.  xii.  49,  50.  /  have  not  fpoken  of  my  f elf  ;  but 
the  Father  which  fent  me.  He  gave  me  a  Conwiandmcnt  what  _  / 
foould  fay,  and  what  I  Jhould  fpeak  :  And  I  know  that  his  Com- 
manchnent  is  Life  everlafling  :  IVJ^atfoever  I  fpeak  therefore,  even 
as  the  Father  Jaid  unto  me,  fo  1  fpeaL---God  promifes  to  di- 
vide Flim  a  Portion  with  the  great  Sec.  for  his  being  his 
righteous  Servant,  for  his  glorious  Vertue  under  fuch  great 
Trials  &  Sufferings.  Ifai.  liii.  11,12.^  He  Jhall  fee  of  the  Travel 
of  his  Soul  and  be  fatisfied  :  By  his  Knowledge  jhall  my  righteous' 
\  Servant  juflify  many  -,  for  he  Jhall  bear  their  Iniquities,  Therefore 
will  I  divide  him  a  Portion  tvith  the  Great,  and  he  flmll  divide  the 
Spoil -with  the  Strong,   becaufe    He  hath    poured  out  his  Soul  unto 

Death. The   Scriptures  reprefent  God   as  rewarding  Him 

far  above  all  his  other  Servants.  Phil.  ii.  7,  8,  9.  He  took  on 
Him  the  Form  of  a  Servant,  and  was  made  in  the  Likenefs  of 
Men  :  arid  being  found  in  Fajhion  ai  a  Man,  He  humbled  himfelf, 
: and  became  obedient  unU^  Death,  even  the.  Death  of  the  Crofs  : 
Wherefore  GOD  alfo  hath  highly  .exalted  Him,  and  given  Him  a 
Name  above  every  Name.—'jPM.  xiv.  7.  Thou  lovefl  Righieoifnejs, 
and  hatefl  JVickednefs  ;  Therefore  God,  thy  God,  hath  anointed  Thee 
With  the  Oil  of  Gladnefs  above  thy  Fellows, 

There  is  no  Room  to  pretend,  that  the  glorious  Benefits 
beilowed  in  Confequence  of  Chrift's  Obedience,  are  not  pro- 
perly of  the  Nature  of  a  Rev/ard.  What  is  a  Reward,  in 
the  moil  proper  Senfe,  but  a  Benefit  bellowed  in  Confe- 
quence of  lomething  ^morally  exceiient  in  Quality  or  Beha- 
^'iour,  in  Teftimony  of  weii-pieafednefs  in  that  moral  Ex- 
:cjjency>    and   Rcfpe<5l  and    Favour  on   that   Account  ?     If 

we 


152  Christ's  Righteoufnefsj^c*.  Partlll, 

We  confider  the  Nature  of  a  Reward  moft  ftn(5lly,  and  make 
the  utmoft  of  it,  and  add  to  the  Things  contained  in  this 
Defcription,  proper  Merit  or  Worthinefs,  and  the  Beftow- 
ment  of  the  Benefit  in  Confequence  of  a  Promife  ;  ftill  it 
will  be  found,  there  is  Nothing  belonging  to  it,  but  that 
the  Scripture  is  moft  exprefs  as  to  it's  belonging  to  the 
Glory  beftowed  on  Chrift,  after  his  Sufferings  ;  as  appears 
from  what  has  been  already  obferved  :  There  was  a  glo- 
rious Benefit  beflowed  in  Confequence  of  fomething  mo- 
rally excellent,  being  called  Righteoufnefs  and  Obedience  ; 
There  was  great  Favour,  Love  and  Well-pleafednefs,  for 
this  Righteoufnefs  and  Obedience,  in  the  Beftower  ;  There 
was  proper  Merit,  or  Worthinefs  of  the  Benefit,  in  the  O- 
bedience  ;  It  was  beftowed  in  Fulfilment  of  Promifes,made 
to  that  Obedience  ;  and  was  beftowed  therefor,  or  becaufi 
he  had  performed  that  Obedience. 

I  may  add  to  all  thefe  Things,  that  Jefus  Chrifl, 
while  here  in  the  Flefh,  was  manifellly  in  a  State  of  Trial. 
The  laft  Adam^  as  Chnfl  is  called,  i  Cor,  xv.  45.  Rom.v.  14. 
taking  on  Hun  the  human  Nature,  and  fo  the  Form  of 
a  Servant,  and  being  under  the  Law,    to  fland  and  a6t   for 

us,  was  put  into  a  State  of  Trial,   as  the  firit  Adam  was. 

Dr.  Whitby  mentions  thefe  three  Things  as  Evidences  of 
Perfons  being  in  a  State  of  Trial  (on  the  live  Points,  P.  298, 
299.)  namely.  Their  Afflidions  being  fpoken  of  as  their 
Triafs  or  Temptations,  their  being  the  Subjeds  of  Promifes, 
and  their  being  expofed  to  Satan's  Temptations.  But  Chrift 
was  apparently  the  Subjed  of  each  of  thefe.  Concerning 
Promifes  made  to  Him,  I  have  fpoken  already.  The 
Difficulties  and  AffiiBionz  He  met  v^ith  in  the  Courfe  of  his 
Obedience,  are  called  his  Temptations  or  l^riaU^  Luke  xxii.  28. 
Ye  are  they  which  have  continued  with  me  in  my  Temptations,  or 
Trials.  Heb.  ii.  18.  For  in  that  he  Himfelf  hath  fuffered,  being 
tempted  [or  tried]  He  is  able  to  fuccour  them  that  are  tempted* 
And  Chap.  iv.  15.  We  have  not  an  High-Prieji,  which  cannot  bt 
touched  with  the  Feeling  of  our  Infirmities  ;  but  was  in  all  Points 
tempted,  like  as  we  are^  yet  without  Sin.  And  as  to  his  being 
tempted  by  Satan,  it  is  what  none  will  difpute. 


S  E  c  T  J  Oif 


(    ^53    ) 

Section   III. 
The  Cafe  offuch  as  are  given  up  of  God  to 
Sin,  and  (t/' fallen  Man  in  general^  proves 
moral  Necejfity   and  Inability  to  be  con-* 
fijient  with  Blame-worthinefs. 

R.  fFhiiby  aflerts  Freedom,  not  only  from  Coac^ion, 
but  Neceffity,  to  be  eflential  to  any  Thing  deferving 
the  Name  of  Sin,  and  to  an  Adion's  being  cuipa^ 
hie:  in  thefe  Words  (Difcourfe  on  five  Points,  Edit.  3.P.348.) 
*'  If  they  be  thus  neceflitated,  then  neither  their  Sins  of  O^ 
*'  mifTion  or  Commiffion  could  deferve  that  Name  ;  it  be- 
*'  ing  efTential  to  the  Nature  of  Sin,  according  to  St.  AufitrC^ 
*'  Definition,  that  it  be  an  Action,  a  quo  liberum  efl  ahfi'mere^ 
*'  Three  Things  feem  plainly  neceffary  to  make  an  Adion 
•'  or  Omiffion  culpable  ;  i.  That  it  be  in  our  Power  to 
**  perform  or  forbear  it  :  For,  as  OrigeUy  and  all  the  Fa* 
*'  thers  fay,  no  Man  is  blame-worthy  for  not  doing  what 
"  He  could  not  do." — And  clfewhere  the  Doctor  infills,  that 
*'  when  any  do  Evil  of  Neceffity,  what  they  do  is  no  Vice^ 
"  that  they  are  guilty  of  no  Fault,  ||  are  worthy  of  no 
"  Blame,  Difpraife,  %  or  Diftionour,  \  but  are  unblamea- 
"  ble.  * 

If  thefe  Things  are  true,  in  Dr.  lVJMy\  Senfe  of  Neceffity, 
they  will  prove  all  fuch  to  be  blamelefs,  who  are  given  up  of 
God  to  Sin,  in  what  they  commit  after  they  are  thus  given 
up. That  there  is  fuch  a  Thing  as  Men's  being  judici- 
ally given  up  to  Sin,  is  certain,  if  the  Scripture  rightly  in- 
forms us  ;  fuch  a  Thing  being  often  there  fpoken  of  :  as  m 
Pfal.  Ixxxi.  12.  So  I  gave  them  up  to  their  oivn  Hearts  Lujly 
.  and  they  ivalked  in  their  ownCounfeh.  A61.  vii.  42.  TJyenGod  twned^ 
and  gave  them  up  ta  worjhip  toe  Hoji  of  Heaven,  Rom.  i.  24, 
Wherefore,  God  alfo  gave  them  up  to  UncleannefSy  through  the 
Lu/ls  of  their  own  Hearts,  to  dijhonour  their  own  Bodies  between 
Themfelves,  Ver.  26.  For  this  Cauje  God  gave  them  up  to  vile  Af* 
feSiions.  Ver.  28.  And  even  as  they  did  not  like  to  retain  God  in 
their  Knowledge,  God  gave  them  over  to  a  reprubati  Mind,  t9  do 
thofe  Things  that  are  not   convenient, 

V  Tis 

5  Difc.   oh  £vePoins.  P.  347.  360,  361.  377.     %  303^  325.  329. 
and  many  other  Places,     f  371.     *  304.  361, 


154  Of  the  Inability-^  Sin  offuch  PartllL 

'Tis  needlefs  to  iland  particularly  to  inquire,  what  God's 
giving  Men  up  to  their  own  Heart* s  Liifls  fignities  :  .  It  is  fuffi- 
cient  to  obferve,  that  hereby  is  certainly  meant  God's  fo  or- 
dering or  difpjpfing  Things,  in  fome  Refpedt  or  other,  either 
by  doing  or  forbearing  to  do,  as  that  the  Confequence  (hould 
be  Men's  continuing  in  their  Sins.  So  much  as  Men  >are 
given  up  to^  fo  much  is  the  Confequence  of  their  being 
given  up  ;  whether  that  be  lei5  or  more.  If  God  don't  6rder 
Things  fo,  by  Adtion  or  Permiffion,  that  Sin  will  be  the 
Confequence,  then  the  Event  proves  that  they  are  not  given 
up  to  that  Confequence.  If  Good  be  the  Confequence,  in- 
Head  of  Evil,  then  God's  Mercy  is  to  be  acknowledged  in 
that  Good  ;  which  Mercy  muft  be  contrary  to  God^s 
Judgment  in  giving  up  to  Evil.  If  the  Event  muft  prove 
that  they  are  given  up  to  Evil  as  the  Confequence,  then  the 
Perfons  who  are  the  Subjects  of  this  Judgment,  muft  be  the 
Subjeds  of  fuch  an  Event,    and  fo  the  Event  is  neceifary. 

If  not  only  CoaS^lon^  but  all  NeceJJity^  will  prove  Men 
blamelefs,  then  Judas  was  blamelefs,  after  Chrift  had  given 
kim  ov^er,  and  had  already  declared  his  certain  Damnation, 
and  that  he  Ihould  verily  betray  Him.  He  was  guilty  of  no 
Siu  in  betraying  his  Mafter,  on  this  Suppofition  ;  tho  his  fo 
doing  is  fpoicen  of  by  Chrift  as  the  moft  aggravated  Sin, 
more  heinous  than  the  Sin  of  Filate  in  crucifying  Him. 
And  the  Jews  in  Egypt ^  in  Jereimah's  Time,  were  guilty  of 
no  Sin,  in  their  not  worfhipping  the  true  God,  after  God 
had  Sworn  by  his  great  Name^  that  his  Name  Jl^ould  he  no  more 
named  in  the  Alouth  of  any  Man  <?/"  Judah,  in  all  the  Land  of 
Egypt.  Jer.  xliv.  26. 

Dr.  Whithy  (Difc.  on  five  Points.  P.  302,  303)  denies,  that 
Men,  in  this  World,  are  ever  fo  given  up  by  God  to  Sin,  that 
their  Vv^ills  fnould  be  necelTarily  determined  to  Evil  ;  tho'  He 
Gv/ns,  tnat  hereby  it  may.  become  exceeding  difficult  for  Men  to 
do  Good,  having  a  ftrong  Bent,  and  powerful  Inclination  to 
what  is  Evii.— But  \i  we  ftiould  allow  the  Cafe  to  be  juft  as 
he  reprefcnts,  the  Judgment  of  giving  up  to  Sin  will  no  better 
agree  with  his  Notions  of  that  Liberty,  which  is  effential 
to  Praife  or  Blame,  than  if  we  fhould  fuppofe  it  to  render  the 
avoiding  of  Sin  i?npcjjible.  For  if  an  ImpoJJibility  of  avoiding 
Sin  wholly  excufes  a  Man  5  then,  for  the  fame  Reafon,  it's 
being   difficult    to    avoid    it  excufes  Him  in    Part  ;  and  this 

iu.^  in   Proportion   to   the    Degree  of    DijBiculty. If  the 

'.     Influence 


Seft.  Hi.       as  are  given  up  to  Sin.       155 

j  Influence  of- W(7r^/Impoffibility  or  Inability  be  the   fame,  tcj 
;  fexcufe   Perfons    in  not  doing,    or   not  avoiding  any   Thing, 
,  as  that  oi  natural  Inabihty,  (which  is  fuppofed)  then  undoubt- 
I  edly,  in  like   Manner,  moral  Difficulty  has  the  fame  Influence 
I  to  tXQuit  W\\h  natural  Difficulty.     But   all    allow,  that  natural 
j  Impoflibility   wholly    excufes,;  and  alfo   that  natural  Difficulty 
j  excufes  in  rart,   and  makes  the  A6t,or  Omiflion  lefs  blame- 
able,    in    Proportion   to  the  Difliculty.     AW  natui-al  Difficult j^^ 
according  to   the   plaineft  Didtates  of  the  Light  of  Nature, 
excufes  in  fome  Degree,   fo   that  the  Negle6l  is-  not  fo  blame- 
j  able,  as  if  there  had  been  no  Brfliculty   in   the  Gafe  :  -  and  fo 
the  greater  the  Difliculty  is,  ftill  the  more   excufable,  in  Pro- 
i  f)ortion  to  the  Increafe  of  the  Difficulty.     And  as  naiural  Im-. 
polfibility  wholly  excufes  and  excludes  all  Blame,,  fo  the  nearec 
the  Difliculty  approaches  to  Impolhbility,  ftill  'th'e   nearer   a 
Perfon  is    to  Blamelefnefs,  in  Proportion  to   that  •Approach. 
And  if  the  Cafe  of  moral  Impoffibility  or  Necellity,  be  jufl:  the 
fame  with  natural  Necellity  orCo-adtion,    as  to  Influence   to' 
excufe  a  Negitd,  then  alio,  for  the  fame  Reafon,  the  Cafe  of 
natural  Difliculty  don't  difi^er  in  Iniluence,to  excviie  a'Negle(5f, 
from  moral  Difficulty,  arifing  from  a  ftrong  Bias  or  Bent  to 
I'^vil,  fuch  as  Dr.  IFhnly  owns  in  the  Cafe  of  thofe   that   are 
given  up  to  their  own  Hearts  Lulls.       So  that  the    Fault  of 
luch  Peribns    muft   be    leffen'd^  in  Proportion  to   the  Diffi- 
culty,   and   Approach   to   Impoflibility.      If  ten  Degrees   of 
moral  Difficulty  make    the  Adion   quite    impoffible,    and  fo 
wiiolly  excufe,    then   if  there  be  nine  Degrees   of  Difficulty, 
the  Peribn  is  in  great  Part   excufed,  and    is  nine  Degrees   in 
ten,  lefs  blame-worthy,  than    if  there   had  been  no  Difficulty 
at  ell  ;  and  he   has    but   one  Degree  of   Blame-worlhinefs. 
The  Reafon  is  plain,  on  Arminian  Principles  ;  vvz.  becaufe  as 
Difficulty,   by  antecedent  Bent  and  Bias   on  the  Will,  is  in- 
creafed,  Liberty  of  Indiff'erence,    and   Self-determination   in 
theWill,  is  diminifhed  :  fo  much  Hindrance  and  Impediment 
is  there,   in  the  Way   of   the   Will's  ading  freely,  by   meer 
Self-determination.     And  if  ten  Degrees  of  fuch  Hindrance 
take   away    all    fuch   Liberty,  then  nine  Degrees   take    away 
!  nine   Parts   in   ten,   and  leave  but   one  Degree  of  Liberty. 
, .  And  therefore   there   is  but   one    Degree  of  Blameablenefs, 
j  ceteris  paribus^  in   the  Negle61:  \  the  Man   being  no  further 
'  blameable  in  what  He  does,  or  negle6fs,  than  he  has  Liberty 
'  in  that  Aflfair  :    For  Blame  or  Praife  (fay  they)  arifes  wholly 
i  from  a  good  Ufe  or  Abufe  of  Liberty. 

y  2  From 


IS6       Of  the  Inability^  Sin        Part  III. 

From  all  which  it  follows,  that  a  ftrong  Bent  and  Bias  one 
Way,  and  Difficulty  of  going  the  contrar)^,  never  caufes  a 
Ferfon  to  be  at  all  more  expofed  to  Sin,  or  any  Thing  blame- 
zh\t:  Becaufe  as  the  Difficulty  is  increafed,  lb  much  the  lefs 
is  required  and  expedted.  Tho'  in  one  Refped,  Expofednefs 
to  Sin  or  Fault  is  increafed,  viz.  by  an  Increafe  of  Expofed- 
nefs to  the  evij  Action  or  Omiffion  ;  yet  it  is  dimimfhed  in 
another  Refpe<5t,  to  ballance  it  ;  namely,  as  the  Sinfulnefs 
or  Blameablenefs  of  the  A6lion  or  Omillion  is  diminilhed  in 
the  fame  Proportion.  So  that,  on  the  whole,  the  Affair,  as 
to  Expofednefs  to  Guilt  or  Blame,  is  left  jufl  as  it  was. 

To  illuftratc  this,  let  us  fuppofe  a  Scale  of  a  Balance  to  be 
intelligent,  and  a  free  Agent,  and  indued  with  a  ielf-moving 
Power,  by  Virtue  of  which  it  could  a6t  and  produce  Efie(5ts 
to  a  certain  Degree  ;  ex,  gr.  to  move  it  felf  up  or  down  with 
a  Force  equal  to  a  Weight  of  ten  Pounds  ;  and  that  it  might 
therefore  be  required  of  it,  in  ordinary  Circumftances,  to 
move  it  felf  down  with  that  Force  ;  for  which  it  has  Power 
and  full  Liberty,  and  therefore  would  be  -blame-worthy  \(  it 
fail'd  of  it.  But  then  let  us  fuppofe  a  Weight  of  ten  Pounds 
to  be  put  in  the  oppolite  Scale,  which  in  Force  entirely  cpun* 
ter-balances  it's  felf-moving  Power,  and  fo  renders  it  impolii^ 
blefor  it  to  move  down  at  all  ;  and  therefore  wholly. excufes  it^ 
from  any  fuch  Motion.  But  if  we  fyppofe  there  to  be  only 
pine  Pounds  in  the  oppofite  Scale,  this  renders  it's  MptiOn 
not  impoffible,  but  yet  more  difficult  ;  fo  that  it  can  now 
only  move  down  with  the  Force  of  one  Pqund  :  But  how- 
ever, this  is  all  that  is  required  of  it  vjnder  thefe  Circum- 
flances  ;  it  is  wholly  excufed  from  nine  Parts  of  its  Motion  : 
And  if  the  Scale,  under  thefe  Circumftances,  neglc6ts  to 
inove,  and  remains  at  Refl,  all  that  it  will  be  blamed  for,  v.-ili 
be  it's  Negle6t  of  that  one  tenth  Part  of  it's  Motion  ;  which 
it  had  as  much  Liberty  and  Advantage  for,  as  in  ufual  Cir^* 
cumftances,  it  has  for  the  greater  Motion,  which  in  fuch  a 
Cafe  would  be  reqLjired.  So  th^t  this  new  Difficulty,  don't 
^t  ^11  increafe  its  Expofednefs  to  any  Thing  blame-worthy. 

And  thus  the  very  Suppofition  of  Difficulty  in  the  ^Way 
of  a  Man's  Duty^  or  Proclivity  to  Sin,  thro'  a  being  given 
Vp  to  Hardnefs  of  Heart,  or  indeed  by  any  other  Means 
■yvhatfoever,  is  an  Inconfiftence,  according  to  Dr.  lVhHhy% 
Notions  of  Liberty,Vertue  and  Vice,  Blame  and  Praife.  The 
avoiding  Sin  and  Blame,  and  the  doing  what  is  vertuous 
i^nd  Jj^'faife-werthy,  muft  be  jdways  equally  eafy. 

Dr. 


Sc£l.lII.  of  fallen  Man.  157 

Dr.  W}nihy\  Notions  of  Liberty,  Obligation,  Vertue,  Sin, 
&c.  lead  Him  into  another  great  Inconfiftence.  He  abun- 
dantly infifts,  that  Neceffity  is  inconliftent  with  fne Nature  of 
Sin  or  Fault.  He  fays  in  the  foremention'd  Treatife,  P.  14. 
Who  can  blame  a  Ferfon  for  doing  what  he  could  not  help  ?  and  P.  1 5. 
//  being  fenftbly  unjujl^  to  punijh  any  Man  for  doing  that  which  it 
was  ne^er  in  his  Poiver  to  avoid.  And  in  P.  341.  to  confirm 
his  Opinion,  he  quotes  one  of  the  Fathers,  faying,  Why  doth 
God  command^  if  Man  hath  Jiot  Free-will  and  Fower  to  obey  ?  And 
again  in  the  fame  and  the  next  Page,  IVho  will  not  cry  out^ 
that  it  is  Folly  to  command  hm^  that  hath  7iot  Liberty  to  do  what  is 
commanded ;  and  thai  it  is  unjuf  to  condeinn  Him^  that  has  it  not  in 
his  Fower  to  do  what  is  required?  And  in  P.  373.  He  cites 
another  faying,  A  Law  is  given  to  Him  that  can  turn  to  both 
Parts  ;  i.  e.  cbfy  or  tranfgrefs  it  :  Bitt  no  Law  caii  he  againjl  Him. 
\vho  is    hound  by  Natuj-^. 

And  yet  the  fame  Dr.  PFhithy  ailcrts,  that  fallen  Man  is  not 
able  to  perform  perfe6l  Obedience.  In  P.  165.  He  has  thefe 
Words,  ^'  The  Nature  of  Jdam  had  Power  to  continue  in- 
.*'  nocent,  and  without  Sin  ;  whereas  it  is  certain,  our  Nature 
*'  never  had  fo."  But  if  we  han't  Power  to  continue  innocent 
and  without  Sin,  then  Sin  is  confiftent  with  Neceffity,  and  we 
may  be  fmful  in  that  which  we  have  not  Power  to  avoid  ; 
and  thofe  Things  can't  be  true,  which  He  aflerts  elfewhere, 
nan^ly,  "  That  if  we  be  necelTitated,  neither  Sins  of  Omiflion 
"  nor  Commiffion,  would  deferve  that  Name.  (P.  348.)  If 
we  have  it  not  in  our  Power  to  be  innocent,  then  we  have 
it  not  in  our  Power  to  be  blamelefs  :  and  if  fo,  we  are  un- 
der a  Necelhty  of  being  blame-worthy.  And  how  does  this 
confift  with  what  he  fo  often  alferts,  that  Necellity  is  in-' 
confiftent  with  Blame  or  Praife  ?  If  we  have  it  not  in  our 
Power  to  perform  perfe6t  Obedience  to  ail  the  Coifimands  of 
God,  then  we  are  under  a  NecelTity  of  breaking  fome 
Commands,  in  fome  Degree  ;  having  no  Power  to  perform 
fo  much  as  is  commanded.  And  if  fo,  why  does  he  cry  out 
of  the  Unreafonablenefs  and  Folly  of  commanding  beyond 
what  Men  have  Power  to  do  ? 

And  Armimans  in  general  are  vtry  inconfiftent  w^ith  them- 
ftlves  in  what  they  lay  of  the  Inability  of  fallen  Man  in  this 
Refpedl.  They  ftrenuoufly  maintain,  that  it  would  be  un- 
juft  in  God,  to  require  any  thing  of  us  beyond  our  prefent 
*Power  and  Ability  to  perform  ;  and  alfo  hold,  that  we  are 
now  undblc  to  perform    perfect   Obedience,   and  that  Chrift 

died 


J  58  Of  de  Inability  (^/^  fallenMan.  Part  III. 

died  to  fatisfy  for  the  ImperfeSfions  of  our  Obedience^  and  has 
made  Way  that  our  impertecSt  Obedience  might  be  accept- 
ed inftead  of  perfect  :  Wherein  they  feem  infenfibly  to  run 
themfelves  into  the  groiTeft  Inconfiftence.  For,  (as  I  have 
obferved  elfewherej  *'  They  hold  that  God  in  Mercy  to 
*'  Mankind  has  aboiiflied  that  rigorous  Conftitution  or  LaWj 
*'  that  they  were  under  originally  ;  and  inftead  of  it,  has  in- 
*'  troduced  a  more  mild  Conftitution,  and  put  us  under  a 
*'  new  Law,  which  requires  no  more  than  imperfed  fmcere 
*'  Obedience,  in  Compliance  with  our  poor  inlirm  impotent 
*'  Circumftances  fmce  the  Fall." 

Now,  how  can  thefe  Things  be  made  confiftent  ?  I  would 
sfk  what  Law  thefe  Imperfedions  of  our  Obedience  are  a 
Breach  of  ?  If  they  are  a  Breach  of  no  Law  that  jwe  were 
ever  under,  then  they  are  not  Sins.  And  if  they  be  not 
Sins,  what  Need  of  Chrift's  dying  to  fatisfy  for  them  ?  But 
if  they  are  Sins,  and  the  Breach  of  fome  Law,  what  Law  is 
it  ?  They  can't  be  a  Breach  of  their  new  Law  ;  for  that 
requires  no  other  than  imperfe(5t  Obedience,  or  Obedience 
with  Imperfedions  :  And  therefore  to  have  Obedience  attend- 
ed with  Imperfections,  is  no  Breach  of  it  ;  for  'tis  as  much 
as  it  requires.  And  they  can't  be  a  Breach  of  their  old  Law  ; 
for  that,they  fay, is  entirely  aboliIhed,and  we  never  were  under 
it..---  They  fay,  it  would  not  be  juft  in  God  to  require 
of  us  pertecSl  Obedience,  becaufe  it  would  not  be  juft  to  re- 
quire more  than  we  can  perform,  or  to  punifh  us  for  failing 
of  it.  And  therefore,  by  their  own  Scheme,  the  Imper- 
feflions  of  our  Obedience  don't  deferve  to  be  puniftied. 
What  need  therefore  of  Chrift's  dying,  to  fatisfy  for  them  ? 
What  need  of  his  Sufferings  to  fatisfy  for  that  which  is  no 
Fault,  and  in  it's  own  Nature  deferves  no  fuffering  ?  "What 
need  of  Chnft's  dying,  to  purchafe,  that  our  imperfeSl  Obedi- 
ence fnould  be  accepted,  when  according  to  their  Scheme,^ 
it  would  be  unjuft  in  it  felf,  that  any  other  Obedience  than 
imperfci^  ihould  be  required  ?  What  need  of  Chrift's  dying 
to  make  Way  for  God's  accepting  fuch  an  Obedience,  as 
it  would  be  unjuft  in  Him  not  to  accept  ?  Is  there  any 
Need  of  Chrift's   dying,  to   prevail   with   God  not  to  do  un- 

righteoufly  ? If  it  be  faid,    that   Chrift    died   to   fatisfy 

tliat  old  Law  for  us,  that  io  we  might  not  be  under  it,  but  that 
there  might  be  Room  for  our  being  under  a  more  mild  Law  ; 
ftiil  I  would  inquire,  what  Need  of  Chrift's  dying  that 
we  might  not  be  under  a  Law,  which  (by  their  Principles). 
it  would  be  in  it  felf  unjuft  that  we  ftxouJd  be  under,  whe- 
ther 


Se£t.  IV.  Of  Inability^  and OhXig^Xiori.  159 

ther   Ghrift  had  died  or  no,  becaufe  in  our  prefent  State  we 
are  not  able  to  keep  it  ? 

'  So  the  Jrmimans  are  inconfiftent  with  thcmfelves,  not 
op]y-  in  what  they  fay  of  the  Need  of  ChrilVs  Satisfac- 
tion ;,to  attone  for  thofe  ImperfecStions  which  we  cannot 
avoid,"  but  alfo  in  what  they  fay  of  the  Grace  of  God, 
granted  to  enable  Men  to  perform  the  fincere  Obedience  of 
the  new  Law.  "  I  grant  (fays  Dr.  Stebbing  *)  indeed,  that 
.«  by  Reafon  of  original  Sin,  we  are  utterly  difabled  for  the 
*'  Performance  of  the  Condition,  without  new  Grace  from 
' '  God.  But  I  fay  then,  that  He  gives  fuch  Grace  to  all  of 
"  us,  by  which  the  Performance  of  the  Condition  is  truly 
*'  poffible  :  And  upon  this  Ground  he  may,  and  doth  moil 
'"  righteoufly  require  it."  If  Dr.  Stebbing  intends  to  fpeak 
properly,  by  Grace  he  muft  mean,  that  AlTiftance  which  is  of 
Grace,  or  of  free  Favour  and  Kindnefs.  But  yet  in  the  fame 
Place  he  fpeaks  of  it  as  very  unreafonable^  ^^^j^i/^  and  cruel^  for 
God  to  require  that,  as  the  Condition  of  Pardon,  that  is  be- 
come impolTible  by  original  Sin.  If  it  be  fo,  what  Grace  is 
there  in  giving  AiTiftance  and  Ability  to  perform  the  Condi - 
%  tion  of  Pardon  ?  Or  why  is  that  called  by  the  Name  of 
\  Grace,  that  is  an  abfolute  Debt,  which  God  is  bound  to  be- 
ftow,  and  which  it  would  be  unjuft  and  cruel  in  Him  to 
with-hold,  feeing  he  requires  that,  as  the  Condition  of  PariJt9k^ 
which  we  cannot  perform  without  it  ? 


Section     IV. 

Command,    and  Obligation  to  Obedience, 

conjiftent  with  moral  Inability  to  obey. 

IT  being  fo  much  infifted  on  by  Arminian  Writers,  that 
NecelTity  is  inconfiftent  with  Law  or  Command,  and 
particularly,  that  it  is  abfurd  to  fuppofe  God  by  his 
Command  Ihould  requrre  that  of  Men  which  they  are  una- 
ble to  do  ;  not  allowmg  in  this  Cafe  for  any  Difference  that 
there  is  between  natural  and  moral  Inability  ;  I  would  there- 
fore now  particularly  confider  this  Matter. 

And 

*  Treatife  of  the  Operations  of  the  Spirit.    2  Edit.  P.  1 1  z,  113. 


1 60         Commands  conf^Jlent        Part  IIL 

And  for  the  greater  Clearnefs,  I  would  diftin(5lly  lay  down 

the  following  Things. 

I.  The  Will  it  itXU  and  not  only  thofe  A6Vions  which  arc 
the  Effe6^s  of  the  Will^  is  the  proper  Obje6t  of  Precept  of 
Command.  That  is,  fuch  or  fuch  a  State  or  A6ts  of  Men's 
Wills,  is  in  many  Cafes,  properly  required  of  them /by 
Command  ;  and  not  only  thofe  Alterations  in  the  State  of 
their  Bodies  or  Minds  that  are  the  Confequences  of  Volition» 
This  is  moil  manifeft  ;  for  'tis  the  Soul  only,  that  is  properly 
and  directly  the  Subjedl  of  Precepts  or  Commands  j  that  /. 
only  being  capable  of  receiving  or  perceiving  Commands.,' 
The  Motions  or  State  of  the  Body  are  Matter  of  Command, 
only  as  they  are  fubjecfl  to  the  Soul,  and  conneded  with 
it's  A6ts.  But  now  the  Soul  has  no  other  Faculty  whereby 
it  can,  in  the  moft  dire6t  and  proper  Senfe,  confent,  yield  to^ 
or  comply  with  any  Command,  but  the  Faculty  of  the  Will ; 
and  'tis  by  this  Faculty  only,  that  the  Soul  can  diredly  dif- 
obey,  or  refufe  Compliance  :  For  the  very  Notions  of 
Confentmgy  TieUing^  Accepting^  Complying^  Refuftng^  RejeSimg  &c. 
are,  according  to  the  Meaning  of  the  Terms,  Nothing  but 
certain  Ads  of  the  Will.  Obedience,  in  the  primary  Na- 
ture of  it,  is  the  fubmitting  and  yielding  of  the  Will  of  one 
to  the  Will  of  another.  Difobedience  is  the  not  eonfent- 
i«g,  not  complying  of  the  Will  of  the  commanded  to  the 
manifefted  Will  of  the  Commander.  Other  A61s  that  are 
not  the  Adfs  of  the  Will,  as  certain  Motions  of  the  Body 
and  Alterations  in  the  Soul,  are  Obedience  or  Difobedience 
only  indiredly,  as  they  are  connected  with  the  State  or 
Adions  of  the  Will,  according  to  an  eftablilhed  Law  of 
Nature.  So  that  'tis  manifefl,  the  Will  it  {t\i  may  be  re- 
quired :  And  the  Being  of  a  good  Will  is  the  mort  proper, 
diredt  and  immediate  Subjedt  of  Command  j  and  if  this 
can't  be  prefcribed  or  required  by  Command  or  Precept,  no- 
thing can  ;  For  other  Things  can  be  required  no  otherwife 
than  as  they  depehd  upon,  and  are  the  Fruits  of  a  good  Will, 

Corol.  I.  If  there  be  feveral  Ads  of  the  Will,  or  a  Series 
of  Ads,  one  following  another,  and  one  the  Effed  of  ano- 
ther, the  firfi  and  dettr?n:mng  A^  is  properly  the  Subjed  of 
Command,  and  not  only  the  confequent  Ads,  which  are  de* 
pendent  upon  it.  Yea,  'tis  this  more  efpecially  which  is  that 
which  Command  or  Precept  has  a  proper  Refped  to  ;  be- 
caufe  'tis  this  Ad  that  determines  the  whole  Affair  :  In  this 
Ad  rh.cObedience  orDifobediencc  lies,  in  a  peculiar  Manner  ; 

the 


i  Sed.  IV.        with  moral  Inability.  16c 

I  the  confequent  A(5ts  being  all  fubje(5l  to  it,  and  governed  and 
I  determined  by  it.  This  determining  governing  A61  mull  be 
i  the  proper  Subjed  of  Precept,  or   none. 

Corol,  2.  It  alfo  follows  from  what  has  been  obferved, 
j  That  if  there  be  any  Sort  of  Ad,  or  Exertion  of  the  Soul, 
\  prior  to  all  free  Acts  oi  theWiil  or  A6ts  of  Choice  in  the  Cafe, 
direding  and  determining  Vv^hat  the  A(5ts  of  the  Will  (ball  be  ; 
that  A(5l  or  Exertion  of  the  Soul  can't  properly  be  fubject 
to  any  Command  or  Precept,  in  any  Refpe6t  whatfoever, 
either  directly  or  indirectly,  immediately  or  remotely.  Such 
Acts  can't  be  fubje6t  to  Commands  diredly^  becaufe  they  are 
no  A(5ts  of  the  Will  ;  being  by  the  Suppofition  prior  to  all 
A<5ts  of  the  Will,  determining  and  giving  Rife  to  all  it's  Ads  : 
They  not  being  Ads  of  the  Will,  there  can  be  in  them  no 
Confent  to,  or  Compliance  with  any  Command.  Neither  can 
they  be  fubjed  to  Command  or  Precept  tndireSfly  or  remotely  ; 
for  they  are  not  fo  much  as  the  Ejf&5is  or  Confequences  of  the 
Will,  being  prior  to  all  its  Ads.  So  that  if  there  be  any 
Obedience  in  that  original  Ad  of  the  Soul,  determining  all 
Volitions,  it  is  an  Ad  of  Obedience  wherein  the  \V\\\  has  no 
Concern  at  all ;  it  preceeding  evei-y  Ad  of  Will.  And  there- 
fore, if  the  Soul  either  obeys  or  difobeys  in  this  Ad,  it  is 
wholly  involuntarily  ;  there  is  no  willing  Obedience  or  Rebel- 
lion, no  Compliance  or  Oppofition  of  the  Will  in  the  Affair  : 
and  what  Sort  of  Obedience  or  Rebellion    is  this  ! 

And  thus  the  Armiman  Notion  of  the  Freedom  of  the  Will 
confiding  m  the  Soul's  determining  it's  own  x\ds  of  Wlij], 
inftead  of  being  efiential  to  moral  Agency,  and  to  Men's 
being  the  Subjeds  of  moral  Government,  is  utterly  incon- 
fiftent  with  it.  For-  if  the  Soul  determines  all  it's  Ads  of 
Will,  it  is  therein  fubjed  to  no  Command  or  moral  Govern- 
ment, as  has  been  now  obferved  ;  becaufe  it's  original  deter- 
mining Ad  is  no  Ad  of  Will  or  Choice,  it  being  prior,by  the 
Suppofition,  to  every  Ad  oi  Will.  And  the  Soul  can't  be  the 
Subjed  of  Command  in  the  Ad  of  the  Will  it  felf,  which 
depends  on  the  foregoing  determining  Ad,  and  is  determined 
by  it  ;  in  as  much  as  this  is  neceiTary,  being  the  necelTary 
Confequence  and  Effec^:  of  that  prior  determining  i\d,  which 
is  not  voluntary.  Nor  can  the  Man  be  the  Suojed  of  Com- 
mand or  Government  in  his  external  Adious  ;  becaufe  thek* 
are  all  neceffary,  being  the  neceiTary  Effeds  of  the  Ads  of  the 
Will  themfelves.  So  that  Mank.ind,according  to  this  Scheme^ 
sre  Subjeds  of  Command  or  moral  Government  in   noth  ng 

X  .at 


i52  ■        Commands  ^^;^^/^^;^/        PartllL 

at  all  ;  and  all  their  moral  Agency   is   entirely   excluded,  and 
no  Room  left  for  Vertue  or  Vice  in  the  World. 

So  that  'tis  the  Arminian  Scheme,  and  not  the  Scheme  of 
the  Cahinjjis^  that  is  utterly  inctnfiftent  with  moral  Govern-  , 
ment,  and  with  all  Ufe  of  Laws,  Precepts,  Prohibitions,  Pro- 
mifes,  or  Threatnings.  Neither  is  there  any  Way  whatfoever 
to  make  their  Principles  confift  with  thefe  Things.  For  if, 
it  be  faid,  that  there  is  no  prior  determining  Acl  of  the  Soul, 
preceding  the  A6ls  of  the  Will,  but  that  Volitions  are  Events 
that  come  to  pafs  by  pure  Accident,  without  any  determining 
Caufe,  this  is  moft  palpably  inconfiftent  with  all  Ufe  of  Laws 
and  Precepts  ;  for  nothing  is  more  plain  than  that  Laws  can 
be  of  no  Ufe  to  direcTt  and  regulate  perfect  Accident  ;  which 
by  the  Suppofition  of  it's  being  pure  Accident,  is  in  no  Cafe 
regulated  by  any  Thing  preceeding  ;  but  happens  this  Way 
or  that  perfe6tly  by  Chance,v/ithout  any  Caufe  or  Rule.  The 
perfedl  Ufelefnefs  of  Laws  and  Precepts  alfo  follows  from  the 
Arminian  Notion  of  Indifference,  as  elTential  to  that  Liberty 
which  is  requifite  to  Vertue  or  Vice.  For  the  End  of  Laws  is 
to  hind  to  one  Side  ;  and  the  End  of  Commands  is  to  turn  the 
Will  one  Way  :  and  therefore  they  are  of  no  Ufe  unlefs  they 
turn  or  bias  the  Will  that  Way.  But  if  Liberty  confifts  in 
Indifference,  then  their  biafTmg  the  Will  one  Way  only,  de-  . 
llroys  Liberty  ;  as  it  puts  the  Will  out  of  'Equilibrium.  So 
that  the  Will,  having  a  Bias,  thro'  the  Influence  of  binding 
Law,  laid  upon  it,  is  not  wholly  left  to  it  ^qM^  to  determine 
it  felf  which  Way  it  will,  Vv'ithout  Influence  from  without. 

II.  Having  fhewn  that  the  Will  it  kl^^  efpecially  in  thofe 
A6fs  wlfich  are  original,  leading  and  determining  in  any  Cafe,  ' 
is  the  proper  Subjed  of  Precept  and  Command,  and  not  only 
thofe  Alterations  m  the  Body,  &c.  which  are  the  Effeds  of  the 
Vv'ill  J  I  now  proceed  in  the /^-tw/^/ Place,  to  obferve  that  the 
very  Oppofition  or  Defed  of  the  Will  it  k\t^  In  that  A(5t 
which  is  it's  original  and  detennining  Aol  in  th^  Cafe,  I  fay  the 
Will's  Oppofition  in  this  Acl  to  a  Thing  propofed  or  com- 
manded, or  it's  failing  of  Compliance,  implies  a  moral  Inabi- 
lity to  that  Thing  :  Or  in  other  Words,  whenever  a  Com- 
mand requires  a  certain  State  or  A(5t  of  the  Will,  and  the 
Perfon  conuTianded,  notwithftanding  the  Command  and  the 
Circumilances  under  which  it  is  exhibited,  ftill  finds  his  Will 
oppoute  or  wanting,  in  that^  belonging  to  it's  State  or  Acfts,. 
ichich  is  original  and  determining  in  the  Affair^  that  Man  is  morally 
Unable  to  obey  that  Coinmand. 

This 


Sc6l.  IV.         with  moral  Inability.         163 

This  is  manifeft  from  what  was-obferved  in  the  fiift  Part, 
concerning  the  Nature  of  moral  Inability,  as  didinguiOied  from 
jwtural :  where  it  was  obferved,  That  a  Man  may  then  be  faid 
to  be  morally  unable  to  do  a  Thing,  when  He  is  under  the 
Influence  or  Prevalence  of  a  contrary  Inclination,  or  has  a 
Want  of  Inclination,  under  fuch  Circumftances  and  Views. 
'Tis  alfo  evident  from  what  has  been  before  proved,  that  the 
Will  is  always,  and  in  every  individual  A61,  necelTarily  deter- 
mined by  the  ftrongeft  Motive  ;  and  fo  is  alvv^ays  unable  to  go 
againft  the  Motive,  which  all  Things  confidpred,  has  now 
the  greateft  Strength  and  Advantr.ge  to  move  the  Will.--- 
But  not  further  to  infift  on  thefe  Things,  the  Truth  of 
the  Pofition  now  laid  down,  viz.  That  when  the  Will  is  op- 
pofite  /(?,  or  failing  of  a  Compliance  with  a  Thing  in  it\ 
§riginal  determining  Inclination  or  Acl^  it  is  not  able  to  comply, 
appears   by  the  Conlideration  of  thefe  two  Things. 

1.  The  Will  in  the  Time  of  that  diverfe  or  oppoilte  leading 
A61  or  Inclination, and  when  adually  under  the  Influence  of  it, 
is  not  able  to  exert  it  felf  to  the  contrary,  to  make  an  Alte- 
ration, in  order  to  a  Compliance.  The  Inclination  is  unable 
to  change  it  felf  ;  and  that  for  this  plain  Reafon,  that  it  is 
unable  to  in.cline  to  change  it  felf,  Prefent  Choice  can't  at 
preient  chufe  to  be  othervv^ife ':  for  that  would  be  at  prejc?it 
to  chufe  fomething  diverfe  from  v/hat  is  at  prefent  cliofen.  If 
the  Will,  all  Things  now  confidered,  inclines  or  chufes  to  go 
that  Way,  then  it  can't  chufe,  all  Things  now  confidered,  to 
go  the  other  Way,  and  fo  can't  chufe  to  be  made  to  go 
the  other  Way.  To  fuppofe  that  the  Mind  is  now  fmcerely 
inclined  to  change  it  felf  to  a  different  Inclination,  is  to  fiip- 
pofe  the  Mmd  is  now  truly  inclined  othtrwife  than  it  is  now 
inclined.  The  Will  may  oj^pofe  fome  future  remote  A<5t  that 
it  is  expofed  to,  but  not  its  own  prefent  A61. 

2.  As  it  is  impoffible  that  the  Will  fhould  comply  with  the 
Thing  commanded  with  Refpe6t  to  it's  leading  J^,  by  any  Act 
of  it's  own,  in  the  Time  of  that  diverfe  or  oppofite  leading  and 
original  ASi^  or  after  it  is  a6kially  come  under  the  Influence  of 
that  determining  Choice  or  Inclination  ;  fo  'tis  impolTible  it  fhould 
be  determined  to  a  Compliance  by  any  foregomg  k.Si  ;  for  by 
the  very  Suppofition,  there  is  no  foregoing  A<5t  ;  the  oppof.te 
or  non-complying  Aft  being  that  A6t  v.'hich  is  originul  and 
determining  in  the  Cafe.  Therefore  it  muft  be  io^  that  if  this 
firjd  determining  ASi  be  found  non-complying,  on  the  Propcfal 
of  the  Command,  the  Mind  is  morally  unable  to  obey.  For 
to  fuppofe  it  to  be  able  to  obey,  is  to  fuppofe  it  to  be  able  to 
determine  and  caufc  it's    frjl  detcrrnining  Aif-  to  be   oriiv;ivvi''"e, 

X  2  and 


164  Q>omx^2iVidi%  confiflent        Part  III. 

and  that  it  has  Power   better  to   govern  and  regulate  it's  jirjl 
governing  and  regulating  Aa^  v/hich  is  abfurd  ;  For  it  is  to  flip- 
pofe  a  prior  Ad  of  the  Wi]l,  determining  it's  firft  determining 
A6t  ;  that  is,an  A6t  prior  to  the  firft,  and  leading  and  govern-    ^ 
ing   the   original   and  governing    K6X    of  all  \    which  is   a    . 
Contradiction.  1 

Here  if  it  fhould  be  faid,  that   attho*   the  Mind  has   not  ; 

any    Ability    to  will  contrary  to   what  it  does   will,  in   the  - 

original   and   leading  A(5l  of  the   Will,  becaufe  there  is  fup-  « 

pofed  to  be  no   prior  A61  to  determine  and  order  it  otherwife,  :;j 

and  the  Will   can't  immediately    change  it   felf,  becaufe  it  »3 

can't  at  prefent  incline  to  a   Change  ;    yet  the  Mind   has   an  li 

Ability  for  the    prefent  to  forbear  to  proceed  to  Adion,  and  y 

take  Time  for  Deliberation  ;    which    may   be  an  Occafion  of  h 

the  Chanp;e   of  the   Inclination.  |' 

I  anfwer,  (i.)  In  this  Objection  that  feems  to  be  for-  t 
gotten  which  was  obferved  before,  viz.  that  the  determin-  | 
ing  to  take  the  Matter  into  Confideration,  is  it  felf  an 
K€t  of  the  Will  :  And  if  this  be  all  the  Ad  wherein 
the  Mind  exercifes  Ability  and  Freedom,  then  this,  by 
the  Suppofition,  muft  be  all  that  can  be  commanded  or  re» 
quired  by  Precept.  And  if  this  Acl  be  the  commanded  Ad, 
then  all  that  has  been  obferved  concerning  the  commanded 
Acft  of  the  Will  remains  true,  that  the  very  Want  of  it  is  a 
moral  Inability  to  exert  it,  &c.  (2.)  We  are  fpeaking  con- 
cerning the  firft  and  leading  A6t  of  the  Will  in  the  Cafe,  or 
about  the  Affair  ;  And  if  a  Determining  to  deliberate,  or  on 
the  contrary',  to  proceed  immediately  without  deliberating, 
be  the  nrft  and  leading  A6t ;  or  whether  it  be  or  no,if  there 
be  another  A6t  before  it,  which  determines  that  ;  or  what- 
ever be  the-  original  and  leading  Ad  j  ftill  the  foregoing 
Proof  ftands  good,  that  the  Non-compliance  of  the  leading 
Ad  implies  moral  Inability  to  comply. 

If  it  ftiould  be  objeded,  that  thefe  Things   make  all  moral 
Inability    equal,     and  fuppofe  Men    morally  unable   to    will    | 
otherwife  than  they  aduaily  do  will,  m  all  Cafes,  and  equally    ' 

fo,   in  every  Inftance. 

.1 

In  anfvrer  to  this  Objedion,  I  defire  two  Things  maybe  ' 
obrervcd.  Firji^  That  if  by  being  equally  unable,  be  meant "j 
5ts  really  un^blt)  then  fo  far  as  the  Inability  is  meerly  mo-;| 
r^ilj  'tis  true,  th^  Will,   in  every  Inftance,   ads  by  moral  Ne-  | 

cefTity,  i 


Se6l:.  IV.         "^tth  moral  Inability i  165 

ceflity,  and  is  morally  unable  to  a6l  otherwife,  as  truly  ancjl 
properly  in  one  Cafe  as  another  ;  as,  I  humbly  conceive, 
has  been  perfedly  and  abundantly  demonftrated  by  what 
has  been  faid  in  the  preceeding  Part  of  this  ElTay.  But  yet, 
in  forne  Refpe6l,  the  Inability  may  be  faid  to  be  greater  in 
fome  Inftances  than  others  :  Tho'  the  Man  may  be  truly  un^ 
able,  (if  moral  Inability  can  truly  be  called  Inability,)   yet 

'.  he  may  be  further  from  being  able  to  do  fome  Things  than 
others.  As  it  is  in  Things  which  Men  are  naturally  unable 
to  do.  A  FV^rfon  whofe  Strength  is  no  more  than  fufficient 
to  lift  the  Weight  of  one  Hundred  Pounds,  is  as  truly  and 
really  unable  to  lift  one  Hundred  and  one  Pounds,  as  ten 
Thoufand  Pounds  ;  but  yet  he  is  further  from  being  able  to 
lift  the  latter  Weight  than  the  former  j  and  fo,  according  to 
common  Ufe  of  Speech,  has  a  greater  Inability  for  it.  So 
it  is  in  moral  Inability.  A  Man  is  truly  morally  unable  to 
chufe  contrary  to  a   prefent  Inclination,  which   in   the  leaft 

[  Degree  prevails  ;     or  contrary  to  that   Motive,  which,    all 

I  Things  confidered,  has  Strength  and  Advantage  now  to 
move  the  Will,  in  the  leaft.  Degree,  fuperiour  to  all  other 
Motives  in  View  :  But  yet  he  is  further  from  Ability  to  refill 
a  very  ilrong  Habit,  and  a  violent  and  deeply  rooted  Incli- 
nation, or  a  Motive  vaftly  exceeding  all  others  in  Strength. 
And  again,  the  Inability  may  in  fome  Refpe6ts  be  called 
greater,  in  fome  Inilances  than  others,  as  it  may  be  more 
general  and  extenpve  to  all  JMs  of  that  Kind.  So  Men  may  be 
faid  to  be  unable  in  a  different  Senfe,  and  to  be  further  from 
moral  Ability,  who  have  that  moral  Inability  which  is  gene- 

I  ral  and  habitual^  than  they  who  have  only  that  Inability  which 
is  occafional  2n\A  particular.  \  Thus  in  Cafes  of  natural  Inability  ; 
he  that  is  born  blind  may  be  faid  to  be  unable  to  fee,  in  a 
difterent  Manner,  and  is  in  fome  Refpe6fs  further  from  being 

I  able  to  fee,  than   He  whofe  Sight  is  hinder'd  by  a   tranfient 

:  Cloud  or  Mift. 

And  befides,  that  which  was  obferved  in  the  firft  Part  of 
this  Difcourfe  concerning  the  Inability  which  attends  a  ftrong 
and  fettled  Hablt^  fhould  be  here  remember'd  ;  viz.  That  fix'd 
Habit  is  attended  v»^ith  this  peculiar  moral  Inability,  by  which 
it  is  diflinguiihed  from  occafional  Volition^  namely,  that  En- 
deavours to  avoid  future  Volitions  of  that  Kind,  which  arc 
agreabie  to  luch  a  Habit,  much  more  frequently  and  com- 
monly prove  vain  and  infufficient.     For  tho*  it  is  impofTible 

there 


•}•  See  thisDilliD(5lion  of  moral  Inability  explain'd  in  Part  I.  Secl,lY> 


1 66         Covcivci^xi6%  confijient        Part  III.    ! 

I 

there  ihould  be   any   true  fincere  Defires  and  Endeavours  a-  ! 

gainft  a  prefent  Volition  or  Choice,  yet  there  may  be  againft  ;j 

Vohtions  of  that  Kind,  when  view'd  at  a  Diftance.     A  Perfon  i 

may  defire  and  ufe  Means   to   prevent  future  Exercifes  of  a  :J 

certain  Inclination  ;  and  in  order  to  it,  may  wifh    the  Habit  h 

might  be  removed  ;  but  his  Defires  and  Endeavours    may   be  'i 

inefFedual.     The   Man   may   be   faid   in  fome  Senfe    to  be  ■': 

unable  ;  yea,  even  as  the   Word  unable  is  a  relative  Terniy  and  j: 

has  Relation  to  ineffectual  Endeavours  ;  yet  not  with  Regard  ^  | 
to  prefent,  but  remote  Endeavours. 

Secondly^  It  muft  be  borne  in  Mind,  according'  to  what  was, ' 
obferv'd  before,   that  indeed  no  Inability  whatfoever  which  is 
meerly  moral,   is  properly  called  by  the  Name  of  Inability  j 
and  that  in  the  ftrkSteft  Propriety  of  Speech,   a  Man  may   be" 
faid  to  have  a  Thing  in  his  Power,if  he  has  it  at  his  Election  ;    »; 
and  He   can't  be  faid  to  be  unable  to  do  a  Thing,  when   He   \ 
can  if  He  now  pleafes,   or  whenever  he  has   a  proper,  direct,  \ 
and  immediate  Defire  for  it.     As  to  thofe  Defires  and  Endea-    [« 
vours  that  may   be  againft  the  Exercifes  of  a   ftrong   Habit,    | 
with  Regard  to  which    Men    may  be    faid  to   be   unable   to    j 
avoid  thofe   Exercifes,  they  are   remote  Defires  and    Endea-    ^ 
vours   in  two  Refpe6ls.    Firji^  as  to  Ti?ne  \    they    are  never:  fi 
againft  prefent  Volitions,  but  only  againft  Volitions  of  fuch  a    \ 
Kind,  when  view'd  at  a  Diftance.     Seeondfyy^s  to  their  Nature ;    | 
thefe  oppofite  Defires  are  not  directly  and  properly  againft  the    | 
Habit  and  Inclination  itfelf,  or  the  Volitions  in  which  it   is  J 
exercifed  ;  for  thefe,  in  themfelves  conndered,  are  agreable  ; 
but  againft  fomething  elfe,  that  attends  them,  or  is  their  Con- 
fequence  ;  the  Oppofition  of  the    Mind  is  levelled  entirely 
againft  this  ;  the  Inclination  or  Volitions  themfelves  are  not 
at   all   oppofed  dire6lly,    and  for  their  own  fake  ;    but  only 
indiredly,  and  remotely  on  the  Account  of  fomething  aliene 
and  foreign. 

III.  Tho'  the  Oppofition  of  the  Will  it  kl^^  or  the  very 
want  of  Will  to  a  Thing  commanded,  implies  a  moral  Ina- 
bility to  that  Thing  ;  yet,  if  it  be  as  has  been  already  fhewn, 
that  the  Being  of  a  good  State  or  Ad  of  Will,  is  a  Thing 
moft  properly  required  by  Command  ;  then,  in  fome  Cafes 
fuch  a  State  or  Ad  of  Will  may  properly  be  required,  which 
*t  prefent  is  not,  and  which  may  alfo  be  wanting  after  it  is 
commanded.  And  therefore  thofe  Things  may  properly  be 
commanded,  which  Men  have  a  moral  Iiiability  for. 

Such 


Sed. I V.  with  tioral  Inability.  167 

Such  a  State  or  A(fl  of  the  Wil],  may  be  required  by  Com- 
mand, as  does  not  already  exifc.  For  if  that  Volition  only 
may  be  commanded  to  be  which  already  is,  there  could  be 
no  ufe  of  Precept  ;  Commands  in  all  Cafes  would  be  per- 
fedly  vain  and  impertinent.  And  not  only  may  fuch  a  Will 
be  required  as  is  wanting  before  the  Command  is  given,  but 
alfo  fuch  as  may  poflibly  l3e  wanting  afterwards  ;  fuch  as  the 
Exhibition  of  the  Command  may  not  be  effe<5hial  to  produce 
or  excite.  Otherwife,  no  fuch  Thing  as  Difobedience  to  a 
proper  and  rightful  Command  is  poffible  in.  any  Cafe ;  and 
there  is  no  Cafe  fuppofable  or  polTible,  wherein  there  can 
be  an  inexcufable  or  faulty  Difobedience.  Which  Armimam 
cannot  affirm, confiftcntly  with  their  Principles  :  for  this  makes 
Obedience  to  jull  and  proper  Commands  always  neceffary^  and 
Difobedience  impoffible.  And  fo  the  Arminian  would  over- 
throw Himfelf,  yielding  the  very  Point  we  are  upon,  which 
He  fo  fti'enuoufly  denies,  vi%.  that  Law  and  Command  are 
I  confident  with  Neceffity. 

If  meerly  that  Inability  will  excufe  Difobedience,  which  is 
implied  in  the  Oppofition  or  Defe(5t  of  Inclination,  remaining 
after  the  Command  is  exhibited,  then  Wickednefs  always 
carries  that  in  it  which  excufes  it.  'Tis  evermore  fo,  that  by 
ihow  much  the  more  Wickednefs  there  is  in  a  Man*s  Heart, 
I  by  fo  much  is  his  Inclination  to  Evil  the  Wronger,  and  by  fo 
much  the  more  therefore  has  he  of  moral  Inability  to  the 
iGood  required.  His  moral  Inability,  confifting  in  the 
IjStrength  of  his  evil  Inclination,  is  the  very  Thing  wherein 
jhis  Wickednefs  conlifts  ;  and  yet  according  to  Annmian  Prin- 
ciples, it  muft  be  a  Thing  inconfiflent  with  Wickednefs  ;  and 
(by  how  much  the  more  he  has  of  it,  by  fb  much  is  he  the 
[further  from  Wickednefs. 

I  Therefore,  on  the  whole,it  is  manifeft,  that  moral  Inability 
jalone  (which  confifts  in  Difmclination)  never  renders  any 
Thing  improperly  the  fubje6t-matter  of  Precept  or  Command, 
land  never  can  excufe  any  Perfon  in  Difobedience,  or  Want 
fjof  Conformity  to  a- Command. 

\\    Natural  Inability,  arifing  trom  the  Want  of  natural   Capa-^ 

Icity,    or   external  Hindrance  (which  alone   is  properly  called 

Inability)  without  doubt  wholly  excufes,    or   makes  a  Thing 

improperly  the  Matter  of  Command.      If  Men   are   excufed 

I  trom  doing  or  adting  any   good  Thing,  fuppofed  to  be  com- 

I  Imanded,  it   mull  be  through  fome  Defed  or  OblUcle  that  is 

y  not 


1 68    Commands  and  Invitations    Part  III.  \ 

not  In  the  Will  itfelf,   but  extrinfic  to  it  ;  either  in  the  Capa-     '] 
city  of  Underilanding,  or  Body,  or  outward  Circumftances.        | 

Here  two  or  three  Things  may  be  obferved,  y 

1.  As  to  fpiritual  Duties  or  Ad^s,  or  any  good  Thing  in  the  \ 
State  or  immanent  A6ts  of  the  Will  it  felf,  or  of  the  Affections  i 
(which  are  only  certain  Modes  of  the  Exercife  of  the  Will  )  | 
if  Perfons  are  juifly  excufed,  it  muft  be  thro'  want  of  Capacity  j 
in  the  natural  Faculty  of  Underftanding.  Thus  the  fame  fpi-  \\ 
ritual  Duties,  or  holy  Affedions  and  Exercifes  of  Heart,  can't  \ 
be  required  of  Men,  as  may  be  of  Angels  ;  the  Capacity  of  Un-  j 
derftanding  being  fo  much  inferiour.  So  Men  can't  be  Id 
required  to  love  thofe  amiable  Perfons  w^hom  they  have  '? 
had  no  Opportunity  to  fee,  or  hear  of,  or  come  to  the  Know-  \\ 
ledge  of,  in  any  Way  agreable  to  the  natural  State  and  Capacity  'J 
of  the  human  Underftandmg.  But  the  Infufficiency  of  Mo-  j 
lives  wiii  not  excufe  ;  uniefs  their  being  infufficient  arifes  not  -v 
from  the  moral  State  of  the  Will  or  Inclination  it  feif,  but  j- 
from  the  State  of  the  natural  Underftanding.  The  great  ^, 
Kindnefs  andGenerofity  of  another  may  be  a  Motive  infuf^-  1 
cient  to  excite  Gratitude  in  the  Perfon  that  receives  the  J 
Kindnefs,  thro'  his  vile  and  ungrateful  Temper  :  In  this  Cafe,  I 
the  Infufficiency  of  the  Motive  arifes  from  the  State  of  the  'y 
Will  or  Inclination  of  Heart,  and  don't  at  all  excufe.  But  if  '.; 
this  Generofity  is  not  fufficient  to  excite  Gratitude,  being  un-  -A 
known,  there  being  no  Means  of  Information  adequate  to  the  '..\\ 
State  and  Meafure  of  the  Perfon's  Faculties,  this  Infufriciency  '{^^ 
is  attended  with  a  natucal  Inability,  which  entirely  excufes.       !• 

2.  As  to  fuch  Motions  of  Body,  orExerciles  and  Alterations  '  1 
of  Mind,  which  don't  confift  in  the  immanent  Acts  or  State  ;•  i 
of  the  Vv^iil  it  felf,  but  are  fuppofed  to  be  required  as  Effe6ts  'i^ 
of  the  W'ill^  I  fay,  in  fuch  fuppofed  EffecSts  of  the  VyfiW^  in  |t 
Cafes  wherein  there  is  no  Want  of  a  Capacity  of  Underftand-  % 
ing  ;  that  Inability,  and  that  only  excules,  which  confifts  in  \ 
V/ant  of  Connexion  between  them  and  theWill.  If  the  Will  %, 
fullv  complies,  and  the  propofed  Effect  don't  prove,  according  \ 
to  the  Laws  of  Nature,  to  be  cr>ane6fed  with  his  Volition,  ^ 
the  Man  is  perfectly  excufed  ;  he  has  a  natural  Inability  to  the  \ 
Thing  required.  'For  the  Will  Itfelf,  as  has  been  obferved,  is  i 
all  that  can  be  direcSily  and  immediately  required  byCommand;  \ 
and  other  Tilings  only  indirectiy,  as  connected  with  the  Will.  i» 
If  therefore  there  be  a  full  Compliance   of  Will,   the  Perfon  \ 

haf  ;i 


Sec^^.lV.  conjijient  with  morallnability.  169 

has   done   his  Duty  ;  and  if  other  Things  don*t  prove  to  be 
connected  with  his  VoUtion,;  that  is  not  owing  to   him. 

3.  Both  thefe  Kinds  of  natural  Inability  that  have  been 
mentioned,  and  fo  all  Inability  that  excufes,  may  be  refolved. 
into  one  Thing  ;  namely.  Want  of  natural  Capacity  or 
Strength  ;  either  Capacity  of  Underflanding,  or  external 
Strength.  For  when  there  are  external  Defeats  and  Obftacles, 
they  would  be  no  Obftaeles,  were  it  not  for  the  Imperfedtion 
and  Limitations  of  Underftanding  and  Strength. 

Carol.  If  Things  for  which  Men  have  a  moral  Inability, 
may  properly  be  the  Matter  of  Precept  or  Command,  then 
they  may  alio  of  Invitation  and  Couniel.  Commands,  and 
Invitations  come  very  much  to  the  fame  Thing  ;  the  Differ- . 
ence  is  only  circumftantial  :  Commands  are  as  much  a  Mani- 
feilation  of  the  Will  of  him  that  Ipeaks,  as  Invitations,  and  as . 
much  Tedimonies  of  ExpeClation  of  Compliance.  The  Dif- 
ference between  them  Hes  in  nothing  that  touches  the  Affair 
in  Hand.  The  main  Difference  betv/een  Command  and 
Invitation  confiiis  in  the  Enforcement  of  the  Will  of  Him 
who  commands  or  invites.  In  the  latter  it  is  his  Klndncfs^  the 
Goodnefs  which  his  Will  arifes  from  t  in  the  former  it  is 
iiis  Authority.  But  whatever  be  the  Ground  of  the  Will  of 
him  that  fpeaks,  or  the  Enforcement  of  what  he  fays,  yet 
feeing  neither  his  Will  nor  Expedation  is  any  more  teltifkd 
in  the  one  Cafe  than  the  other  ;  therefore  a  Perfon's  being 
known  to  be  morally  unable  to  do  the  Thing  to  which  he  is  ■ 
directed  hy  Invitation^  is  no  more  an  Evidence  of  InfmcerJty  in. 
him  that  directs,  in  manifeliing  either  a  Will,  or  Expc6tation: 
which  he  has  not,  than  his  bemg  known  to  be  morally  unable 

to   do  what   he  is  diredted  to  hy  Cotmnand, So  that  all  this 

grand  Objection  of  Arniiniam   againil  the  Inability  oi  fallen 
Men  to  exert  Faith  in   Chrift,  or  to  perform  other   fpiritual- 
Gofpel-Duties,  from  the  Sincerity  of  God's  Counfels  and  In^ 
vitations,  muft  he  without  Force.  #' 


i>i         ■* 


Section 


1 70         What  Willingnefs  and      Part  IIL 

Section     V. 

H^at  Sincerity  of  Defires  and  Endeavours, 
ivhich  is  Juppofed  to  tXQ\x{Q,  in  the  Non- 
performance of  Things  in  themf elves  goody 
particularly  conjidered. 


^  *^--|-'^IS  what  is  much  Infifted  on  by  many,  that  fome  Men, 
I  thp'  they  are  not  able  to  perform  fpiritual  Duties, 
iuch  as  Repentance  of  Sin,  Love  to  God,  a  cordiaj 
/Acceptance  of  Chrift  as  exhibited  and  offer'd  in  the  Gofpe!,&c. 
yet  they  may  fmcerely  defire  and  endeavour  thefe  Things  ; 
and  therefore  muft  be  excufed  ;  it  being  unreafonable  to 
blame  'em  for  the  Omiflion  of  thofe  Things  which  they  fm- 
cerely deiire  and  endeavour  to  do,  but  can't  do. 


Concerning  this  Matter,  the  following  Things  may  be 
obferved. 

I.  What  is  here  fuppofed,  is  a  great  Miftake,  and  grofs 
Abfurdity  ;  even  that  Men  may  iincerely  chufe  and  deftre 
thofe  fpiritual  Duties  of  Love,  Acceptance,  Choice,  Rejec^lion 
&c.  confifting  in  the  Exercife  of  the  Will  it  felf,  or  in  the  Dif- 
pofition  and  Inclination  of  the  Heart ;  and  yet  not  be  able  to 
perform  or  exert  them.  This  is  abfurd,  becaufe  'tis  abfurd  tq 
fuppofe  that  a  Man  fhould  directly,  properly  aod  fmcerely  in- 
cline to  have  an  Inclination,  which  at  the  fame  Time  is  con- 
trary to  his  Inclination  :  for  that  is  to  fuppofe  him  not  to  be 
inclined  to  that  which  he  is  inclined  to.  If  a  Man,  in  the 
State  and  Ads  of  his  Will  and  Inclination,  does  properly  and 
dire6ily  fall  in  with  thofe  Duties,  he  therein  performs  'em  : 
For  the  Duties  themfeives  conlift  in  that  very  Thing  ;  they 
coniift  in  the  State  and  hdis  of  the  Will  being  fo  formed  and 
directed.  If  the  Soul  properly  and  fmcerely  falls*  in  with  a 
certain  propofed  A61  of  Will  or  Choice,  the  Soul  therein 
makes  that  Choice  it's  own.  Even  as  when  a  moving  Body 
falls  in  with  a  propofcd  Direction  of  its  MotioHj  that  is  the 
fame  Thing  as  to  move  in  that  Direflion« 

2.  That 


SeA.V.         Sincerity  is  no  Excufe.        17 1 

2*  That  which  is  called  a  Deftre  and  IVUlingnefs  for  thofe 
inward  Duties,  in  fuch  as  don't  perform  them,  has  refpe6t  to 
thefe  Duties  only  indirectly  and  remotely,  and  is  improperly 
reprefented  as  a  Willingnefs  for  them  -,  not  only  becaufe  (as 
was  obferved  before)  it  refpeds  thole  good  Volitions  only  in  a 
diftant  View,  and  with  refped  to  future  Time  ;  but  alfo  be- 
caufe evermore,  not  thefe  Things  themfelves,  but  fomething 
t\k^  that  is  aliene  and  foreign,  is  the  Objed  that  terminates 
thefe  Volitions  and  Defires, 

A  Drunkard,  who  continues  in  his  Druhkeiinefs,  being  un- 
der the  Power  of  a  Love,  and  violent  Appetite  to  ftrong  Drink, 
and  without  any  Love  to  Vertue  ;  but  bemg  alfo  extreamly 
•covetous  and  clofe,  and  very  much  exercifed  and  grieved  at 
the  Diminution  of  his  Eftate,  and  Profpe6t  of  Poverty,  may  ia 
a  Sort  defij-e  the  Vertue  of  Temperance  :  and  tho'  his  prefent 
Will  is  to  gratify  his  extravagant  Appetite,  yet  he  may  wifh 
he  had  a  Heart  to  forbear  future  Ads  of  Intemperance,  and 
forfake  his  Exceffes,  thro'  an  Unwillingnefs  to  part  with  his 
Money  :  But  ftill  he  goes  on  with  his  Drunkennefs  ;  his 
V/ifhes  and  Endeavours  are  infufficient  and  ineffectual  :  Such 
a  Man  has  no  proper,  direct,  lincere  Willingnefs  to  forfake 
this  Vice,  and  the  vicious  Deeds  which  belong  to  it  :  for  He 
.adls  voluntarily  in  continuing  to  drink  to  excefs  :  His  Defire 
is  very  improperly  called  a  Willingnefs  to  be  temperate  ;  it  is 
no  true  Defire  of  that  Vertue  ;  for  it  is  not  that  Vertue  that 
terminates  his  Wiihes  ;  nor  have  they  any  dire(5t  Refpedt  at 
all  to  it.  'Tis  only  the  faving  his  Adoney^  and  avoiding  Poverty, 
that  terminates,  and  exhaufts  the  whole  Strength  of  his  Defire, 
The  Vertue  of  Temperance  is  regarded  only  very  indire6lly 
and  improperly,  even  as  a  neceffary  Means  of  gratifying  th<s 
Vice  of  Covetoufnefs. 

So,  a  Man  of  an  exceeding  corrupt  and  wicked  Heart, 
who  has  no  Love  to  God  and  Jefus  Chrift,  but  on  the  con- 
trary, being  very  profanely  and  carnally  inclined,  has  the 
greateft  Diftafte  of  the  Things  of  Religion,and  Enmity  againft 
'em  ;  yet  being  of  a  Family,  that  from  one  Generation  to 
another,  have  moil:  of  'em  died  IrtYouth  of  an  hereditaryCon- 
fumption  j*'&  fo  having  littleHope  of  livmg  long  ;  and  having 
been  inftru6ted  in  the  Necelllty  of  a  fupreara  Love  to  Chrifr, 
and  Gratitude  for  his  Death  and  Sufferings,  in  Order  to  his 
Salvation  from  eternal  Mifery  j  if  under  thefe  Circumftances 
he  fliould^tbro'  Fear  of  eternal  Toiments,  wiOi  he  had  fuch  a 
-  Difpoiltioa  :  But  his  profane  and  carnal  Heart  remaining,  He 

Y  a  Gontiuuss^ 


I7«  What  W-^xi^^^  and       PartllL 

continues  ftill  in  his  habitual  diftafte  of,  and  Enmity  to  God 
and  Religion,  and  wholly  without  any  Exercife  of  that  Love 
and  Gratitude,  (as  doubtlefs  the  very  Devils  themfelves,  not- 
withftanding  all  the  Devilifhnefs  of  their  Temper,  would  wifh 
for  a  holy  Heart,  if  by  that  Means  they  could  get  out  of  Hell  :) 
In  this  Cafe,  there  is  no  lincere  Wiliingnefs  to  love  Chrift 
and  chufe  him  as  his  chief  Good  :  Thefe  holy  Difpofitions 
and  Exercifes  are  not  at  all  the  dlred  Object  of  the  Will  : 
they  truly  (hare  no  Part  of  the  Inclination  or  Defire  of  the 
Soul  ;  but  all  is  terminated  on  Deliverance  from  Torment  : 
and  thefe  Graces  and  pious  Volitions,  notvvithtianding  this 
forced     Confent,    are   looked  upon  undefirable  ;    as  when  a 

fick  Man  defires  aDofe  he  greatly  abhors,  to  fave  his  Life. 

From  th^fe  Things  it  appears. 

3.  That  this  indire(5l  Wiliingnefs  which  has  been  fpoken 
of,  is  not  that  Exercife  of  the  Will  which  the  Command 
requires  ;  but  is  entirely  a  different  one  ;  being  a  Volition  of 
a  di^^erent  Nature,  and  terminated  altogether  on  different 
Objtds  ;  wholly  falling  fliort  of  that  Vertue  of  Will,  which 
the  Command  has  refpedl  to. 

.  4.  This  other  Volition,  which  has  only  fome  indirecStCon- 
cern  with  the  Duty  required,  can't  excufe  for  the  Want  of 
that  good  Will  it  {t\^^  which  is  commanded  ;  being  not  the 
Thing  which  anfwers  and  fulfils  the  Command,  and  being 
wholly  deftitute  of  the  Vertue  which  the  Command  feeks.   , 

Further  to  illuftrate  this  Matter. If  a  Child  has  a  moft 

excellent  Father,  that  has  ever  treated  him  with  fatherly 
Kindnefs  and  Tendernefs,  and  has  eveiy  Way  in  the  higheft 
Degree  merited  his  Love  and  dutiful  Regard,  being  withal 
very  wealthy  ;  but  the  Son  is  of  fo  vile  a  Difpofition,  that  He 
jnveterately  hates  his  Father  ;  and  yet,  apprehending  that  his 
Hatred  of  Him  is  like  to  prove  his  Ruin,  by  bringing  Him 
iinally  to  Poverty  and  abjedt  Circumfiances,  thro'  his  Father's 
difinheriting  Him,  or  otherwife  ;  which  is  exceeding  crofs  \o 
his  Avarice  and  Ambition  ;  He  therefore  wifhes  it  were  other- 
wife  :  but  yet  remaining  u^^dcr  the  invincible  Power  of  his  vile 
and  malignant  Di{j>olition,  He  continues  ftill  in  his  fettled 
Hatred  of  his  Father.  Now  if  fuch  a  Son's  indirect  Wiliing- 
nefs to  have  Love  and  Honour  towards  his  Father,  at  all  ac- 
quits or  excufes  before  God,  for  his  failing  of  a6luaily  exer- 
citing  thefe  Difpofitions  tov»'ards  Him  which  God  requires, 
it  muft  be  ou  one  of  thcf<i  two  Accounts,     (i.)   Either  that 

it 


Se<St.V.        Sincerity  h  no  Excufe.  173 

ii 

I  it  anfwers  and  fulfils  the  Command.  But  this  it  does  not,  by 
the  Suppofition  ;  becaufe  the  Thing  commanded  is  Love  and 

,  Honour  to  his  worthy  Parent.  If  the  Command  be  |)roper 
and  juft,  as  is  fuppofed,  then  it  obliges  to  the  Thing  com- 
manded ;  and  fo  nothing  elfe  but  that  can  anfwer  the  Ob- 
ligation.    Or,  (2.)  It  mufl:  be    at  leaft  ^becaufe  there   is  that 

;  yertue  or  Goodnefs  in  his  indirecft  Willingnefs,that  is  cquiva- 

1  lent  to  the  Vertue  required  ;  and  fo  balances  or  coun- 
tervail^  it,  and  makes  up  for  the  Want  of  it.  But  that 
alfo  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition.     The  Willingnefs  the  Son 

j  has  merely  from  a  Regard  to  Money  and  Honour,  has  no 
<^oodnefs  in  it,  to  countervail  the  Want  of  the  pious  filial 
•^efpe(5i:  required. 

Sincerity  and  Reality,  in  that  indire(^  W^illingnefs  which 
has  been  fpoken  of,  don't  make  it  the  better.  That  which 
is  real  and  hearty  is  often  called  fmcere  ;  whether  it  be  in 
Vertue  or  Vice.  Some  Perfons  are  fmcerely /'^^  ;  others  are 
fincerely  good  ;  and  others  may  be  fincere  and  hearty  in 
Things  which  are  in  their  ownNaturefW/^7T«f ;  asaMan  may 
-be  fincerely  defirous  of  eating  when  he  is  hungry.  But  a 
being  fincere,  hearty  and  in  good  Earnefl:,  is  no  Vertue,  un- 
lefs  it  be  in  a  Thing  that  is  vertuous.  A  Man  may  be  fin- 
cere and  hearty  in  joining  a  Crew  of  Pirates,  or  a  Gang  of 
Robbers.  When  the  Devils  cried  out,  and  befought  Chrift 
•not  to  torment  them,  it  was  no  mere  Pretence  ;  they  were 
very  hearty  in  their  Defires  not  to  be  tormented  :  but  this 
did  not  make  their  Will  or  Defires  vertuous.  And  if  Men 
,have  fincere  Defires,  which  are  in  their  Kind  and  Nature  no 
better,  it  can  be  no  Excufe  for  the  want  of  any  required 
■  Vertue. 

And  as  a  Man's  being  fincere  in  fuch  an  indiredt  Defire  or 
Willingnefs  to  do  his  Duty,  as  has  been  mention'd,  can't  ex- 
cufe for  the  w^ant  of  Performance  ;    fo    it    \%  y^\\\\  Eyideavours 
arifing  from  fuch   a  Willingnefs.     The  Endeavours  can  have 
no  more  Goodnefs  in  'em,  than  the  Will  which  they  are  the 
Effe6l  and  Exprefiion  of.     And  therefore,  however  fincere  and 
^  real,  and  however  great  a  Perfon's  Endeavours  are  ;  yea,  tho' 
they  fhould  be  to  \\\t  utmoft  of  his  Ability  j    unlefs  the  Will 
which  they  proceed  from  be   truly  good   and  vertuous,  they 
•can  be  of  no  Avail,  Influence  or  Weight  to  any  Purpofe  what- 
r/oever,  in  a  moral  Senfe  or  Refpedl.     That  which  is  not  truly 
.  vertuous  in  God's  Sight,  is  looked  upon  by  Him  as    good  for 
;  J^othing  :    and  fo  can  be  of  no  Value,  Weight  or  Influence 

in 


174-  T^hat  Sincerity  of  Endeavours,  PartllL 

in  his  Account,  to  recommend,  Tatisfy,  excufe  or  make  up  for 

any  moral  Defe6t.  For  nothing  can  counter-balance  Evil,  but 
Good.  If  Evil  be  in  one  Scale^  and  we  put  a  great  deal  into 
^\-i^  other,  iincere  and  earneil:  Defires,  and  many  and  great 
Endeavours  ;  yet  if  there  be  no  real  Goodnefs  in  all,  there  ig 
no  Weight  in  it  ;  and  fo  it  does  nothing  towards  balancing 
the  real  Weight  which  is  in  the  oppofite  Scale.  Tis  only  lilcft 
the  fubftradVing  a  Thoufand  Noughts  from  before  a  real  Num- 
ber, v/hich  leaves  the  Sum  julf  as  it  was. 

Indeed  fuch  Endeavours  may  have  a  negatively  good  Influ- 
ence, "rhoie  Things  which  have  no  pofitive  Vertue,  have  no 
pofitive  mo:al  Influence  ;  yet  they  may  be  an  Occafion  of 
Pcrfons  avoiding  fome  pofitive  Evils.  As  if  a  Man  were  in 
the  Water  with  a  Neighbour  that  he  had  ill-will  to,  wha 
could  not  fwim,  holding  him  by  his  Hand  ;  which  Neigh- 
bour was  much  in  Debt  to  Him  ;  and  (hould  be  tempted  to  let 
him  fmk  and  drown  ;  but  Ihould  rei'ufe  to  comply  with  the 
Temptation  ;  not  from  Love  to  his  Neighbour,  but  from  the 
Love  of  Money,  and  becaufe  by  his  drowning  He  fliould  lofe 
his  Debt  ;  that  which  he  does  in  preferving  his  Neighbour 
fi-om  drowning,  is  nothing  good  in  the  Sight  of  God  :  Yet 
hereby  he  avoids  the  greater  Guilt  that  would  have  bfeent 
contracted,  if  he  had  defignedly  let  his  Neighbour  fink  ^d 
periih.  But  when  Armhnans  in  their  Difpiites  with  CahiA/is 
infill:  (6  much  on  Hncere  Defires  and  Endeavours,  as  wiat 
mull:  excufe  Men,  muft  be  accepted  of  God  he.  'tis  manlSneft 
they  have  Refped  to  fome  pofitive  moral  Weight  or  Influence 
cf  thofe  Defires  and  Endeavours.  Accepting,  juftifying,  or 
excufing  on  the  Account  of  iincere  honeft  Endeavours  (as 
they  are  called)  and  Men's  doing  what  they  can,  &c.  has  Re- 
lation to  fome  moral  Value,  iomething  that  is  accepted  as 
Good,  and  as  fuch,  countervailing  fome  Defedl. 

But  there  is  a  great  and  unknown  Deceit,  arifing  from  tlie 
Ambiguity  of  the  Phrafe,  y/Wr^  Endeavours.  Indeed  there  is  a 
vaft  Ind!uin(5tnefs  &  Unhxednefs  in  moft,or  at  leaft  very  many 
of  the  Terms  ufed  to  exprefs  Things  pertaining  to  nwral  and 
fpiritual  Matters.  Whence  arife  innumerable  Miifakes,  ftrong 
Prejudices,  inextricable  Confulion,  and  endiefs  Controverfy. 

The  Word  finccre  is  mofi:  commonly  ufed  to  fignify  fome- 
thing  that  is  good  :  Men  are  habituated  to  underlfand  by  it 
the  fame  as  honejl  and  vpight  \  which  Terms  excite  an  Idea 
of  fomething  good  iu  the  flri^^eft  aiid  highell:  Senie  i  good  in 

the 


I  Sect. V.  is  no  Excufe.  175 

i 

j  the  Sight  of  Him  who  fees  not  only  the  outward  Appearance, 

I  but  th"e  Heart.     And  therefore  Men  think  that  if  a  Perfon  be 

;  fuuere^  he  will  certainly  be  accepted.      If  it  be  faid  that  any 

\  one  is  fincere  in  his  Endeavours,  this  fuggeih  to  Men's  Minds 

as  much,  as  that  his  Heart  and  Will  is  good,  that  there  is  no 

Defed  of  Duty,  as  to  vertuous  Inclination  ;    he   honeflly  and 

uprightly  defires  and  endeavours  to  do  as   he  is   required  ;  and 

this  leads  'em  to  fuppofe  that  it  would  be  very  hard  and  un- 

reafonable  to  punifh   him,  only  becaufe  he  is  unfuccefstul  in 

\i\s  Endeavours,  the  Thing  endeavoured   being    beyond  his 

Power. Whereas  it  ought  to   be  obferved,   that  the  Word 

[  ftncere  has  thefe  different  Significations. 

1.  Sincerity^  as  the  Word  is    fometimes   ufed,    fignifies   no 
I  more  then  Reality  of  IP' ill  and  Endeavour^  with  refpect  to  any 

Thing  that  is  profelled  or  pretended  ;  without  any  Confidera- 
tion  of  the  Nature  of  the  Principle  or  Aim,  whence  this  real 
I  Will  and  tme  Endeavour  arifes.      If  a    Man  has   fome  real 
Defire  to  obtain  a  Thing,either  diredl  or  indired,or  does  really 
endeavour  after  a  Thing,he  is  laid  iincer:ly  to  deiire  or  endea- 
vour It  j  without  anyConfideration  of  the  Goodnefs  or  V'ertu- 
oufnefs  of  thePrincipie  he  acts  rrom,or  anyExcellency  orWor- 
thinefs  of  the  End  he.acSls  for.      Thus    a  Man  that  is  kind 
to  his  Neighbour's  Wife,    who    is  f)ck   and  languifhing,   and 
very  helpful  in  her  Cafe,  makes  a  Shew  of  defiring  and  en- 
I  deavouring  her  Reftoration  to  Health  and  Vigour  ;    and   not 
i  only  makes  fuch  a  Shew,  but  there  is  a  Reality  in  his  Pretence, 
!  he  does  heartily  and  earneftly   defire  to  have    her  Health   re- 
j  ftored,  and  ufes  his  true  and   utmoft  Endeavours  for  it  5    He 
}  is  faid  fmcerely  to  deiire  and    endeavour   it,  becaufe  he  does 
1  ki  truly  or  really  ;  tho'  perhaps  the  Principle  he   ads  from, 
i$  no  other  than   a  vile  and  fcandalous  PalTion  ;  having  lived 
in  Adultery  with  her,    he  earneftly  defires  to  have  her  Health 
and  Vigour  reftored,  that  he  may  return  to  his  criminal  Plea- 
fures  With  her.         Or, 

2.  By  Sincerity  is  meant,  not  meerly  a  Reality  of  Will  and 
'Endeavour  of  fome  Sort  or  other,  and  from  fome  Coniidera- 
tion  or  other,  but  a  vertuous, Sincerity.  That  is,  that  in  the 
Performance  of  thofe  particular  Ads  that  are  the  Matter  of 
Vertue  or  Duty,  there  be  not  only  the  Matter,   but  the  Form 

J  and  EiTence  of  Vertue,  confifting  in  the  Axim  that  governs  the 
I  Ad,  and  the  Principle  exercifed  in  it.  There  is  not  only  the 
1  Reality  of  the  A.d,  that  is  as  it  were  the  Body  of  the  Duty  ; 
i  but  ahb  the  Soul^  v;hich  fhould  properly  belong;  to  fuch  a 
1  ^  Body. 


17^  0/  Promises  Part  IIL 


^ 


Body.  In  this  Senfe,  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fincere,  when  he 
2(5ts  with  a  pure  Intention  ;  not  from  finifter  Viev/s,  or  bye- 
Ends  :  He  not  only  in  Reality  defires  and  feeks  the  Thing  to 
be  done,  or  Qualitication  to  be  obtained,  for  fome  End  or 
other  ;  But  he  wills  the  Thing  direaiy  and  properly,  as  nei-.  :§i 
ther  forced  nor  bribed  ;  the  Vertue  of  the  Thing  is  properly,  ffj 
the  Objea  of  the  Will.  ^  it 

Jn  the  former  Senfe^a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fmcere,in  Oppofiti-,;  i| 
on  to  a  mecr  Pretence,  and  Shezv  of  the  particular  Thing  to  he  done  \% 
or  exhibited,  without  any  real  Deiire  or  Endeavour  at" all.      la- 
the latter  Senfe,  a  Man  is  faid  to  be  fincere,  in  Oppofition  to/ 
that  Shezu  of  Vertue  there   is  in  meerly  doing  the  Matter   of  Duty, 
without  the  Reality  of  the  Vertue  it   felf  in  the  Soul,  and  the 
EiTence  of  it,  which  there  is  a  Shew  of.     A  Man  may  be  fin- 
cere in  the  former  Senfe,  and  yet  in  the  latter  be  in  the  Sight 
of  God,  who  fearches  the  Heart,  a  vile  Hypocrite. 

In  the  latter  Kind  of  Sincerity,  only,  is  there  any  Thin^ 
truly  valuable  or  acceptable  in  the  Sight  of  God.  And  this  is- 
the  Thing  which  in  Scripture  is  called  Sincerity,  Uprightnefsj 
Integrity,  Truth  in  the  inward  Parts,  and  a  being  of  a  perfe^  Heart, 
And  if  there  be  fuch  a  Sincerity,  and  fuch  a  Degree  of  it  as 
there  ought  to  be,  and  there  be  any  Thing  further  that  the 
Man  is  not  able  to  perform,  or  which  don't  prove  to  be  con^ 
neded  with  his  fincere  Defires  and  Endeavours,  the  Man  is. 
wholly  excufed  and  acquitted  in  the  Sight  of  God  ;  His  Will 
jfhall  furely  be  accepted  for  his  Deed  :  And  fuch  a  fincere. 
Will  and  Endeavour  is  all  that  in  Stri6tnefs  is  required  of  him, 
by  any  Command  of  God.  But  as  to  the  other  Kind  of 
Sincerity  of  Defires  and  Endeavours,  it  having  no  Vertue  in 
it,  (as  was  obferved  before)  can  be  of  no  Avail  before  Goc' 
in  any  Cafe,  to  recommend,  fatisfy,  or  excufe,  and  has  no  pofi 
tive  moral  Weisht  or  Influence  whatfoever. 


n 


Cord'  I.  Hence  it  may  be  infer'd,  that  Nothing  in  the  Rea-' 
fon  and  Nature  of  Things  appears,  from  the  Confideration  of 
any  moral  Weight  of  that  former  Kind  of  Sincerity,  whicK 
has  been  fpoken  of,  at  all  obliging  us  to  believe,  or  leading" 
us  to  fuppofe,  that  God  has  made  any  pofitive  Promifes  of 
Salvation,  or  Grace,  or  any  faving  Afilftance,  or  any  fpiritual 
Benefit  whatfoever,  to  any  Defires,  Prayers,  Endeavours, 
Striving,  or  Obedience  of  thofe,  who  hitherto  have  no  true 
%'ertue  or  Holinefs  in  their  Hearts  ;  tho'   we  fiiculd  fuppofe 

all 


Sed.V.      to  gracelefs  Endeavours.       177 

all  the  Sincerity,  and  the  utmoft  Degree  of  Endeavour,  that  is 
polFible  to  be  in  a  Perlon  without  Holinefs* 

Some   objefl  againft  God's   requiring,  as  the  Condition  of 

ii  Salvation,  thole  holy  Exercifes,  which  are  the  Refult  of  a   fu- 

pernatural  Renovation  ;  fuch  as  a  fupream   Refped  to  Chrifl, 

Love  to  God,  loving  Holinels  for  it's  own  fake,  ^c.  that  thefe 

inward  Difpofitions  and  Exercifes  are    above  Men's  Power,  as 

they  are  by  Nature  ;  and  therefore  that  we  may  conclude,  that 

i  when  Men  are  brought  to  be  fmcere  in  their  Endeavours,  and 

[do  as  well  as  they  can,  they  are  accepted  ;   and  that  this  muft 

,1  be  ail  that  God  requires  in  order  to  Men's    being   received  as 

'the  Objects    of  his   Favour,  and  muft  be    what  God  has  ap- 

'  pointed  as  the  Condition  of  Salvation.     Concerning  v/hich  I 

vsould  obferve,  that  in  fuch  a  Manner   of  Speaking  of  Men's 

being  accepted^    becavfe   they  are  fincere^    and  do  as  well  as  they  can<^ 

there  is  evidently  a  Siippofition  of  fome  V^ertue,  fome  Degree 

of  that   wdiich    is  truly  Good  ;  tho'  it  don't  go  fo  far  as  were 

tobewifh'd.     For  if  Men  do  what   ihey   can^    unlefs    their  fo 

doing  be  from  fome  good  Principle,  Difpofition,  or  Exercife  of 

Herrt,  fome  vertuous  Inclination   or  A61  of  the  Will  ;    their 

fo  doing  Vv^hat  they  can,  is  in  fome  Refpeds  not  a  Whit  better 

than  if  they  did  Nothing  at  all.     In  fuch  a  Cafe,   there  is  no 

more  pcfitive  m.orai  Goodnefs  in  a  Man's  doing  what  he  can, 

than  in  a  Vv'ind-MiU's  doing  what  it  can  ;  becaufe  the  A6iioa 

does  no  more  proceed  from  Vertue  ;    and  there  is  Nothing  in 

iuch  Sincerity  of  Endeavour,  or  doing  what  we  can,  that  Ihould 

render  it  any  mere  a  proper  or  fit  Recommendation  to  pofitivc 

Favour  and  Acceptance,   or  the  Condition  of  any  Reward  or 

ad-uai  Benefit,  than  doing  Nothing  -,  for  both  the  one  and  the- 

other   are  alike  Nothing,   as   to  any  true   moral   Weight  or 

Value. 

Coroh  2.  Hence  alfo  it  follov>'s,  there  is  Nothing  that  appears 
in  theRealbn  and  Nature  of  Things,which  can  juftly  lead  us  to 
determine,  that  God  will  certainly  give  the  neceffary  Means  of 
Salvation,  or  fome  Way  or  other  beftow  true  Holinefs  and 
tternal  Life  on  thofe  Heathen^  who  are  fincere  (in  the  Senfc 
above  explained)  in  their  Endeavours  to  find  out  the  Will  of 
the  Deity,  and  to  pleafc  Him,  according  to  their  Light,  that 
they  may  efcape  his  future  Difpleafure  and  Wrath,  and  obtain 
Happinefs  in  their  future  State,  through  his  Favour, 


Z  Section 


178       IndifFerence  inconftjlent      Part  III. 
Section     VI. 


Liberty  of  IndifFerence,  not  only  not  ne-: 
cejfary  to  Vertue,   but  utterly  mconj7jie?pt{\\ 
with  it  ;   And  ally  either  vertuous  or  vi-r 
cious  Habits  or  Inclinations,    inconjifient 
with  Arminian  Notions  of  Liberty   an 
moral  Agency. 

lO  fuppofc  fuch  a  Freedom  of  Will,  as  Armin'ians  talk  of,  \ 
to  be  requilite  to  Vertue  and  Vice,  is  many  Ways  con-  I 
trary  to  common  Senfe.  J 

If  Indifference  belongs  to  Liberty  of  Will,  as  Arminlam  fup-  |i 
pofe,  and  it  be  effential  to  a  vertuous  A6lion  that  it  be  perfor-  m 
med  in  a  State  of  Liberty,  as  they  alfo  fuppofe  ;  it  will  follow,  fl 
that  it  is  ellential  to  a  veituous  A6lion  that  it  be  performed  in  | 
a  State  of  Indifference  :  And  if  it  be  performed  in  a  State  of  \ 
Indifference,  then  doubtlefs  it  muft  be  performed  in  the  77W  ,1 
of  Indifference.  And  fo  it  will  follow,  that  in  order  to  th^  % 
Vertuoufnefs  of  &n  A61,  the  Heart  mull  be  indifferent  in  the  j 
Time  of  the  Performance  of  that  Adi,  and  the  more  indiffer-  \ 
cnt  and  cold  the  Heart  is  with  Relation  to  the  A(5t  which  is  f 
p-crformed,  fo  much  the  better  ;  becaufe  the  A(5l  is  performecj  -i 
with  fo  much  the  greater  Liberty.  But  is  this  agreable  to  the  \ 
Light  of  Nature  ?  Is  it  agreable  to  the  Notions  which  Man-  i 
kind,  in  all  Ages,  have  of  Vertue,  that  it  lies  in  that  which  \ 
is  contrary  to  Indifference,  even  in  the  Tendency  and  Inclination  i 
of  theHeart  to  vertuous  Action  ;  and  that  the  ftronger  the  In-  I 
clmation,  and  fo  the  further  from  Indifference,  the  more  ver-  ' 
tucus  the  Heart,  and  fo  much  the  more  praife-worthy  the  J^  ] 
which  proceeds  from  it  r  \ 

If  we  (hould  fuppofe  (contrary  to  what  has  been  before  de—  j 
monftrated)  that  there  may  be  an  A61  of  V/iIl  in  a  State  of  j 
indifference  ;  for  Inflance,  this  A6t,  vi-z.  The  Will's  deter-'  | 
mining  to  put  it  felf  out  of  a  State  of  Indifference,  and  give  it  1 
iclf  a  Preponderatiou  one  Vv^ay,  then  it  would  follow,  on  Jrm^ 

nian 


Sed:.  VL  wii^/j  Ycrtwc.  179 

man  Principles,  that  this  A61  or  Determination  of  the  Will  is 
that  alone  wherein  Vertue  confifts,    becaufe    this   only  is  per- 
formed while  the  Mind  remains  in  a  State  of  Indifference,  and 
fo  in  a  State  of  Liberty  :    For  when  once  the  Mind  is  put  out 
of  it's  Equilibrium,  it  is  no  longer  in  fuch  a  State  ;  and  there- 
fore all  the  A(5ts  which   follow  afterwards,  proceeding  from 
Bias,  can  have  the  Nature  neither  of  Vertue  nor  Vice.     Or  if 
the  Thing  which  the  Will  can   do,   while  yet    in   a   State  of 
Indifference,  and  fo  of  Liberty,  be  only  to  fufpend  ailing,  and 
determine  to  take  the  Matter  into  Confideration,  then  this 
Determination  is  that  alone  wherein  Vertue  confifts,   and  not 
proceeding  to  Action  after  the  Scale  is  turned  by  Confideration, 
So  that  it  will  follow  from  thefe  Principles,   all   that  is   done 
after  the  Mind,  by  any  Means,  is  once  out  of  it's  Equilibrium 
and  already  pollelfed  by  an  Inclination,    and    ariling  from  that 
Inclination,  has  nothing  of  the  Nature  of  Vertue  or  Vice,  and 
is  worthy  of  neither  Blame  nor  Praife.     But  how  plainly  con- 
trary is  tills  to  the  univerfal  Senfe  of  Mankind,  and  to  the  No.- 
tion  they  have  of  fmcerely  vertuous  A6lions  ?  Which  is,  that 
they  are  Actions  which  proceed  from  a  Heart  well  difpofed  and 
ind'med  ;  and  Xh^Jironger^  and  the  vaox^t  fix'd  and  determined  xht 
good   Difpofition  of  the  Heart,  the   greater  the  Sincerity  of 
Vertue,  and  fo  the  more  of  the  Truth  and  Reality  of  it.     But 
if  there  be  any  Ads  which  are  done  in  a  State  of  Equihbrium, 
or  fpring  immediately  from  perfe61:   Indifference  and  Coldnefs 
;  of  Heart,  they  cannot  .arife   from  any  good  Principle  or  Djf- 
J3ofition  in  theHesrt ;  and  confequentlyj  according  to  common 
Senfe,  have  no  nncere  Goodnefs  in  'em,   having   no  Vertue  of 
Heart  in  'em.     To  have  a  vertuous  Heart,  is  to  have  a  Heart 
that  favours  Vertue,  and  is  friendly  to  it,  and  not  one  perfcd\- 
1  ly  cold  and  indifferent  about  it. 

And  befides  the  Anions  that  are  done  in  a  State  of  Indiffer- 
ence, or  that  arife  immediately  out  of  fuch  a  State,  can't  be 
vertuous,  becaufe,  by  the  Suppofition,  they  are  not  determined 
by  any  preceeding  Choice.  For  if  there  be  preceedingChoice, 
then  Choice  intervenes  between  the  A61  and  the  State  of  In- 
difference ;  which  is  contrary  to  the  Suppofition  of  the  Ad's 
"  arifing  immediately  out  of  Indifference.  But  thofe  Ads  which 
are  not  determined  by  preceeding  Choice,  can't  be  vertuous  or 
vicious  hy  Arminian  Principles,  becaufe  they  are  not  determined 
^by  theWill.  So  that  neither  oneWay,  nor  the  other,  can  any 
Adions  be  vertuous  or  vicious  according  toy/rwrn/^wPrinciples. 
If  theAdion  be  determined  by  a  preceedingAd  oif  Choice  it  can't 
be  vertuous  ;  becaufe  the  Adion  is  not  done  in  a  State  of  In- 
i  Z  2  d-ifFerence,^ 


i8o  \nd\Stv.  inconft/i^  withV^vtuQ.  Part  III, 

difference,  nor  does  immediately  arife  from,  fuch  a  State  ;  and, 

fo  is  not  done  in  a  State  of  Liberty.     If  the  A6tion  be   not  d^-.  .  \ 

Urmined  by  a  preceeding  Act  of  Choice,  then  it  can't  be  ver-^  ^ 

tuous  J  becaufe  then  the   Will   is   not    Self-determin'd  in  it,  \ 

So  that  'tis  made  certain,  that   neither  Vertue   nor   Vice  caa  '\ 

ever  find  any  Place  in  the  Univerfe.  ;  \ 

Moreover,   that  it  is  neceffary  to  a  vertuous  A^ion  that  \%  i 

be  performed   in  a    State  of  Indifference,  under  a  Notion   of  \ 

that's  being  a  State  of  Liberty,  is  contrary  to  common  Senfe  ;  a 

as  'tis  a  Di6tate  of  common  Senfe,  that  Indifference  it  felf,  in  - 

Tnany  Cafes,  is  vicious,  and  fo  to  a  high  Degree.     As  if  when  % 

I   fee   my   Neighbour   or   near   Friend,   and  one   who  has  in  \ 

the  higheft  Degree  merited   of  me,    in  extreme  Diflrefs,  and  \ 

ready  to  penlh,   I   find  an  Indifference  in  my  Heart  with  Re-»  l^ 

fpc6t  to  any  Thing  propofed  to  be  done,  which  I  can  eafily  do,  f 

for  his  Relief.     S^  if  it  Ihpuld  be  propofed  to  me,  to  blafpheme  ^ 

God,   or  kill  my  Father,   or  to  do  numberlefs  other  Things  j 

"which  might  be  mentioned  ;  the  being  indifferent,  for  a  Mo-  i 

nient,  would  be  highly  vicious  and  vile.  j 

And  it  may  be  further  obferved,  that  to  fuppofe  this  Liberty  \ 

of  Indifference   is   effential    to  Vertue  and  Vice,    deilroys  the  .1 

great  Difference  of  Degrees  of  the  Guilt  of  different  Crimes,  k 

and  takes  away  the  Heinoufnefs  of  the  moft  fiagitious  horrid  ' 

Iniquities  ;  fuch  as  Adultery  Beftiality,  Murder,  Perjur)',  Blaf-  \ 

phe'Tiy,  &c.  For  according  to  thefe   Principles,   there   is  no  1 

Harm  at  all  in  having  the  Mind  in  a  State  of  perfect  Indiffer-  i 

ence  withRefpe<fl  to  thefeCrimes  ;  nay,  'tis  abfolutely  neceffary  j 
in  order  to  aiiy  Vertue  in   avoiding  them,    or  Vice  in  doing 

them.     But   for   the   Mind  to  be  in  a    State  of  Indifference  j 

%vith  Refpedt  to  'em,    is  to  be  next  Door  to  doing  them  :  It  is  i 
then  inlinitely  near  to  chuling,   and  fo  committing  the  Fad  : 

For  Equilibrium  is  the  next  Step  to   a  Degree  of  Prepondera^  J 

tion  ;  and  one,  even  the  leaft  Degree   of  Preponderation  (all  'i 

Things  confidered)  is   Choice.     And  not  only  fo,  but  for  the  \ 

Will  tQ  be  in  a   State  of  perfed  Equilibrium  with  Refped  to  \ 

fuch  Crimes,  'is   for  the  Mind  to  be  in  fuch  a  State,  as  to  he  Jj 

full  as  likely  to  chufe  'em  as  to  refufe  'em,   to  do  'em   as  to  ! 

prnit   'em.      And  if  our   Minds    muft   be   in   fuch  a   State  \ 

vvherein  it  is  as  neSr  to  chufmg  as  refufing,    and   wherein  it  \ 

^nud  of  Neceffity,  according  to  the  Nature  of  Things,  be  ^  |; 

likely  to  commit  'em,   as   to  refrain   from  'em  \  where  is  the^  \ 

^xceedin^  Heinoufnefs  of  chuf^ng  and  committing  them  .''    If  l| 

thefe  be  no  Harm  ia  often  being  ia  fuch  a  State,  wherein  the  |j 

Probability  \ 


Sed.VI.  Ofvertuous  &*  vicious  Habits.  i8i 

Probability  of  doing  and  forbearing  are  exaflly  equal,  there 
being  an  Equilibrium,  and  no  more  Tendency  to  one  than  thq 
other  ;  then  according  to  the  Nature  and  Laws  of  fuch  a  Con- 
tingence,  it  may  be  expeded,  as  an  inevitable  Confequence  of 
fjjch  a  Difpofition  of  Things,  that  we  {hould  chufe  'em  as 
often  as  reject  'em  :  That  it  fhould  generally  fo  fall  out  is  ne- 
cefTary,  as  Equality  in  the  EfFed  is  the  natural  Confequence 
of  the  equal  Tendency  of  the  Caufe,  or  of  the  antecedent 
State  of  Things  from  which  the  Effed  arifes  r  Why  then 
Ihould  we  be  fo  exceedingly  to  blame,  if  it  does  fo  fall  out  \ 

'Tis  many  Ways  apparent,  that  the  Jrminian  Scheme  of  Li- 
berty is  utterly  inconiiitent  with  the  being  of  any  fuch  Thin2;s 
as  either  vertuous  or  vicious  Habits  orDifpoiitions.  If  Liberty 
of  Indiffere-nce  be  efTential  to  moral  Agency,  then  there  can  be 
no  Vertue  in  any  habitual  Inclinations  of  the  Heart  ;  which 
are  contrary  to  Indifference,  and  imply  in  their  Nature  the 
very  Dertrudion  and  Exclulion  of  it.  They  fuppoie  nothing 
can  be  vertuous,  in  which  no  Liberty  is  exerciied  ;  '  but  hov/ 
abiurd  is  it  to  talk  of  exerciling  Indiiference  under  Bias  and 
Prcponderation  ! 

And  if  felf- determining  Power  in  the  Will  be  necelTarv  to 
moral  Agency,  Praife,  Blame,  &c.  then  nothing  done  by^  the 
Will  can  be  any  further  Praife  or  Bhme-vvorthy,than  fo  far  a$ 
the  Will  is  moved,  fwayed  and  determined  by  it  {e\i^  and  the 
Scales  turned  by  the  fovereign  Pov/er  the  Will  has  over  it  {e\x» 
And  therefore  the  Will  muft  not  be  put  outof  it'sBaiance  already, 
thePreponderation  muft  not  be  determined  and  effected  before- 
hand ;  and  fo  the  felf-determining  A61:  anticipated.  Thus  it 
appears  another  Way,  that  habitual  Bias  is  inconfiftent  with 
that  Liberty  which  Annlnlans  fuppofe  to  be  necelTary  to  Vertue 
or  Vice  ;  and  fo  it  follows, that  habitual  Bias  it  felf  cannot  be 
either  vertuous  or  vicious. 

The  fame  Thing  follows  from  their  Dodrine  concerning 
the  Inconfiftence  of  Necejfity  with  Liberty,  Praife,  Difpraife,&e. 
None  will  deny,thatBias  and  Inclination  may  be  fo  ftrong  as  to 
be  invincible,  and  leave  no  Poilibility  of  the  Will's  deterinin- 
Jng  contrary  to  it  ;  and  fo  be  attended  with  Neceifity.  This 
^Dr.  Whitby  allows  concerning  the  Vv'ili  of  God,  Angels  and 
glorified  Saints,  with  Refped  to  Good  ;  and  the  V/ill  of 
Devils  with  Refped  to  Evil.  Therefore  if  NeceiTity  be  incon- 
Hftent  with  Liberty  ;  then  when  iix'd  Inclination  is  to  fuch  a 
;Pegree  of  Strength,  it  utterly  exgiudes  aii  Vertue,  Vice^  Praife 

or 


1 82  Of  vertuous^  PartllL 


or  Blame.     And  if  fo,  then  the  i\earer  Habits ^'are   to  thisj^ 

iitrength,  the  .more  do  they  impede  Libetty,  and  Po  diminifti'  j 
Praife  and  Blame.  If  very  ftrong  Habits  deilroy  Liberty,  the  j 
leiler  Ones  proportionably  hinder  it,  a.ccording  to  their  Degree'  i 
of  Strength.  And  therefore  it  wilt  follow,  that  then  is  the  ;j 
A<51  moft  vertuous  or  vicious,  when  perfonned  without  any  ^5 
Inclination  or  habitual  Bias  at  all  j  becaufe  it  is  then  perform-'  -'^ 
ed  with  moft  Liberty.  -l 

Every  pre-poffeffing  fix'd  Bias  oti  the  Miijd  brings  a  Degree  i 
of  moral  inability  for  the  contrary  ;  becaufe  fo  far  as  theMind  ( 
is  biaffed  and  pre-poiTeffed,  fo  much  Hindrance  is  there  of  the  ^ 
contrary.  And  therefore  if  moral  Inability  be  inconfit^ent  with  j 
moral  Agency,  or  the  Nature  of  Vertue  and  Vice,  then  fo  far  v^ 
as  tiiere  is  any  fuch  Thing  as  evil  Diipofition  of  Heart,  or  ha-  J 
bitual  Depravity  of  Inclination  ;  whether  Covetoufnefs,  Pride,  '^ 
Malice,  Cruelty,  or  whatever  elfe  ;  fo  much  the  more  excuf-  •' 
able  Peribns  are  j  fo  much  the  lefs  have  their  evil  Ads  of  this  j 
Kind,  the  Nature  of  Vice.  And  on  the  contrary,  v^rhatever  "{ 
excellent  Difpolitions  and  Inclinations  they  have,  fo  much  are  ' 
they  the  ieis  vertuous.  ] 

1 
'Tis  evident,  that  no  habitual  Difpofition  of  Heart,  whether  \ 

it  be  to  a  greater  or  lefler  Degree,  can  be  in  any  Decree  ver- 
tuous or  vicious  i  or  the  Avftions  which  proceed  from  them  | 
at  all  Praife  or  Blame-worthy.  Becaufe,  tho'  we  faould  fup-  '\ 
pofe  the  Habit  not  to  be  of  fuch  Strength  as  wholly  to  take  \ 
av/ay  all  moral  Ability  and  felf-determining  Power  i  or  hin-  '\ 
der  but  that,  altho'  the  Acft  be  partly  from  Bias,  yet  it  may  ^| 
be  in  Part  from  Self-determination  ;  yet  in  this  Cafe,  all  that  \ 
is  from  antecedent  Bias  muft  be  fet  afide,  as  of  no  Confidera-  | 
tion  5  and  in  eftimating  the  Degree  of  Vertue  or  Vice,  no  >' 
more  muft  be  confidered  than  what  arifes  from  felf-determin- 
ing Pov^/er,  without  any  Influence  of  that  Bias,  becaufe  Liberty  i 
is  exercifed  in  no  more  :  So  that  all  that  is  the  Exercife  of  | 
habitual  Inclination,  is  thrown  away,  a^  not  belonging  to  thcj  '■ 
Morality  of  the  Adlion.  By  which  it  appears,  that  no  Exer-  j 
cife  of  t'hefe  Habits,  let  'em  be  ftronger  or  weaker,  can  ever  i'l 
have  any  Thing  of  the  Nature  of  either  Vertue  or  Vice.         I 

Here  if  any  one  ffeould  fay,  that  notwithftanding  all  thefd  ' 
Things,  there  may  be  the  Nature  of  Vertue  and  Vice  in  Habits  \ 
of  the  Mind  j  becaufe  thefe  Habits  may  be  the  .Effe6ls  of  | 
thofe  h&.i,  wherein  the  Mind  exercifed  Liberty  ;  that  how-  ;| 
ever   t^ie  foremention'd  Reafons   will   prove  that   no  Habits  '{ 

vv]-)ich 


Sed.  VI.  and  ^/r/^^j\Habits, ,,  ^       183 

which  are  natural^  or  that  any  are  born  or  created  with  us,  can 
be  either  vertuous  or  vicious  ;  yet  they  will  not  prove  this  of 
Habits,  which  have  been  acquired '  and  eftablifh'd  by  repeated 
free  Ads. 

To  fuch  an  Objector  I  would  fay,  that  this  Evifion  will  not 
at  all  help  the  Matter.  For  if  Freedom  of  Will  be  eflential  to 
the  very  Nature  of  Vertue  and  Vice,  then  there  is  no  Vertiie 
or  Vice  but  only  in  that  very  Thing,  wherein  this  Liberty  is 
exerclfed.  If  a  Man  in  one  or  more  Thing  that  he  does,  ex- 
ercifes  Liberty,  and  then  by  thofe  A6ts  is  brought  into  fuch' 
Circumftances,  that  his  Liberty  ceafes,  and  there  follows  a 
■.long  Series  of  A6ls  or  Events  that  come  to  pafs  neceflarily  ; 
thofe  confequent  Ads  are  not  vertuous  or  vicious,  rewardable 
or  punhhable  ;  but  only  the  free  Adts  that  eftablifli'd  this  Ne- 
cedlty  J  for  in  them  alone  v^as  the  Man  free.  The  following 
Effects  that  are  neceffary,  have  no  more  of  the  Nature  of  Ver- 
tue or  Vice,  than  Health  or  Sicknefs  of  Body  have  properly 
the  Nature  of  Vertue  or  Vice,  being  the  EfFe61:s  of  a  Courfe  of 
free  Acts  of  Temperance  or  Intemperance  ;  or  than  the  good 
Qiialities  of  a  Clock  are  of  theNature  of  Vertue,which  are  the 
Eifiects  of  free  A6ls  of  theArtificer  ;  or  theGoodnefs  and  Sweet- 
nefs  of  the  Fruits  of  a  Garden  are  moral  Vertues,  being  the 
Efre6ls  of  the  free  and  faithful  Adts  of  the  Gardener.  If  Li- 
berty be  abfolutely  requifite  to  the  Morality  of  Actions,  and 
Neceflity  wholly  inconfiftent  with  it,  as  Annmians  greatly  infift  ; 
then  no  necejfary  EffeSls  whatfoever,  let  the  Caufe  be  never  fo 
good  or  bad,  can  be  vertuous  or  vicious  ;  but  the  Vertue  or 
Vice  muft  be  only  in  \Sx^  free  Caufe.  Agreably  to  this,  Dr. 
Whtihy  fuppofes,  the  Neceffity  that  attends  the  good  anti 
evil  Habits  of  the  Saints  in  Heaven,  and  Damned  in  Hell, 
which  are  the  Confequence  of  their  free  Acts  in  tlieir  State  of 
Probation,  are  not  rewardable  or  puniQiable. 


On  the  whole,-  it  appears,  that  if  the  Notions  o^  Ar?n'm}nns 
concerning  Liberty  and  moral  Agency  be  true,  itjv/ill  fol]ov»r 
that  there  is  no  Vertue  in  any  fuch  Habits  or  Qualities  as 
Humility,  Meeknefs,  Patience,  Mercy,  Gratitude,  Generofity, 
Heavenly-mindednefs  ;  Nothing  at  ail  Praife -worthy  in  loving 
Chrid:  above  Father  and  Mother,  Wife  and  Children,  or  our 
own  Lives  ;  or  in  Delight  in  Holinefs,  hungring  and  thirfting 
after  Rightebufnefs,  Love  to  Enemies,  univerfal  Benevolence 
to  Mankind  :  And  on  the  other  Hand,  there  is  nothing  at  all 
vicious,  or  worthy  of  Difpraife,  in  the  moft  fordid,  beaflly, 
Rlgljg^cant,  dcviiiinDifpofition^  ;.  in  being  ungrateful,  profane, 

habitually 


184     Armimamfm  intonfiftent       Partlll. 

habitually  hating  God,  and  Thihgs  facred  and  holy  ;  or  in 
being  mofi:  treacherous^  ehvibUs  and  cruel  toVvards  Men.  For 
all  thefe  Things  are  Difpojitions  i.'ix^  Inclmations  of  the  Heart. 
And  in  fliort,  there  is  no  iuch  Thing  as  any  vertuous  or  vici- 
ous ^ality  of  Mind  ;  no  Iuch  Thing  as  inherent  Vertue  and 
Holinels,  or  Vice  and  Sin  :  And  the  ftronger  thofe  Habits  or 
Difpofitions  are,  which  ufed  to  be  called  vertuous  and  vicious, 
the  further  they  are  from  being  fo  indeed  ;  the  more  violent 
Men's  Lufls  are,  the  more  tix'd  their  Pride,  Envy,  Ingratitude 
and  Malicioufnefs,  ftill  the  further  are  they  from  being  blame- 
worthy. If  there  be  a  Man  that  by  his  own  repeated  Acts, 
or  by  any  other  Means,  is  come  to  be  of  the  moft  hellifh 
Diipofition,  defperately  inclined  to  treat  his  Neighbours  with 
Injurioufnefs,  Contempt  and  Malignity  ;  the  further  they 
fliould  be  from  any  Diipofition  to  be  angry  with  Him,  or  in 
the  leafi  to  blame  Him.  So  on  the  other  Hand,  if  there  be  a 
Perfon,  who  is  of  a  moft  excellent  Spirit,  ftrongly  inclining 
him  to  the  moft  amiable  Actions,  admirably  meek,  benevolent 
&:c.  fo  much  is  he  further  from  anyThing  rewardable  or  com- 
mendable. On  which  Principles,  the  Man  Jefus  Chrift  was 
very  far  from  being  Praife-worthy  for  thofe  Acts  of  Holinefs 
and  Kindnefs  which  He  performed,  thefe  Propenfities  being  fo 
ftrong  in  his  Heart.  And  above  all,  the  infinitely  holy  and 
gracious  God,  is  infinitely  remote  from  any  Thing  commen- 
dable, his  good  Inclinations  being  infinitely  ftrong,  and  He 
therefore  at  the  utmoft  poflible  Diftance  from  being  at  Liberty. 
And  in  all  Cafes,  the  ftronger  the  Inclinations  of  any  are  to 
Vertue,  and  the  more  they  love  it,  the  lefs  vertuous  they 
are  ;  and  the  more  they  love  Wickednefs,  the  lefs  vicious.— ^ 
Whether' thefe  Things  are  agreable  to  Scripture,  let  every 
Chriftian,  and  every  Man  who  has  read  theBible,  judge  :  and 
whether  they  are  agreable  to  common  Senfe,  let  every  one 
judge,  that  have  human  Underftanding  in  Exercife. 

And  if  we  purfue  thefe  Principles,  we  (hall  find  that  Ver- 
tue and  Vice  are  wholly  excluded  out  of  the  World  -,  and  that 
there  never  was,  nor  ever  c^an  be  any  fuch  Thing  as  one  or 
the  other  ;  either  in  God,  Angels  or  Men.  No  Propenfity, 
Difpofition  or  Habit  can  be  vertuous  or  vicious,  as  has  been 
(liewn  i  becaufe  they,  ki  far  as  they  take  Place,  deftroy  the 
Freedom  of  the  Will,  the  Foundation  of  all  moral  Agency, 

and   exclude   all   Capacity  of  either   Vertue   or    Vice. 

And  if  Habits  and  Difpofitions  themfelves  be  not  vertuous 
nor  vicious,  neither  can  the  Exercife  of  thefe  Difpofitions  be 
ig  ;  For  the  Exercife  of  Bias  is  not  the  Exercife  of  free  fTf- 

dctermtning 


Seel. VII.  with  moral  Habits  ^Motives.  185 

determining  TVtll^  and  fo  there  is  no  Exercife  of  Liberty  in  it. 

Confequently  noMan  is  vertuous  or  vicious, either  in  being  well 

or  ill  difpofed,  nor  in  acting  from  a  good   or  bid  Difpolition. 

And  whether  this  Bias  or  Difpofition  be  habitual  or  not,  if  it 

exifts  but  a   Moment  before  the   Act  of  Will,  which  is  the 

Effect  of  it,    it  alters  not  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  Neceflity   of  .the 

Effect.     Or   if  there  be  no  previous  Difpofition  at  all,   either 

habitual  or  occafional,  that  determines  the  Act^   then  it  is  not 

Choice  that  determines  it  :   it  is  therefore  a  Contingence,  that 

happens  to  the  Man,  arifing  from  Nothing  in  him  ;   and   is 

neeeffary,  as  to  any  Inclination  or  Choice  of  his  ;    and  there- 

I  fore  can't  make  Him  either  the  better  or  worfe,  any  more  than 

a  Tree  is  better  than  other  Trees,  becaufe  it  oftener  happens 

to  be  lit  upon  by  a  Swan   or  Nightingal  ;    or   a   Rock  more 

vicious  than  other  Rocks,  becaufe  Rattle-Snakes  have  happen'd 

I  oftner  to  crawl  over  it.     So  that  there  is  no  Vertue  nor  Vice 

I  in  good  or  bad  Difpofitions,  either  fix'd  or  tranfient  ;  nor  any 

!  Vertue  or  Vice  in  acting  from   any  good  or  bad  previous  In- 

i  clination  ;  nor  yet  any  Vertue  or  Vice  in  acting  wholly  with- 

j  out   any  previous  Inclination.      Where  then   fhali   we  find 

1  Room  for  Vertue  or  Vice  ? 


Section     VII. 

Arminlan  Notions  of  moral  Agency  incojt- 
Jiftent  with  all  Influence  of  Motive   and 
Inducement,  in  either  vertuous  or  vicious 
AElions. 


As  Armtnian  Notions  of  that  Liberty,   which  is   efTentlal 
to  Vertue  or  Vice,  are  inconfiftent  with  common  Senfe^ 
in  their  being  inconfiftent  with  all  vertuous  or   vicious 
Habits  and  Difpofitions  ;  fo  they  are  no  lefs  fo  in  their  Incon- 
^{lency  with  all  Influence  of  Motives  in  moral  Actions. 

A  a  'Ti3 


1 86    Motive  &^  Inducem^  incoiifif^  Y'^xX  III. 

'Tis  equally  againft  thofe  Notions  of  Liberty  of  Will,  whe- 
ther there  be,  previous  to  the  Act  of  Choice,  a  Preponde- 
rancy  of  the  Inchnation,  or  a  Preponderancy  of  thofe  Circum- 
ftances,  which  have  a  Tendency  to  move  the  Inchnation. 
And  indeed  it  comes  to  juft  the  fameThing  :  To  fay,  the  Cir- 
cumftances  of  the  Mind  are  fuch  as  tend  to  fway  and  turn  it*s 
Incliaation  one  Way,  is  th^  faine  Thing  as  to  fay,  the  IntU- 
nation  of  the  Mind,  as  under  fuch  Circumftances,  tends  th^t 
Way. 

Or  if  any  think  it  moft  proper  to  fay,  that  Motives  do  alter 
the  Inclination,  and  give  a  new  Bias  to  the  Mind  ;  it  will  not 
alter  the  Cafe,  as  to  the  prefent  Argument.  For  if  Motives 
operate  by  giving  the  Mind  an  Inclination,  the^  they  operate 
by  deftroying  the  Mind's  Indifference,  and  laying  it  under  a 
Bias.  But  to  do  this,  is  to  deftroy  the  Anninian  Freedom  :  B: 
is  not  to  leave  the  Will  to  it's  own  Self-determination,  but  to 
bring  it  into  Subjection  to  the  Power  of  fomething  extrinficfc, 
which  operates  upon  it,  fways  and  det-ermines  it,  previous  to 
it's  own  Determination.     So  that  what  is  done  from  Motive, 

can't  be  either  vertuous  or  vicious. And  befides,  if  the  Acts 

of  the  Will  are  excited  by  Motives,  thofe  Motives  are  the 
Caufes  of  thofe  Acts  of  the  Will  :  which  makes  the  Acts  of 
the  Will  neceffary  ;  as  Effects  neceffarily  follow  the.  Efficieticy 
of  the  Caufe.  And  if  the  Influence  and  Power  of  the  Mo- 
tive caufes  the  Volition,  then  the  Influence  of  the  Motive 
determines  Volition,  and  Volition  don't  determine  it  felf ; 
and  fo  is  not  free,  in  the  Senfe  of  Arviinimis  (as  has  been 
largely  (liewn  already)  and  confequently  can  be  neither  ver- 
tuous nor  vicious. 

The  Suppofition,  v/hich  has  already  been  taken  Notice  of 
as  an  infufficient  Evafion  in  other  Cafes,  would  be  in  like 
Manner  impertinently  alledged  in  this  Cafe  ;  namely,  the* 
huppofition  that  Liberty  coniifl:s  in  a  Power  of  fuipending 
Adlion  for  the  prefent,  in  order  to  Deliberation.  If  it  (hould 
be  faid,  Tho'  it  be  true,  that  the  V/Ul  is  under  a  Neceffity  of 
finally  following  the  firongeft  Motive,  yet  it  may  for  the  pre- 
fent forbear  to  ad  upon  the  Motive  prefented,  till  there  has- 
been  Opportunity  thoroughly  to  confider  it,  and  compare  it's 
real  Weight  with  the  Merit  of  other  Motives.  I  anfwef, 
as  follow^. 

Here  ?gain  it  mufl:  be  remember'd,  that  if  determining  thust 
to  fufpeud  and  confider,be  that  A61  of  the  Will  wherein  alone 
Liberty  is  exercifed„  then  in  this  all   Vertue  and  Vice  muft 

conflU  i 


Sedl.Vll.  mthXtmim^nFertue^Fict.  1S7 

confift  5  and  the  A<5ls  that  follow  this  Confidcration,  and  are 
#ie  Effe6ts  of  it,  being  neceflary,  are  no  more  vertuous  or 
vicious  than  fome  good  or  bad  Events  which  happen  when 
they  are  fail  alleep,  and  are  the  Confequences  of  what 
they  did  when  they  were  awake.  Therefore  I  would  here 
obierve  two  Things. 

I.  To  fuppofe  that  all  Vertue  andVice,  in  every  Cafe,  con- 
fifts  in  determining  whether  to  take  Time  for  Confideration, 
or  not,  is  not  agreable  to  common  Senfe.  For  according  to 
fuch  a  Suppofition,  the  moft  horrid  Crimes,  Adultery,  Murder, 
Buggery,  Blafphemy,  &c.  do  not  at  all  confift  in  the  horrid 
Nature  of  the  Things  themfelves,  but  only  in  the  Negle6t  of 
thorough  Confideration  before  they  were  perpetrated  :  which 
brings  their  Vicioufnefs  to  a  fmall  Matter,  and  makes  all 
Grimes  equal.  If  it  be  faid,  that  Negled  of  Confideration, 
when  fuch  heinous  Evils  are  propofed  to  Choice,  is  worfe  than 
in  other  Cafes  :  I  anfwer,  this  is  inconfiftent,  as  it  fuppofes 
the  very  Thing  to  be,  which  at  the  fame  Time  is  fuppofed 
ftot  to  be  ;  it  fuppofes  all  moral  Evil,  all  Vicioufnefs  and  Hei- 
noufnefs,  dees  not  confift  meerly  in  the  want  of  Confideration, 
It  fuppofes  fome  Crimes  in  themfelves^  in  their  oivn  Nature,  to  be 
inore  heinous  than  others,  antecedent  to  Confideration  or  In- 
confideration,  which  lays  the  Perlbn  under  a  previous  Obliga- 
tion to  coafider  in  fome  Cafes  more  than  others. 

2.  If  it  were  fo,  that  all  Vertue  and  Vice,'  in  every  Cafe, 
confifted  only  in  the  Ael  of  the  Will,  whereby  it  determines 
'ii^hether  to  coniider  or  no,  it  would  not  alter  the  Cafe  in  the 
leaft,  as  to  the  prefent  Argument.  For  ftill  in  this  A6t  of  the 
Will  on  this  Determination,  it  is  induced  by  fome  Motive,  and 
neceffarily  follows  the  ftrongeft  Motive  ;  and  fo  is  necelTary, 
vcven  in  that  Ad  wherein  alone  it  is  either  vertuous  or  vicious. 

Gne  Thing  more  I  would  obfefve,  concerning  the  In  con - 
fiftence  of  Jrmiman  Notions  of  moral  Agency  with  the  Influ- 
ence of  Motives. I  fuppofe  none  will  deny,that  'tis  pof^ibie 

for  Motives  to  be  fet  before  theMind  fo  powerful,  and  exhibit- 
<rd  in  fo  ftrong  aLight,and  under  fo  advantageousCircumliances, 
as  to  be  invmcible  ;  and  fuch  as  the  Mind  cannot  but  yield 
to.  In  this  Cafe,  ^rwm/^;zi  will  doubtlefs  fay.  Liberty  is  de- 
ftroyed.  And  if  fo,  then  if  Motives  are  ejvhibited  with  half 
fo  much  Power,  they  hinder  Liberty  in  Proportion  to  their 
Strength,  and  go  half-way  towards  deftroying  it.  If  a 
Thoufand  Degrees  of  Motive   abolith  all  Liberty,   then   five 

A  a  2  Hundrect 


1 88  hxmvci.  Arg^ from  />6^ Sincerity  Partlll. 

Hundred  take  it  half  away.  If  one  Degree  of  the  Influence^ 
of  Motive  don't  at  all  infringe  or  diminifn  Liberty,  then  no 
more  do  two  Degrees  \  for  Nothing  doubled,  is  ftill  Nothing. 
And  if  two  D'Cgrees  don't  diminifli  the  Will's  Liberty,  no 
more  do  four,  eight,  fixteen,  or  fix  Thoufand.  For  Nothing 
multiplied  never  fo  much,  comes  to  butNothing.  If  there  be 
iicthing  in  the  Nature  of  Motive  or  moral  Suafion,  that  is  at 
all  oppolite  to  Liberty,  then  the  greateft  Degree  of  it  can't 
hurt  Liberty.  But  if  there  be  any  Thing  in  the  Nature  of 
the  Thing,  that  is  againft  Liberty,  then  the  leaft  Degree  of  it 
hurts  it  in  fome  Degree  ;  and  confequently  hurts  and  dimi- 
nifhes  Vertue.  If  invincible  Motives  to  that  A6tion  which  is 
good,  take  av/ay  all  the  Freedom  of  the  Ad,  and  fo  all  the 
v''ertue  of  it  ;  then  the  more  forceable  the  Motives  are,  fo 
much  the  worfe,  fo  much  the  lefs  Vertue  i  and  the  weaker 
the  Motives  are,  the  better  for  the  Caufe  of  Vertue  j  and 
none  is  befl  of  all. 

Now  let  it  be  confidered,v^hether  thefe  Things  are  agreable 
to  common  Senfe.  If  it  Ihould  be  allowed,  that  there  are 
fome  Infcances  wherein  the  Soul  chufes  without  any  Motive, 
what  Vertue  can  there  be  in  fach  a  Choice  ?  I  am  fure,  there 
is  no  Prudence  or  Wifdom  in  it,  Such  a  Choice  is  made  for 
no  good  End  ;  for  it  is  for  no  End  at  all.  If  it  were  for  any 
End,  the  View  of  the  End  would  be  the  Motive  exciting  to 
the  Acft  ;  and  if  the  A61  be  for  no  good  End,  and  fo  from  no 
good  Aim,  then  there  is  no  good  Intention  in  it  ;  And  there- 
fore, according  to  all  our  natural  Notions  of  Vertue,  no  more 
Vertue  in  it  than  in  the  Motion  of  the  Smoke,which  is  driven 
to  arid  fro  by  the  V/ind,  without  any  Aim  or  End  in  the 
Thing  moved,  and  which  knows  not  whither,  i)or  why  and 
wherefore,  it  is  moved. 

Corol.  I.  By  thefe  Things  it  appears,  that  the  Argument 
againft  the  Cahinijls^  taken  from  the  Ufe  of  Counfels,  Exhor- 
tations, Invitations,  Expoftulations,  &c.  fo  much  infifted  on 
by  Armhnans^  is  truly  again [t  themfeives.  For  thefe  Things 
can  operate  no  other  Way  to  any  good  EfFed,  than  as  in 
them  is  exhibited  Motive  and  Inducement,  tending  to  excite 
p.nd  determine  the  Acls  of  the  V/ill.  But  it  follows  on  their 
Principles,  that  the  A6ts  of  Will  excited  by  fuch  Caufes,  can't 
t-e  vertuous  j  becaufe  fo  far  as  they  are  from  thefe,  they 
3re  not  from  the  Will's  felf-determining  Power.  Hence  it 
ivill  follovv/,  th:it  it  :s  not  worth  the  while  to  offer  any  Argu- 
iy\mp  to  peruvade  I'ltxx  to  any  vertuous  Volition  or  voluntary 
''  '"  '•■'•••■•  Aetion  5 


Se.VII.  of  Invit2LWc.  again/!  thcmklvcs.  189 

I  A<5tion  ;  'tis  in  vain  to  fet  before  them  the  Wifdom  and 
Amiablenefs  of  Ways  of  Vertue,  or  the  Odioufnefs  and 
Folly  of  Ways  of  Vice.  This  Notion  of  Liberty  and  moral 
Agency  fruftrates  all  Endeavours  to  draw  Men  to  Yertuc 
by  Inftrudion,  or  Perfwafion,  Precept,  or  Example  :    For  tho* 

I  thefe  Things  may  induce  Men  to  what  is  materially  vertuous, 
yet  at  the  fame  Time  they  take  away   the  Form  of   Vertue, 

;  becaufe  they  deftroy  Liberty  ;  as  they,  by  their  own  Power, 
put  the  Will  out  of  it's  Equilibrium,  determine  and  turn  the 
Scale,  and  take  the  Work   of  felf-dctermining  Power  out  of 

\  it's  Hands.   And  the  clearer  the  Inftru(5lions  are  that  are  given, 

,  the  more  powerful  the  Arguments  that  are  ufed,  and  the  more 
moving  the  Perfwafions  or  Examples,  the  more  likely  they  are 
to  fruftrate  their  own  Defign  ;  Becaufe  they  have  fo  much  the 

i  greater  Tendency  to  put  the  Will  out  of  it's  Balance,  to  hinder 
it's  Freedom  of  felf-determination  •,  and  fo  to  exclude  the 
very  Form  of  Vertue,  and  the  EiTence  of  whatfoever  is  Praife- 
worthy. 

So  it  clearly  follows  from  thefe  Principles,  that  God  has  no 
Hand  in  any  Man's  Vertue,  nor  does  at  all  promote  it,  either 
by  a  phyfical  or  moral  Influence  ;  that  none  of  the  moral 
Methods  He  ufes  with  Men  to  promote  Vertue  in  the  World, 
have  Tendency  to  the  Attainment  of  that  End  ;  that  all  the 
Inilrudlions  which  He  has  given  to  Men,  from  the  Beginning 
of  the  World  to  this  Day,  by  Prophets,  or  Apoftles,  or  by  his 
Son  Jefus  Chrift  ;  that  all  his  Counfels,  Invitations,  Promifes, 
Threatnings,  Warnings  and  Expoftulations  ;  that  all  Means 
He  has  ufed  with  Men,  in  Ordinances,  or  Providences  ;  yea, 
all  Influences  of  his  Spirit,  ordinary  and  extraordinary,  have 
had  no  Tendency  at  all  to  excite  any  one  vertuous  Adl  of  the 
Mind,  or  to  promote  any  Thing  morally  good  and  commen- 
dable, in  any  Refpe6t. For  there  is  no  Way   that  thefe   or 

any  other  Means  can  promote  Vertue,  but  one  of  thefe  three. 
Either  ( I.)  By  a  phyfical  Operation  on  the  Heart.  But  all 
Effe6ls  that  are  wrought  in  Men  in  this  Way,  have  no  Vertue 
in  them,  by  the  concurring  Voice  of  all  Jr?mmans.  Or  (2.) 
Morally,  by  exhibiting  Motives  to  the  Underftanding,to  excite 
good  Acls  in  the  Will.  But  it  has  been  demonftrated,  that 
Volitions  which  are  excited  by  Motives,  are  neceflary,  and  not 
excited  by  a  felf-moving  Power  ;  and  therefore,  by  their  Prin- 
ciples, there  is  no  Vertue  in  them.  Or  (3.)  By  meerly  giving 
the  Will  an  Opportunity  to  determine  it  felf  concerning 
the  Objects  propofed,  either  to  chufe  or  reject,  by  it's  own 
Jjncaufed,  unmoved,  uninfluenced  felf-determinatiou.     And  if 

this 


igo  Arminianifhl  excludes  ^// Vertuey  P.llL 

this  be  all,  then  all  thofe  Means  do  ho  more  to  promote  Ver-^ 
ttic,  than  Vice:  For  they  do  Nothing  but  give  the  Will 
Opportunity  to  determine  it  felf  either  Way\  either  to  Good 
or  Bad,  without  laying  it  under  any  Bias  to  either  :  And  fo 
thtrc  is  really  as  much  of  an  Opportunity  given  to  determine 
in  Favour  of  Evil,  as  of  Gefod. 

Thus  that  horrid  blafphemous  Confequence  will  certainly- 
follow  from  the  Armiman  Dodrine,  which  .they  charge  on 
Others  \  namely,  that  God  a6ls  an  inconfiftent  Part  in  ufing 
fo  many  Counfels,  Warnings,  Invitations,  Intreaties,  &c.  with 
Sinners,  to  induce  'em  to  forfake  Sin,  and  turn  to  the  Ways  of 
Vertue  ;  and  that  all  are  infincere  and  fallacious.  It  will  fol- 
\m^  from  their  Dodrine,  that  God  does  thefe  Things  whert 
He  knows  at  the  fame  Time,  that  they  have  no  Manner  of 
Tendency  to  promote  the  Effedt  He  feems  to  aim  at ;  yea^ 
knows  that  if  they  have  any  Influence,  this  very  Influence 
will  be  inconfiftent  with  fuch  an  Eifecl:,  and  will  prevent  it. 
But  what  an  Imputation  of  Infincerity  would  this  tix  on  Him 
who  is  infinitely  holy  and  true  !~So  that  their's  is  theDo6lrJn5 
which  if  purfued  in  it's  Confequences,  does  horribly  reflect  on 
the  moft  High,  and  fix  on  Him  theCharge  of  Hypocrify  ;  arid 
not  the  Dodlrine  of  the  Cahhiijl  ;  according  to  their  frequentj 
and  vehement  Exclamations  and  Invedives. 

Corol.  2.  From  what  has  been  obferved  in  this  S€<51:ion,  ft- 
again  appears,  that  Armhuayi  Principles  and  Notions,  when 
fairly  examined,  and  purfued  in  their  demonftrable  Confe- 
quences, do  evidently  Ihut  all  Vertue  out  of  the  World,  and 
make  it  impoflible  that  there  fhould  ever  be  any  fuch  Thing, 
in  any  Cafe  \  or  that  any  fuch  Thing  fhould  ever  be  conceiv'd 
of.  For  by  thefe  Principles,  the  very  Notion  of  Vertue  oi^ 
Vice  implies  Abfurdity  and  Contradidion.  For  it  is  abfurd  irt 
it  felf,  and  contrary  to  common  Senfe,  to  fuppofe  a  vertuous 
A<51  of  Mind  without  any  good  Intention  or  Aim  ;  and  by 
their  Prin^eiples,  it  is  abfurd  to  fuppofe  a  vertuous  A(5l  with  a 
good  Intention  or  Aim  \  for  to  att  for  an  End,  is  to  a6t  froih- 
a  Motive.  So  that  if  we  rely  on  thefe  Principles,  there  cart 
be  no  vertuous  A61  with  a  good  Defign  and  End  ;  and  'tiS 
felf-evident,  there  can  be  none  without  :  confequently  there 
can  be  no  vertuous  A61  at  all. 

Corol,  3.  Tis  manifeft,  that  Armmian  Notions  of  moral 
Agency,  and  the  Being  of  a  Faculty  of  V/ill,  cannot  confift  to- 
gether i  and  that  if  there  be  apy  fuch  Thixig  as,  either  a  ver- 

tuous> 


Sea.VIL   and  Victy  out  of  the  World.     191 

tuous,  or  vicious  A<5t,  it  can't  be  an  A(5l  of  Will ;  no  Will  can 
bye  at  all  concerned  in  it.  For  that  A6t  which  is  performed 
without  Inclination,  without  Motive,  without  End,  muft  be 
performed  without  any  Concern  of  the  Will.  To  fuppofe  an 
A51  of  the  Will  without  thefe,  implies  a  Contradiction.  If 
the  Soul  in  it's  Act  ha?  no  Motive  or  End  ;  then  in  that  Ad 
(as  was  obferv^d  before)  it  feeks  Nothing,  goes  after  Nothing, 
exerts  no  Inclination'to  any  Thing  ;  and  this  implies,  that  in 
that  A61  it  defires  Nothing,  and  chufesNothing  ;  fo  that  there 
is  noA<5t  of  Choice  in  theCafe  :  And  that  is  as  much  as  to  fay, 
there:  is  no  Adt  of  Will  in  the^  Cafe.  Which  very  effedtualiy 
fhuts  out  all  vicious  and  vertuous  A6ts  put  of  the  Univerfe  ; 
in  as  much  as,  according  to  this,  there  can  be  no  vicious  or 
vertvious  A(5t  wherein  the  Will  is  concerned  ;  arid  according 
\.o  the  plaineft  Didates  of  Reafon,  and  the  Li^ht  of  Nature, 
and  alfo  the  Principles  of  Armin'mm  themfelyes,  there  can  be 
no  vertuous  or  vicipus  K6k  wherein  the  Will  is  not  concerned. 
And  therefore  there  is  no  Room  for  any  vertuous  or  vicious 
A«ts  at  all. 

Corok  4.  If  none  of  the  moral  A(ftions  of  intelligent  Beings^ 
are  influenced  by  either  previous  Inclination  or  Motive,  ano- 
ther ftrange  Thing  will  follow  ;  and  this  is,  that  God  not 
only  can't  foreknow  any  of  the  fijiture  moral  Acftions  of  his 
Creatures,  but  He  can  make  no  Conjedure,  can  give  no  pro- 
bable Guefs  concerning  them.  For,  all  Conjedure  in  Things 
of  this  Nature,  muft  depend  on  fome  Difcerning  or  Apprcr. 
li^nfion  of  thefe  two  Things,  previous  Difpcfition^  and  Motive  ; 
which,  as  has  been  obferved,  Arminian  Notions  pf  moral 
'  Agency,  in  their  real  Confequ.ence,  altogether  exclude. 


PART 


{       192       ) 


PART      IV. 

Wherein  the  chief  Grounds  of  the  Reafon- 
ings  o{  Arminians^m  Support  andDefence 
of  the  foremention'd  Notions  o{  Liberty^  I 
moral  Ageitcy^^c.  and  againft  the  oppo-  I 
file  Doctrine,  are  confidered.  ■% 


Section     I. 


!r>5^  Eflence  of  the  Vertue  and  Vice  of  Dif  \ 

pofttions  of  the  Hearty  a?td  A8is  of  the  \ 

JVilly  lies  not  in  their   Caufe,  hut  their  \ 

Nature.  \ 


NE  main  Foundation  of  the  Reafons,  which  are 
brought  to  eftablifh  the  foremention'd  Notions  of 
Liberty,  Vertue,  Vice,  &c.  is  a  Suppofition,  that  the 
Vertuoufnefs  of  the  -Difpofitions  or  A^s  of  the  Will 
confifts  not  in  the  Nature  of  thefe  Difpofitions  or 
A6ls,  but  wholly  in  the  Origin  or  Caufe  of  them  :  fo  that  if 
the  Difpofition  of  the  Mind  or  hdi  of  the  Will  be  never  io 
£Ood,  yet  if  the  Caufe  of  the  Difpofition  or  Adt  be  not  our 
Vertue,  there  is  nothing  vertuous  or  praife-worthy  in  it ;  and 
•a  the  contraiy,  if  the  Will  in  it's  Inclination  or  Ads  bene- 

vei^ 


Sea.I.  OftkeMcnctofFertue  &>  Fice,i^^ 

I  vcr  fo  bad,  yet  unlefs  it  arifes  from  fomething  that  is  our 
Vice  or  Fault,  there  is  Nothing  vicious    or  bIame-^\^orthy   in 

I  it.  Hence  their  grand  Objedlion  and  pretended  Demonftra- 
tion,  or  Self-Evidence,  againft  any  Vertue  and  Cofrtmenda- 
bJenefs,  or  Vice  and  Blame-worthinefs,  of  thofe  Habits  or 
A(5ls  of  the  Will 3  which  are  not  from  fome  vertuous  or  Vici* 

I;  ous  Determination  of  the  Will  it  felf. 
Now,  if  this  Matter  be  well  confidered,  it  will  appear  to 
be  altogether  a  Miftake,  yea,  a  grofs  Abfurdity  ;  and  that  it  is 
r  moft  certain,  that  if  there  be  any  fuch  Things,  as  a  vertuous, 
or  vicious  Difpofition-,  or  Volition  of  Mind,  the  Vertu5ufnefs 
or  Vicioufnefs  of  them  confifts  not  in  the  Origin  or  Caufe  of 
thefe  Things,   but  in  the  Nature  of  them. 

If  the  EiTence  of  Vertuoufnefs  or  Commendablenefs,  and 
of  Vicioufnefs  or  Fault,  don't  lie  in  the  Nature  of  the  Difpo- 
fitions  Or  A6ls  of  Mind,  which  are  faid  to  be  our  Vertue  or 
our  Fault,  but  in  their  Caufe,  then  it  is  certain  it  lies  no 
where  at  all.  Thus^  for  Inflance,  if  the  Vice  of  a  vicioi^s 
Aa  of  Will,  lies  not  in  the  Nature  of  the  Aa,  but  the 
Caufe  ;  fo  that  it's  being  of  a  bad  Nature  will  not 
make  it  at  all  our  Fault,  unlefs  it  afifes  from  fome  faulty 
Determination  of  our's  as  it*s  Caufe,  or  fomething  in  us  that 
is  our  Fault;  then  for  the  fame  Reafon,  neither  can  the 
Vicioufnefs  of  that  Caufe  lie  in  the  Nature  of  the  Things  it 
felf,  but  in  it^s  Caufe  :  that  evil  Determination  of  our's  is  not 
our  Fault,  meerly  becaufe  it  is  of  a  bad  Nature,  unlefs  it 
arifes  from  fome  Caufe  in  us  that  is  our  Fault;  And  when 
v/e  are  come  to  this  higher  Caufe,  fl:ill  the  Reafon  of  the 
Thing  holds  good  ;  tho*  this  Caufe  be  of  a  bad  Nature,  ye^L 
V,  e  are  not  at  all  to  blame  on  that  Account,  unlefs  it  arifes 
from  fomething  faulty  in  us.  Nor  yet  can  Blame-worthinefs 
lie  in  the  Nature  of  ibis  Canje^  but  in  the  Caufe  of  that.  And 
thus  we  muft  drive  Faultinefs  back  from  Step  to  Step,  from 
a  lower  Caufe  to  a  higher,  in  infinitum  :  and  that  is  thoroughly 
to  banilh  it  from  the  World,  and  to  allow  it  no  polfibility  of 
Exigence  any  where  in  the  Univerfality  of  Things.  On  thefe 
Principles,  Vice  or  moral  Evil  can't  confift  in  any  Thing 
I  that  is  an  EffeSf  ;  becaufe  Fault  don't  confift  in  the  Nature 
;  of  Things,  but  in  their  Caufe  ;  as  well  as  becaufe  Effefls 
:  are  neceiuiry,  being  unavoidably  conne(5led  with  their  Caufe  : 
'  \  therefore  the  Caufe  only  is  to  blame.  And  fo  it  follows,  that 
Faultinefs  can  lie  only  in  that  Caufi^  which  is  a  Caufe  only^  zn6. 
no  Effecft  of  any  Thing.  Nor  yet  can  it  lie  in  this  ;  for  then 
it  muft  lie  in  the  Mature  of  the  Thinir  it  felf ;  cct  in  it's  be- 
k  B  b       ^  ia^ 


K^^T^e  Effcnct  of  Fertue  &  J^ke^  Part  IV* 

ing  from  any  Determination  of  o]jr*s,  nor  any  Thing  faulty 
m  us  which  is  the  Caufe,  nor  indeed  from  any  Caufe  at  all, 
for  by  the  iiuppofition,  it  is  no  EfFed,  and  hai  no  Caufe. 
And  thus,  He  that  will  maintahi,  it  is  n'ot  the  Nature  of 
Habits  or  Ads  of  Will  that  makes  them  vertuous  or  faulty, 
but  the  Caufe,  muft  immediately  run  Hnnfelf  out  of  his 
ovm  AfTertion  ;  and  in  maintaining  it,  will  infenfibly  con- 
tradid  and  deny  it. 

This  is  certain,  tha.t  if  EfFe6ls  are  vicious  and  faulty,  not 
from  their  Nature,  or  from  any  Thing  inherent  in  them, 
but  bccaufe  they  are  from  a  bad  Caufe,  it  muft  be  on  Ac- 
count of  the  Badnefs  of  the  Caufe  ;  and  fo  on  Account 
of  the  Nature  of  the  Caufe  :  A  bad  EfFea  in  the  Will  muf^ 
be  bad,  becaufe  the  Caufe  is  bad^  or  of  an  evil  Nature^ 
or  has  Badnefs  as  a  Quality  inherent  in  it  :  and  tl  good  Eflfed 
in  the  Will  muft  be  good^  by  Reafon  of  the  Goodnefs  of  the 
Caufe,  or  it's  being  of  a  geod  Kind  and  Nature,  And  if  this 
be  what  is  meant,  the  very  Suppofition  of  Fault  and  Praife 
iving  not  in  the«»  Nature  of  the  Thing,  but  the  Caufe,  con- 
tradicts it  {€ii^  and  does  at  leaft  refolve  the  Eftence  of  Vertue 
and  Vice  into  theNature  of  Things,  and  fuppofes  it  originally 

to  confift  in  that. And  if  a  Caviller  has  a   Mind   to  run 

from    the   Abfurdity,   by   faying,    ''  No,    the  Fault   of  the 
«"^  Thing  which  is  the  Caufe,   lies  not  in  this,  that  the  Caufe, 
>'  it  {^ii   is  of  an  evil  Nature^  but  that   the   Caufe   is   evil  in 
*^'  that  Senfe,  that  it  is  from  another   bad  Caufe".     Still  the 
Abfurdity  will  follow  him  ;    for  if  fo,    then  the  Caufe  before, 
ch"arged  is  at  once  acquitted,    and  all  the  Blame  muft  be    laid, 
to  the  higher  Caufe,  and  muft  confift  in  that's  being  Evil^   or 
of  an  evil  Nature.     So  now  we  are  come  again  to  lay  theBlamC' 
of  the  Thing  blame-worthy,  to  the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  and 
not  to  the  Caufe.     And  if  any  is  fo  foolifti  as  to   go  higher 
ftill,    and  afcend  from  Step    to    Step,  till  he  is  come  to   that 
which  is  the  lirftCaufe  concerned  in  the  whole  Affair,  and  will 
fay,  all  the  Blame  lies  in  that  ;    then  at  laft  he  muft  be  forced 
to  ov/n,  that   the  Faultinefs  of  the  Thing  which  he  fuppofes 
alone  blame-worthy,  lies  wholly    m   the  Nature  of  the  Thing, 
and  not  in  the  Original  or  Caufe  of  it  ;   for   the  Suppofition 
is,  that  it  has  no  Original,  it  is  determined  by  noAct  of  our's, 
is  caufcd  by  nothing    faulty   in   us,   being   abfolutely  w///>tf«f 
ans;  Qaufl.     And  fo  the  Race  is  at  an  End,  but   the  Evader  is 
taken  In  his   Flight. 

'Tis  agreable  to  x\\'^  natural  Notions  of  Mankind,  that 
moral  Evil,  v.'ith  it's  Defert  of  Diilike  and  Abhorrence,  and 
ali  it's  other  Jll-defcrvings,   confifts  in  a  certain  DAtw/Zv  in 

.  the 


Se.I.  in  the^^t^  of  Volition  ^not  in  theC^LVik.  1 9  5 

the  Nature  of  certain  Difpofitions  of  the  Heart,  and  A€is  of 
the  Will  ;  and  not  in  the  Deformity  of  fcrmihing  elfe^  diverfe. 
from  the  very  Thing  it  felf,  which  deferves  Abhorrence, 
fuppofed  to  be  the  Catife  of  it.  Which  would  be  abfurd, 
becaufe  that  would  be  to  fuppofe,  a  Thing  that  is  in- 
nocent and  not  Evil,  is  truly  evil  and  faulty,  becaufe  another 
Thing  is  Evil.  It  implies  a  Contradidion  ;  for  it  would  be 
to  fuppofe,  the  very  Thing  which  is  morally  evil  and  blame- 
worthy,is  innocent  and  not  blame-worthy  j  but  that  fomething 
elfe,  which  is  it's  Cauie,  is  pnly  to  blame.  To  fay,  that  Vice 
don't  confift  in  the  Thing  which  is  vicious,  but  in  it's  Caufe, 
is  the  fame  as  to  fay,  that  Vice  don't  confiil:  in  Vice,  but  in 
that  which,  produces  it. 

'Tis  true,  a  Caufe  may  be  to  blame,  for  being  the  Caufe 
of  Vice  :  It  may  be  Wicicednefs  in  the  Caufe,  that  it  pro- 
duces Wickednefs.  But  it  would  imply  a  Contradidion,  to 
fuppofe  that  thefe  two  are  the  fame  individual  Wickednefs. 
The  wicked  A61  of  the  Caufe  in  producing  Wickednefs,  is 
one  Wickednefs  ;  and  the  Vf  ickednefs  produced,  if  there  be 
any  produced,  is  another.  And  therefore  the  Wickednefs  of 
the  latter  don't  lie  in  the  form.er,  but  is  diftind  from  it  ;  and 
the  Wickednefs  of  both  lies  in  the  evil  Nature  of  the  Things 
which  are   wicked. 

The  Thing' which  makes  Sin  hateful,  is  that   by   which   it 
deferves  P'uniSiment  ;  which  is  but  the  Expreffion  of  Hatred. 
And  that  which  renders  Vertue   lovely,  is  the  fame  with  that, 
on  the  Account  of  which,    it  is  fit  to   receive  Praife  and  Re- 
ward ;  which   are   but   the  Expreflions   of  Efteem  and  Love. 
But  that  which  makesVice  hateful,  is  it's  hateful  Nature  ;  and 
that  which  rendersVertue  lovely,  is  it's  amiable  Nature.     'Tis 
a  certain  Beauty  or  Deformity  that  are    inherent  in   that  good 
'or  evil  Will,  whieh  is  the  Soul  of  Vertue  and  Vice  (and  not 
in  the  Occafion  of  it)   which  is  their  Worthinefs  of  Eileem   or 
Difefteem,  Praife  or  Difpraife,  according  to  the  common  Senfe 
of  Mankind.     If  the  Caufe  or  Occaficn   of  the   Rife    of   an 
hateful  Difpofition  or  Ad  of  Will,  be    alfo  hateful  ;  ^  fuppofe 
another  antecedent    evil   Will  5    that  is  entirely  an^ig.  Sin, 
and  defer\^es  Punidiment  by  it  felf,   under  a  diilincrv^onf  de- 
ration.    There  is  Worthinefs  of  Difpraife  in  the  Nature  of  an 
evil  Volition,    and  not  wholly  in   fome  foregoing  A<5t  which 
is  it's  Caufe  ;  otherwife  the  evil  Volition  wl»ich  is  the  Eifeit* 
is  no  moral  Evil,  any  more  than  Sicknefs,  or  fome  other  na- 
tural Calamity,  which  arifes  from  a  Caufe  moraUy  evil. 

B  b  2  Thus 


IL 


«96  The  Effence  ofFerm  ^Vice,  PartlV. 

Thi;s  for  Inftance,  Ingratitude  is  hateful  and  worthy  of 
Difpraife,ajccording  to  common  Senfe  ;  not  becaufe  fomethjng 
as  bad,  or  worfe  than  Ingratitude,  was  the  Caufe  that  produced 
^t  ;  but  becaufe  it  is  hateful  in  it  i€ii^  by  it's  own  inherent 
Deformity.  So  the  Love  of  Vertue  is  amiable,  and  worthy  of 
Praife,  not  meerly  becaufe  fomething  elfe  went  before  thi^ 
Love  of  Vertue  in  our  Minds,  which  caufed  it  to  take  Place 
there  ;  forlnflance  our  own  Choice  ;  we  chofe  to  love  Vertue, 
and  by  fome  Method  or  other  wrought  our  felves  into  th$ 
Love  of  it  ;  but  becaufe  of  the  Amiablenefs  and  Condecei\cy 
of  fuch  a  Difpofition  and  Inclination  of  Heart.  If  that  was 
the  Cafe,  that  we  did  chufe  to  love  Vertue,  and  {o  produced 
that  Love  in  our  \thts^  this  Choice  it  felf  could  be  no  other-! 
wife  amiable  or  praife- worthy,  than  as  Love  to  Vertue,  or 
fom,e  other  amiable  Inclination,  was  exercifed  and  impjied  in 
it.  If  that  Choice  was  amiable  at  all,  it  muft  be  fo  on  Act 
count  of  fome  amiable  Qiiality  in  the  Nature  of  the  Choice, 
If  we  chofe  to  love  Vertue,  not  in  Love  to  Vertue,  or  any 
Thing  that  was  good,  and  exercifed  no  fort  of  good  Difpofi* 
tion  in  the  Choice,  the  Choice  it  felf  was  not  vertuous,  no!" 
worthy  of  any  Praife,  according  to  commpn  Senfe,  becaufe^ 
the  Choice  vvas  not  of  a  good  Nature. 

^  It  may  not  be  improper  here  to  take  Notice  of  fomething 
faid  by  anAuthor,  that  has  lately  made  a  mighty  Noife  in  Ame- 
rica, <«  A  neceffary  Holinefs  (fays  He  *)  is  no  Holinefs.- — 
"  Adam  could  not  be  originally  created  in  Righteoufnefs  and 
*'  true  Holinefs,  becaufe  He  muft  chufe  to  be  righteous,  before 
*^  He  could  be  righteous,  And  therefore  He  muft  exift.  He 
'*  muft  be  created,  yea  He  muft  exercife  Thought  and  Re^^ 
"  fledtion,  before  he  v<ras  righteous."  There  is  much  more 
to  the  fame  Effed:  in  that  Place,  and  alfo  in  P.  437,  438,  439, 
440.  If  thefe  Things  are  fo,  it  will  certainly  follow,  that  the 
^rft  chufmg  to  be  righteous  i?  no  righteous  Choice  ;  there 
is  no  Righteoufnefs  or  Holinefs  in  it  ;  becaufe  no  chufing  to 
be  righteous  goes  before  it.  For  He  plainly  fpeaks  of  chufmg 
to  be  righteous y  as  what  muji  go  before  Righteoufnefs  :  And  that 
which  follows  the  Choice,  being  the  EfFe^  of  the  Choice, 
can't  be  Righteoufnefs  cr  Holinefs  :  For  an  Eife<5l  is  a  Thing 
neceifary,  and  can't  prevent  the  Influence  or  Efficacy  of  it's 
Caufe  J  and  therefore  is  unavoidably  dependent  upon  the 
Caufe  :  And  He  fays,  A  neceffaryHolinefs  is  no  Holinefs,  So  that 
neither  can   a   Chpice  of  Righteoufpefs  be  Righteoufnefs  oc 

Holinefs, 

♦^  ?cnp.  Pqc,  of  Qri^iaal  Sin.y,  f,   180.  3d  ^dit* 


ScJ.m  theNat^  ofVoUtton^notin  /^^Caufe.  197 

Holincfs,  nor  can  anyThing  that  is  confequent  on  that  Choice, 
and  the  EfFedl  of  it,  be  Righteoufnefs  or  Holinefs  ;  nor  can 
any  Thing  that  is  without  Choice,  be  Righteouinefs  or  Holi- 
nefs. So  that  by  his  Scheme,  all  Righteoufnefs  and  Holinefs 
is  at  once  fhut  out  of  the  World,  and  no  Door  left  open,  by 
which  it  can  ever  poflibly  enter  into  the  World. 

I  fuppofe,  the  Way  that  Men  came  to  entertain  this  abfurd 
inconfirtent  Notion,  with  Refpe6l  to  internal  Inclinations  and 
Volitions  themfelves,  (or  Notions  that  imply  it,)  vi%.  that  the 
ElTence  of  their  moral  Good  or  Evil  lies  not  in  their  Nature, 
but  their  Caufe  ;  was,  that  it  is  indeed  a  very  plain  Didate 
of  common  Senfe,  that  it  is  fo  with  Refpe(5t  to  all  outward 
J^fio-fis,  and  fenfible  Motions  of  the  Body  ;  that  the  moral 
Good  or  Evil  of  'em  don't  lie  at  all  in  the  Motions  them- 
felves ;  which  taken  by  themfelves,  are  nothing  of  a  moral 
Nature  ;  and  the  EfTence  of  all  the  moral  Good  or  Evil  that 
concerns  them,  lies  in  thofe  internal  Difpofitions  and  Volitions 
which. are  the  Caufe  of  them.  Now  being  always  ufed  to  de- 
termine this,  without  Hedtation  or  Difpute,  concerning  external 
Atliom  \  which  are  the  Things  that  in  the  ccmmiOn  Ufe  of 
Language  are  fignified  by  fuch  Phrafes,  as  Men's  Actions^  or 
their  Doings  ;  Hence  v^hen  they  came  to  fpeak  of  Volitions, 
and  internal  Exercifes  of  their  Inclinations,  under  the  fame  De- 
nomination of  their  Jdlisns,  or  what  they  do,  they  unwarily  de- 
termined the  Cafe  muil  alfo  be  the  fame  with  thefe,  as  with 
txterjzal  Actions  ;  not  confidering  the  vaft  Difference  in  th« 
Nature  of  the  Cgfe. 

If  any  (hall  ftill  objed  and  fay.  Why  is  it  not  neceffary 
tfiat  the  Caufe  ihould  be  confidered,  in  order  to  determine 
whether  anyThing  be  worthy  of  Blame  orPraife  ?  Is  if  agreable 
to  Reafon  and  common  Senle,  that  a  Man  is  to  be  praifed  or 
blamed  for  that  which  he  is  not  the  Caufe  or  Author  of,  and 
has  no  Hand  in  ? 

I  anfwer,  fuch  Phrafes  as  being  the  Caufe,  being  the  Author, 
paving  a  Hand^  and  the  like  are  ambiguous.  They  are  moft 
vulgarly  underftood  for  being  the  defigning  voluntary  Caufe, 
or  Caufe  by  antecedent  Choice  :  And  it  is  moft  certain  that 
Men  are  not  in  this  Senfe  the  Caufes  or  Authors  of  the  firfl 
A<5t  of  their  Wills,  in  any  Cafe  ;  as  certain  as  any  Thing  is, 
or  ever  can  be  ;  for  nothing  can  be  more  certain,  than  that  a 
Thing  is  not  before  it  is,  nor  a  Thing  of  the  fame  Kind  be- 
fcre  the  firft  Thing  of  that  Kind  -,    and  To  no  Choice  before 

thfc 


rgS  The  Arminian  JVo/ion  of  A&ion,  P.IVr 

Ac  firft  Choice.-— As  ihtPhrvik,  heing  the  Juthofy  may  be  un- 
derftood,  not  of  being  the  Producer  by  an  antecedent  Ad:  of' 
Will  ;  but  as  a  Perfon  may  be  faid  to  be  the  Author  of  the 
A<5t  of  Will  it  felf,  by  his  being  the  immediate  Agent, 
^  the  Being  that  is  a^'mg^  or  in  Exercife  in  that  A&.  ;  If  the' 
Phrafe  of  heitig  the  Author^  is  ufed  to  iignify  this,  then  donbt-\ 
lefs  cwnmon  Senfe  requires  Men's  being  the  Authors  of  their 
own  A(5ts  of  Will,  in  order  to  their  being  efteemed  worthy  of 
Praife  or  Difpraife  on  Account  of  them.  And  common  Senfe'  * 
teaches,  that  tHey  muft  be  the  Authors  of  external  ASiions^  \vi 
the  former  Senfe,  namely,  their  being  the  Caiifes  of  'em  by  an" 
A6t  of  Will  or  Choice,  in  order  to  their  being  juftly  blamed 
or  praifed  :  But  it  teaches  no  ftich  I'hing  with  Refpe6t  to  the 
Ads  of  the  Will  thennfelves.— But  this  may  appear  more  ma- 
nifeft  by  the  Things  whrch  will  be  obferved  in  the  following 
S^dion. 


Section     II. 

lT)e  Falfenefs  and  Incon/tjience  of  that  meta- 
phyfcal  Notion  of  Adion,  ^W  Agency, 
which  feems  to  be  generally  entertained  by 
the  Defenders  of  the  Arminian  Do&riner 
concerning  Liberty  ^  moral  Agency  y  &c. 

ONE  Thing  that  is  made  very  much  a  Ground  of  Argu- 
ment and  fuppofed  Demonftration  by  Arminians^  in 
Defence  of  the  fore-mentioned  Principles,  concerning 
moral  Agency,  Vertue,  Vice  5cc.  is  their  metaphyseal  Notion 
of  Agency  and  A^ion.  They  fay,  unlefs  the  Soul  has  a  Self- 
determining  Power,  it  has  no  Power  of  A5iion  ;  If  it's  Vo- 
litions be  not  caufed  by  it  felf,  but  are  excited  and  determined 
by  fome  ex»rinfic  Caufe,  they  can't  be  the  Soul's  own  ASls  j 
and  that  the  Soul  can't  be  a^'ive^.  but  muft  be  wholly  pajjlvey  in 
thofe  EfFeds  which  it  is  the  Subject  of  necefTarily-,  and  ;iQt 
from  it's  own  free  Determination, 

Mr, 


Se£l:.  II.        falfe  and  inconjijlent.  igg 

Mr.  Chuhh  lays  the  Foundation  of  his  Scheme  of  Liberhr, 
and  of  his  Arguments  to  fupport  it,  very  much  in  this  Pofiti- 
on.  That  Man  is  an  Agent^  ancl  capable  of  A6lion.  Which 
doubtlefs  is  true  :  But  Bdf- determination  belongs  to  his  Notion 
pf  A6fion^  and  is  the  very  Eflence  of  it.  Whence  he  infers 
that  it  is  impoffible  for  a  Man  to  a6l  and  be  ac^led  upon,  in 
the  fame  Thing,  at  the  fame  Time  ;  and  that  nothing  that  is 
an  Adion,  can  be  the  Effedl  of  the  Adion  of  another  :  and  he 
infifts,  that  a  necejjary  Agent ^  or  an  Agent  that  is  neceffarily 
determined  to  ad:,  is  a  plain  Cofitracii^ion, 

But  thofe  are  a  precariousSort  of  Demonftrations,whichMen 
build  on  the  Meaning  that  they  arbitrarily  affix  to  a  Word  ; 
efpeciaily  when  that  Meaning  is  abftrufe,  inconfiftent,  and 
entirely  diverfe  from  the  original  Senfe  of  the  Word  in  com^ 
mon  Speech. 

That  the  Meaning  of  the  Word  Adlion^  as   Mr.  Chubb  apd 

many  others  ufe  it,  is  utterly  unintelligible  and  inconfifl:ent,^is 

manifell:,  becaule  it  belongs  to  their  Notion  of  an  Adion,  that 

'tis   fomething   wherein  is  no   Pafllon  or  PalTivcnefs  ;    that  is 

(according   to   their    Senfe   of   Paffivenefs)    it   is   under   the 

Power,  hiiluence  or  Adion  of  no  Caufe.     And   this  implies, 

that  A(5tion  has  no   Caufe,   and  is   no   Effed  :    for  to  be  an 

Effe6t  implies  Pajftvenefs^  or  the  being  fubjed  to  the  Power  and 

!  Adion  of  it's  Caufe.      And   yet  they   hold,  that   the  Mind's 

A^ion  is  the  Effedl  of  it's  own  Determination,  yea,  the  Mind's 

free  and   voluntary  Determination  ;    which   is  the  fame  with 

i  free  Choice.     So  that  Adion  is  the  EfFed  of  fomething   pre- 

ceeding,  even  a  preceeding  Ad  of  Choice  :  And  confequently, 

i  in  this  Effed  the  Mind  is  paffive,   fubjed   to   the  Power  and 

I  Adion  of  the  preceeding  Caufe,  which  is  the  foregoing  Choice, 

[and  therefore  can't  be  adive.     So  that  here  we  have  this  Con- 

tradidion,  that  Adion  is  always  the  Effed  of  foregoingChoice  ; 

;  and  therefore    can't  be   Adion  ;    becaufe  it  is  pajftve  to  the 

I  Power  of  that  preceeding  caufal  Choice  ;  and  the  Mind  can't 

I  be  adive  and  paffive  in  the  fame   Thing,    at   the  fame  Time. 

I  Again,  they  fay,  Neceffity  is  utterly  inconfiftent  with  Adion, 

iand  a  neceflary  Adion  is  a  Contradidion  ;  and  fo  their  Notion 

of  Adion  implies    Contingence,  and  excludes  all   NecefTity. 

And  therefore  their  Notion  of  Adion  implies,  that  it  has   no 

neceflary  Dependence  or  Connedion  with  any  Thing  forego- 

{ing  ;  for  fuch  a  Dependence   or  Connedion  excludes  Contin- 

|gence,  and  implies  Neceflity.     And  yet  their  Notion  of  Adion 

^implies  NecefTity,  and  fuppofes  that  it  is  neceffary,  and  can't  be 

contingent, 


200  T^^Arminian  Notion  of  AGtion^  Parti V.  \ 

tontingent.     For  they  fuppofe,that  whatever  is  properly  called  i 

A(5tion,   muft  be  determined  by  the  Will   and  free  Choice  ;  ] 

and  this  is  as  much  as  to  fay,  that  it  muft  be  neceffary,  being  j 

dependent  upon,   and  determined   by   fomething   foregoing  ;  j 

namely,  a  foregoing  A(5t  of  Choice.     Again,  it  belongs  to  their  1 

Notion   of  Adtion,   of  that  which  is  a   proper  and  meer  A<51^  f 

that  it  is  the  Beginning  of  Motion,  or  of  Exertion  o(  Power  ;  ^ 

but  yet  it  is  implied  in  their  Notion   of  A6lion,  that  it   is  not  i 

the  Beginning  of  Motion  or  Exertion  of  Power,  but  is  confe-  i 

quent  and  dependent  on  a  preceeding  Exertion  of  Power,  viz»  i 

the  Power  of  Will  and  Choice  :    for  they  fay  there  is  no  pro-  .  i 
per  Adion  but  what  is  freely  chofen  ;    or,   which   is  the   fame 

Thing,  determined  by  a  foregoing  A6i   of  free  Choice.     But  i 

if  any  of  them  (hall  fee  Caufe  to  deny  this,  and  fay  they  hold  \ 
flo  filchThing  as  that  every  A6tion  is  chofen. or  determined  by 

a  foregoing  Choice  ;  but  that  the  very  firft  Exertion   of  Will  j 

tonly,   undetermined  by  any  preceeding  A61:,  is  properly  called  \ 

Adion  ;  then  I  fay,   fuch  a  Man's  Notion  of  A6tion  implies  i 

NecelTity  ;  for  what  the  Mind  is   the  Subjedt  of  without  the  'J 

Determination  of  it's  own  previous  Choice,  it  is  the  Subjed  of"  I 

necefiarily,  as  to  any  Hand  that  free  Choice  has  in  the  Affair  ;  ' 

and  without  any  Ability  the   Mind  has  to  prevent  it,  by  any  * 

Will  or  Eledlion  of  it's   own  :    becaufe  by  the  Suppofition  it  1 
precludes  all  previous  Ads  of  the  Will  or  Choice  in  the  Cafe, 

which  might  prevent  it.     So   that  it  is  again,   in   this  'other  i 

Way,  implied  in  their  Notion  of  Ad,  that  it  is  both  neceffary  '} 

and  not  necefiary.     Again,it  belongs  to  their  Notion  of  an  Ji^,  i^ 

that  it  is  no  Effed  of  a  pre-determining  Bias  or  Preponderation,  'J 

but  fprings  immediately  out  of  Indifference  ;  and  this  implies  % 

that  it  can't  be  from  foregoing  Choice,  which  is  foregoing  Pre-  'j 

ponderation  :    if  it  be  not  habitual,  but   occafional,    yet  if  it  'f 

caufes  the  Ad,  it  is  truly  previous,  efficacious  and  determining.  ' ; 

And  yet,  at  the  fame  Time,  'tis  eifential  to  their  Notion  of  an '  j;1 

Ad,  that  it  is  what  the  Agent  is  the  Author  of  freely  and  vo-  'i* 

luntarily,  and  that  is,  by  previous  Choice  and  Defign.  •] 

So  that  according  to  their  Notion  of  an  Ad,  confidered  witb^  i1 

Reeard  to  it's  Coniequences,  thefe  following   Things    are  all  ! 

cffential  to  it  j  viz.  That  it  fhould  be  neceffary,  and  not  ne-  \  < 

cefTary  ;  that  it  fhould  be  from  a  Caufe,  and  no  Caufe' ;  that  it.  3 

(hould  be  the  Fruit  of  Choice  and  Defign,  and  not  the  Fruit  of  '\ 

Choice  and  Defign  ;  that  it  fhould  be  the  Beginning  of  Motioi*  i 

or  Exertion,  and  yet  confequent  on  previous  Exertion  ;    that  :« 

it  fhould  be  before   it  is  ;    that  it    fliould  fpring  immediately  '^- 

out  oi  Indifference  and  Eq^iiibrium,  aftd  yet  be  the  EfFed  oP  i 

PiCeponderation.^  ^ 


Sed:.  II.         falfe  and  inconfifient.  20 1 

Preponderation  ;  that  it  lliould  be  felf-orlginated,  and  alfo 
have  it's  Original  from  fomething  elfe  ;  that  it  is  what  the 
Mind  caufes  it  felf,  of  it's  own  Will,  and  can  produce  or  pre- 
vent, according  to  it's  Choice  or  Pleafure,  and  yet  what  the 
Mind  has  no  Power  to  prevent,  it  precluding  all  previous 
Choice  in  the  Affair. 

So  that  an  A(5l,   according  to  their  metaphyfical  Notion  of 

it,  is  fomething  of  which  there  is  no  Idea  ;    'tis   nothing  but 

a   Confufion   of  the   Mind,  excited  by  Words  without   anv 

difi:in6l  Meaning,    and  is  an  abfolute  Non-entity  ;  and  that  in 

two  Refpeds  ;    (i.)  There  is   nothing  in  the  World  that  ever 

was,  is,  or  can  be,  to  anfwer  the  Things  which  mufl  belong  to 

it's  Defcription,  according  to  what  they  fuppofe  to  be  eflential 

jto  it.     And  (2.)  There  neither  is,  nor  ever  was,   nor  can  be, 

any  Notion  or  Idea  to  anfwer  the  Word,   as   they  \ife  and  ex- 

i  plain  it.     For  if  we  (hould  fuppofe  any  fuch  Notion,  it  would 

many  Ways  deftroy   it   felf.      But  'tis  impolTible,  any  Idea  of 

i  Notion  (liould  fubfift  in  the  Mind,  v/hofe  very  Nature  and 

lEfTence,   which   conftitutes   it,  deilroys  it.™  If  fome  learned 

i  Philofopher,  who  had   been   abroad,   in  giving  an  Account  of 

[the  curious  Obfervations  he  had  made  in   his  Travels,  fhould- 

|fay,    "  He  had  been  in  Terra  del  Fuego^  and  there  had  feen  an 

I  "  Animal,  which  he  calls  by  a  certain  Name,   that  begat  and 

I ««  brought  forth  it  felf,  and  yet  had  a  Sire  and  a  Dam  di{lin<5l 

i "  from  it  felf  ;  that  it  had  an  Appetite,  and  was  hungry  before 

r'  it  had  a  Being  ;  that  his  Mafier,  v/ho  led  him,  and  govern- 

*'  ed  him  at  his  Pleafure,   was  always  governed  by  him,   and 

I  •*  driven  by  him  where  he  pleafed  ;  that  when  he  moved,  hs 

\  **  always"  took  a  Step  before  the  firit  Step  ;  that  he  went  with 

i "  hisHead  firft,and  yet  always  wentTail  foremoft  ;  and  this,tho' 

J!"  he  had  neitherHead  norTail:"  It  would  be  no  Impudence  at 

;  all,  to  tell  fuch  a  Traveller,  tho'  a  learned  Man,  that  Ke  him- 

felf  had  no  Notion  or  Idea  of  fuch  an  Animal  as   he  gave  an 

i  Account  of,  and  never  had,  nor  ever  would  have. 

■  As  the  fcremention'd  Notion  of  Acftion  is  very  inconfiflent, 
fo  it  is  wholly  diverfe  from  the  original  Meaning  of  the  Word, 
The  more  ufual  Signification  of  it  in  vulgar  Speech,  f^ems  to 
be  fome  Moticn  or  Exertion  of  Power ^  that  is  voluntary,  or  that 
\%  the  Effe6l  cf  the  IVill ;  and  is  ufed  in  the  fame  Senle  as  doing  : 
And  moil  commonly  'tis  ufed  to  fignify  cutzuard  Afuom.  So 
Tinr.kirg  is  often  diftinguilh'd  from  Atnng  ;  and  Defirhig  and 
TVilUng^  from  Doing. 

C  c  Befide* 

4  " 


202  7^^ArininIaniV<9//^;^  of  Ailion,  Part  IV. 

Befides  this  more  ufual  and  proper  Signification  of  the  Word 
A^ion^  there  are  other  Ways  in  which  the  Word  is  ufed  that 
are  lefs  proper,  which  yet  have  Place  in  common  Speech. 
Oftentimes  'tis  ufed  to  fignify  fome  Motion  or  Alteration  in 
inanim.ate  Things,  with  Relation  to  fome  Obje6l  and  Effect. 
So  the  Spring  of  a  Watch  is  faid  to  aot  upon  the  Chain  and 
Wheels  ;  the  Sun-beams,  to  a6l  upon  Plants  and  Trees  ; 
and  theFire,  to  ad  upon  Wood.  Sometimes  the  Word  is  ufed 
to  fignify  Motions,  Alterations,  and  Exertions  of  Power,  which 
are  feen  in  corporeal  Things,  cor.fidered  ahfolutely  ;  efpecially 
when  thefe  Motions  feem  to  arife  from  fome  internal  Caufe 
■which  is  hidden  j  fo  that  they  have  a  greater  Refemblance  of 
thofe  Motions  of  our  Bodies,  which  are  the  Effe6fs  of  internal 
Volition,  or  invifible  Exertions  of  Will.  So  the  Fermentation 
of  Liquor,  the  Operations  of  the  Loadfi:one,  and  of  eledlrical 
Bodies,  are  called  the  Adiion  of  thefe  Things.  And  fometimes 
the  Word  Aciion  is  ufed  to  fignify  the  Exercife  of  Thought, 
or  of  Will  and  Inclination  :  fo  meditating,  loving,  hating,  in- 
clining, difinclining,  chufing  and  refufing,  may  be  fometimes 
called  acting  ;  tho'  more  rarely  (unlefs  it  be  by  Philofophers 
and  Metaphyficians)  than  in  any  of  the  other  Senfes. 

But  the  Word  is  never  ufed  in  vulgar  Speech  in  that  Senfe 
which  Anninian  Divines  ufe  it  in,  namely,  for  the  felf-deter- 
minate  Exercife  of  the  Will,  or  an  Exertion  of  the  Soul  that 
arifes  without  any  necefiTary  Connexion  v^rith  any  Thing  fore- 
going. Jf  a  Man  does  fomething  voluntarily,  or  as  the  EfFed 
of  his  Choice,  then  in  the  moft  proper  Senfe,  and  as  the  Word 
is  moil  originally  and  commoaly  ufed,  he  is  faid  to  a^  :  But 
whether  that  Choice  or  Volition  be  feif-determined,  or  no, 
whether  it  be  conne(5led  with  foregoing  habitual  Bias,  whether 
it  be  the  certain  Effed  of  the  ftrongefi;  Motive,  or  fome  extrin- 
iick  Caufe,  never  comes  into  Confideration  in  the  Meaning  of 
the  Word. 

And  if  the  Word  ASfion  is  arbitrarily  ufed  by  fome  Men 
othervv'ife,  to  fuit  fome  Scheme  of  Metaphyficks  or  Morality, 
no  Argument  can  reafonably  be  founded  on  fuch  a  Ufe  of  this 
Term,  to  prove  any  Thing  but  their  own  Pleafure.  For  Di- 
vines and  Philofophers  ftrenuoufly  to  urge  fuch  Arguments,  as 
tiio'  they  were  fufficient  to  fupport  and  demonftrate  a  whole 
Scheme  of  moral  Philofcphy  and  Divinity,  is  certainly  to  eredt" 
a  mighty  Edifice  on  the  Sand,  or  rather  on  a  Shadow.  And 
tho'  it  mav  now  perhaps,  thro'  Cufiom,  have  become  natural 
for  'em  tg  ufe  the  \Vord  in  this  Senfe  (if  that  may  be  called  a 

Senfe* 


Seel,  II.         falfe  and  inconjijlent.         203 

Senfe  or  Meaning,  which  is  fo  in  confident  with  it  felf  )  yet 
this  don't  prove  that  it  is  agreable  to  the  natural  Notions  Men 
have  of  Things,  or  that  there  can  be  anyThing  in  the  Creation 
that  fhould  anfwer  fuch  a  Meaning.  And  tho'  thej^  appeal  to 
Experience,  yet  the  Truth  is,  that  Men  are  fo  far  from  expe- 
riencing any  fuch  Thing,  that  it  is  impolTible  for  'em  to  have 
any  Conception  of  it. 

If  it  fhould  be  objecfled,  that  Atihii.  and  Faffion  are  doubtlefs 
Words  of  a  contrary  Signification  ;  but  to  fuppofe  that  the 
Agent,  in  it's  Action,  Is  under  the  Power  and  Influence  of 
fomething  extrinlick,  is  to  confound  Adion  and  PafTion,  and 
make  'em  the  fame  Thing. 

I  anfwer.  That  Acflion  and  Faffion  are  doubtlefs,  as  they  are 
fometimes  ufed,  Words  of  oppofite    Signification  ;  but  not  as 
fignifying  oppofite  Exijiences^  but  only  oppofite  Relations.     The 
Words  Caufe  and  Ef}£i  are  Terms   of  oppofite   Signification  ; 
but  neverthelefsjif  I  afieit  that  the  fameThing  may  at  the  fame 
Time,  in  different  Refpecls  and  Relations,  be   both  Caiife  and 
Effe^^  thi^  will  not   prove  that  I  confound  the  Terms.     The 
Soul  may  be  both  aSiive  and  paffive  in  the  fame  Thing  „in  dif- 
ferent Refpeds,   aSiive  with  Relation  to  one  Thing,  and  pajjlvg 
with  Relation  to  another.     The  Word  PaJJion  when  fet  in  Op- 
pofition  to  A^mt  or  rather  ASiivenefs^  is  meerly  a  relative  Term  : 
it  fignifies  noEfled  or  Caufe,  nor  any  proper  Exiftence  ;  but  is 
the  fame  ^'xKwPaJfivencfi.^  or  a  being  paflive,or  a  being  a6led  up- 
on by  fomething.    Which  is  a  meerRelatlon  ofaThing  to  fome 
Power  or  Force  exerted  by  fome  Caufe,  producing  fome  Effe6t 
in  it,  or  upon  it.     And  ASi'ion^  when  fct  properly  m  Oppofition 
to  Pajfion^  or  Pajfivenefs.,  is  no  real  Exifience  ;  it  is  not  the  fam.c 
with  AN  AtYion^  but  is  a  meer  Relation  :    'Tis  the  ABvvcnefi  of 
fomething  on  another  Thing,  being  the    oppofite   Relation   to 
the  other,  Wz.  a  Relation  of  Power,  or  Force  exerted  by  fome 
Caufe,  towards  another  Thing,   which    is    the  Subjcn^l  of   the 
Effe6l  of  that  Power.     Indeed  the  Word  Att'ion   is   frequently 
ufed  to  fignify  fomething  not  meerly  relative^  but  more  ahfoluie^ 
and  a  real  Exifience  ;    as   when  we  fay  An  Acfion  ;    when  the 
Word  is  not  uled  tranfitively,  but  abfoiutely,  for  fome  Motion 
or  Exercife   of  Body  or  Mind,   without  any  Relation  to  any 
Object  or  Eff&6t  :  And  as  ufed  thus,  it  is  not  properly. the  op- 
'Ippfite  of  Pajfton  \  v^hich  ordinarily   fignifies    nothing  abfolute, 
but   meerly   the   Relation    of  being  aiied  upon.     And  therefore  if 
the  Word  '/JStion  be  ufed  in  the  like  relative  Seiife,  then  Action 
and  PalTion  are  only  two  contrary  Relations.     And  'tis  no  Ab- 

Q  Q  2,  furdity 


:204     How _  this  Arminian  Notion    Part  IV.  ] 

furdlty  to  fuppofe,  that  contrary  Relations  may   belong  to  the  i 

fame  Thing,  at  the  fame  Time,  with  refpedt  to  difFerentThings.  \ 

So  to  fuppofe,  that  ther^  are  Ads  of  the  Soul  by  which  a  Man  \ 

voluntarily  moves,  and  ac^s  upon  ObjecSts,  and  producesEfFe6ls>  , 

which  yet  themfelves  are  Effe6ls  of  fomething  elfe,  and  wherein  \ 

the  Soul  it  felf  is  the  Object  of  fomething   adting  upon,  and  i 

influencing  that,   don't   at  all   confound  Adion   and  PafTion.  i 

The  Words  may  neverthelefs  be  properly  of  oppoiite  Signiti-  • 

cation  :  there  niay  be  as  true  and  real  a   Difference   between  I 

adling  and  being  caufed  to  a6l^  tho'  we  fliould  fuppofe   the  Soul  "i 

to  be  both  in  the  fame  Volition,  as  there  is  between  livings  and  \ 

heing  qtiukerid^  or  made  to  live.     'Tis  no  more  a  Contradiction,  to  'i 

luppofe  that  Adion   may  be  the  Effe6t   gf  fome  other  Caufe,  ,^ 

hefides  the  Agent,  or  Being  that  aifts,  than  to  fuppofe  that  Life  \ 

may  be  the  EfFed  of  fome  other  Caufe,   befides  the  Liver,   or  1 

the  Being  that  lives,  in  whom  Life  is  caufed  to  be.  ■ 

The  Thing  v/hich  has  led  Men  into  this  inconfiftent  No-  j 
tion  of  Action,  v/hen  applied  to  Volition,  as  tho*  it  were  \ 
eiTential  to  this  internal  A6lion,  that  the  Agent  (hould  be  felf-  I 
determined  in  it,  and  that  the  Will  fliould  be  the  Caufe  of  it,  ^ 
was  probably  this  ;  that  according  to  the  Senfe  of  Mankind,  \ 
and  the  common  Ufe  of  Language  it  is  fo,  with  refpedl  to  ; 
Men's  external  Adions  ;  which  are  what  originally,  and  ac- 
cording to  the  vulgar  Ufe  and  mofl:  proper  Senfe  of  the  Word,  A 
are  called  A^iions.  Men  in  thefe  are  felf-dire(5ted,  felf-deter-  i 
mined,  and  their  Wills  are  the  Caufe  of  the  Motions  of  thei?  ij 
Bodies,  and  the  external  Things  that  are  done  ;  fo  that  unlefg  ij 
Men  do  'em  voluntarily,  and  of  Choice,  and  the  A6tion  be  de-  ij 
termined  by  their  antecedent  Volition,  it  is  no  A61ion  or  Doing  || 
of  theirs.  Hence  fomeMetaphyficians  have  been  led  unwarily,  \\ 
but  exceeding  abfurdly,  to  fuppofe  the  fame  concerningVolitioi)  |  ■ 
it  felf,  that  That  alfo  mufl:  be  determined  by  the  Will  ;  which  % 
is  to  be  determin'd  by  antecedent  Volition,  as  the  Motion  of  1 
the  Body  is  5  not  confidering  the  Contradiction  it  implies. 

\ 

But  'tis  very  evldent,that  in  the  metaphyfical  Diftind^ion  bev 

tween  A6lion  and  PaiT|on,    (tho'  long   fince    become  common  j 

and  the  general  Vogue)  due  Care  has  not  been  taken   to  con-  -■ 

form  Language  to  the  Nature  of  Things,   or   to  any   diftind  j 

clear  Ideas.  As  it  is  in  innumerable  other  Philofophical,  Me*  1 
t:aph3^f]cal  Terms,  ufed  in  thefe Difputes  ;  which  has  occafion'<|[^!.;| 
;r,e::fQrcirible  Difficiilty,  Contention,  Errour  and  Confufion. 


An4 


Se(^.  II.  probably  arofe.  205 

And  thus  probably  it  came  to  be  thought,that  NecefTity  was 
inconfifleiit  with  Adion,  as  thefe  Terms  are  applied  to  Vo- 
lition. Firft,  thefeTerms  A^'ion  and  Necejftty  afe  changed  from 
dieir  original  Meaning,  as  fignifying  external  voluntary  A6tion, 
and  Conftraint,  (in  which  Meaning  they  are  evidently  incon- 
fiftent)  to  fignify  quite  other  Thinigs,  viz.  Volition  it  felf,  and 
Certainty  of  Exiftence.  And  when  the  Change  of  Signification 
is  made,  Care  is  riot  taken  to  make  proper  Allowances  and 
Abatements  for  the  Difference  of  Senfe  ;  but  ftill  the  fame 
Things  are  unwarily  attributed  to  J^ion  and  Necejftty^  in  the 
new  Meaning  of  the  Words,  which  plainly  belonged  to  'em  in 
their  firft  Senfe  ;  and  on  this  Ground,  Maxims  are  eftablifned 
without  any  real  Foundation,  as  tho'  they  were  the  moft  cer- 
tain Truths,  and  the  moft  evident  Didates  of  Reafon. 

But  however  ftrenuoufly  it  is  maintain'd,  that  what  is  necef- 
fary  can't  be  properly  called  Adion,  and  that  a  necefTary 
Adion  is  a  Contradicftion,  yet  'tis  probable  there  are  few  Armt^ 
man  Divines,  who  if  thoroughly  tried,  would  ftand  to  thefe 
Principles.  They  will  alIow,that  God  is  in  the  higheft  Senfe 
an  a6tive  Being,  and  the  higheft  Fountain  of  Life  and  A(5tion ; 
and  they  would  not  probably  deny,  that  thofe  that  are  called 
God'^s  X<5ts  of  Righteoufnefs,  Holinefs  and  Faithfulnefs,  are 
truly  and  properly  God's  A6ls^  and  God  is  really  a  holy  Agent 
in  them  :  and  yet  I  truft,  they  will  not  deny,  that  God  necef- 
farily  adts  juftly  and  faithfully,  and  that  it  is  impoflibk  for 
Him  to  ad  unrighteoufly  aad  unholily. 


Section 


2o6     JVhy  C^\m\(vn.  is  fuppofed   Part  IV. 

Section     III. 

The  Reafons  why  fome  think  it  contrary  to 
common  Scnfe,  to  fuppofe  thofe  things 
which  are  neceffary,  to  be  worthy  of  either 
Praife  or  Blame. 


^^~W^<IS  abundantly  affirmed  and  urged  by  Armm'ian  Writers, 
I  that  it  is  contrar}^  to  common  Senfe^  and  the  natural  No- 
tions and  Apprehenfions  of  Mankind,  to  fuppofe  o- 
therwife  than  that  Neceffity  ('making  no  Diftindlion  between 
natural  and  moral  Necefnty)  is  inconfiftent  with  Vertue  and 
Vice,  Praife  and  Blame,  Revv^ard  and  Punilhment.  And  their 
Arguments  from  hence  have  been  greatly  triumphed  in  ; 
and  have  been  not  a  little  perplexing  to  many  who  have  been 
friendly  to  the  Truth,  as  clearly  revealed  in  the  holy 
Scriptures  .*  It  has  fcem'd  to  them  indeed  difficult,  to  recon- 
cile Calvinijlk  Do6lrines  with  the  Notions  Men  commonly 
hav^e  of  Juftice  and  Equity.  And  the  true  Reafons  of  it 
feem  to  be  thefe  that  follow. 

L  'Tis  Indeed  a  very  plain  Dictate  of  common  Senfe,  that 
natural  Neceffity  is  wholly  inconfiftent  with  juft  Praife  or 
Blame.  If  Men  do  Things  which  in  themfelves  are  very 
good,  fit  to  be  brought  to  pafs,  and  very  happy  Effeds,  pro- 
perly againft  their  Wills,  and  can't  help  it  ;  or  do  them  from 
a  Neceffity  that  is  without  their  Wills,  or  with  which 
their  Wills  have  no  Concern  or  Connexion  ;  then  'tis 
a  plain  Didate  of  common  Senfe,  that  it's  none  of  their 
Vertue,  nor  any  moral  Good  in  them  ;  and  that  they  are 
not  worthy  to  be  rewarded  or  praifed  ;  or  at  all  efteemed, 
honoured  or  loved  on  that  Account.  And  on  the  other 
Ha^d,  that  if  from  like  Neceffity  they  do  thofe  Things  which 
in  Themfelves  are  very  unhappy  and  pernicious,  and  do  them 
becaufe  they  can't  help  it  ;  the  Neceffity  is  fuch,  that  it  is 
all  one  whether  they  will  them,  or  no  j  and  the  Reafon  why 
they  are  done,  is  from  Neceffity  only,  and  not  from  their 
Wills  ;  'Tis  a  very  plain  Dicflate  of  common  Senfe  that  they 
are  not  at  all  to  blame  ;  there  is  no  Vice,  Fault,  or  moral 
Evil  at  ail  in  the  E£fe6l  ilQii^  j  *noi;  are  they  who  arc   thus 

neceff.tate4 


Se6l.III.     contrary  to  common  Senfe,    207 

necelTitated,  in   any  wife   worthy   to  be  puniihed,   hated,  or 
in  the  leall  difrefpeded,  on  that  Account. 

In  like  Manner,  if  Things  in  themfelves  good  and  defira^ 
ble  are  abfolutely  impofhbie,  with  a  natural  Impoffibility, 
the  univerfal  Reafon  of  Mankind  teaches,  that  this  wholly  a)id 
perfcSlly  excufes  Perfons  in  their  not  doing  them. 

And  'tis  alfo  a  plain  Didate  of  common  Senfe,  that  if  the 
doing  Things  in  themfelves  Good,  or  avoiding  Things  io 
themfelves  Evil,  is  not  abfolutely  impojfihle^  with  fuch  a  natural 
Impoffibility,  but  very  difficulty  with  a  natural  Difficulty ;  that 
is,  a  Difficulty  prior  to^  and  not  at  all  confifling  in  Will  and 
Inclination  it  felf,  and  which  would  remain  the  fame,  let  the 
Inclination  be  what  it  will  ;  then  a  Perfon's  Negle6t  or  O- 
miffion  is  excufed  in  fojne  Meafure^  tho'  not  wholly  ;  his  Sin  is 
lefs  aggravated,than  if  theThing  to  be  done  were  eafy.  And  if 
inftead  of  Difficulty  and  Hindrance,  there  be  a  contrary  natural 
Propenfity  in  the  State  of  Things,  to  the  Thing  to  be  done,  or 
£fte6i:  to  be  brought  to  pafs,  abftra6ted  from  any  Confidera- 
tion  of  the  Inclination  of  the  Heart  ;  tho'  the  Propenfity  be 
not  fo  great  as  to  amount  to  a  natural  Neceffity  ;  yet  being 
fome  Approach  to  it,  fo  that  the  doing  the  good  Thing  be 
very  much  from  this  natural  Tendency  in  the  State  of  Things, 
and  but  little  from  a  good  Inclination  ;  then  it  is  a  Dictate 
of  common  Senfe,  that  there  is  fo  much  the  lefs  Vertue  in 
what  is  done  ;  and  fo  it  is  lefs  Praife-worthy  and  rewarda- 
ble.  TheReafon  is  eafy,  viz,  becaufe  fuch  a  natural  Propenfity 
or  Tendency  is  an  Approach  to  natural  Neceffity  ;  and  th® 
greater  the  Propenfity,  ftill  fo  m^uch  the  nearer  is  the 
Approach  to  Neceffity.  And  therefore  as  natural  Neceffity 
takes  away  or  fhuts  out  all  Vertue,  fo  this  Propenfity  ap- 
proaches to  an  Abolition  of  Vertue  ;  that  is,  it  diininijhes  it. 
And  on  the  other  Hand,  natural  Difficulty  in  the  State  "of 
Things  is  an  Approach  to  natural  Impoffibility.  And  as  the 
latter,  when  it  is  compleat  and  abfolute,  whclly  takes  away 
Blame  ;  fo  fuch  Difficulty  takes  away  fome  Blame,  or  dimi- 
niflies  Blame  ;  and  makes  the  Thing  done  to  be  lefs  worthy 
of  Punifhment. 

II.  Men  in  their  firft  Ufe  of  fuch  Phrafes  as  thefe,   Mnjf^ 

.  mritn^  cant  help  it,    can't  avoid   it^   necejjary^    unable^  impojJible.y  uH" 

trvoidable^  Irreftflible  he.  ufe  them  to  fignify  a  Neceffity  of  Con- 

ftraint  or  Rertraint,  a  natural  Neceffity   or   Impoflibility  ;   or 

-fome  Neceffity  that  the  Will    has   nothing   to  do  in- ;    which 

-may 


2 o8    tFhy  Galvinlfm  is  fuppofed    Part  IV. 

may  be,  whether  Men  will  or  no  ;  and  which  may  be  fup- 
pofed to  be  juft  the  fame,  let  Men's  Inclinations  and  DefireJ 
be  what  they  will.  Such  Kind  of  Terms  in  their  original 
\Jky  I  fuppofe  among  all  Nations,  are  relative  ;  carrying  in 
their  Signification  (as  was  before  obferved)  a  Reference  or  Re-' 
fpe6l  to  fome  contrary  Will,  Defire  or  Endeavour,  which,  it  is^ 
fuppofed,  is,  or  may  be  in  the  Cafe.  All  Men  find,  and  be- 
gin to  find  in  early  Childhood,  that  there  are  innumerable 
Things  that  can't  be  dene,  which  they  defire  to  do  ;  and  in- 
numerable Things  which  they  are  averfe  to,  that  mull  be, 
they  can't  avoid  them,  they  will  be,  whether  they  chufe  them 
or  no.  'Tis  to  exprefs  this  Neceflity,  which  Men  fo  foon 
and  fo  often  find,  and  which  fo  greatly  and  fo  early  afFe6ls 
them  in  innumerable  Cafes,  that  fuch  Terms  and  Phrafes 
are  firft  formed  ;  and  'tis  to  fignify  fuch  a  Neceffity,  that 
they  are  firft  ufed,  and  that  they  are  moft  conftantly  ufed,  in 
the  common  Affairs  of  Life  ;  and  not  to  fignify  any  fuch  me- 
taphyfical,  fpeculative  and  abftradt  Notion,  as  that  Connexion 
m  the  Nature  or  Courfe  of  Things,  which  is  between  the 
Subje6t  and  Predicate  of  a  Propofition,  and  which  is  the  Foun- 
dation of  the  certain  Truth  of  that  Propofition  ;  to  fignify 
which,  they  who  employ  themfelves  in  Philofophical  Inqui- 
ries into  the  firft  Origin  and  Metaphyfical  Relations  and 
Dependences  of  Things,  have  borrowed  thefe  Terms,  for 
want  of  others.  But  we  grow  up  from  our  Cradles  in  a  Ufa^ 
of  fuch  Terms  and  Phrafes,  entirely  diff*erent  from  this,  and 
carrying  a  Senfe  exceeding  diverfe  from  that  in  which  they  are 
commonly  ufed  in  the  Controverfy  between  Jr?nmia?is  anM 
Calvinifts.  And  it  being,  as  was  faid  before,  a  Di6late  of , 
the  univerfal  Senfe  of  Mankind,  evident  to  us  as  foon  as  we 
begin  to  think,  that  the  Neceflity  fignified  by  thefe  Terms,  in 
the  Senfe  in  which  we  firft  learn  them,  does  excufe  Perfons, 
and  free  them  from  all  Fault  or  Blame  ;  Hence  our  Idea's  of 
Excufablenefs  or  Faultlefnefs  is  tied  to  thefe  Terms  and 
Phrafes  by  a  ftrong  Habit,  which  is  begun  in  Childhood  as 
foon  as  we  begin  to  fpeak,  and  grows  up  with  us,  and  is 
ftrengthned  by  conftant  Ufe  and  Cuftom,  the  Connedioft 
growing  ftronger  and  ftronger. 

The  habitual  Conneaion  which  is  in  Men's  Minds  be- 
tween Blamelefnefs  and  thofe  foremention'd  Terms,  Muji^ 
cannot^  unable^  mcejfary,  impcjfible^  unavoidable  &:c.  becomes  very 
ftrong  j  becaufe  as  foon  as  ever  Men  begin  to  ufe  Reafori 
and  Speech,  they  have  Occafion  to  excufe  themfelves,  from 
the  nataral  Neceflity  fignified  by  thefe  Terms*,  in  numerous   i, 

Inftancesv  | 


Sed.  III.    contrary  to  common  Senfe.    209 

Inftances I  can't  do  It—  1  could  not  help  it. And  all  Man- 
kind have  conftant  and  daily  Occafion  to  ufe  fuch  Phrafes 
in  this  Senfe,  to  excufe  themfelves  and  others  in  almoft  all 
the  Concerns  of  Life,  with  Refped  to  Difappointments,  and 
Things  that  happen  which  concern  and  afFe(5t  us  and  others, 
that  are  hurtful,  or  difagreable  to  us  or  them,  or  Things  de» 
firable  that   we  or  others  fail  of. 

That  a  being  accuftomed  to  an  Union  of  different   Ideas, 
hfem  early  Childhood,   makes  the   habitual  Connexion   ex- 
ceeding ftrbng,  as  tho'  fuch  Connection  were  owing  \.q  Nature^ 
is  manifeil   in   innumerable*  Inftances.      It   is  altogether  by 
fuch  an  habitual  Connexion  of  Ideas,  that  Men  judge  of  the 
Bignefs  or  Diftance   of  the  Objects  of   Sight  from  their  Ap- 
pearance.    Thus  'tis  owing  to  fuch  a  Connection  early  ellab- 
i  liflied,  and  growing  up  with  a  Perfon,  that  he  judges  a  Moun- 
i  tain,  which  he  fees  at  ten  Miles    diftance,  to   be   bigger  than 
I  his  Nofe,    or  further  off  than   the  End  of  it.  ■    Having  been 
s  uled  fo  long  to  join  a  confiderable   Diftance  and  Magnitude 
[with  fuch  an  Appearance,   Men  imagine   it  is  by  a  Dictate  of 
natural  Senfe  :      Whereas  it  v^rould  be   quite  otherwife  with 
one  that  had  his  Eyes  newly  ofxened,  who  had  been  born  blind  : 
He  would    have   the  fame   vifible   Appearance,    but  natural 
Senfe  would  dictate  no  fuch  Thing  concerning  the  Magnitude 
.or  Diftance  of  what  appeared. 

III.  When  Men,after  they  had  been  fo  habituated  to  conne(S 
Ideas  of  Innocency  or  Blamelefnefs  with  fuch  Terms,  that  the 
Union  feems  to  be  the  Effe6t  of  meer  Nature,  come  to  hear  the 
fameTerms  ufed,  &  learn  to  ufe  them  themfelves  in  the  foremen- 

\  tion'd  new  &  metaphyiical  Senfe,  to  fignify  quite  anotherSort  of 
Necefllty,which  has  no  fuchKind  of  Relation  to  a  contrary  fup- 
pofable  Will  and  Endeavour  ;  the  Notion  of  plain  and  mani- 
feft  Blamelefnefs,  by  this  Means,  is  by  a  ftrong  Prejudice,  in- 

ienfibly  and  unwarily  transfer'd  to  a  Cafe  to  which  it  by  no 
Means  belongs  :  The  Change  of  the  Ufe  of  the  Terms,  to 
a  Signification  which  is  very  diverfe,   not  being  taken  Notice 

L  of,   or  adverted  to.     And  there   are   feveral    Reafons  why  it 

fis  not. 

I.  The  Terms,as  ufed  by  Philofophers,  are  not  very  diftlnd 
kind  clear  in  their  Meaning  :  few  ufe  them  in   a   fix'd  deter- 
mined Senfe.     On  the  contrary,  their  Meaning  is  very  vagus 
;uid  confufed.     Which   is   what   coininonly   happens   Xo  "the 

D  d  Words 


2  lo     TVhy  Calvinifm  isfuppvfed  Part  IV.  i 


Words  ufed  to  fignify  Things  intelle6tual  and  moral,  and  to 
exprefs  what  Mr.  Locke  calls  mixt  Modes.  If  Men  had  a  clear  J 
and  diftindl  underftanding  of  what  is  intended  by  thefe  meta-  s| 
phyfical  Terms,  they  would  be  able  more  eafily  to  compare  i 
them  with  their  original  and  common  Senfe ;  and  fo  would  i 
not  be  fo  eafily  cheated  by  them.  The  Minds  of  Men  are  i 
fo  eafily  led  into  Delufion  by  no  Sort  of  Terms  in  the  World,  'i 
as  by  Words  of  this  Sort.  j 

2.  The  Change  of  the  Signification  of  the  Terms  is  the  .1 
more  infenfible,  becaufe  the  Things  fignified,  tho'  indeed  very  : 
different,  yet  do  in  fome  generals  agree.  In  Necefftty^  that  I 
which  is  vulgarly  fo  called,  there  is  a  ftrong  Connection  be- '  \ 
tween  the  Thing  faid  to  be  neceflary,  and  fomething  antece-  i 
dent  to  it,  in  the  Order  of  Nature  ;  {o  there  is  alfo  m  philo-  \ 
fophical  Necejfity,  And  tho' in  both  Kinds  of  Neceflity,  the;; 
Connexion  can't  be  called  by  that  Name,  with  Relation  to'j 
an  oppofite  Will  or  Endeavour,  to  which  it  \%  fuper'iour  \-[ 
which  is  the  Cafe  in  vulgar  Neceflity  \  yet  in  both,  the  Con-  i 
ne^ion  is  prior  to  Will  and  Endeavour,  and  fo  in  fome  Re-,! 
fpe(5t  fuperiour.  In  both  Kinds  of  Neceffity  there  is  a  Foun-j 
dation  for  fome  Certainty  of  the  Propofition   that  affirms  the  ; 

Event. The  Terms  ufed  being  the  fame,  and  the  Things  1 

lignified  agreeing  in  thefe  and  fome  other  general  Circumftan-  ■' 
ces,  and  the   Exprefllons  as  ufed  by  Philofophers  being  not  il 
well  defined,  and  fo  of  obfcnre  and  loofe  Signification  i   hence  j 
Perfons  are  not  aware   ©f  the  great  Difference  ;  and  the  No-  ^j 
tions  of  Innocence   or   Faultlefnefs,    which   were  fo  ftrongly  [j 
^bciated  with  them,  and  were  ftricSlly  united  in  their  Mind^, 
ever  fince  they  can  remember,  remain  united  with  them  ftill, 
as  if  the   Union   were  altogether  natural  and  neceffary  ;    and 
they  that  go  about  to  make  a  Separation,  feem  to  them  to  do  \ 
great  Violence   even  to  Nature  it  ML  \ 

■  \ 
IV.  Another  Reafbn  why  it  appears   difficult  to  reconcile  it  | 
with  Reafon,   that   Men   mould  be  blamed  for  that  which  U  \ 
neceffary  with  a  moral  Neceffity  (which  as  was  obferved  before^  | 
is  a  Species   of  Philofophical  Neceffity)  is,   that   for   want   of  I 
due  Confideration,  Men  inwardly  entertain  that  Apprehenfion> 
that  this  Neceffity  may  be  agair\il  Men's  Wills  andfincere  En- 
deavours.    They  go  away  with  thatNotion,thatMen  may  truly 
will  and  wilb  and  firivc  that  it   may    be  otherwife  ;    but  that 
invjncible  Neceflity  iiands  in  the  Way.     And  many  think,  thus 
concerning  themfelves  :  fome  that  are  wicked  Men  think  tliey. 
AViih  that  they  were  jood,  that  tliey  loved  God  and  Holinefs  jj 

burJ 


Seil.III.    contrary  to  common  Senfev     211 

but  yet  don't  find  that   their   Wifhes  produce  the  EfFe<5V. 

The  Reafons  why  Men  think  thus,  are  as  follows,  (i.)  They 
ifind  what  may  be  called  an  indire£i  Willingnefs  to  have  a  better 
^Will,  in  the  Manner  before  obferved.      For  it   is  impoflible, 
J  and   a   Contradiction   to  fuppofe  the  Will  to  be  diredly  and 
•  properly  againft  it  felf.     And  they  don't  confider,  that  this  in- 
direct Willingnefs  is  entirely  a  different  Thing  from  properly 
willing  the  Thing  that  is  the  Duty  and  Vertue  required  ;  and 
that  there  is  no  Vertue  in  that  fort  of  Willingnefs  whicbthey 
have.     They  don't  con{ider,that  the  Volitions  which  a  wicked 
M^n  may  have  that  he  loved    God,   are  no  Ads  of  the  Will 
at  all  againft  the  moral   Evil   of  not  loving   God  ;   but  only 
feme  difagreable  Confequences.     But  the  making  the  requifite 
Diflindion  requires  more  Care  of    Reflection  and  Thought 
than  moft  Men  are  ufed  to.     And  Men  thro'  a   Prejudice   in 
their  own  Favour,   are  difpofed  to   think   well   of  their  own 
Defires  and  Difpoiitions,   and    to  account  'em  good  and  ver- 
tuous,  tho'  their  Rel"pe6l  to  Vertue  be  only  ipAire£i  and  remote^ 
and  'tis  noticing  at  all  that  is  vertuous  that  truly  excites  or  ter- 
minates their  Inclinations.  (2.)  Another  Thing  that  infenfibly 
leads  and  beguiles   Men  into   a   Suppofition  that  this  moral 
NecelTity  or  ImpolTibility  is,  or  may  be  againft  Men's  Wills, 
and  true  Endeavours,  is  the  Derivation  and  Formation  of  the 
Terms  themfelves,   that    are  often  ufed  to  exprefs  it,  which 
is  fuch  as  feems  direClly  to  point  to,  and  hold  this  forth.    Such 
,  Words,  for  Inftance,  as  unable^  unavoidable^  impojjible^  Irreftjiihle  ; 
v/hich  carry  a  plain  Reference  to  a  fiippofable  Power  exerted. 
Endeavours  ufed,  Refiftance  made,   in   Oppofition  to  the  Ne- 
celfity  :    And  the  Perfons  that  hear  them,  not  confidering  nor 
fufpeding  but  that  they  are  ufed  in  their  proper  Senfe  :    That 
Senfe  being  therefore  underftood,  there  does  naturally,  and  as 
it  were  neceffarily  arife  in  their    Minds  a  Suppofition  that   it 
may  be  fo  indeed,  that  true  Defires  and  Endeavours  may  take 
Place,  but  that  invincible  Neceffity  ftan4s  in  the   Way,  and 
renders  '.em  vain  and  to  no  Effed:. 

V.  Another  Thing  which  makes  Perfons  more  ready  to 
fuppofe  it  to  be  contrary  to  Reafon,  that  Men  fliould  be  ex- 
pofed  to  the  Punifhments  threaten'd  to  Sin,  for  doing  thofc 
Things  which  are  morally  neceflary,  or  not  doing  thole 
Things  morally  impoffible,  is,that  Imagination  ftrengLhens  the 
Argument,  and  adds  greatly  to  the  Power  and  Influence  of 
the  feeming  Reafons  againft  it,  from  the  Greatnefs  of  that 
Puniftiment.  To  allow  that  they  may  be  juftly  expofed  to  a 
u  fmall  Puniftiment,  would  not  be  fo  difficult.  Whereas,- if  there 
I  D  d  2  •  were 


212        Neceffary  Vertue^  &c.        Part  IV^  « 

were  any  good  Reafon  in  the  Cafe,  if  it  were  truly  a  Didate  of 
Reafon  that  fuch  Neceffity  was  inconfiftent  with  Faultineis,  or 
jufl  Punifhment,  the  Demonftration  would  be  equally  certain 
with  refpecfl  to  a  fmall  Punifhment,  or  any  Punifliment  at  all, 
as  a  very  great  one  :  But  it  is  not  equally  eafy  to  the  Imagi-  ; 
nation.  They  that  argue  againft  the  Juftice  of  daimiing  Men  ' 
for  thofe  Things  that  are  thus  neceflary,  feem  to  make  their 
Argument  the  llronger,  by  fetting  forth  the  Greatnefs  of  the 
Punifliment  in  flrong  ExprefTions  -.—-'That  a  Man  jhould  he  cafi 
into  eternal  Burnings,,  that  he  Jhould  he  rnade  to  fry  in  Hell  to  all 
Eternity ,,  for  thofe  Things  which  He  had  no  Power  to  avoids  and  was 
under  afatal^  unfruftrahle^  invincible  Necejfity  of  doing. ^ 


Section     IV, 

//  is  agreahle  to  common  Senfe,  and  the  na- 
tural Notions  of  Mankind,  to  fuppofe 
moral  NeceJJlty  to  be  conjifient  with  Praife 
and  Blame ^  Reward  and  Punijhment. 

WHETHER  the  Reafons  that  have  been  given,  why  it 
appears  difficult  to  fome  Perfons  to  reconcile  with 
common  Senfe  the  praifing  or  blaming,  rewarding  gr 
piinifhing  thofe  Things  which  are  morally  neceffary,  are 
thought  fatisfadory,  or  not  ;  yet  it  mofl  evidently  appears  by 
the  following  Things,  that  if  this  Matter  be  rightly  under- 
ilood,  fetting  afide  all  Deiufion  arifmg  from  the  Impropriety 
and  Ambiguity  of  Terms,  this  is  not  at  all  inconfiftent  with 
the  nature  Apprehenfions  of  Mankind,  and  that  Senfe  of 
Things  which  is  found  every  where  in  the  common  People, 
who  are  furtheft  from  having  their  Thoughts  perverted  from 
their  natural  Channel,  by  metaphyseal  and  philofophical  Sub- 
tilties  ;  but  on  the  contrary,  altogether  agreable  to^  and  the 
yery  Voi<;:e  and  DitiUte  of  this  natqral  and  vulgar  Senfe. 

L  This  vnW  appear  if  we  confid^r  what  the  vuIgarNotion  of  % 
BJr.tnf-'Worthinefs  is.  The  Idea  which  the  common  People  i 
■  ^  -  through  i 


Sed.  IV.    agreable  to  common  Senfe.    213 

through  all  Ages  and  Nations  have  of  Faultinefs,  I  fuppofe  to 
be  plainly  this  ;  A  Perfon's  being  or  doing  wrongs  with  his  own 
Will  and  Pleafure  ;  containing  thefe  two  Things  ;  i.  His  doing 
ijurong^  when  he  does  as  he  pleafes,  2.  His  Pleafure*s  being  wrong. 
Or  in  other  Words,  perhaps  more  intelligibly  exprefTing  their 
'  Notion  ;  A  Per/on  s  having  hisHeart  wrongs  and  doing  wrong  from 
his  Heart,     And  this  is  the  Sum  total  of  the  Matter. 

The  common  People  don't  afcend  up  in  their  Refledtions  and 
Abftra6tions,  to  the  metaphyfical  Sources,  Relations  and  De* 
pendences  of  Things,  in  order  to  form  their  Notion  of  Faul- 
tinefs or  Blame-worthinefs.  They  don't  wait  till  they  have 
decided  by  their  Refinings,  what  firft  determines  the  Will  ; 
whether  it  be  determined  by  fomething  extrinfiQ,  or  intrinfic  ; 
whether  Volition  deterniines  Volition,  or  whether  the  Under- 
ftanding  determines  the  W~ill  ;  whether  there  be  any  fuch 
Thing  as  Metaphyficians  mean  by  Contingence  (if  they  have 
any  Meaning;)  whether  there  be  a  Sort  of  a  ftrange  unac- 
countable Sovereignty  in  the  Will,  ir)  the  Exercife  of  which, 
by  it's  own  fovereign  A6ls,  it  brings  to  pafs  all  it's  own  fove- 
reign  Ads.  They  don't  take  any  Part  of  their  Notion  of 
Fault  or  Blame  from  the  Refolution  of  any  fuch  Queftions.  If 
this  were  the  Cafe,  there  are  Multitudes,  yea  the  far  greater 
Part  of  Mankind,  nine  Hundred  and  ninety-nine  out  of  a 
.  Thoufand  would  live  and  die  without  having  any  fucH 
Notion  as  that  of  Fault  ever  entring  into  their  Heads,  or  with- 
out fo  much  as  once  having  any  Conception  that  any  Body- 
was  to  be  either  blamed  or  commended  for  any  Thing.  To 
be  fure^^it  would  be  a  long  Time  before  Men  came  to  have 
fuchNotions.  Whereas  'tis  manifeft,they  are  fome  of  the  firft 
Notions  that  appear  in  Children  ;  who  difcover  as  foon  as 
they  can  think,  or  fpeak,  or  a(5l  at  all  as  rational  Creatures, 
a  Senfe  of  Defert.  And  certainly,  in  forming  their  Notion  of 
it,  they  make  no  ufe  of  Metaphyficks.  All  the  Ground  they 
go  upon  conlifts  in  thefe  two  Things  ;  Experience^  and  2.  natu^ 
ral  Senfation  of  a  certain  Fitnefs  or  Agreablenefs  which  there  is 
in  uniting  fuch  moral  Evil  as  is  above  defcribed,  vi%.  a  being 
or  doing  wrong  with  the  Will^  and  Refentment  in  others,  and 
Pain  inflided  on  the  Perfon  in  whom  this  moral  Evil  is. 
Which  natural  Senfe  is  what  we  call  by  the  Name  of  Confcience, 

'Tis  true,the  common  People  and  Children,  in  their  Notion 

of  a  faulty  A 61  or  Deed  of  any  Perfon,   do  fuppofe  that    it  is 

'  the  Perfon's  own  ASf  and  Deed.     But  this  is  all  that  belongs  to 

what  they  underiland  by  aThing's  being  a  Perfon's  own  Deed  9r 

A^ion  i 


214        Necejfary  Fertue^  &c.        Part  IV. 

j£fion  I  even  that  it  is  fomething  done  by  him  of  Choice. 
That  fome  Exercife  or  Motion  fliould  begin  of  it  felf,  don't 
belong  to  their  Notion  of  an  A6lion^  or  Doing.  If  fo,  it  would 
belong  to  their  Notion  of  it,  that  it  is  fomething  which  is  the 
Caufe  of  it*s  own  Beginning  :  And  that  is  as  much  as  to  fay, 
that  it  is  before  it  begins  to  be.  Nor  is  their  Notion  of  dm 
ASiion  fome  Motion  or  Exercife  that  begins  accidentally,  with- 
out any  Caufe  or  Reafon  ;  for  that  is  contrary  to  one-  of  the 
prime  Dictates  of  common  Senfe,  namely,  that  every  Thing 
that  begins  to  be,  has  fome  Caufe  or  Reafon  why  it  is. 

The  common  People,  in  their  Notion  of  a  faulty  or 
praife-worthy  Deed  or  Work  done  by  any  one,  dp  fup- 
pofe  that  the  Man  does  it  in  the  Exercife  of  Liberty.  But 
then  their  Notion  of  Liberty  is  only  a  Perfon's  having  Oppor^ 
tunity  of  doing  as  he  pleafes.  They  have  no  Notion  of  Liber- 
ty confiding  in  the  Will's  firft  ading,  and  fo  caufmg  it's  own 
A<5ls  ;  and  determining,  and  fo  caufing  it's  own  Determinati- 
ons ;  or  chufing,  and  fo  caufing  it's  own  Choice.  Such  a 
Notion  of  Liberty  is  what  none  have,  but  thofe  that  have 
darken'd  their  own  Minds  with  confufed  metaphyfical  Specu- 
lation, and  abftrufe  and  ambiguous  Terms.  If  a  Man  is  not 
reftrain'd  from  ading  as  his  Will  determines,  or  conftrain'd  to 
Z.&.  otherwife  ;  then  he  has  Liberty,  according  to  common  No- 
tions of  Liberty,  without  taking  into  the  Idea  that  grand  Con- 
tradi6tion  of  all  the  Determinations  of  a  Man's  free  Will  being 

the  EfFecfts  of  the  Determinations  of  his   free  Will. Nor 

have  Men  commonly  any  Nol^ion  of  Freedom  confiding  in  In- 
difference. For  if  fo,  then  it  would  be  agreable  to  their  No- 
tion, that  the  greater  Indifference  Pvlen  a6t  with,  tlie  more 
Freedom  they  a6t  with  ;  whereas  theReverfe  is  true.  He  that 
in  acfling,  proceeds  with  the  fulleft  Inclination,  does  what  He 
does  with  the  greateft  Freedom,  according  to  common  Senfe. 
And  fo  far  is  it  from  being  agreable  to  common  Senfe,  that 
fuch  Liberty  as  confifts  in  Indifference  is  requifite  to  Praife  ox 
Blame,  that  on  the  contrary,  the  Didate  of  every  Man's  natu-  '\ 
ral  Senfe  thro'  the  World  is,  that  the  further  he  is  from  being 
indifferent  in  his  ading  Good  or  Evil,  and  the  more  he  does 
either  with  full  and  ftrong  Inclination,  the  more  is  he  efteemed 
or  abhorred,  commended  or  condemned. 

II.  If  It  were  inconfiftent  with  the  common  Senfe  of  Man- 
kind, that  Men  (hould  be  either  to  be  blamed  or  commend- 
ed in  any  Volitions  they  have  or  fail  of,  in  Cafe  of  moral 
Neceffity  or  Impoffibihty  ;  then  it  would  furely  alfo  be  agrea- 
feie  to  the  fame  Senfe  and  Reafon  of  Mankjind,  that  the  near- 
ex 


Se£t.  IV.  agr cable  to  common  Senfc.    215 

er  the  Cafe  approaches  to  fuch  a  moral  Neceffity  or  Iinpoffi- 
bility,  either  through  a  flrong  antecedent  morai  Propenfity 
on  the  one  Hand,  *  or  a  great  antecedent  Oppofition  and 
Difficulty  on  the  other,  the  nearer  docs  it  approach  to  a  being 
neither  blameable  nor  commendable  ;  fo  that  A<5Vs  exerted 
with  fuch  preceeding  Propenfity  would  be  worthy  of  propor- 
tionably  lefs  Praife  ;  and  v/hen  omitted,  the  A61  being  attend- 
ed with  fuch  Difficulty,  the  Omiffion  would  be  worthy  of  the 
lefs  Blame.  It  is  fo,  as  was  obferved  before,  with  natural 
Neceffity  and  Impoffibility,  Propenfity  and  Difficulty  :  As  'tis 
a  plain  Didate  of  the  Senfe  of  all  Mankind,  that  natural  Ne- 
ceffity and  Impoffibility  takes  away  all  Blame  and  Praife  j  and 
therefore,  that  the  nearer  the  Approach  is  to  thefe  through 
previous  Propenfity  or  Difficulty,  fo  Praife  and  Blame  are 
proportionably  diniinijhed.  And  if  it  were  as  much  a  Dictate 
of  common  Senfe,  that  moral  Neceffity  of  doing,  or  Impoffi- 
bility of  avoiding,  takes  away  all  Praife  and  Blame,  as  that 
natural  Neceffity  or  Impoffibility  does  this  ;  then,  by  a  psrfe<5l 
Parity  of  Reafon,  it  would  be  as  much  the  Dictate  of  common 
Senfe,  that  an  Approach  to  moral  Neceffity  of  doing,  or  Im- 
poffibility of  avoiding,  diminijhes  Praife  and  Blame,  as  that 
an  Approach  to  natural  Neceffity  and  Impoffibility  does  fo. 
'Tis  equally  the  Voice  of  common  Senfe,  that  Perfons  are 
excufahle  in  Part^  in  negleding  Things  difficult  againft  their 
Wills,  as  that  they  are  excufahle  wholly  in  negledling  Things 
impoffible  againft  their  Wills.  And  if  it  made  no  Difference, 
whether  the  Impoffibility  were  natural  and  againft  the  Will, 
or  moral,  lying  in  the  Will,  with  regard  to  Excufablenefs  > 
fo  neither  would  it  make  any  Difference,  whether  the  Diffi- 
culty, or  Approach  to  Neceffity  be  natural  againft  theWiH, 
or  moral,  lying  in  the  Propenfity  of  the  Will. 

But  'tis  apparent,  that  the  Reverfe  of  thefe  Things  is  true. 
\  If  there  be  an  Approach  to  a  moral  Neceffity  in  a  Man's  Ex- 
ertion of  good   A6ls  of  Will,  they   being  the  Exercife   of  a 
Lftrong  Propenfity  to  Good,  and  a  very  powerful  Love  to  Ver- 
I  tue  3  'tis  fo  far  from  being  the  Di<5tate  of  common  Senfe,  that 
I  He  is  lefs  vertuous,  and  the  lefs  to  be  efteem'd,   loved   and 
praifed  ;  that  'tis  agreable  to  the  natural  Notions  of  all  Man- 
'  kind  that  he  is  fo  much  the  better   Man,  worthy   of  greater 
Refped,  and  higher  Commendation.     And  the   ftronger  the 
Inclination  is,  and  the  nearer  it  approaches  to  Neceffity  in  that 

Refpect  ; 

,  *  'Tis  here  argued,  on  Suppofition  that  not  all  Propenfity  implies 
moral  Necefiiiy,  but  only  fom«  very  high  Degrees ;  which  rione 
will  deny. 


2i6       Neceffary  Vertue^  &c.         Part  IV. 

Refpe6t,  or  to  Impoflibility  of  neglecting  the  vertuous  A(5t,or  of 
doing  a  vicious  one  ;  ftiJl  the  more  vertuous,  and  worthy  of 
higher  Commendation.  And  on  the  other  Hand,  if  a  Man 
exerts  evil  A6ts  of  Mind  ;  as  for  Inftance,  A(5ls  of  Pride  or 
Mahce,  from  a  rooted  and  ftrong  Habit  orPrinciple  of  Haugh- 
tinefs  and  Mahcioufnefs,  and  a  violent  Propenfity  of  Heart  to 
fuch  Ads  J  according  to  the  natural  Senfe  of  all  Men,  he  is 
fo  far  from  being  the  lefs. hateful  and  blameable  on  that  Ac- 
count, that  he  is  fo  much  the  more  worthy  to  be  detefted  and 
condemned  by  all  that  obferve  Him, 

Moreover,  'tis  manifeft  that  it  is  no  Part  of  the  Notion 
which  Mankind  commonly  have  of  a  blameable  or  praife- 
lyorthy  A6t  of  the  Will,  that  it  is  an  Adl  which  is  not  deter- 
mined by  an  antecedent  Bias  or  Motive,  but  by  the  fovereign 
Power  of  the  Will  it  felf  j  becaufe  if  fo,  the  greater  Hand 
fuchCaufes  have  in  determining  any  Ads  of  the  Will,  fo  much 
the  lefs  vertuous  or  vicious  would  they  be  accounted  j  and 
the  lefs  Hand,  the  more  vertuous  or  vicious.  Whereas  the 
Keverfe  is  true  :  Men  don't  think  a  good  A<5t  to  be  the  lefs 
praife-worthy,  for  the  Agent's  being  much  determined  in  it  by 
a  good  Inclination  or  a  good  Motive  ;  but  the  more.  And  if 
good  Inclination  or  Motive  has  but  little  Influence  in  deter- 
mining the  Agent,  they  don't  think  his  A61  fo  much  the  more 
vertuous,  but  the  lefs.  And  fo  concerning  evil  Ads,  which 
are  determined  by  evil  Motives  or  Inclinations. 

Yea,  if  it  be  fuppofed  that  good  or  evil  Difpofitlons  are  xm- 
planted  in  the  Hearts  of  Men  by  Nature  it  felf  (which,  it  \% 
certain,  is  vulgarly  fuppofed  in  irmumerable  Cafes)  yet  it  is 
not  commonly"  fuppofed  that  Men  are  worthy  of  no  Praife  or 
Difpraife  for  fuch  Difpofitions  ;  altho*  what  is  natural  is  un- 
doubtedly neceffary,  Nature  being  prior  to  all  Ads  of  the  Will 
whatfoever.  Thus  for  Inftance,  if  a  Man  appears  to  be  of  a 
very  haughty  or  malicious  Difpofition,  and  is  fuppofed  to  be 
fo  by  his  natural  Temper,  'tis  no  vulgar  Notion,  no  Didae  of 
the  common  Senfe  and  Apprehenfion  of  Men,  that  fuch  Dif- 
pofitions are  no  Vices  or  moral  Evils,  or  that  fuch  Perfons  arc 
not  worthy  of  Difefteem,  Odium  and  Difhonour  ;  or  that  the 
proud  or  malicious  Ads  which  flow  from  fuch  natural  Difpo- 
fitions, are  worthy  of  .  no  Refentment.  Yea,  fuch  vile  na- 
tural Difpofitions,  and  the  Strength  of  'em,  will  commonly  be 
mention'd  rather  as  an  Aggravation  of  the  wicked  Ads  that 
come  from  fuch  a  Fountain,  than  an  Extenuation  of  'em. 
Jt's  being  natural  for  Men  to  ad  thus,  i$  gften  obferved  by 
.  Mea 


Seel.  IV.     agr cable  to  common  Senfe.     217 

Men  in  theHeight  of  their  Indignation  :  They  will  fay,  "  'Tis 
;"  his  very  Nature  :  He  is  of  a  vile  natural  Temper  -,  'tis  as 
i  4*<,  natural  to  Him  to  adt  fo,  as  it  is  to  breathe  ;  He  can't  help 
I  "  ferving  the  Devil,  &c."  But  it  is  not  thus  with  Regard  t(> 
hurtful  mifchievous  Things  that  any  are  the  Subjecfis  or  Ccca- 
iions  of  by  natural  Nectijjity^  zg^iin^  their  Inclinations.  In  fuch 
a  Cafe,  the  NecelTity,  by  the  common  Voice  of  Mankind,  will 

be  fpoken   of  as  a  full  Excufe. Thus  'tis  very  plain,  that 

common  Senfe  makes  a  vaft  Difference  between  thefe  two 
Kinds  of  Neceffity,  as  to  the  Judgment  it  makes  of  their  In- 
fluence on  the  moral  Quality  and  Defert  of  Men's  A<5lions» 

AndthefeDi6latesof  Men'sMinds  are  fo  natural  and  neceffar}'', 
iihat  it   may  be  very   much  doubted  whether  the   Arminlam 
themfelves  have  ever  got  rid  of  'em  ;  yea,their  greatefbDodors, 
t^^at  have  gone  furtheft  in  Defence  or  their  metaphyseal   No- 
tions of  Liberty,    and  have  brought  their  Arguments  to  their 
greateu    Strength,  and  as   they   fuppofe  to  a  Demonftration, 
againu  theConfiftence  of  Vertue  and  Vice  with  any  Neceffity  : 
'"ris  to  be  queflion'd,  whether  there  is  fo  much  as  one  of  them, 
but  that  if  He  fuffered  very  much  from  the  injurious  AcSIs  of  a 
Man  under  the  Pov>rerof  an  invincible  Haughtinefs  and  Malig- 
nancy of  Temper,  would  not,  from  the   foremention'd  natural 
I  Senfe  of  Mind,  refent  it  far  otherwife,than  if  as  great  Sufferings 
came  upon  Him  from  the  Wind   that  blows,  and   Fire  that 
burns  by  natural  Neceffity  ;  and  otherwife  than   he  would,  if 
!  he  fuffered  as  much  from  the  Condu6l  of  a  Man  perfecflly  de- 
;  hrious  ;  yea,    tho'   he  hrft  brought   his  Diftraction  upon  Him 
t  feme  Way  by  his  own  Fault. 

Some  feem  to  difdain  the  Diflindlon  that  we  make  between 
i  natural  and  moral  Neceffity^  as  tho'  it  were  altogether  impertinent 
in  this  Controverfy  :  "  That  which  is  neceffary  (fay  they)  is 
*'  neceffary  ;  it  is  that  which  muft  be,  and  can't  be  prevented. 
"  And  that  which  is  impoffible,isimpoffible, and  can't  be  done  : 
*'  and  therefore  none  can  be  to  blame  for  not  doing  it."  And 
fuch  Comparifons  are  made  ufe  of,  as  the  commanding  of  a 
Man  to  walk  who  has  loft  his  Legs,  and  condemning  and  pu- 
nilhing  Him  for  not  obeying  ;  Inviting  and  calling  upon  a 
Alan,,  who  is  ffiut  up  in  a  ftrong  Prifon,  to  come  forth,  &:c. 
But  in  thefc  Things  Armmians  arc  very  unreafonable.  Let 
common  Senfe  determine  whether  there  be  hot  a  great  Differ- 
ence between  thofe  two  Cafes  ;  the  one,  that  of  a  Man  who 
has  offended  his  Prince,  and  is  caft  into  Prifon  ;  and  after  he 
has  lain  there  a  while^  the  King  ccnies  to  him,  calls  him  to 
...  E  «  corns 


2i8  Calyinifm  conjijlent  Part  IV.' 

come  forth  toHim  ;  and  tells  him  that  if  he  will  do  fo,and  will 
fall  down  before  Him,  and  humbly  beg   his  Pardon,  he  (hall 
be  forgiven,  and  fet  at  Liberty,  and  alfo  be  greatly  enrich'd,and 
advanced  to  Honour  :    The   Prifoner  heartily  repents  of  the 
Folly  and  Wickednefs   of  his    Offence  againft  his    Prince,    is 
thoroughly  difpofed  to  abafe  Himfelf,  and  accept  of  the  King's 
Offer  ;  but  is  confined  by  flrong  Walls,  with  Gates  of  Brafs;,  ^ 
and  Barrs  of  Iron.     The  other   Cafe   is,  that  of  a  Man  who  4 
is  of  a  very   unreafonable  Spirit,   of  a   haughty,   ungrateful,  |j 
wilful  Difpofition  ;    and  moreover,   has   been  brought   up  in  | 
traiterious  Principles  ;  and  has   his   Heart   poUeffed   with   an  ii^ 
extream  and  inveterate  Enmity  to   his  lawful  Sovereign  ;    and  ij 
for  his  Rebellion  is  caft  into  Prifon,  and  lies  long  there,  loaden  |ij 
with  heavy  Chains,  and  in  miferable  Circumflances.  At  length  jtj 
the  compaflionate   Prince    comes   to  the   Prifon,     orders  his  ps 
Chains  to  be  knocked  off,  and  his  Prifon-Doors  to  be  fet  widp  ;| 
open  ;  calls  to  him,    and   tells  Him,  if  He  will  come  forth  to  ,'5 
him,   and   fall  down   before  him,   acknowledge  that   he   has  i 
treated  him  unworthily,    and  afk  his  Forgivenefs  ;  He  Ihall  h&i 
forgiven,  fet  at  Liberty,  and  fet  in  a  Place  of  great  Dignity  and  p 
Profit  in  his  Court.     But    He  is  fo  flout  and  flomachful,  and  ,il 
full  of  haughty'Malignity,that  He  can't  be  willing  to  accept  the  1 
Offer  :  his  rooted  flrong  Pride  and  Malice  have  perfe61:  Power  ]»; 
over  him,  and  as  it  were    bind  him,   by  binding  his   Heart :  ) 
The  Oppofition  of  his  Heart  has  the  Maflery  over  Him,  hav-  i 
ing  an  Influence  on  his  Mind  far  fuperiour  to  the  King's  Grace  ] 
andCondefcenfion,and  to  all  his  kindOffers  &  Promifes.  Now,  } 
is  it  agreable  to  common  Senfe,   to  affert  and  fland  to  it,  that  a 
there  is  no  Difference   between   thefe   two   Cafes,  as   to   any  \ 
Worthinefs  of  Blame  in  thePrifoners  ;  becaufe,  forfooth,  there  ( 
is  a  Neceffrty  in  both,   and  the   required  A(5t  in  each  Cafe  is  j 
iijipoffible  ?  'Tis  true,    a   Man's    evil  Difpofitions  may  be  as,  j 
llrong   and  immovable  as    the  Bars  of  a   Caflle.      But  who 
can't  fee,  that  when  a  Man,  in  the  latter  Cafe,   is  faid  to   be 
unable  to  obey  the  Command,  the  Expreffion  is  ufed  improper- 
ly,  and  not   in  the   Senfe  it  has   originally  and  in   common ;| 
Speech  ?  And  that  it  may  properly  be  faid  to  be  in  theRebersfl 
Power  to  come  out  of  Prifon,  feeing  he   can  eafily  do  it  if  he  ; 
pleafes  ;  tho*  by  Reafon  of  his  vile  Temper  of  Heart  which  i%;| 
hx'd  and  rooted,  'tis  impoffible  that  it  fhould  pleafe  Him  ?        J 

Upon  the  whole,  I  prefume  there  is  no  Perfon  of  good  Un-  | 
derftanding,  who  impartially  confiders  the  Things  which  have  "^ 
been  obferved,  but  will  allow  that  'tis  not  evident  from  the  '^ 
Didta^es  of  the  common  Senfe,  or  natural  Notions  of  Man- .; 

kind,  I 


■ 

'Sed^  VI.        with   common  Senfe.  219 

kind,  that 'moral  Neceffity  is  inconfiftent  with  Praife  and  Blame. 
And  therefore,  if  the  Arminians  would  prove  any  fuch  Incon^ 
ififtency,  it  muft  be  by  fome  philofophical  and  metaphyfical 
Arguments,  and  not  common  Senfe. 

There  is  a  grand  Illufion  in  the  pretended  Demonftration 
of  Armimans  from  common  Senfe.  The  main  Strength  of  all 
ithefeDemonftrations,  lies  in  that  Prejudice  that  arifes  thro'  the 
infenfible  Change  of  the  Ufe  and  Meaning  of  fuch  Terms  as 
Liberty^  able ^uneble^  necejjary^  impojfible^  unavoidable^  invincible,  j£fiony 
&c.  from  their  original  and  vulgarSenfe,  to  a  metaphyfxaiSenfe 
entirely  diverfe  ;  and  the  ftrong  Connection  of  the  Ideas  of 
Blamelefnefs  &c.  with  fome  of  thefe  Terms,  by  an  Habit 
contraded  and  eftablifh'd,  while  thefe  Terms  were  ufed  in 
their  firft  Meaning.  This  Prejudice  and  Delufion  is  the  Fouii- 
dation  of  all  thofe  Portions  they  lay  down  as  Maxims,  by 
which  moft  of  the  Scriptures,  which  they  alledge  in  this  Con- 
troverfy,  are  interpreted,  and  on  which  all  their  pompous  De- 
monftrations  from  Scripture  and  Reafon  depend.  From  this 
fecret  Delufion  and  Prejudice  they  have  almofl  all  their  Ad- 
vantages :  'Tis  the  Strength  of  their  Bulwarks,  and  the  Edge 
of  their  Weapons.  And  this  is  the  main  Ground  of  all  the 
Right  they  have  to  treat  their  Neighbours  in  fo  affuming  a 
Manner,  and  to  infult  others,  perhaps  as  wife  and  good  as 
themfelves,  as  weak  Bigots^  Men  thai  dwell  in  the  dark  Caves  of 
Superjlition^  perverjly  fet^  objfinately /hutting  their  Eyes  againjl  the 
Noon-day  Lights  Enemies  to  common  Senfe^  maintaining  the  firjl -born 
of  Abfurdities^  &c.  hc.  But  perhaps  an  impartial  Confideration 
of  the  Things  which  have  been  obferved  in  the  preceeding 
Parts  of  this  Enquiry,  may  enable  the  Lovers  of  Truth  better 
to  judge,  whofe  Do6lrine  is  indeed  abfurd,  abjhufe^  felf-contra- 
diotory^  and  inconfiftent  with  common  Senfe,  and  many  Ways 
repugnant  to  the  univcrfal  Dictates  of  the  Reafon  of  Mankind. 

Corol.  From  Things  which  have  been  obferved,  it  will  fol- 
low, that  it  is  agreable  to  common  Senfe  to  fuppofe,  that  the 
glorified  Saints  have  not  their  Freedom  at  all  diminifti'd,  in 
any  Refpect  ;  and  that  God  Himfelf  has  the  higheft  pofTible 
Freedom,  according  to  the  true  and  proper  Meaning  of  the 
Term  ;  and  that  He  is  in  the  higheft  poflible  refpect  an  Agent, 
and  active  in  the  Exercife  of  his  infinite  Holinefs  ;  tho'  He 
acts  therein  in  the  higheft  Degree  necefiarily  :  and  his  Actions 
of  this  Kind  are.  in  the  higheft,  moft  abfolutely  perfect  Man- 
ner vertuous  and  praife-worthy  ;  and  are  fo,  for  that  very 
Reafon,  becaufe  they  are  moft  perfectly  necefiary. 

E  e  2  Section 


2  20  Endeavours  not  rendered  vain,  Part  I V. ' 
Section     V. 


Concerning  thofe  ObjeftionSj  that  this  Scheme  \ 
of  Necejftty  renders  all  Means  and  En-  | 
deavoursy^r  the  avoiding  of  Siny  or  the  i 
obtaining  Vertue  and  Holinefs ^  vain,  and  i 
to  no  Purpofe  ;  and  that  it  snakes  Men  \ 
no   more  than  meer  M.?ich\nt^  in  Affairs  i 

of  Morality  and  Religion.  | 

t 

yfRm'inians  fay,  if  it  be  fo,  that  Sin  and  Vertue  come  to  ! 
„^:^^  pafs  by  a  Neceffity  conliiling  in  a  fure  Conne6tion  of  ■ 
Caufes  and  Effects,  Antecedents  and  Confequents,  it  \ 
can  never  be .  worth  the  while  to  ufe  any  Means  or  Endea-  '\ 
vours  to  obtain  the  one,  and  avoid  the  other  ;  feeing  no  En-  '■. 
deavours  can  alter  the  Futurity  of  the  Event,  which  is  become  j 
neceffary  by  a  Connexion  already  eftabliftied.  j^ 

But  I  defire,  that  this  Matter  may  be  fully  confidered  ;  and  \\ 
that  it  may  be  examined  with  a  thorough  Stridtnefs,  whether  ij 
it  will  follow  that  Endeavours  and  Means,  in  order  to  avoid  or  ;> 
obtain  any  future  Thing,  muft  be  more  in  vain,  on  the  Sup-  li 
pofition  of  fuch  a  Connedtion  of  Antecedents  and  Confequents^  \\ 
than  if  the  contrary  be  fuppofed,  |i 

\i 
For  Endeavours  to  be  In  vain,  is  for  'em  not  to  be  fuccefsfui^  fi 
that  is  to  fay,  for  'em  not  eventually  to  be  the  Means  of  the  p 
Thing  aimed  at,  which  can't  be,  but  in  one  of  thefe  two  l| 
Ways  ;  either,  Firfi^  That  altho'  the  Means  are  ufcd,  yet  the  |^ 
•Event  aimed  at  don't  follow  :  Or,  Secondly^  If  the  Event  does  i^ 
follow,  it  is  not  becaufe  of  the  Means,  or  from  any  Connexion  j; 
or  Dependence  of  the  Event  on  the  Means,  the  Event  would  il 
have  come  to  pafs,  as  well  without  the  Means,  as  with  them,  i} 
If  either  of  thefe  two  Things  are  the'Cafe,  then  the  Means  jj 
are  not  properly  fuccefsful,  and  are  truly  in  vain.  The  Sue-  |] 
cefsfulnefs  or  Unfuccefsfuinefs  of  Means,  in  order  to  an  s 
Effe6t,  or  their  being  in  vain  or  not  in  vain,  confilfs  in  thofe  \ 
Means  being  connected,  or  not  counec^led,  with  the  EfFe<^,  in  j 

iuch  \ 
A 


Sect.  V.     hy  Calviniftic  Principles.       22 1 

fuch  a  Manner  as  this,  vi%.  That  the  Ef?e6t  is  with  thcMeans, 
,and  not  without  them  ;  or,  that  the  Being  of  the  EfFe6t  is,  ori 
the  one  Hand,  conne6ted  with  the  Means,  and  the  Want  of 
the  Effe(5t,  on  the  other  Hand,  is  conne6ted  with  the  Want  o# 
the  Means.  If  there  be  fuch  a  Connexion  as  this  between 
Means  and  End,  the  Means  are  not  in  vain  :  The  more  there 
is  of  fuch  a  Connedion,  the  further  they  are  from  being  in 
vain  ;  and  the  lefs  of  fuch  a  Connedion,  the  more  are  they 
in  vain. 

Now  therefore  the  Qiieftion  to  be  anfwered,  (in  order  to 
determine,  whether  it  follows  from  this  Dodnne  of  the  ne- 
cefiary  Connedion  between  foregomg  Things  and  confequent 
ones,  that  Means  ufed  in  order  to  any  EffciSt^  are  more  in 
vain  than  they  would  be  otherwife)  is.  Whether  it  follows 
from  it,  that  there  is  lefs  of  the  forementioned  Connedion 
between  Means  and  EfFed  ;  that  is.  Whether  on  the  Suppoli- 
tion  of  there  being  a  real  and  true  Connedion  between 
antecedent  Things  and  confequent  ones,  there  mufi:  be  lefs  of 
a  Connedion  between  Means  and  EfFed,  than  on  the  Suppo- 
fition  of  there  being  no  fix'd  Connedion  between  antecedent 
Things  and  confequent  ones  :  And  the  very  ftating  of  this 
Quefi:ion  is  fufficient  to  anfwer  it.  It  muil:  appear  to  every 
one  that  w^ill  open  his  Eyes,  that  this  Queftion  can't  be 
affirmed,  without  the  grofseft  Abfurdity  and  Inconfiftence. 
Means  are  foregoing  Things,  and  Effeds  are  following 
Things  :  And  if  there  were  no  Connedion  between  foregoing 
Things,  and  following  ones,  there  could  be  no  Conne6lion 
between  Means  and  End  5  and  fo  all  Means  would  be  wholly 
vain  and  fruitlefs.  For  'tis  by  Vertue  of  fome  Connedion 
only,  that  they  become  fu(±efsful  :  'Tis  fome  Connedion 
obferved,  or  revealed,  or  otherwife  known,  between  ante- 
icedent  Things  and  following  on^s,  that  is  what  direds  in  the 
Choice  of  Means.  And  if  there  were  no  fuch  Thing  as  an 
eftablifh'd  Connedion,  there  could  be  no  Choice,as  to  Means  ; 
one  Thing  would  have  no  more  Tendency  to  an  Effed,  than 
another  ;  there  would  be  no  fuch  Thing  as  Tendency  in  the 
Cafe.  All  thofe  Things  which  are  fuccefsful  Means  of  other 
Things,  do  therein  prove  conneded  Antecedents  of  the  m  : 
And  therefore  to  aflert,  that  a  fix'd  Connedion  between  Ai  ite- 
cedents  and  Confequents  makes  Means  vain  and  ufelefs,  or 
(lands  in  the  Way  to  hinder  the  Connedion  between  Me'ans 
and  End,  is  juft  fo  ridiculous,  as  to  fay,  that  a  Conned :ion 
between  Antecedents  and  Confequents  ftands  in  the  Wa}/  to 
hinder  a  Connedion  between  Antecedents  and  Confequentsj;. 

'Hor 


222  Means&^ Endeavours  made  rain,  P.IV. 

Nor  can  any  fuppofed  Connexion  of  the  Succeffion  orTrain 
©f  Antecedents  and  Confequents,  from  the  very  Beginning  of 
all  Things,  the  Connexion  being  made  already  fure  and 
neceffary,  either  by  efl:abli(h'd  Laws  of  Nature,  or  by 
thefe  together  with  a  Decree  of  fovereign  immediate  Inter- 
pofitions  of  divine  Power,  on  fuch  and  fuch  Occafions,  or  any 
other  Way  (if  any  other  there  bej)  I  fay,  no  fuch  neceffary 
Connexion  of  a  Series  of  Antecedents  and  Confequents  can 
in  the  leaft  tend  to  hinder,  but  that  the  Means  we  ufe  may 
belong  to  the  Series  ;  and  fo  may  be  fome  of  thofe  Antecedents 
which  are  eonneded  with  the  Confequents  we  aim  at,  in  the 
eftablifh'd  Courfe  of  Things.  Endeavours  which  w^e  ufe,  are 
Things  that  exift ;  and  therefore  they  belong  to  tl;ie  general 
Chain  of  Events  ;  all  the  Parts  of  which  Chain  are  fuppofed 
to  be  conne6ted  :  And  fo  Endeavours  are  fuppofed  to  be  con- 
nected with  fomeEffe6ls,  or  fome  confequent  Things,  or  other. 
And  certainly  this  don't  hinder  but  that  the  Events  they  are 
connected  with,  may  be  thofe  which  we  aim  at,  and  which 
we  chufe,  becaufe  we  judge  'em  moft  likely  to  have  a  Con- 
nection with  thofe  Events,  from  the  eftablifh'd  Order  and 
Courfe  of  Things  which  we  obferve,  or  from  fomething  in 
divine  Revelation. 

Let  us  fuppofe  a  real  and  fure  Connexion  between  a  Man's 
having  his  Eyes  open  in  the  clear  Day-light,  with  goodOrgans 
of  Sight,  and  Seeing  ;  fo  that  Seeing  is  connected  with  his 
opening  his  Eyes,  and  not  feeing  with  his  not  opening  his 
Eyes  5  and  alfo  the  like  Connection  between  fuch  a  Man's 
attempting  to  open  his  Eyes,  and  his  adtually  doing  it  :  The 
fuppofed  eftablifhed  Connection  between  thefe  Antecedents  and 
Confequents,  let  theConnedion  -be  never  fo  fure  and  neceffary, 
certainly  don't  prove  that  it  is  in  vain,  for  a  Man  in  fuch  Cir- 
cumftances  to  attempt  to  open  his  Eyes,  in  order  to  feeing  : 
His  aiming  at  that  Event,  and  the  tJfe  of  the  Means,  being 
the  Effect  of  his  Will,  don't  break  the  Conne(5tion,  or  hinder 
the  Succefs. 

So  that  the  Objecftion  we  are  upon,  don't  lie  againft  the 
Doctrine  of  the  Neceffity  of  Events  by  a  Certainty  of  Connec- 
tion and  Confequence  :  On  the  contrary,  it  is  truly  forcible 
againft  the  Armiman  DoCtrine  of  Contingence  and  Self-deter- 
mination ;  which  is  inconfiftent  with  fuch  a  Connexion.  If 
there  be  no  Connection  between  thofe  Events  wherein  Vertue 
and  Vice  confift,  and  any  Thing  antecedent  j  then  there  is  no 
Connection  between  thefe  Evens  and  any  Means  orEndeavours 

ufed 


Sed.  V.      by  the  Arminian  Scheme.       223 

ufed  in  order  to  them  :  And  if  fo,  then  thofe  Means  mud  be 
in  vain.  The  lefs  there  is  of  Conne6lion  between  foregoing 
Things.and  following  ones,  fo  much  the  lefs  there  is  between 
Means  and  End,  Endeavours  and  Succefs  ;  and  in  the  fame 
Proportion  are  Means  and  Endeavours  inefFedlual  and  in  vain. 

It  will  follow  from  Arminian  Principles,  that  there  is  no 
Degree  of  Connection  between  Vertue  or  Vice,  and  any 
foregoing  Event  or  Thing  :  Or  in  other  Words,  That  the 
Determination  of  the  Exiftence  of  Vertue  or  Vice  don't  in  the 
leaft  depend  on  the  Influence  of  any  Thing  that  comes  to 
pafs  antecedently,  from  which  the  Determination  of  its  Ex- 
iftence is,  as  its  Caufe,  Means,  or  Ground  ;  becaufc,  fo  far  as 
it  is  fo,  it  is  not  from  Self-determination  :  And  therefore,fo  far 
there  is  nothing  of  the  Nature  of  Vertue  or  Vice.  And  fo 
it  follows,  that  Vertue  and  Vice  are  not  at  all,  in  any  Degree, 
dependent  upon,  or  conneded  with  any  foregoing  Event  or 
Exiftence,  as  its  Caufe,  Ground,  or  Means.  And  if  fo,  then 
all  foregoing  Means  muft  be  totally  in  vain. 

Hence  it  follows,  that  there  cannot,  in  any  Confiftence  with 
the  Arminian  Scheme,  be  any  recifonable  Ground  of  fo  much 
as  a  Conje6lure  concerning  the  Confequence  of  any  Means 
and  Endeavours,  in  order  to  efcaping  Vice  or  obtainingVertue, 
or  any  Choice  or  Preference  of  Means,  as  having  a  greater 
Probability  of  Succefs  by  fome  than  others  ;  either  from  any 
natural  Connexion  or  Dependence  of  the  End  on  the  Means, 
or  through  any  divine  Conftitution,  or  revealed  Way  of  God's 
beftowing  or  bringing  to  pafs  thefe  Things,  in  Confequence  of 
any  Means,  Endeavours,  Prayers  or  Deeds.  Conjedure  in 
this  latter  Cafe  depends  on  a  Suppolition  that  God  himfelf  is 
the  Giver,  or  determining  Caufe  of  the  Events  fought  :  But 
if  they  depend  on  Self-determination,  then  God  is  not  the 
determining  or  difpofing  Author  of  them  :  And  if  thefe 
Things  are  not  of  his  Difpofal,  then  no  Conje(5ture  can  be 
made  from  any  Revelation  he  has  given  concerning  any  Way 
or  Method  of  his  Difpofal  of  them. 

Yea,  on  thefe  Principles,  it  will  not  only  follow  that  Men; 
can't  have  any  reafonable  Ground  of  Judgment  or  Conje^hire, 
that  their  Means  and  Endeavours  to  obtain  Vertue  or  avoid 
Vice,  will  be  fuccefsful,"  but  they  may  be  fure  ,they  will  not  ; 
they  may  be  certain,  that  they  will  be  in  vain  j  and  that  if 
ever  the  Thing  which  they  feek  comes  to  pafs,  it  will  not  be 
at  ail  owing  to  the  Means  they  ufe.  For  Means  and  En- 
deavours 


2  24  Calvinifm  dm  t  encoiirage  Sloth.  P. IV; 

deavours  can  have  no  EfFe6t  at  all,  in  Order  to  obtain  the 
End,  but  in  one  of  thefe  two  Ways  j  either  (i.)  Through  fi 
natural  Tendency  and  Influence,  to  prepare  and  difpofe  the 
Mind  more  to  vertuous  Adts,  either  by  cauflng  the  Difpofition 
of  the  Heart  to  be  more  in  Favour  o^  fuch  A6ls,  or  by 
bringing  the  Mind  more  into  the  View  of  powerful  Motives 
and  Inducements  :  Or,  (2.)  By  putting  Perfons  more  in  the 
Way  of  God's  Be''owmept.;  of  the  pjenelit.  But  neither  o£ 
thefe  can  be  the  Cafe.  Nbt  the,  latter  ;  fof.  as  has  been  juft 
now  obferved,  it  don't  confift  with  the  j^rmiman  l^ot'.on  of 
Self-determination,  which  they  fupppie  effential  to  Vertue, 
that  God  fhould  be  the  Bel'tpwer,  or  (which  is  the  fame 
Thing)  the  determining,  ^ifpoimg  Author  of  Vertue.  NoJ: 
^he  former ;  for  natural  Influence  and  Tendency  fuppofes 
Caufality  and  Connexion  >  and  that  fuppoies  Necefiity  of 
Event,  which  is  inconfiftent  with  Ar?mnian  Liberty.  A  Ten- 
dency of  Means, by  biafling  the  Heart  in  Favour  of  Vertue,  or 
by  bringing  the  Will  under  ;  the  Influence  and  Power  of 
motives  in  its  Determinations,  are  both  inconfiftent  with 
Armin'ian  Liberty  of  Will,  confifting  in  Indifference,  and 
fovereign  Seif-determination,  as  has  been  largely  demonftrated. 

But  for  the  more  full  Rernoval  of  this  Prejudice  againft  that 
Do61:rine  of  N^icemty  which  has  been  maintain'd,  as  though  it 
tended  to  encourage  a  total  Negledt  of  all  Endeavours  as  vain  j  j 
ihe  following  Things  may  be  conlidered. 

The  Queftion  is  not.  Whether  Men  may  not  thus  improve 
this  Do6\rine  :  We  know  that  many  true  and  wholefome 
Do6trines  are  abufed  :  But,  V/hether  the  Doctrine  gives  any 
juft  Occaiion  for  fuch  an  Improvement  ;  or  whether,  on. the. 
Suppofition  of  tlie  Truth  of  the  Do61rine,  fuch  a  Ufe  of  it 
would  not  be  unreafonable  ?  If  any  fliall  aflirm,  that  it  would 
not,  but  that  the  very  Nature  of  the  Do6lrine  is  fuch  a*' 
gives  juft  Occafion  for  it,  it  muft  be  on  this  Suppofition ; 
iiamely.  That  fuch  an  invariableNeceflity  of  all  Things  already 
fettled,  muft  render  the  Interpofition  of  all  Means,  Endear 
vours,  Conclufions  or  A6lions  of  ours,  in  order  to  the  obtaining 
any  "future  End  whatfoever,  perfectly  infignificant  ;  becaufe 
they  can't  in  the  leaft  alter  or  vary  the  Courfe  and  Series  of 
Thmgs,  in  any  Event  or  Circumftance  ;  all  being  already  fixed 
unalterabiy  by  Neceffity  :  And  that  therefore  'tis  Folly,  for 
Men  to  ufe  any  Means y^^r  cn.'^  End  \  but  their  Wifdom,to  fave 
themfelves  the  Trouble  of  Endeavours,  and  take  their  Eafe. 
No  Perfon  can  dravf  fuch   an   Inference   from  this  Dodrine, 

and 


6^(3:. V.  Calvlhifm  dont  encourageSloth,  225 

and  come  to  fuch  a  Conclulion,  without  contradic^ing^himfclf, 
and  going  counter  to  the  very  Principles  he  pretends  to  a6l 
upon  :  For  he  comes  to  a  Conclufion,  and  takes  a  Gourfe,  hi 
order  to  an  &nd,  even  his  Eafe^  or  the  faving  himfelf  from 
Trouble  ;  he  feeks  fomething  future,  and  ufes  Means  inOrder 
to  a  future  Thing,  even  in  his  drawing  up  that  Conclufion, 
that  he  will  feek  nothing,  and  ufe  no  Means  in  order  to  any 
Thing  future  ;  he  feeks  his  future  Eafe,  and  the  Benefit  and 
"Comfort  of  Indolence.  If  prior  Neceffity  that  determines  ail 
'Things,  makes  vain  all  A6tions  or  Conclufions  of  ours,  in 
order  to  any  Thing  future  ;  then  it  makes  vain  all  Conclufions 
and  Condu6l  of  ours,  in  order  to  our  future  Eafe.  The  Mea- 
fure  of  our  Eafe,  with  the  Time,  Manner  and  every  Circum- 
fiance  of  it,  is  already  fix'd,  by  all-determining  Neceffity,  as 
much  as  any  Thing  elfe.  If  he  fays  within  himfclf,  "  What 
♦'  future  Happinefs'or  Mifery  I  (hall  have,  is  already  in  Efied: 
*'  determined  by  the  neceiTary  Courfe  and  Connedtion  of 
"*'  Things  ;  therefore  I  will  lave  myfelf  the  Trouble  of  Labour 
*'«  and  Diligence,  which  can't  add  to  my  determined  Degree 
*'  of  Happinefs,  or  diminilh  my  Mifery  i  but  will  take  my 
*'  Eafe,  and  will  enjoy  the  Comfort  of  Sloth  and  Neghgence." 
Such  a  Man  contradicts  himfelf :  He  fays,  the  Meafure  of  his 
future  Happinefs  and  Mifery  is  already  tix'd,  and  he  won't 
try  to  diminilh  the  one,  nor  add  to  the  other  :  But  yet  in  his 
very  Conclufion,  he  contradi6ts  this  ;  for  he  takes  up  this 
Conclufion,  to  add  to  his  future  Happinefs^  by  the  Eafe  and 
Comfort  of  his  Negligence  ;  and  to  diminidi  his  future  Trou- 
ble and  Mifery,  by  faving  himfeif  the  Trouble  of  ufing  Means 
and  taking  Pains. 

Therefore  Perfons  can't  reafonably  make  this  Improvement 
of  the  Dodrine  of  Neceffity,  that  they  will  go  into  a  v6iuntary 
Kegligence  of  Means  for  their  own  Happinefs.  For  the 
Principles  they  mufi:  go  upon,  in  order  to  this,  are  inconfiftent 
with  their  making  any  Improvement  at  ail  of  the  Dodrine  : 
For  to  make  fome  Improvement  of  it,  is  to  be  influenced  by 
it,  to  come  to  fome  voluntary  Conclufion,  in  Regard  to 
their  own  Condu6t,  with  fome  View  or  Aim  :  But  this,  as 
has  been  (hown,  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Principles  they  pretend 
to  a6t  upon.  In  (hort,  the  Principles  are  fuch  as  cannot  be 
acted  upon  at  all,  or  in  any  Refpect,  confiftently.  And  there- 
fore in  every  Pretence  of  acting  upon  them,  or  making  ur.y 
Improvement  at  all  of  them,  there  is  a  Seif-con^adicticn. 

F  f  -•  A^ 


2  2  6C^\vim{mdo/2'itmakeMenMachincs.'PAV' 

As  to   that  Objection  againft   the  Doctrine  which  I   have 
endeavoured   to  prove,    that  it  makes  Men   no   more   than 
meer  Machines  ;  I  would  fay,  that  notwithftanding  this  Doc- 
trine, Man  is  entirely,  perfedly  and  unfpeakabiy  tlifferent  from 
a  meer  Machine,    m  that  he   has  Reafon   and  Underftanding^ 
and  has  a  Faculty  ot'  Will,  and  fo  is  capable  of  Volition  and  'i 
Choice  ;  and  in  that,  his  Will    is    guided  by  the  Di6tates    or 
Views  of  his  Underftanding  ;  and  in  that  his  external  Adions 
and  Behaviour,  and  in  many  Refpe6l  alfo  his   Thoughts,  and    'j 
the  Exercifes  of  his  Mind,   are  fubje6l    to    his  V^ill  ;  fo  that  i 
he  has  Liberty  to  acft  according  to  his  Choice,  and  do  what  he   (^ 
pleafes  j  and  by  Means  of  thefe  Things,  is  capable  of  moral  i 
Habits   and   moral   A6ls,   fuch   Inclinations   and  Actions  a^  i;( 
according  to  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind,  are  worthy   of  !.| 
Praife,   Efteem,   Love  and    Reward  ;  or  on   the  contrary,  of 
Difefteem,  Deteftgtion,  Indignation   and  Punifhment. 

In  thefe  Things  is  all  the  Difference   from  meer  Machines,  ii 

as  to  Liberty  and  Agency,  that  would  be  any  Perfection,  Dig-  | 

nity  or  Privilege,  in  any  Refpect :   Ail  the  Difference  that  can  a 

be  defired,    and  all  that  can  be  conceived  of  j   and   indeed  all  j 

that  the  Preteniions   of  the  Jr?nmians  themfelves  come  to,    as  j 

they  are  forced  often  to  explain  themfelves.  (Tho'  their  Expli-  I 

cations  overthrow   and  abolifh  the  Things  afferted,   and    pre-  '\ 

tended  to  be  explained)  For  they  are  forced  to  explain  a    felf-  \\ 

determining  Power  of  Will,  by  a  Power  in  the  Soul,  to  deter-  ii 
mine-  as  it  chufes  or  wills  ;  v*hich   comes  to   no  more  than';! 

this,   that   a  Man  has  a  Power   of  chufmg,    and  in   many  \\ 
Inilances,can  do  as  he  chufes.  Vv'hich  is  quite  a  differentThing 
fr-om  that  Contradiction,    his   having   Power  of  chufmg   hi5 
flrft  Act  of  Choice  in  the  Cafe. 

Or  if  their  Scheme  makes  any  other  Difference  than  this^ 
between  Men  and  Machines,  it  is  for  the  worle  :  It  is  fo  far 
from  fuppoUng  Men  to  have  a  Dignity  and  Privilege  above 
Machines,  that  it  makes  the  Manner  of  their  being  determined 
(lijl  more  unhappv.  Whereas  Machines  are  guided  by  an  un- 
derflanding  Caule',  by  the  flcihul  Hand  of  the  Workman  or 
Owner  ;  the  V/ill  of  Man  is  left  to  the  Guidance  of  nothing, 
but  abibiute  blind  Contingence. 


S  E  c  T  I  on 


Sea.  VI.        Of  the  Stoical  Fate.  227 


Section     VL 

Concerning  that  Objeflion  agai7ijl  the  Doc- 
trine which  has  been  maintain  d^  that  it 
agrees  with  the  Stoical  DoEirine  of  'Fate, 
and  the  Opinions  of  Mr,  Hobi3es. 

WHEN  Calv'inij^s  oppcfe  the  Armmlan  Notion  of  the  Free- 
dom of  Will,  and  Contingence  of  Volition,  and  infift 
I  V  that  there  are  no   A6ts  of  the   Will,  nor   any   other 

Invents  whatfoever,  but  what  are  attended  with  fome  Kind  of 
Neceffity  ;  their  Oppofers  cry  out  of  thenr,  as  agreeing  with 
the  antient  Stoicks  in  their  Doctrine  of  Fut^y  and  with  Mr. 
Hobbes  in  his  Opmion  of  Necejftty. 

It  would  not  be  worth  while,  to  take  Notice  of  fo  imperti- 
nent an  Objection,  had  it  not  been  i#ged  by  fome  of  the  chief 

'Jrminian  Writers. There  were    many    important   Truths 

\  maintain'd   by  the  antient  Greek  2in^  Roman  Philofophers,    and 
I  cfpecially  the  Stoicks^  that  are  never  ther  worfe  for  being  held  by 
[them.     The  S/^/V  Philofophers,  by   the  general  Agreement  of 
\  Chriflian    Divines,    and    even    Arminian   Divines,    were    the 
\  greateit,  wifeft  and  molt  vertuous  of  all   the  Heathen  Philofo- 
\  phers  ;  and  in  their   Dodrine  and  PracStice  came  the   neareft 
"  to  Chriftianity  of  any  of  their  Seels.     Flow    frequently  are  the 
I  Sayings  of  thefe  Philofophers,   in  many  of  the   Writings    and 
Sermons,  even  of  Arminian  Divines,   produced,   not   as  Argu- 
ments of  the  P'alfenefs   of  the  Dodrines  which  they  delivered, 
but  as  a  Confirmation  of  fome  of  the  greateft  Truths  of  the 
Chriftian  Religion,  relating  to  the  Unity  and  Perfedions  of  the 
Godhead,  a  future  State,  the  Duty  and  Happinefs  of  Maiikind, 
h<z.  as  obferving  how  the  Light  of  Nature  and  Realbn  in  the 
wifeft  and  beft  of  the  Heathen,  harmonized  with,  and  confirms 
the  Gofpel  of  Jefus  Chrift.  a 

And  it  is  very  remarkable  concerning  Dr.  W¥itb)\  that  altho' 
He  alledges  the  Agreement  of  the  Stoicks  with  us,  wherein  He 
fuppofes  they  maintain'd  the  like  Dodrine  with  us,  as  an  Ar^ 
gument  againft  the  Truth  of  our  Doctrine  \  yet  this  very  Dr. 
Whitby  alledges  the  Agreement  of  the  Stoich  with  the  Jrminians^ 

F  f  2     '  wherein 


2  28  Of  the  Stoical  Fate.        Part  IV. ' 

"vvherein  he  fuppofes  they  taught  the  fame  Do6lrine  with  them, 
as  an  Argument  tor  the  Truth  of  their  Doctrine.  *  So  that 
v/hen  the  ^toicks  agree  >vith  t^em.^  this  (it  feems)  is  a  Confirma- 
tion of  their  Dodrine,  and  a  Confutation  of  ours,  as  fhewing 
that  our  Opinions  are  contrary  to  the  .natural  Senfe  h  common 
Reafoh  of  Mankind  :  Neverthelefs,  when  the  Stoicks  agree  with 
7is^  it  argues  no  fuch  Thing  in  our  Favour  ;  but  on  the  con- 
trary, is  a  great  Argument  agairjft  us,  and  ihews  our  Doctrine 
to  be  Heathenifh.  .   «.'    :' 

It  is  obfe)*ved  by  fome  Cahinifilc  Writers,  that  the  Jrmintam  \\\ 
fymbohze  with  the  Stokksy  in  fome  of  thofe  Dodrines  wherein  4' 
they  are  oppofed  by  the  Cahinijls  \  particularly  in  their  denying  '  : 
an  original,  innate,  total  Corruption  and  Depravity  of  Heart';  \\ 
and  in  what  they  held-  of  Man's  Ability  to  make  Himfelf  i 
truly  vertuou5  and  conformed  to  God  ;— -  and  in  fome  other  jj 
Doctrines.  '  | 

It  may  be  further  obfervcd,  'tis  certainly  no  better  Objection  j 

againft  our  Doctrine,  that  it  agrees  in   fome  Refpects  with  the  I 

Doctrine  of  the  antient  Sttoic  Philofophers,  than   it  is  againft  \ 

theirs,  wherein  they  diffe?^from  us,  that  it   agrees  in  fome  Re-  i 

fpects  with  the  Opinion  of  the  very  word  of  the  Heathen  Phi-  \ 
lofophers,  the  Followers  of  Epicurus^  that   Father  of  Atheifm 
and  Licentioufnefs,  and  with  the  Dodrine  of  the  Sadducees  and 

jefuits,  ;;^ 

I  am  not  much  concerned  to  know  precifely  what  the  antient;. 
Stoic  Philofophers  held  concerning  Fate^  in  order  to  determine 
what  is  Truth  ;  as  tho'  it  were  a  fure  Way  to  be  in  the  right, 
to  take  good  Heed  to  differ   from  them.     It   feems  that  they 
differed  among  themfelves  ;  and  probably  the  Do61rineofiv7^^,  .) 
yis  maintain'd  by  moft  of 'em,  was  in  fome  Refpe6ts  erroneous,  ^j 
But  whatever  their  Dodrine  was,  if  any  of  'em    held  fuch  \  ■ 
Fate,  as  is  repugnant   to  any   Liberty  conlifting  in  our  doing  ')\ 
as  we  pleafe,  I  utterly  deny    fuch  a  Fate.      If  they  held   any.  v 
fuch  Fate,  as  is  not  confident  with  the  common  and  univerfal   j 
Notions  thatMankmd  have  of  Liberty,  A61:ivity,  moral  Agency,  | 
Vertue  and  Vice  ;    I  difclaim  any  fuch   Thing,   and   think   I  j 
have  demonftrated  that   the    Scheme  I  maintain  is    no  fuch  <] 
Scheme.     If  the  Stoicks  by  Fate  meant   any   Thing  of    fu^h  a^.;' 
Nature,  as  can  be  fuppofed  to  ftand  in  the  Way  of  the  Advan-*?| 
tage  and  Benefit   of  the  Ufe  of  Means  and  Endeavours,  or-j^ 

niake^;',^ 

f  l-rhithy  on  the  five  Points,  Edit.  3.  P.  325,  326,  327.  '  | 


f'Sc(a.VI.      0/ Hohhidical  JVeceJ^fj.       229 

makes  it  lefs  worth  the  while  for  Men  to  defire,  and  feek  after 
any  Thing  wherein  their  Vertue  and  Happinefs  confifts  ;  1 
hold  no  Do6lrin€  that  is  clog'd  with  any-  fuch  Inconvenience, 
any  more  than  any  other  Scheme  whatfoever  ;  and  by  no 
Means  fo  much  as  the  Jrm'inian  Scheme  of  Contingence  ;  as 
has  been  Ihewn.  If  they  held  any  fuch.  Dodrine  of  univerfal 
Fatality,  as  is  inconfiftent  with^ny  Kind  of  Liberty,  that  is 
or  can  be  any  Perfection,  Dignity,  Privilege  or  Benefit,  or 
any  Thing  defirable,  in  any  Refpect,  for  any  intelligent  Crea- 
ture, or  indeed  with  any  Liberty  that  is  poiflible  or  conceivable  ; 
lembrace  no  fuch  Doctrine;  If  they  held  any  fuch  Doctrine 
of  Fate  as  is  inconfiftent  with  the  World's  being  in  all  Things 
fubject  to  the  Difpofal  of  an  intelligent  wife  Agent,  that  pre- 
lides,  not  as  the  Soul  of  the  World,  but  as  the  fovereign  Lord 
of,  the  Univerfe,  governing  all  Things  by  proper  Will,  Choice 
.and  Defign,  in  the  Exercife  of  the  moft  perfect  Liberty  con- 
ceivable, without  Subjection  to  any  Conftraint,  or  being  pro- 
perly under  the  Power  or  Influence  of  any  Thing  befote,  above 
or  without  himfelf  ;  I  wholly  renounce  any  fuch  Doctrine. 

'  As  to  Mr.  Hobbes's  maintaining  the  fame  Doctrine  concern- 
ing NeceiTity  ;— I  confefs,  it  happens  I  never  read  Mr.  Hobbes, 
Let  his  Opinion  be  what  it  will,  we  need  not  reject  all 
Truth  which  is  demonftrated  by  clear  Evidence,  meerly  be- 
caufe  it  was  once  held  by  fome  bad  Man.-  This  great  Truth, 
that  Jefus  is  thj  Son  of  God,  was  not  fpoil'd  becaufe  it  was* 
once  and  again  proclaimed  with  a  loud  Voice  by  the  Devil. 
If  Truth  is  fo  defiled  becaufe  it  is  fpoken  by  the  Mouth,  or 
written  by  the  Pen  of  fome  ill-minded  mifchievous  Man,  that 
it  muft  never  be  received,  we  fhall  never  know  when  we  hold 
any  of  the  moft  precious  and  evident  Truths  by  a  lure 
Tenure.  And  if  Mr.  Hobbes  has  made  a  bad  Ufe  of  this 
Truth,  that  is  to  be  lamented  :  bat  the  Truth  is  not  to  be 
tho't  worthy  of  Reje6lion  on  that  Account.  'Tis  common  for 
the  Corruptions  of  the  Hearts  of  evil  Men,  to  abufe  the  beft 
Things  to  vile  Purpofes. 

I  might  alfo  take  Notice  of  it's  having  been  obferved,  that 
the  ArminidJis  agree  with  Mr.  Hobbes  f  in  many  more  Things 
than  the  Cahinijh.  As,  in  what  he  is  faid  to  hold  concerning 
Original  Sin,  in  denying  the  Neceffity  of  fupernatural  Illumi- 
nation, in  denying  infufed  Grace,  in  denying  the  Dodrine  of 
Juftification  by  Faith  alone  ,  and  other  Things. 

t  Dr.  Gill,  in  his  Anfwcr  to  Dr.  IVhithy.  Vol.  3.  P.  1 83,  &c. 

Section 


230       Concerning  the  Neceffity     Part  IV. 

Section     VIL 
Concerning  the  NecefTity  of  the  Divine  Will. , 

^OME  may  pofTibly  obje6l  againft  what  has  be^n  fuppofed 
^S  of  the  Abfurdity  and  Inconfiftence  ,of  a  feif-determining 
Power  in  the  Will,  and  the^  ImpolfibilJty  of  it's  being 
otherwife,  than  that  the  Will  fhould  be  determined  in  every^ 
Cafe  by  fome  Motive,  and  by  a  Motive  which  (as  it  (lands 
in  the  Viev/  of  the  UnderRanding)  is  of  fuperiour  Strength  to 
any  appearing  on  the  other  Side  ;  That  if  thefe  Thmgs  are 
true,  it  will  follow,  that  not  only  the  Will  of  created  A4inds, 
but  the  Will  of  GqcI  Hhnfelf  is  necefiaryin  all  it's  Determina- 
tions. Concerning  which  fays  the  Authpr  of  the  EJfay.  on  the 
Freedj?n  of  IVill  hi  God  and  m  the  Creature'  {V^g^  85,  86.) 
What  llrange  Doctrine  is  .  this,.,  contrary  to  ail  our  Ideas  oi 
the  Dominion  of  God  ?  Does  it  not  deftroy  the  Glory  of 
his  Liberty  of  Choice,  and  take  away  from  the  Creator  and 
Governour  and  Benefactor  of  the.  World,  that  moft  free  and 
fovereign  Agent,  all  the  Glory  of  this. Sort  of  Freedom  ? 
Does  it  not  feem  to  make  Him  a  Kind  of  mechanical  Me- 
dium of  Fate,  and  introduce  Mr.  Hohbcs's  Dodrine  of  Fata.- 
li'ty  and  NecelTity,  into  all  Things  that  God  hath  to  do 
with  ?  Does  it  riot  feem  to  reprefent  the  blelTed  Go^,  as  a 
Being  of  vaft  Underftanding,  as  well  as  Power  and  Effi- 
ciency, but  flill  to  leave  Him  without  a  Will  to  chufe  among 
all  the  Objects  within  his  View^  ?  In  fliort,  it  feems  to  make 
the  blefTed  God  a  Sort  of  almighty  Minifter  of  Fate,  under 
it's  univerfal  and  fupream  Influence  ;  as  it  was  the  profefs'd 
Sentiment  of  fome  of  the  Antknts,  that  Fate  was  above  the 
Gods." 

This  is  declaiming,  rather  than  arguing  5  and  an  Applica- 
tion to  Men's  Imaginations  and  Prejudices,  rather  than  to  meer 

Reafon. But  1  would  calmly  endeavour  to  confider  whether 

there  be  any  Reafon   in   this  frightful  Reprefentation. But 

before  I  enter  upon  a  particular  Confideration  of  the  Matter,  I 
would  obferve  this  :  That  'tis  reafonable  to  fuppofe,  it  ftiould 
be  much  more  difficult  to  exprefs  or  conceive  Things  accord- 
ing to  exa<5t  metaphyfical  Truth,  relating  to  the  Nature  and 
Manner  of  the  Exigence  of  Things  in  the  divine  Underftand- 
ing  and  Will,  and   the  Operaticn  of  thefe  Faculties  (if  I  may 

fo 


Seel.  VII.       of  the  Divine  Volume.       231 

To  call  them)  of  the  divine  Mind,  than  in  the  human  Mind  ; 
which  is  infinitely  more  within  our  View,  and  nearer  to  a 
Propottion  to  the  Meafure  of  our  Comprehenfion,  and  more 
commenfurate  to  the  Ufe  and  Import  of  human  Speech. 
Language  is  indeed  very  deficient,  in  Regard  of  Terms  to 
exprefs  precife  Truth  concerning  our  own  Minds,  and  their 
Faculties  and  Operations.     Words  Vv^ere  iirft  formed  to  exprefs 

-external  Things  ;  and  thofe  that  are  applied  to  exprefs  Things 
internal  and  fpiritual,  are  almoft  all  borrowed,and  ufed  in  a  Sort 
ef  figurative  Senfe.  Whence  they  are  mofl  of 'em  attended  with 
a  great  Deal  of  Ambiguity  and  Unfixednefs  in  their  Signitica^ 

-tion,  occafioning  innumerable  Doubts,  Difficulties  and  Confu- 
fions  in  Enquiries  and  Controverfies  about  Things  of  this  Na- 
ture. But  Language  is  much  lefs  adapted  to  exprefs  Things 
in  the  Mind  of  the  incomprehenfible  Deity,precifely  as  they  are. 

We  find  a  great  Deal  of  Difficulty  in  conceiving  exadly  of 
the  Nature  of  our  own  Souls.  And  notwithftanding  all  the 
Progrefs  which  has  been  made  in  pad  and  prefent  Ages,  in 
this  Kind  of  Knowledge,  whereby  our  Metaphyficks,  as  it 
relates  to  thefe '  Things,  is  brought  to  greater  Perfe6tion  than 
once  it  Was  ;  yet  here  is  flill  Work  enough  left  for  future  En- 
quiries and  Refearches,  and  Room  for  Progrefs  flill  to  be  made. 
Tor  many  Ages  and  Generations.  But  we  had  need  to  b^  in- 
finitely able  Metaphyiicians,  to  conceive  withClearnefs,  accord- 
ing to  ftricl,  proper  and  perfed  Truth,  concerning  the  Nature 
of  the  divine  EfTence,  and  the  Modes  of  the  Adion  and  Ope- 
ration of  the  Powers  of  the  divine  Mind. 

And  it  may  be  noted  particularly,  that  tho'  we  are  obliged 
^to  conceive  of  fome  Things  in  God  as  confequent  and  depen- 
dent on  others,  and  of  fome  Things  pertaining  to  the  divine 
Nature  and  Will  as  the  Foundation  of  others,  and  fo  before 
others  in  the  Order  of  Nature  :  As,  we  muft  conceive  of  the 
Knowledge  and  Holinefs  of  God  as  prior  in  the  Order  of  Na- 
ture to  his  Happinefs  ;  the  Perfedion  of  his  Underftanding,  as 
the  Foundation  of  his  wife  Purpofes  and  Decrees  ;  the  Ploli- 
nefs  of  his  Nature,  as  the  Caufe  and  Reafon  of  his  holy  De- 
I  terminations.  And  yet  v/hen  v/e  fpeak  of  Caufe  and  Effedf , 
Antecedent  and  Confequent,  fundamental  and  dependent,  de- 
termining and  determined,  in  the  firfc  Being,  who  is  felf- 
cxifient,  independent,  of  perfe^ft  and  abfolute  Simplicity  and 
Imm.utability,  and  the  firft  Caufe  of  all  Things  ;  doubtlefs 
there  mull:  be  lefs  Propriety  in  fuchPvepref&utations,  than  when 

we 


232  Necefftty  of  aSiing  mojl  wifely.  Part  IV. 

we  fpeak  of  derived  dependent  Beings,  who  are  compounded, 
and  liable  to  perpetual  Mutation  and  Succeflion. 


' 


Having  premifed   this,   I  proceed  to  obferve  concerning  the  i 

foremention'd  Author's  Exclamation,  •showX.i^ix^  necejjary  Deter-  .J 

mination  of  God's  IVill^  in  all  Things,    by  v^at  He  fees  to  be  \ 

fitteji  and  beji.                                                                                  '  \ 

That  all  the  feeming  Force  of  fuch  Obje6lions  and  Excla- 
mations muft  arife  from  an  Imagination,  that  there  is  fomc  i  1 
Sort  of  Privilege  or  Dignity  in  being  without  fuch  a  moral  ; 
Neceffity,  as  will  make  it  impoliible  to  do  any  other,  than  ;^ 
always  chufe  what  is  wifeft  and  beft  ;  as  tho'  there  were  fome  ^c 
Difadvantage,  Meannefs  and  Subje6tion,  in  fuch  a  NecelTity  ;  "j 
a  Thing  by  which  the  Will  was  confined,  kept  under,  and  \i 
held  in  Servitude  by  fomething,-which,  as  it  were,  maintained  >\ 
a  ftrong  and  invincible  Power  and  Dominion  over  it,  by  Bonds  \\ 
that  held  him  fail:,  and  that  he  could  by  no  Means  deliver  { 
himfeif  from.  Whereas,  this  muft  be  all  meer  Imagination  i 
and  Delufion.  'Tis  no  Difadvantage  or  Dilhonour  to  a  Being,  \ 
neceiTariJy  to  a(5t  in  the  moft  excellent  and  happy  Manner,  ' 
from  the  necelTary  Perfedlion  of  his  own  Nature.  This  argues  i 
no  Imperfe6tion,  Inferiority  or  Dependance,  nor  any  Want  of  \ 
Dignity,  Privilege  or  Afcendancy.  f  'Tis  not  inconfiflent  with  j 

the  \ 

•)-  *'  It  might  have  been  objefted  with  much  more  Plaufiblenefs,  that  j 

"  the   fupreme  Caufe   cannot   be   free,  becaufe  he  mutt  needs  do  | 

"  always  what  is  beft  in   the  Whole.     But   this  would   not  at  all  i^ 

*'  ferve  Spinoza  s  Purpofe  :  For  this  is  a  Necefhty,   not  of  Nature  pj 

*•  and  Fate,  but  of  Fitnefs  and   Wifdom  ;    a  Neceffity  confiftent  ji 

•«  with  the  greateft  Freedom,   and  moft    perfeft  Choice.     For  the  lii 

"  only  Foundation  of  this  Neceffity  is  fuch  an  unalterable   Refti-  |^ 

*'  tude  of  Will,   and  Perfeflion  of  Wifdom,   as  makes  it  impoffible  I' 

*'  for  a  wife  Being   to  ad  foolifhiy."     C/arF&  Dem.  of  the  Being  J 

"  and  Attrib.  of  God.  Edit.  6.  P.  64.  ^ 

"  Tho' God  is  a  moft  perfeftly   free  Agent,  yet  he  cannot  but  do.  5 

*'  always  what  is   beft  and  wifeft  in    the   Whole.     The  Reafon  i^  ^  !^ 

"  evident ;  becaufe  perfeft  Wifdom  and   Goodnefs  are  as    fteady*'  j.- 

"  and  certain  Principles   of  Adion,   as  Neceffity  itfejf  ;  and   an'  fi 

**  infinitely  wife    and  good    Being,  indued  with    the   moft  perfect  ? 

*'  Liberty,  can    no  more    chufe  to  aft  in  Contradiftion  to  Wifdom'  f] 

•*  and  Goodnefs,    than    a  neceffary  Agent   can  aft  contrary  to  the  ^ 

*'  Neceffity  by  which  it  is  afted  ;  it  being  as  great  an  Abfurdity  and  > 

«*  impoffibility  in  Choice,  for  infinite  Wifdom  to  chufe   to  aft  un-  \\ 

*'  wifely,  or  infinite  Goodnefs  to  chufe  what  is  not  good,   asit  would  i 

••  be 


;  Se.VII.  agreahle  to  mojl perfeBUhzYty.  233 

il  the  abfolute,  and  moft  perfe6l  Sovereignty  of  God.  The 
I  Sovereignty  of  God  is  his  Ability  and  Authority  to  do  what- 
'  ever  pleafes  Him  ;  v^^hereby  He  doth  accord'mg  to  his  TVill  in  the 
.  Armies  of  Heaven^  and  amon^  the  Inhabitants    of  the   Earthy    and 

none  canjiay  his  Hand^  or  fay    unto    hirfi^  What  dofi  thou  ? The 

I  following  Things  belong  to  the  Sovereignty  of  God  ;  vi-z, 
\  (i.)  Supreme,  univerfal,  and  infinite  Ptjwn*;  whereby  he  is 
able  to  do  what  he  pleafes,  without  Controul,  without  any 
■  (Confinement  of  that  Power,  without  any  Subje(5\ion  in  the  leaft 
Meafure  to  any  other  Power  ;  and  fo  without  any  Hindrance 
or  Refiraint,  that  it  fhould  be  either  impolTible,  or  at  all 
difficult,  for   him  to  accomplifli   his  Will  3  and  without  any 

G  g  Dependance 

"  be  in  Nature,  for  abfolute  Neceffity  to  fail  of  producing  its  ne- 
*'  ceffary  EfFeft.  There  was  indeed  no  Neceffity  in  Nature,  thac 
*'  (jod  Ihould  at  firll  create  fuch  Beings  as  he  has  created,  or  in- 
*'  deed  any  Being  at  all  ;  becaufe  he  is  in  himftilf  infinitely  happy 
"  and  Allfaflicient.  There  was  alfo  no  Neceffity  in  Nature,  that 
•'  he  fhould  preferve  and  continue  Things  in  Being,  after  they  were 
*'  created;  becaufe  he  would  be  felffufiicient  without  their  Conti- 
"  nuance,  as  he  was  before  their  Creation.  But  it  was  fit  and  wife 
-<•  and  good,  that  infinite  Wifdora  fhould  manifeft,  and  infinite  Good- 
*'  nefs  communicate  itfelf ;  and  therefore  it  was  neceilary,  in  the 
"  Senfe  of  Neceffity  I  am  now  fpeaking  of,  that  Things  ihould  be 
^  •'  made  at  fuch  a  l'i?ne^  and  cor^tinued  fo  long^  and  indeed  with. 
**  various  Perfedlions  in  fuch  Degrees,  as  infinite  VVifdom  and 
"  Goodnefs  faw  it  wifeft  and  bell  that  they  fhould."  Ibid,  P.  1 1 2,1 1 3. 
*'  'Tis  not  a  Fault,  but  a  Perfedion  of  our  Nature,  to  defirc,  will  and 

**  adl,  according  to  the  laft  Rcfult  of  a  fair  Examination. This 

**  is  fo  far  from  being  a  Reftraint  or  Diminution  of  Freedom,  that 
*'  it  is  the  very  Improvement  and  Benefit  of  it :  'Tis  not  an  Abridg- 
"  ment,  'ds  the  End  and  Ufe  of  our  Liberty  ;  and  the  further  we 
"  are  removed  from  fuch  a  Determination,  the  nearer  we  are  ta, 
*'  Mifery  and  Slavery.  A  perfed:  JndifTerence  in  the  Mind,  noc 
*'  determinable  by  its  lafl  Judgment  of  the  Good  or  Evil  that  is 
*'  thought  to  attend  its  Choice,  would  be  fo  far  from  being  an  Ad- 
*'  vantage  and  Excellency  of  any  inteJiedlual  Nature,  that  it  would 
•*  be  as  great  an  Imperfedion,as  the  Want  of  IndifFerency  to  a£l,  or 
**  not  to  ad,  till  determined  by  the  Will,  would  be  an  Imperfedtion 

**  on  the  other  Side." Tis  as  much  a  Perfedion,  that  Defire 

**  or  the  Power  of  preferring  fhould  be  determined  by  Good,  as  that 

**  the  Power  of  ading  fliould  be  determined  by  the  Will  :  And  the 

**  certainer  fuch  Determination  is,  the  greater  the  Perfedion,     Nay, 

"  were  we  determined  by  any  Thing  but  the  lall  Refult  of  our  owa 

^**  Minds,  judging  of  the  Good  or  Evil  of  any  Adion,  we  were 

?     "  not  U^Q,     The  very  End  of  our  Freedom  being,  t!:at  we  might 

M.  »»  attam 


2  3  4  Necejftty  of  aEiing  moji  wifely,  Part  IV. 

Dependance  of  his  Power  on  any  other  Power,  from  whence 
it  fliould  be  derived,  or  which  it  (hould  ftand  in  any  Need  of: 
So  far  from  this,  that  all  other  Power  is  derived  from  Him,  \ 
and  is  abfolutely  dependent  on  Him.  (2.)  That  He  has  fu-  \ 
preme  Authority  ;  abfolute  and  moft  perfect  Right  to  do  what  j 
He  wills,  without  Subjedion  to  any  fuperiour  Authority,  or  • 
any  Derivation  of  Authority  from  any  other,  or  Limitation  by  ; 
any  diftind  independent  Authority,  either  fuperiour,  equal,  or  , 
inferiour  5  he  being  the  Head  of  all  Dominion,  and  Fountain  ; 
of  all.  Authority  ;  and  alfo  without  Reftraint  by  any  Obliga-  \ 
tion,  implying  either  Subje6tion,  Derivation,  br  Dependance,  ; 
or  proper  Limitation.  (3.)  That  his /F/7/ is  fupreme,  unde-  i 
rived,  and  independent  on  any  Thing  without  Himfelf ;  being  j 

in  \ '[ 
J 
*'  attain  theGood  we  chufe  ;  and  therefore  every  Man  is  bro't  under  i 
**  a  NeceiTity  by  his  Conftitution,  as  an  intelligent  Being,  to  be  " 
"  determin'd  in  willing  by  his  own  Thought  and  Judgment,  what  i 
*'  is  beft  for  him  to  do  ;  elfe  he  would  be  under  the  Determination  j 
"  of  fome  other  than  himfelf,  which  is  Want  of  Liberty.  And  to 
**  deny  that  a  Man's  Will,  in  every  Determination,  follows  hisov^n 
**  Judgment,  is  to  fay,  that  a  Man  wills  and  afts  for  an  End  that  ; 
**  he  would  not  have,  at  the  fame  Time  that  he  wills  and  afts  for  it,  ' 
<'  For  if  he  prefers  it  in  his  prefcnt  Thoughts,  before  any  other, 
"  'tis  plain  he  then  thinks  better  of  it,  and  would  have  it  before  any  \ 
*'  other  ;  unlefs  he  can  have,  and  not  have  it;  will,  and  not  will  it,  1 
<*  at  the  fame  Tiroe  ;  a  Contradidtion  too  manifeft  to  be  admitted.--  i 
"  If  we  look  upon  thofe  fuperior  Beings  above  us,  who  enjoy  per-  \ 
«*  fe6l  Happinefs,  we  /hall  have  Reafon  to  judge/that  they  are  more  V 
*'  Readily  determined  in  their  Choice  of  Good  than  we  j  and  yet  f] 
"  we  have  no  Reafon  to  think  they  are  lefs  happy,  or  lefs  free,  than  f^ 
**  we  are.  And  if  it  were  fit  for  fuch  poor  finite  Creatures  as  we  ;^ 
'■  are,  to  pronounce  what  infinite  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  could  do,  ij 
**  I  think  we  might  fay,  that  God  himfelf  cannot  chufe  what  is  not  itj 
"  Good.     The  Freedom  of  the  Almighty  hinders  not  his  being  deter minei  "^ 

♦*  by  ivhat  is  beji. But  to  give    a  right  View  of   this  miftaken  % 

*'  Part  of  Liberty,  let  me  a/k,  Would  any  one  be  a  Changeling,  | 
**  becaufe  he  is  lefs  determined  by  v/ife  Determinations,  than  a  wife'  | 
"  Man  ?  Is  it  worth  the  Name  of  Freedom,  to  be  atLiberty  to  play  ii, 
**  the  Fool,  and  draw  Shame  and  Mifery  upon  a  Man's  felf  ?  If  to  > 
•*  break  loofe  from  the  Condudl  of  Reafon,  and  to  want  that  fi 
*'  Reftraint  of  Examination  and  Judgment,  that  keeps  us  from  \\ 
*'  doing  or  chufing  the  worfe,  be  Liberty,  true  Liberty,  Mad -men  ;j 
*'  and  Fools  are  the  only  free  Men.  Yet  I  think  no  Body  would  | 
*'  chufe  to  be  mad,  for  the  fake  of  fuch  Liberty,  but  he  that  is  ' 
*♦  mad  already.  Locke,  Hum.  Und.  Vol.  I.  Edit.  7.  P.  215,  216.  j 
**  This  Being  having  all  Things  always  necelTarily  in  View,  mull  al^   j 

••  ways,.  I 


Sed-VII.  ;7(? Meannefs (?r  Difadvantage*  235 

in  every  Thing  det'ermin'd  by  his  own  Counfel,  having  no 
other  Rule  but  his  own  Wifdom  ;  his  Will  not  being  fubjedl 
to,  or  reftrain'd  by  the  Will  of  any  other,  and  others  Wills 
being  perfectly  fubje6t  to  his.  (4.)  That  his  Wifdom^  which 
determines  his  Will,  is  fupreme,  perfe6t,  tinderived,  felf- 
fufficient,  and  independent  ;  io  that  it  may  be  faid  as  in  Ifai. 
■xl.  14.  With  whom  took  He  Counfel  ?  And  who  wjiru5ted  Him  and 
taught  Him  in  the  Path  of  Judgment^  and  taught  Him  Knowlege^  and 

\Jhewed  Him  the    Way   of  Vndcrjianding  f There   is  no    other 

(divine  Sovereignty  but  this  :  and  this  is  properly  ahfolute  Sove- 
reignty :  No  other  is  defirable  ;  nor  would  any  other  be  ho- 
liourable,  or  happy  :  and  indeed  there  is  no  other  conceivable 
or  poffible.  'Tis  the  Glory  and  Greatnefs  of  the  divine 
Sovereignty,  that  God's  Will  is  determin'd  by  his  own  infinite 
all-fufficient  Wifdom  in  every  Thing  ;  and  in  nothing  at  all 
is  either  direded  by  any  infenour  Wifdom,  or  by  no  Wifdom  ; 
whereby  it  would  become  fenfelefs  Ai-bitrarmels,  determining 
and  adlmg  without  Reafon,  Defign  or  End. 

'  G  g  2  If 

ways,  and  eternally  will,  according  to  his  'infinite  Comprehenfion 
of  Things;  thac  is,  mull  will  all  Things  that  arewifeil  and  bell  to 
be  done.  There  is  no  getting  free  of  this  Confequence.  If  it 
can  will  at  all,  it  mufl  will  this  Way .  To  be  capable  of  know- 
ing, and  not  capable  of  u'il'ing,  is  not  to  be  underftood.  And 
to  be  capable  of  willing  otherwife  than  what  is  wifeft  and  beft, 
contradids  that  Knowledge  which  is  infinite.  Infinite  Knowledge 
mufl  diredl  the  Will  without  Error      Here   then  is   ths  Origin  of 

moral  NeceJJity  ;   and  that  is  really^  of  Freedom.  ■ Perhaps  it 

may  be  faid,  when  the  divine  Will  is  determined,  from  the  Con- 
fideration  of  the  eternal  Aptitudes  of  Things,  it  is  as  necelTarily 
determined,  as  if  it  were  phyfically  impel'd,  if  that  were  poiTible. 
But  it  is  Unfkilfulnefs,  to  fuppofe  this  an  Objection.  The  great 
Principle  is  once  eftablifhed,  <viz.  That,  the  divine  Will  is  deter- 
mined by  the  eternal  Reafon  and  Aptitudes  of  Things,  inllead  of 
being  phyfically  impelled;  and  after  that,  the  more  (Ircng  and 
neceflary  this  Determination  is,  the  more  pcrfeft  the  Deity  muil 
be  allowed  to  be:  It  is  this  that  makes  him  an  amiable  and 
adorable  Being,  whofe  Will  and  Power  are  condantly,  immutably 
determined,  by  the  Confideration  of  what  is  wifeft  and  beft  ;  in- 
ftead  of  a  furd  Being,  with  Power,  bnt  without  Difcerning  and 
Reafon.  //  is  the  Beauiy  of  this  Necefity,  thnt  it  is  fro?2g  as  Fate 
itfelf    nvith  all  the  Ad'vantnge  of  Ren  fan   and    Goodnefs. It  is 

■  ftrange,  to  fee  Men  contend,  that  the  Deity  is  notFree,  becaufe  he 

■  is  neceflarily  rational,  immutably  good  and  wife  ;  when  a  Man 
is  allowed  ftiil  the  perfecler  Being,  the  more  fixedly  and  conllantly 
his  Will  is  de  ermined  by  Reafon  and  Truth."  Enquiry  into  the 
Nature  of  the  Hum.  Soul.    Edit.  3.  Vol.  II.  P.  403,  404. 


1 

236  Necejfity  of  aEiing  mo  ft  wifely,  Parti  V.  \ 

If  God's  Will  is  fteadily  and  furely  determined  in  every  J 
Thing  by/z//'r^?//^Wifdora,  then  it  is  in  every  Thing  neceiTarily  :i 
determined  to  that  which  is  moji  wife.  And  certainly  it  would  „f 
be  a  Djfadvantage  and  Indignity,  to  be  othervv^ife.  P  or  if  the  J 
divine  Will  was  not  necefiarily  determined  to  that  which  in  '  ( 
every  Cafe  is  wifeft  and  beft,  it  muft  be  fubjec5t  to  fome  Degree  ( 
of  undefigning  Contingence  ;  and  fo  in  the  fame  Degree  i 
liable  to  Evil.  To  fuppofe  the  divine  Will  liable  to  be  carried  j 
hither  and  thither  at  Random,  by  the  uncertain  Wind  of  blind  I 
Contingence,  which  is  guided  by  no  Wifdom,  no  Motive,  no  :; 
intelligent  Didate  whatfoever,  (if  any  fuchThing  were  pbfTible)  i 
would  certainly    argue    a    great  Degree  of  Imperfection  and  \ 

Meannefs,  infinitely  unworthy  of  the  Deity. If  it  be  a  Dif-  J 

advantage,  for  the  divine  Will  to  be  attended  v/ith  this  moral  (j 
NecefTity,  then  the  more  free  from  it,  and  the  more  left  at  j 
Random,  the  greater  Dignity  and  Advantage.  And  confe-  \ 
quently  to  be  perfectly  free  from  the  Direction  of  Underftand-  \ 
ing,  and  univerfally  and  entirely  left  to  fenfelefs  unmeaning! 
Contingence,  to  act  abfolutely  at  Random,  would  be  the  \ 
fupreme  Glory.  "^  ,, 


It  no  more  argues  any  Dependence  of  God's  Will,  that  his  \ 
fupremely  wife   Volition  is  ncceffary,  than  it  argues  a  Depcn-  -J 
dence  of  his  Being,   that  his  Exiftence  is  necellary.     If  it  be  i 
fomething  too  low,  for  the  fupreme  Being  to  have  his  Will  de-  i^ 
termined  by  moral  Ne^ceffity,    fo  as  neceiTarily,   in  every  Caf^  1! 
to  will    in  the  higheil:    Degree    holily  and  happily  ;  then  why 
is  it  not  alfo  fom.ething/too  low,  for  him  to  have  hisExiftence, 
and   the  infinite  Perf^edion   of   his  Nature,    and  his   infinite 
Happinefs  determined  by  NecefTity  ?  It   is  no  more  to   God's 
Diilionour,  to  be  necefTarily  wife,  than  to  be  necefTarily  holy.> 
And   if    neither   of  them    be  to   his    Dilhonour,   then   it  i^ 
not  to  his  Difhonour  necefTarily   to  ad  holily  and  wifely.   An<t 
if  it  be  not  diihonourable,  to  be   necefTarily  holy   and  wife,  iii 
the  highefi  pofTible  Degree,  no  more  is  it  mean  or  diflionour- , 
able,  necefTarily  to  act  holily  and  wifely  in  the  higheil  pofTible 
Degree  ;  or  (vv'hich  is  the  fame  Thing)   to   do  that,  in   every 
Cafe,  which  above  all  other  Things  is  wifefl  andbefl.  • 

The  R.eafon  why  it  is  not  difhonourable,  to  be  necefTarily 
7n'iji  holy,  is,  becaufe  Holinefs  in  itfelf  is  an  excellent  and 
honourable  Thing.  Eor  the  fame  Reafon,  it  is  no  Difhonour 
to  be  necefTarily  rr.cj}  wife,  and  in  every  Cafe  to  a(5t  moft  wifely, 
or  do  the  Thing  which  is  the  wifefl  of  all  ;  for  Wifdom  is 
alfo  i»  it  felf  excellent  and  honourable. 

TheJ 


Sed.VII.  /^^  Meannefs  (^r  Difad vantage.  237 

The  forementioned  Author  of  the  EJpiy  on  the  Freedom  of  IVtll 
Sec.  as  has  been  obferved,  reprefents  that  Do6lrine  of  the 
divine  Will's  being  in  every  Thing  neceflarily  determined  by 
fuperior  Fitnefs,  as  making  the  blefled  God  a  Kind  of  al- 
mighty Minifter  and  mechanical  Medium  of  Fate  :  And  he 
infifts,  P.  93,  94.  that  this  moral  NeceiTity  and  ImpolTibility  is 
in  Effea  the  fame  Thing  with  phyfical  and  natural  NecelTity 
and  Impoffibility  :  And  in  P.  54,  55.  he  fays,  "  The  Scheme 
"  which  determines  the  Will  always  and  certainly  by  the 
"  Underflanding,  and  the  Underftanding  by  the  Appearance 
"  of  Things,  feems  to  take  away  the  true  Nature  of  Vice 
"  and  Vert^ue.  For  the  fublimefi:  of  Vertues,  and  the  vileil 
"  of  Vices,  feem  rather  to  be  Matters  of  Fate  and  Neceffity, 
"  flowing  naturally  and  neceflarily  from  the  Exiftence,  the 
"  Circumliances,  and  prefent  Situation  of  Perfons  andThings  : 
"  For  this  Exiilence  and  Situation  neceflTarily  makes  fuch  an 
"  Appearance  to  the  Mind  ;  from  this  Appearance  flows  a 
"  neceflary  Perception  and  Judgment,  concerning  thefeThings; 
"  this  Judgment  neceflTarily  determines  the  Will  :  And  thus 
"  by  this  Chain  of  necefl'ary  Caufes,  Vertue  and  Vice  would 
"  iofe  their  Nature,  and  become  natural  Ideas,  and  neceflary 
"  Things,  infl:ead  of  moral  and  free  Adions." 

And  yet  this  fame  Author  allows,  P.  30,  31.  That  a  per- 
fe6i:ly  wife  Being  will  confl;antly  and  certainly  chufe  VN^hat  is 
?nofl:  fit  ;  and  fays,  P.  102,  103.  "  I  grant,  and  ahvays  have 
"  granted,  that  wherefoever  there  is  fuch  an  antecedent  fupe- 
"  nor  Fitnefs  of  Things,  God  acts  according  to  it,  fo  as  never 
"  to  contradi<St  it ;  and  particularly,  in  all  his  judicial  Pro- 
"  ceedings,  as  a  Governor,  and  Diftributer  of  Rewards  and 
"  Puniflimcnts."  Yea,  he  fays  exprefly,  P.  42.  "  That  it  is 
*'_  not  poflible  for  God  to  act  otherwife,  than  according  to 
"  this  Fitnefs   and  Goodnefs  in  Things." 

So  that  according  to  this  Author,putting  thefe  feveralPafiages 
of  his  EflPay  together,  there  is  fio  Vertue^  nor  any  Thing  of  a  moral 
Nature,  in  the  moft  fublime  and  glorious  A6ts  and  Exercifes  of 
God's  Holinefs,  Juftice,  and  Faithfulnefs  ;  and  He  never  does 
any  Thing  which  is  in  it  felf  fupreamly  worthy,  and  above  dl 
other  Things  fit  and  excellent,  but  only  as  a  Kind  of  mecha- 
nical Medium  of  Fate  ;  and  in  iJuhat  he  does  as  the  Judge^  and 
moral  Governor  of  the  IVorld,  He  exercifes  no  moral  Excellency  ; 
exercifing  no  Freedom  in  thefe  Things,  becaufe  He  a6ts  by 
moral  Neccflity,  \Yhich  is  in  Effect  the  fame  with   phyfical   or 

natural 


2Z^]Veceffity  of  Govs  a^  wifely,^c.  P.IV. 

natural  Neceffity  ;  and  therefore  he  only  a6ts  by  an  Hohhiftical 
Fatality  \  as  a  Being  indeed  ofvaji  Vnderjianding>,  as  ivcll  as  Poiuer 
and  Efficiency  (as  He  iaid  before)  but  wiihout  a  Will  to  chufe^  being 
a  Kind  cf  almighty  Adinifier  of  Fate^  acting  under  ifsfupreafu  In- 
fiuenee.  For  He  allows,  that  in  all  thefe  Things  God's  Will 
is  determined  conftantly  and  certainly  by  a  fuperiour  Fitnefs, 
and  that  it  is  not  poffible  for  Him  to  acft  otherwife.  And  if 
thefe  Things  are  fo,  what  Glory  or  Praife  belongs  to  God 
for  doing  holily  and  judly,  or  taking  the  moft  fit,  holy,  wife 
and  excellent  Courfe,  in  any  one  Inftance  ?  Whereas,  accord- 
ing to  the  Scriptures,  and  alio  the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind, 
it  don't  in  the  leaft  derogate  from  the  Honour  of  any  Being, 
that  through  the  moral  Perfedlion  of  his  Nature,  he  necelTarily 
sets  with  fupream  Wifdom  and  Holinefs  :  But  on  the  con- 
trary, his  Praife  is  the  greater  :  Herein  confifts  the  Height  of 
his  Glory. 

The  fame  Author,  P.  56.  fuppofes,  that  herein  appears  the 

excellent  Character  of  a  zvife  and  good  lidan^  that  tho'  he  can  chuje 
contrary  to  the  Fitnefs  of  Things^  yet  he  does  not  ;  hut  fuff'ers  himfef 
U  be  dire^ed  by  Fitnefs  ;  and  that  in  this  Condu<^  He  imitates 
the  bleffed  God.  And  yet  He  fuppofes  'tis  contrariwife  with  the 
blefled  God  ;  not  that  he  fufrers  Himfelf  to  be  direded  by 
Fitnefs,  when  He  can  clmfe  contrary  totheFitnefs  of  Things^  but  that 
he  cannot  chufe  contrary  to  the  Fitnefs  of  Things  -,  as  he  fays,  P.  42. 
— Tl:at  it  is  not  poffible  for  God  to  a^  otherwife^  than^  accorditig  to 
this  Fitnefs^  where  there  is  any  Fitnefs  or  Goodn^s  in  Things  :  Ye  a,  he 
fuppofes,  P.  31.  That  if  a  Man  were  fetfe^ily  wife  and  good^  he 
could  not  do  otherwife  than  be  conflantly  and  certainly  determined  by  the 
Fitnefs  of  Things. 

One  Thing  more  I  would  obferve,  before  I  conclude  this 
Section ;  and  that  is,  that  if  it  derogates  nothing  from  the 
Glory  of  God,  to  be  necelTarily  determined  by  fuperior  Fitnefs 
in  fome  Things,  then  neither  does  it  to  be  thus  determined  in 
all  Things  ;  from  any  Thing  in  the  Nature  of  fuch  Neceffity, 
as  at  all  detrading  from  God's  Freedom,  Independence,  abfo- 
lute  Supremacy,  or  any  Dignity  or  Glory  of  his  Nature,  State, 
or  Manner  of  ading  ;  or  as  implying  any  Infirmity,  Reftraint, 
or  Subjection.  And  if  the  Thing  be  fuch  as  well  confifts  with 
God's  Glory,  and  hasnothing  tending  at  all  to  detracSl  from 
it  ;  then  we  need  not  be  afraid  of  afcribing  it  to  God  in  too 
many  Things,  left  thereby  we  fhould  detra6t  from  God's 
Glory  too  much. 

Section 


(     239     ) 
Section     VIII. 

Some  further  ObjeEiions  againji  the  moral 
Neceffity  of  God's  Volitions  conjidered. 

THE  Author  laft  cited,  as  has  been  obferved,  owns  that 
God,  being  perfedly  wife,  will  conftantly  and  certainly 
chufe  what  appears  moft  fit,  where  there  is  a  fuperior 
Fitnefs  and  Goodnefs  in  Things  j  and  that  it  is  not  pomble 
for  him  to  do  otherwife.  So  that  it  is  in  Effed  confefs'd,  that 
in  thole  Things  where  there  is  any  real  Preferablenefs, 
'tis  no  Diflionour,  nothing  in  any  Refpec^  unworthy  of  God, 
for  him  to  a6l  from  Neceffity  ;  notwithftanding  all  that  can 
be  obje6tcd  from  the  Agreement  of  fuch  a  Neceflity, .  with  the 
Fate  oit\\Q-Stoicks^  and  the  Neceflity  maintain'd  hylAx.  Hobbes, 
From  which  it  will  follow,  that  if  it  were  fo,  that  in  all  the 
different  Things,  among  which  God  chufes,  there  were  ever- 
more a  fuperior  Fitnefs  or  Preferablencfs  on  one  Side,  then  it 
would  be  no  Dilhonour,  or  any  Thing,  in  any  Refpe6f,  un- 
worthy, or  unbecoming  of  God,  for  his  Will  to  be  neceffarily 
determined  in  every  Thing.  And  if  this  be  allowed,  it  is  a 
giving  up  entirely  the  Argument,  from  the  Unfuitablenefs  of 
fuch  a  Neceifity  to  the  Liberty,  Supremacy,  Independence  and 
Glory  of  the  divine  Being  ;  and  a  refting  the  wholeWeight  of 
-the  Affair  on  the  Decifion  of  anotherPoint  wholly  diverfe  ;  viz. 
Whether  it  be  fo  indeed^  that  in  all  the  various  poifibie  Things 
which  are  in  God's  View,  and  may  be  confidered  as  capable 
ObjecSls  of  his  Choice,  there  is  not  evermore  a  Preferabienefs 
in  one  Thing  above  another.  This  is  denied  by  thisAuthor  ; 
w{io  fuppofes,  that  in  many  Inftances,  between  two  or  more 
poiTible  Things,  which  come  v/ithin  the  View  of  the  divine 
Mind,  there  is  a  perfe6t  Indifference  and  Equality  as  to  Fitnefs, 
or  Tendency  to  attain  any  good  End  which  God  can  have  in 
View,  or  to  anfwer  any  of  his  Deiigns.  Now  therefore  I 
would  coniider  whether  this  be  evident. 


r  The  Arguments  brought  to  prove  this,  are  of  two  Kinds, 
(i.)  It  is    urged,  that    in  many    Inllances    w^e    mufl   fuppofe 

.there  is  abfolutely  no  Difference  between  various  poffible  Ob- 
jeds  of  Choice,  which   God  has  in  View  :  And  (2,). that  the 

•^    .  Difference 


240  0/* God's  creating  the  World^  Part  IV. 

Difference  between  many  Things  is  fo  inconfiderable,  or  of 
fuch  a  Nature,  that  it  would  be  unreafonable  to  fuppofe  it  to 
be  of  any  Confequence  ;  or  to  fuppofe  that  any  of  God's  wife 
Defigns  would  not  be  anfwered  in  oneWay  as  well  as  the  other. 


Therefore,  ,) 

I.  The  firft  Thing  to    be  confidered  is,  "Whether  there  are  \ 

any   Inftances   wherein  there   is   a   perfe(5l  Likenefs,   and  ab-  - 

folutely  no  Difference,between  different  Objeds  of  Choice, that  i: 

are  propofed  to  the  divine  Underffanding  ?              '  ^ 

And  here  in  the  firjl  Place,   it  may    be  worthy  to  be  confi-  " 

dered,   whether  the  Contradiction  there  is  in  the  Ti?r;?2^  of  the  1 

Queftidn  propofed,   don't  give  Reafon  to  fufpedl  that    tliere  is  'i 

an  Inconfirtence   in   the  Thhig  fuppofed.     'Tis  inquired,  whe-  ;j 

ther  different  Objects  of  Choice   mayn't   be    ab  folutely  withcut  \ 

Difference  P  If  they  .are  abfolutely  zvithout  Difference^  then  how  i 

are  they  different  Objeds  of  Choice  ?  If  there  be  abfolutely  no  j 

Difference  in  any  Refpe6t,  then  there  is  no  Variety  or  DiJiinSiion  :  ' 

For  DiftinCtion  is  only  by  fome  Difference.     And  if  there  be  ] 

no  Variety    among  propofed  OhjeSfs  of  Choice^   then  there    is  no  j 

Opportunity  for  Variety  of  Choice^  orDifference  of  Determination.  1 

For  that  Determination  of  a  Thing  w^hich    is  not  different  in  j 

any  Refpedt,  is  not  a  different  Determination,  .  but   the  fame.  \ 

That  this  is  no  Quibble,  inay  appear  more  fully  anon.  I 

ii 

The  Arguments,  to  prove  that  the  moft  High,  in  fome  In-  ' 

ftances,  chufes  to  do  one  Thing  rather   than  another,   where  | 

the  Things  themfelves  are   perfe6tly    without  Difference,   are  1 

two.                              -  j 

I.  That  the  various  Parts  of   infinite  Time  and  Space,    ab-  | 

folutely  confidered,  are  perfedtly   alike,   and    don't  differ  at  all  | 

one  from  another  :  And  that  therefore,  when  God  determined  | 

to  create  the  World   in  fuch   a  Part  of  infinite  Duration    and  ! 

Space,  rather  than  others,  he  determin'd  and  prefer'd  among  '. 
various  Objects,    between  which  there  w^as  no  Preferablenefs, , 
and  abfolutely  no  Difference. 

Jnfiv.  This  Objection  fuppofes  an  infinite  Length  of  Time 
before  theVv^orld  was  created,  diftinguifhed  by  fucceffive  Parts, 
properly  and  truly  fo  ;  or  a  Succeffion  of  limited  and  unmea- 
furable  Periods  of  Time,  following  one  another,  in  an  infi- 
nitely long  Series  :  which  muff  needs  be  a  groundlefs  Imagi- 
nation. The  eternal  Duration  which  was  before  the  Worlds 
Veing  only  the  I'2ternity  of  God's  Exiflence  ;  which  is  nothing 

elle 


Sed.VlIL    atfuch  a  Time  ^W  Place.    1\X 

clfe  but  his  immediate,  perfetfl  and  invariable  Poffeffion  of  the 
whole  of  his  unlimited  Life,  together  and  at  once  5  Vita  inter- 
fninabtlis^' tota^  ftmtil  ^  perfeSfa  Pojfeffio.  Which  is  fo  generally 
allowed,  that  I  need  not  ftand  to  demonftrate  it*  * 

So  this  Obje6lion  fuppofes  an  Extent  of  Space  beyond  the 
Limits  of  the  Creation,  of  an  infinite*  Length,  Breadth  and 
Depth,  truly  and  properly  diftinguilhed  inta  different  meafur- 
able  Parts,  limited  at  certain  Stages,  one  beyond  another,  in 
an  infinite  Series.  Which  Notion  of  abfolute  and  infinite  Space 
is  doubtlefs  as  unreafonable,   as  that  now  mention'd,  of   abfo- 

H  h  lute 

*  "  if  all  created  Beings  were  taken  away,  all  t^oflibility  of  any  Mu- 
"  tation  or  Succeffion  of  one  Thing  to  another  would  appear  to 
*'  be  alfo  removed.  Abftraft  Succeffion  in  Eternity  is  fcarce  to  be 
**  underftood.  What  is  it  that  fiicceeds  ?  One  Minute  to  another 
*'  perhaps,  ^velut  unda  Jupewenit  undam.  But  when  we -imagine 
**  this,  we  fancy  that  the  Minutes  are  Things  feparately  exifting. 
•*  This  is  the  common  Notion  ;  and  yet  it  is  a  manifeft  Prejudice. 
*•  Time  is  nothing  but  the  Exiftence  of  created  fucceffive  Beings, 
*'  and  Eternity  the  necelTary  Exiftence  of  the  Deity.  Therefore^i^ 
'*  this  necefTary  Being  hath  no  Change  or  Succeffion  in  his  Nature, 
«*  his  Exiftence  muft  of  Courfe  be  unfucceffive.  We  feem  to  com- 
•♦  mit  a  double  Overfight  in  this  Cafe  ;  firji,  we  find  Succeffion  in 
«*  the  neceftary  Nature  and  Exiftence  of  the  Deity  himfelf  :  V7hich 
«  is  wrong,  if  the  Reafoning  above  be  conclufive.  And  then 
«*  we  afcribe  this  Succeffion  to  Eternity,  coniidered  abftraftedl/ 
"  from  the  eternal  Being  j  and  fuppofe  it,  one  knows  not  what,  a 
•*  Thing  fubfifting  by  it  {t\iy  and  flowing,  one  Minute  after  another, 
"  This  is  the  Work  of  pure  Imagination,  and  contrary  to  the 
«*  Reality  of  Things,  Hence  the  common  metaphoricalExpreffions  ; 
•*  ^ime  runs  a-pace»  let  us  lay  hold  on  the  frefent  Minute,  and  the  like. 
«  The  Philofophers  themfelves  mifiead  us  by  their  Jlluftrations  : 
"  They  compare  Eternity  to  the  Motion  of  a  Point  running  on 
«  forever,  and  making  a  tracelefs  infinite  Line.  Here  the  Point  u 
**  fuppofed  a  Thing  adually  fubfifting,  reprefenting  the  prefent  Mi- 
**  nute  ;  and  then  they  afcribe  Modon  or  Succeffion  to  it  ;  that  is, 
"  they  afcribe  Motion  to  a  meer  Non-entity,  Co  illuftrate  to  us  a 

"  fucceffive  Eternity  made  up  of  finite  fucceffive  Parts. li  once 

**  we  allow  an  all-perfe6lMind, which  hath  an  eternal,immutable  and 
"  infiniteComprehenfion  of  allThings, always  (and  allow  it  we  muft) 
«*  the  Diftindlion  of  paft  and  future  vaniflies  with  Refpedl  to  fuch  a 

**  Mind. In  a  Word,  if  we  proceed  Step  by  Step,  as  above, 

"  the  Eternity  or  Exiftence  of  the  Deity  will  appear  to  be  Vit^ 
•*  interminahilisy  tot  a,  fimul  tf  perfe^a  PoJfeJJjo  ;  how  much  fosver 
"  this  may  have  been  a  Paradox  hitherto."  Enquiry  ivVo  the  Nature 
tf  thi  Human  Soul,     Vol.  t,  P.  409,  410,  411.  Edit.  3, 


242   Of  Go^'s  placing  6\SQVtvi\\y  Part  IV.  | 

lute  and  infinite  Duration.  'Tis  as  improper,  to  imagine  that  . 
the  Immenfity  and  Omniprefence  of  God  is  diftinguilhed  by  a 
Series  of  Miles  and  Leagues,  one  beyond  another  ;  as  that  I 
the  infinite  Duration  of  God  is  diftinguilhed  by  Months  andij 
Years,  one  after  another.  A  Diverfity  and  Order  of  diftind  t 
Parts,  Hmited  by  certain  Periods,  is  as  conceivable,  and  does  iJ| 
as  naturally  obtrude  itfelf  on  our  Imagination,  in  one  Cafe  as  |:; 
the  other  ;  and  there  is  equal  Reafon  in  each  Cafe,  to  fuppofe  < 
that  our  Imagination  deceives  us.  'Tis  equally  improper,  to  k 
talk  of  Months  and  Years  of  the  divine  Exiftence,  and  Mile-  \ 
fquares  cf  Deity  :  And  we  equally  deceive  our  felves,  when  ) 
we  talk  of  the  World's  being  differently  fix'd  with  Refpec5t  to  ^i 
either  of  thefe  Sorts  of  Meafures.  I' think,  we  know  not  what  \ 
we  mean,  if  we  fay,  the  World  might  have  been  differently  J 
placed  from  what  it  is,  in  the  broad  Expanfe.of  Infinity  ;  or,  ?Jt 
that  it  might  have  been  differently  fix'd  in  the  long  Line  of  I 
Eternity  :  And  all  Arguments  and  Objections  which  are  i 
built  on  the  Imaginations  we  are  apt  to  have  of  infinite  Exten-  1 
fion  or  Duration,  are  Buildings  founded  on  Shadows,  or  J 
Caftles  in  the  Air. 

2.  The  fecond  Argument,  to  prove  that  the  moft  High  wills  1 
one  Thing  rather  than  another,  without  any  fuperior  Fitnefs  or  ;1i 
Preferablenefs  in  the  Thing  prefer'd,  is  God's  adually  placing  ,1 
in  different  Parts  of  the  World,  Particles  or  Atoms  of  Matter  \ 
that  are  perfe6tly  equal  and  alike.  The  forementioned  Author  ii 
jfays,  P.  78,  b'V.  "  If  one  would  defcend  to  the  minute  fpecific  j 
"  Particles,  of  which  different  Bodices  are  compofed,  we  fhould  j 
*'  fee  abundant  Reafon  to  believe  that  there  are  Thoufands  of  \\ 
"  fuch  little  Particles  or  Atoms  of  Matter,  which  are  perfectly  1 
"  equal  and  alike,  and  could  give  no  diftind  Determination  to  il 
*'  the  Will  of  God,  where  to  place  them."  He  there  inftances  )i 
in  Particles  of  Water,  of  which  there  are  fuch  immenfe  Num-  l 
bers,  which  compofe  the  Rivers  and  Oceans  of  this  World  j  ;j 
and  the  infinite  Myriads  of  the  luminous  and  fiery  Particles,  | 
which  compofe  the  Body  of  the  Sun  ;  fo  many,that  it  would  be  ''S 
>ery  unreafonable  to  fuppofe  no  two  of'them  fhould  be  exadly  j 
equal  and  alike.  | 


Jnfw,  (i.)  To  this  I  anfwer  :  That  as  we  mufl  fuppofe  'i 
Matter  to.be  infinitely  divifible,  'tis  very  unlikely  that  any  two  \ 
of  all  thefe  Particles  are  exadtly  equal  and  alike  ;  fo  unlikely,  | 
that  it  is  a  Thoufand  to  one,  yea,  an  infinite  Number  to  one,  i 
but  it  is  lotkerwife  :  And  that  altho'  we  fhould  allow  a  great   I 

Similarity  1 


Se6l.  Vlli,  fimilar  Particles.  243 

Similarity  between  the  different  Particles  of  Water  and  Fire, 
as  to  their  general  Kature  and  Figure  ;  and  however  fmall  we 
fuppofe  thofeParticles  to  be,  'tis  infinitely  unlikely,  that  any  two 
of  them   (hould  be  exa6lly  equal  in  Dimenlions  and  Quantity 

of  Matter. If  we  (liould   fuppofe  a  great  many  Globes  of 

the  fame  Nature  with  the  Glpbe  of  the  Earth,  it  would  be  very 
ftrange,  if  there  were  any  two  of  them  that  had  exactly  the 
fame  Number  of  Particles  of  Dull  and  Water  in  them.  But 
infinitely  lefs  ftrange,  than  that  tvvo  Particles  of  Light  fhould 
have  juft  the  fame  Quantity  of  Matter.  For  a  Partici"  of 
Light  (according  to  the  Dodrine  of  the  infinite  Diviiibuity  of 
Matter)  is  compofed  of  infinitely  more  affignable  Parts,  than 
there  are  Particles  of  Duft  and  Water  in  UiQ  Globe  of  the 
Earth.  And  as  it  is  infinitely  urJ;kely,  that  any  two  of  thefe 
Particles  (hould  be  equal ;  fo  it  is,  that  they  (hiouid  be  alike  m 
other  Refpe6ls  :  To  inriance  ia  the  Configuration  of  their 
Surfaces.  If  there  were  very  many  Globes,  of  the  Nature  of 
the  Earth,  it  would  be  very  unlikely  that  any  two  Ihould  have 
exactly  the  fame  Number  of  Particles  of  Dafi,  Water  andStone, 
in  their  Surfaces,  and  all  pofited  exacStly  alike,  one  with  Ref- 
pe6l  to  another,  without  any  Difference,  in  any  Part  difcernable 
either  by  the  naked  Eye  or  Microfcope  ;  but  infinitely  lefs 
ftrange,  than  that  two  Particles  of  Light  ftiouid  be  periediy 
of  the  fame  Figure.  For  there  are  infinitely  more  alfignable 
real  Parts  on  the  Surface  of  a  Particle  of  Light,  than  there  are 
Particles  of  Duft,  Water  and  Stone,  on  the  Surface  of  the 
terreftrial  Globe. 

Anf,  (2.)  But  then,  fuppofmg  that  there  are  two  Particles 
fer  Atoms  of  Matter  perfe6tly  equal  and  alike,  which  God  has 
placed  in  different  Parts  of  the  Creation  ;  as  I  will  not  deny  it 
to  be  poffible  for  God  to  make  two  Bodies  perfedly  alike,  aad 
put  them  in  different  Places  ;  yet  it  will  not  follow,  that  two 
different  or  diltind  A6ls  or  Eft"e6ls  of  the  divine  Power  have 
^  exadly  the  fame  Fitnefs  for  the  fame  Ends.  For  thefe  two 
different  Bodies  are  not  different  or  diftmd,  in  any  other 
Refpeds  than  thofe  wherein  they  differ  r  They  are  two  in  no 
other  Refpe<5ls  than  thofe  wherein  there  is  a  Difference.  If 
they  are  perfectly  equal  and  alike  in  thernfehes^  then  they  csnbe 
diftinguifhed,  or  be  diftind,  only  in  thofe  Things  "Which  are 
called  Circumjiances  j  as.  Place,  Time,  Reft,  Motion,  or  fome 
other  prefent  or  paft  Circumftar^ces  or  Relations.  For  'tis 
Difference  only,  that  conftitutes  Diftindion.  If  God  makes 
two  Bodies  ifi  tJ3£mfelv€S  everyWay  equal  and  alike,  and  agreeing 

H  h  2  perfeaiy 


244  0/*  God's /'/<?a«^  differently  Part 


IV.  1i 


perfedly  in  all  other  Circumftances  and  Relations,  but  only  i| 
their  Place  ;  then  in  this  only  is  there  any  Diftin6lion  or  Du- 
plicity. The  Figure  is  the  fame,  the  Meafure  is  the  fame, 
the  Solidity  and  Refiftance  are  the  fame,  and  every  Thing  the  , 
fame,  but  only  the  Place.  Therefore  what  the  Will  of  God 
determines,  is  this,  namely,  that  there  (hould  be  the  fame  \ 
Figure,  the  fame  Extenfion,  the  fame  Refiftance,  ^c.  in  two 
different  Places.  And  for  this  Determination  he  has  fome 
Reafon.  There  is  forne  End,  for  which  fuch  a  Determination 
and  A6t  has  a  peculiar  Fitnefs,  above  all  other  A(5ls.  Here  is 
no  one  Thing  determined  without  an  End,  and  no  one  Thing 
without  a  Fitnefs  for  that  End,  fuperior  to  any  Thing  elfe.  If 
it  be  the  Pleafure  of  God  to  caufe  the  fame  Refiftance,  and  the 
fame  Figure,  to  be  in  two  different  Places  and  Situations,  we 
can  no  more  juftly  argue  from  it,  that  here  muft  be  fomq 
Determination  or  A(5t  of  God's  Will,  that  is  wholly  without 
Motive  or  End,  then  we  can  argue  that  whenever,  in  any 
Cafe,  it  is  a  Man's  Will  to  fpeak  the  fame  Words,  or  make, 
the  fame  Sounds  at  two  different  Times  ;  there  muft  be  fome 
Determination  or  A61  of  his  Will,  without  any  Motive  orEnd, 
The  Difference  of  Place,  in  the  former  Cafe,  proves  ne  more 
than  the  Difference  of  Time  does  in  the  other.  If  any  one 
fhould  fay  with  Regard  to  the  former  Cafe,  that  there  muft  be 
fomething  determined withor.t  anEnd  ;  viz.  That  of  thofetwo 
fimilarBodieSjthis  in  particular  Ihould  be  made  in  thisPlace,and 
the  other  in  the  other,  and  fhould  enquire  why  the  Creator  did 
not  make  them  in  a  Tranfpofition,  when  both  are  alike,  and 
each  would  equally  have  fuited  either  Pla^e  ?  The  Enquiry 
fuppofes  fomething  that  is  not  true  j  namely,  that  the  two 
Bodies  differ  and  are  diftin6t  in  other  Refpedts  befides  theift 
Place,  So  that  with  this  DiftincSlion,  inherent  in  them,  they 
might  in  their  firft  Creation  have  been  tranfpofed,  and  each 
inight  have  begun  it's  Exiftence  in  the  Place  of  the  other. 

Let  us  for  Clearnefs  fake  fuppofe,  that  God  had  at  the 
Beginning  made  two  Globes,  each  of  an  Inch  Diameter,  both 
perfe<5|:  Spheres,  and  perfedly  folid  without  Pores,  and  per- 
'fedlly  alike  in  every  Refpe(5t,  and  placed  them  near  one  to 
another,  one  tow^ards  the  right  Hand,  and  the  other  toward* 
the  left,  without  any  Difference  as  to  Time,  Motion  or  Reft, 
paft  or  prefent,  or  any  Circumftance,  but  only  their  Place  ; 
and  the  Qijeftion  fliould  be  afk'd.  Why  God  in  their  Creation 
placed  'em  fo  ?  Why  that  which  is  made  on  the  right  Hapd, 
was  not  made  on  the  left,   and  vice  verfa  f  Let  it  be  well  con- 

fidered* 


.d 


Sed.VIIL  fimilar  Particles.  245 

iidered,  whether  there  be  any  Senfe  in  fuch  a  Queftion  ;  and 
•whether  the  Enquiry  don*t  fuppofe  fomething  falfe  and  abfurd. 
Let  it  be  confidered,  what  the  Creator  muft  have  done  other- 
wife  than  he  did,  what  different  Acl  of  Will  or  Power  he  muft 
have  exerted,  in  order  to  the  Thing  propofed.  All  that  could 
have  been  done,  would  have  been  to  have  made  two  Spheres, 
perfectly  alike,  m  the  fame  Places  where  he  has  made  them, 
without  any  Difference  of  the  Things  made,  either  in  them- 
felvcs,  or  in  any  Circumftance  ;  fo  that  the  whole  Effect  would 
have  been  without  any  Difference,  ^nd  therefore  jufi:  the  fame* 
By  the  Suppofition,  the  two  Spheres  are  different  in  no  other 
Refpe6t  but  their  Place  ;  and  therefore  in  other  Refpeds  they 
are  the  fame.  Each  has  the  fame  Roundnefs  :  it  is  not  a 
diflind  Rotundity,  in  any  other  Refpecft  but  it's  Situation. 
There  are  alfo  the  fame  Dimenfions,  differing  in  nothing  but 
their  Place.  And  fo  of  their  Refiftance,  and  every  Thing  elf® 
that  belongs  to  them. 

Here  if  any  chufes  to  fay,  "  that  there  is  a  Difference  in 
another  Refped,  viz.  That  they  are  not  NUMERICALLY 
the  fame  :  That  it  is  thus  with  all  the  Qualities  that  belong 
to  them  :  That  it  is  confeffed  they  are  in  fome  Refpe6ts 
the  fame  ;  that  is,  they  are  both  exadly  alike  ;  but  yet  nume^ 
rically  they  differ.  Thus  the  Roundnefs  of  one  is  not  the 
fame  numerical.,  individual  Roundnefs  with  that  of  the  other." 
Let  this  be  fuppoied  ;  then  the  Queftion  about  the  Determi- 
nation of  the  divine  Will  in  the  Affair,  is.  Why  did  God  will, 
that  this  individual  Roundnefs  fliould  be  at  the  right  Hand,  and 
the  other  individual  Roundnefs  at  the  left  ?  Why  did  not  he 
make  them  in  a  contrary  Pofition  ?  Let  any  rational  Perfoi> 
confider,  whether  fuchQueftions  be  notWords  without  aMean- 
ing  ;  as  much  as  it"  God  Ihould  fee  fit  for  fome  Ends  to  caufe 
the  fame  Sounds  to  be  repeated,  or  made  at  two  different 
TJiries  ;  the  Sounds  being  perfe6lly  the  fame  in  every  other 
Jvefpedl,  but  only  one  was  a  Minute  after  the  other  ;  and  it 
fhould  be  afk'd  upon  it,  why  God  caufed  thefe  Sounds,  nume- 
rically different,  to  fucceed  one  the  other  in  fuch  a  Manner  ? 
why  he  did  not  make  that  individual  Sound  which  was  in  the 
(irft  Minute,  to  be  in  the  fecond  ?  and  the  individual  Sound  of 
the  laft  Minute  to  be  in  the  firft  ?  Which  Enquiries  would  be 
even  ridiculous  ;  as  I  think  every  Perfon  muft  fee  at  once,  in 
the  Cafe  propofed  of  two  Sounds,  being  only  the  fame  repeat- 
ed, abfolutely  without  any  Difference,  but  that  one  Circum- 
ftance of  Time.     If  the  moft  High  fees  it  will  anfwer  fom^ 

good 


24^6  Of  God's  chuf  among  likeZ^/;^^j,P.IV. 

good  End,  that  the  fame  Sound  (hould  be  made  by  Lightning 
at  two  diftincft  Times,  and  therefore  wills  that  it  fhould  be  fo, 
piuft  it  needs  therefore  be,  that  herein  there  is  fome  Ad  of 
God's  Will  witho|it  anyMotive  or  End  ?  God  faw  fit  often,  at 
diftin<5l  Times,  and  on  different  Occafions,  to  fay  the  very 
fame  Words  to  Mofes  ;  namely  thofe,  /  am  Jehovah.  And 
would  it  not  be  unreafonable,  to  infer  as  a  certainConfequence 
from  this,  that  here  muft  be  fome  A61  or  Adls  of  the  divine 
Will,  in  determining  and  difpofing  thefe  Words  exa6lly  alike 
at  different  Times,  wholly  without  Aim  or  Inducement  ?  But 
it  would  be  no  more  unreafonable  than  to  fay,  that  there  muft 
be  an  AS.  of  God's  without  any  Inducement,  if  he  fees  it  beft, 
and  for  fome  Reafons,  determines  that  there  fhall  be  the  fame 
Refiftence,  the  fame  Dimenfions,  and  the  fame  Figure,  in 
feveral  diftindt  Places. 

If  in  the  Inftance  of  the  two  Spheres,  perfe(5lly  alike,  it  be 
fuppofed  pofTible  that  God  might  have  made  them  in  a  contrary 
Pofition  J  that  which  is  made  at  the  rightHand,  being  made  at 
the  Left ;  then  I  afk,  Whether  it  is  not  evidently  equally  poffi- 
ble,  if  God  had  made  but  one  of  them,  and  that  in  the  Place 
of  the  right-hand  Globe,  that  he  might  have  made  that  nume- 
rically different  from  what  it  is,  and  numerically  different  from 
what  he  did  make  it ;  tho'  perfedlly  alike,  and  in  the  fame 
Place  ;  and  at  the  fame  Time,  and  in  every  RefpecSV,  in  the 
fame  Circumftances  and  Relations  ?,  Namely,  Whether  he 
might  not  have  made  it  numerically  the  fame  with  that  which 
he  has  now  made  at  the  left  Hand  ;  and  fo  have  left  th^at 
which  is  now  created  at  the  right  Hand,  in  a  State  of  Non- 
Exiftence  ?  And  if  fo,  whether  it  would  not  have  been  poffible 
to  have  made  one  in  that  Place,  perfectly  like  thefe,  and  yet 
numerically  differing  from  both  ?  And  let  it  be  confidered, 
whether  from  this  Notion  of  a  numerical  Difference  inBodies, 
perfedly  equal  and  alike,  which  numerical  Difference  is  fome- 
thing  inherent  in  the  Bodies  themfelves,  and  diverfe  from  the 
Difference  of  Place  or  Time,  or  any  Circumftance  whatfoever  j 
it  will  not  follow,  that  there  is  an  infinite  Number  of  numeri  - 
Gaily  different  poffible  Bodies,  perfedlly  alike,  among  which 
God  chufes,  by  a  felf-determining  Power,  when  be  goes  about 
to  create  Bodies. 

Therefore  let  us  put  the  Cafe  thus  :  Suppofing  that  God  in 
the  Beginning  had  created  but  one  perfedly  folid  Sphere,  in  a 
certain  Place  3  and  it  (hould  be  ^nquired,Why  God  created  that 

indivi'dual 


Se.VIII.  andThings  of  XxivbXDifference.  247 

individual  Sphere,  in  that  Place,  at  that  Time  ?  And  why  he 
did  not  create  another  Sphere  perfecSVly  hke  it,  but  numerically 
different,  in  the  fame  Place,  at  the  fame  Time  ?  Or  why  he 
chofe  to  bring  into  Being  there,  that  very  Body,  rather  thaa 
any  of  the  infinite  Number  of  other  Bodies,  perfe(5i:Iy  like  it  5 
either  of  which  he  could  have  made  there  as  well,  and  would 
have  anfwered  his  End  as  well  ?  Why  he  caufed  to  exift,,  at 
that  Place  and  Time,  that  individual  Roundnefs,  rather  thaa 
any  other  of  the  infinite  Number  of  individual  Rotundities,  juft 
like  it  ?  Why  that  individual  Refifiance,  rather  than  any  other 
of  the  infinite  Number  of  poflible  Refiftances  juft  like  it  ?  And 
it  might  as  reafonably  be  afked.  Why,  when  God  firft  caufed 
it  toThunder,he  caufed  that  individualSound  then  to  be  made, 
and  not  another  juft  like  it  ?  Why  did  he  make  Choice  of  this 
very  Sound,  and  reje6l  all  the  infinite  Number  of  other  poflible 
Sounds  juft  like  it,  but  numerically  differing  from  it,  and  all 
differing  one  from  another  ?  I  think,  every  Body  muft  be  fen- 
fible  of  the  Abfurdity  and  Nonfenfe  of  what  is  fuppofed  in  fuch 
Inquiries.  And  if  we  calmly  attend  to  the  Matter,  we  (hall  be 
convinced,  that  all  fuch  Kind  of  Obje<5lions  as  I  am  anfwer- 
ing,  are  founded  on  nothing  but  the  Imperfe(5tion  of  our  Man- 
ner of  conceiving  of  Things,  and  theObfcurenefs  of  Language, 
and  great  Want  of  Clearnefs  and  Precifion  in  the  Signification 
of  Terms. 

If  any  fhall  find  Fault  with  this  Reafoning,  that  it  is  going 
a  great  Length  into  metaphyfical  Niceties  and  Subtilties  ;  I 
anfwer,  The  Obje6tion  which  they  are  in  Reply  to,  is  a  me- 
taphyfical Subtilty,  and  muft  be  treated  according  to  the  Na- 
ture of  it.  * 

II.  Another  Thing  alledged  is.  That  innumerable  Things 
which  are  determined  by  the  divine  Will,  and  chofen  and  done 
by  God  rather  than  others,  differ  from  thofe  that  are  not 
chofen  in  fo  inconfiderable  a  Manner,  that  it  would  be  unrea- 
fonable  to  fuppofe  the  Difference  to  be  of  any  Confequence, 
or  that  there  is  any  fuperiour  Fitnefs  or  Goodnefs,  that  God 
can  have  Refpe<5t  to  in  the  Determination. 

To 

*  "  For  Men  to  have  Recourfe  to  Subtilties,  in  raifing  Difficulties, 
"  and  then  complain,  that  they  fhould  be  taken  off  by  minutely 
"  examining  thefe  Subtilties,  is  a  ftrange  Kind  o(  Procedure.''' 
Nature  0/ the  Hum.  Soul,  V.  2.  P.  331. 


248  0/God's  chufi  am^  (vnzWMattersV.lV. 

To  which  I  anfwer  ;  it  is  impoflible  for  us  to  determine 
with  any  Certainty  or  Evidence,  that  becaufe  the  Difference  is 
very  fmali,  and  appears  to  us  of  no  Confideration,  there- 
fore there  is  abfolutely  no  fuperiour  Goodnefs,  and  no  valuable 
End  which  can  be  propofed  by  the  Creator  and  Governor  of 
the  World,  in  ordering  fuch  a  Difference.  The  foremention'd 
Author  mentions  many  Inftances.  One  is,  there  being  one 
Atom  in  the  wholeUniverfe  more,or  lefs.  But  I  think  it  would 
be  unreafonable  to  fuppofe,  that  God  made  one  Atom  in  vain, 
or  without  any  End  or  Motive.  He  made  not  one  Atom  but 
what  was  a  Work  of  his  almighty  Pov/er,  as  much  as  the 
whole  Globe  of  the  Earth,  and  requires  as  much  of  a  conftant 
Exertion  of  almighty  Power  to  uphold  it ;  and  was  made  and 
is  upheld  underftandingly,  and  on  Defign,  as  much  as  if  no 
<3ther  had^-been  made  but  that.  And  it  would  be  as  unreafo- 
nable to  fuppofe,  that  he  made  it  without  any  Thing  really 
aimed  at  in  fo  doing,  as  mucii  as  to  fuppofe  that  he  made  the 
Planet  Jupiter  without  Aim  or  Defign. 

'Tis  pofFible,  that  the  moft  minute  Efre6ts  of  the  Creator's 
Power,  the  fmaileft  affignable  Differences  between  the  Things 
which  God  has  made,  may  be  attended,  in  the  whole  Series 
of  Events,  and  the  whole  Compafs  and  Extent  of  their  Influ- 
ence, with  very  great  and  important  Confequences.  If  the 
Laws  of  Motion  &  Gravitation,  laid  down  by  Sir  Ifaac  Newton^ 
.hold  univerfally,  there  is  not  one  Atom,  nor  thjs  leaft  affignable 
Part  of  an  Atom,  but  what  has  Influence,  every  Moment, 
throughout  the  whoie  material  Univerfe,  to  caufe  every  Part 
to  be'otherwife  than  it  would  be,'if  it  were  not  for  that  parti- 
cular corporeal  Exiftence.  And  however  the  Effed  is  infenfl- 
ble  for  the  prefent,  yet  it  may  m  Length  of  Time  become 
great  and  important. 

To  illuflrate  this.  Let  us  fuppofe  two  Bodies  moving  the 
fame  Way,  in  flrait  Lines,  perfectly  parallel  one  to  another  j 
but  to  be  diverted  from  this  Parallel  Courfe,  and  drawn  one 
from  another,  as  much  as  might  be  by  the  Attra6tion  of  an 
Atom,  at  the  Diilance  of  one  of  the  furtheft  of  the  fix'd  Stars 
from  the  Earth  ;  thefe  Bodies  being  turned  out  of  the  Lines 
of  their  parallel  Motion,  will,  by  Degrees,  get  further  and 
further  diflant,  one  from  the  other  ;  and  tho'  the  Diftance  may 
be  imperceptible  for  a  longTime,  yet  at  Length  it  may  become 
very  great.  So  the  Revolution  of  a  Planet  round  the  Sun  be- 
i^ttg  retarded  or  accelerated,  and  the  Orbit  of  it's  Revolution 

Wiade 


Se^VIII.Neceflity  conftpwi^^  itttGrace.  249 

made  greater  or  lefs,  and  more  or  lefs  elliptical,  and  (o  it's 
Periodical  Time  longer  or  lliorter,  no  more  than  may  be  by 
the  Influence  of  the  lead  Atom,  might  in  Length  of  Time  per- 
form a  whole  Revolution  fooner  or  later  than  otherwife  it 
would  have  done  ;  which  might  make  a  vaft  Alteration 
with  Regard  to  Millions  of  important  Events.  So  the  Influence 
of  the  leaft  Particle  may,  for  ought  we  know,  have  fuch  EfFecSt 
on  fomething  in  the  Conftitution  of  fome  human  Body,  as  to 
caufe  another  Thought  to  arife  in  the  Mind  at  a  certain  Time, 
than  otherwife  would  have  been  ;  which  in  Length  of  Time 
(yea,  and  that  not  very  great)  might  occafion  a  vaft  Alteration 
thro'  the  whole  World  of  Mankind.  And  fo  innumera- 
ble other  Ways  might  be  mention'd,  wherein  the  leaft  afllgn- 
able  Alteration  may  poflibly  be  attended  with  great  Confc- 
quences. 

Another  Argument^  which  the  foremention'd  Author  brings 
sgainft  a  neceflary  Determination  of  the  divine  Will  by  a  fupe- 
hour  Fitnefs,  is,  that  fuch  Do6trine  derogates  from  the  Freenefl 
of  God's  Grace  and  Goodnefs^  in  chufing  the  Objedls  of  his 
Favour  and  Bounty,  and  from  the  Obligation  upon  Men  to 
Thankfulnefs  for  fpecial  Benefits.  P»  89,  ^c* 

In  anfwer  to  this  Objedion,  I  would  obfefve, 

1.  That  it  derogates  no  more  from  the  Goodnefs  of  God, 
to  fuppofe  the  Exercife  of  the  Benevolence  of  his  Nature  to 
be  determined  by  Wifdom,  than  to  fuppofe  it  determined  by 
Chance,  and  that  his  Favours  ate  beftowed  altogether  at  Ran- 
dom, his  Will  being  determin'd  by  nothing  but  perfed:  Acci- 
dent, without  iany  End  or  Defign  whatfoever  ;  which  muft  be 
the  Cafe,  as  has  been  demonftrated,  if  Volition  be  not  deter- 
mined by  a  prevailing  Motive.  That  which  is  owing  to  per- 
it^  Contingence,  wherein  neither  previous  Inducement,  nor 
antecedent  Choice  has  any  Hand,  is  not  owing  more  to  Good-  • 
nefs  or  Benevolence,  than  that  which  is  owing  to  the  Influence 
of  a  wife  End. 

2.  'Tis  acknowleged,that  if  the  Motive  that  determines  the 
Will  of  God,  in  the  Choice  of  the  Objeds  of  his  Favours,  be 
any  moral  Quality  in  the  Objecfl,  recommending  that  Obje(5t 
to  his  Benevolence  above  others,  his  chufing  that  Objedt  is 
not  fo  great  a  Manifeftation  of  the  Freenefs  and  Sovereignty  of 
his  Grace,  as  if  it  were  otherwife.  But  there  is  no  NecelFity 
of  fuppoiing  this,  in  ©rder  to  our  fuppoiing  that  ha   has  fome 

I  i  wii'tj 


2^0  Neceffity  confifl^  wi^^  free  Cr^c^. Parti V. 

wife  End  in  View,  in  determining  to  beftow  his  Favours  on 
one  Perfon  rather  than  another.  We  are  to  diftinguilh  be- 
tween the  Merit  of  the  Objcdf  of  God's  Favour^. ox  a  moral  Qua- 
lification of  th  ObjeSi  ?.ttracling  that  Favour  and  recommend- 
ing to  it,  "kn^  xhz  nahird  Fkntfs  of  fuch-  a  Determination  of 
the  ASi  of  God's  Goodnefs^    to  anfwer  fome  wife   Defign    of  his 

own,  fome  End  in  the  View    of  God's   Oranifcience. 'Tis 

God's  own  A61,  that  is  the  proper  and  immediate  Objedt  of 
his  Vohtion. 

3.  I  fuppofe  that  none  will  deny,  but  that  in  fome  Inftances, 
God  a6ts  from  wife  Deiign  in  determinmg  the  particular  Sub- 
jeds  of  his  Favours  :  None  will  fay,  I  prefume,  that  when 
God  diftinguifhes  by  his  Bounty  particular  Societies  or  Perfons, 
He  never,  in  any  Inftance,  exercifes  any  Wifdom  in  fo  doing, 
aiming  at  fome  happy  Confequence.  And  if  it  be  not  denied 
to  be  fo  in  fome  Inftances,  then  I  would  enquire,  whether  in 
thefe  Inftances  God's  Goodnefs  is  lefs  manifeiled,  than  in 
thofe  wherem  God  has  no  Aim  or  End  at  all  ?  And  whether 
the  Subjeds  have  lefs  Caufe  of  Thankfulnefs  ?  And  if  fo,  who 
Ihall  be  thankful  for  the  Beftowment  of  diftinguiihing  Mercy, 
with  that  enhancing  Circumftance  of  the  Diftin6Vion's  being 
made  without  an  End  ?  How  fhall  it  be  known  when  God  is 
influenced  by  fome  wife  Aim,  and  when  not  ?  It  is  very  mani- 
fefl  with  Refpe6l  to  the  Apoftle  Paul,  that  God  had  wife  Ends 
in  chuiing  Him  to  be  aChriftian  and  an  Apoll:le,who  had  been 
a  Perfecutor,  &c.  The  Apoftle  himfelf  mentions  one  End. 
I  Tifn.  i.  15,  16.  Chrtft  J  ejus  came  into  the  World  to  fave  Sinners  y 
of  whom  I  am  chief.  Hovjbeit,  for  this  Caufe  I  obtained  Mercy ,  that 
in  ??ie  fi'J}^  J^fr^  Chrijl  might  fhew  forth  all  Long-fuffering^  for  a 
Pattern  to  the?n  who  Jhoidd  hereafter  believe  on  Hi?n  10  Life  ever- 
hfAng.  But  yet  theApoftle  never  look'd  on  it  as  a  Diminution 
"of  the  Freedom  and  Riches  of  divine  Grace  in    his  Election, 

which  Ke  fo  often  and  fo  greatly  magnifies.  This  brings  me 
to  obferve, 

4.  Our  fuppcfrng  fuch  a  moral  Neceifit)'  in  the  Acfls  of  God's 
XViil  as  has  been  fpoken  of,  is  fo"  far  from  neceflariiy  derogat- 
ing from  the  Riches  of  God's  Grace  to  fuch  as  are  the  chofen 
ObjecSts  of  his  Favour,  that  in  many  Inftances,  this  moral  Ne- 
cellity  may  arife  from  Goodnefs,  and  from  the  great  Degree  of 
it.  God  may  chufe  this  Objei5l  rather  than  another,  as  having 
a  fuperiour  Fitnefs  to  anfwer  the  Ends,  Defigns  and  Inclina- 
tions of  his  Goodnefs  ;  being  m*ore  finful,  and  fo  more  mife- 

rkble 


Secl.VIIL      Oi  Arminian  Fatality.       251 

rable  and  neceflitous  than  others  ;  the  Inclinations  of  infinite 
Mercy  and  Benevolence  may  be  more  gratified,  and  the  gra- 
cious Defign  of  God's  fending  his  Son  into  the  World  may  be 
more  abundantly  anfwered,  in  the  Exercifes  of  Mercy  towards 
fuch  an  Object,   rather  than  another. 

One  Thing  more  I  would  obferve,  before  I  finifli  what  I 
have  to  fay  on  the  Head  of  the  Neceflity  of  the  A6ts  of  God's 
Will  ;  and  that  is,  that  fomething  much  more  like  a  fervile 
Subjedion  of  the  divineBeing  to  fatalNeceirity,will  follow  from 
Arminian  Principles,  than  trom  the  Doctrines  which  they  cp- 
pofe.  .  P^or  they  (at  leall  moft  of  them)  fuppofe,  with  Refpedt 
to  all  Events  that  happen  in  the  moral  World  depending  on 
the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  which  are  the  moft  important 
Events  of  the  Univerfe,  to  which  all  others  are  fubordinate  ; 
I  fay,  they  fuppofe  witli  refpe6t  to  thefe,that  God  has  a  certain 
Foreknowledge  of  them,  antecedent  to  any  Purpofes  or  De- 
crees of  his  about  them.  And  if  fo,  they  have  a  fix'd  certain 
Futurity,  prior  to  any  Pefigns  or  Volitions  of  his,  and  inde- 
pendent on  them,  and  to  which  his  Volitions  muft  be  fubjed, 
as  He  would  wifely  accommodate  his  Affairs  to  this  fix'd 
Futurity  of  the  State  of  Things  in  the  moral  World.  So  that 
here,  inftead  of  a  moral  Necelfity  of  God's  Wil],  arifing  from 
or  confiding  in  the  infinite  Perfedtion  and  Blefiednefs  of  the 
divine  Being,  we  have  a  fix'd  unalterable  State  of  Things, 
properly  difiincf  from  the  perfect  Nature  of  the  divine  Mind, 
and  the  State  of  the  divine  Will  and  Defign,  and  entirely  in- 
dependent on  thefe  Things,  and  which  they  have  no  Hand  in, 
becaufe  they  are  prior  to  them  ;  and  which  God's  Will  is  truly 
fubjedl  to,  being  obliged  to  conform  or- accom.modate  himfelf 
to  it,  in  all  his  Purpofes  and  Decrees,  and  in  every  Thing  He 
does  in  his  Difpofals  and  Government  of  the  V/orld  ;  the 
moral  World  being  the  End  of  the  natural  ;  fo  that  all  is  in 
vain,  that  is  not  accommiodated  to  that  State  of  the  moral 
World,  v/hich  confifts  in,  or  depends  upon  the  A6ls  and  State 
of  the  Wills  of  moral  Agents,  which  had  a  fix'd  Futurition 
from  Eternity.  Such  a  Subjedion  to  Necefiity  as  this,  would 
truly  argue  an  Inferiority  and  Servitude,that  would  be  unworthy 
of  the  fupreme  Being  ;  and  is  much  more  agreable  to  the  No- 
tion which  many  of  the  Heathen  had  of  Fate,  as  above  the 
Gods,  than  that  moral  Necefiity  of  Fitnefs  and  Wifdom  which 
has  been  fpoken  of ;  and  is  truly  repugnant  to  the  abfolute 
Sovereignty  of  God, and  inconfiftent  with  the  Supremacy  of  his 
Will  ;  and  really  fu"bjeas  the  Will  of  the  moft  High  to  the  Will 
qI  his  Creatures,  and  brings  him  into  Dependence  upon  them. 

I  i  2  Section 


252  Of  the  0\y^Qdi\QXi  about     Part  IV.  i' 

Section    IX. 


Concerning  that  ObjeEiion  againft  the  Doc-  ' 
trme  which  has  been  maintain  d^  that  it 
makes  Goo  the  Author  of  Sin. 


« 


TTTIIS  urged  by  Arminians^  that  the  Dodrine  of  theNecelTity 
j[.  of  Men's  Volitions,  or  their  neceffary  Connection  with 
antecedetit  Events  and  Circumftances,  makes  the  firft 
Caufe,  and  fupreme  Orderer  of  all  Things,  the  Author  of  Sin; 
in  that  he  has  fo  conftituted  the  State  and  Coyrfe  of  Things, 
that  finful  Volitions  become  neceflary,  in  Confequence  of  his 
pifpofal.  Dr.  Whitby^  in  his  Difcourfe  on  the  Freedom  of  the 
Will,  *  cites  one  of  the  Antients,as  on  his  Side,declaring  that 
this  Opinion  of  the  NecefTity  of  the  Will  "abfolves  Sinners,  as 
^'  doing  nothing  of  their  own  Accord  which  wasEvil,and  would 
**  caft  all  the  Blame  of  all  the  Wickednefs  committed  in  the 
•'  World,  upon  God,  and  upon  his  Providence,  if  that  were 
*'  admitted  by  the  Afl'ertors  of  this  Fate ;  whether  he  himfelf 
♦*  did  neceflitate  them  to  do  thefe  Things,  or  ordered  Matters 
"*'  fo  that  they  fhould  be  conftrain'd  to  do  them  by  fome  other 
<'  Caufe."  And  the  Dodor  iays  in  another  Place,  %  "  In  the  | 
**  Nature  of  the  Thing,  and  in  the  Opinion  of  Philofophers, 
*'  Caufa  deficiens^in  rebus  necejfarils^ad  Caufafii  per  fe  efficient  em  redu- 
^'  cenda  eft.  In  Things  neceflary,  the  deficient  Caufe  muft  be 
*'  reduced  to  the  efficient.  And  in  this  Cafe  the  Reafon  is 
*'  evident ;  bfecaufe  the  not  doing  what  is  required,  or  not 
avoiding  vyhat  is  forbidden,  being  aDefe6t,muft  follow  fron^ 
the  Pofition  of  the  neceflary  Caufe  of  that  Deficiency.'* 


Concerning  this,  I  would  obferve  the  following  Things.  \ 

I.  If  there  be  any  Difficulty  in  this  Matter,  'tis  nothing  pe-  \ 

?!uliar  to   this   Scheme  ;    'tis   no  Difficulty  or  Difadvantage  |i 

wherein  it  is  diftinguirtied  from  the  Scheme  of  Ar?mmans  j  and  \ 

therefore  not  realbnabiy  obje(5led  by  them.  '  \ 

Dr.  Whitby  fuppofes,   that  if  Sin   necefTarily    follows   from  j 

pod's  withholdingAffiftance,  or  if  that  Affiftance  be  not  given  ^ 

which  I 

J  Pn  the  five  Points.  P.  361.        %  Ihid  P.  4S6.  \ 


Seft.lX.  makingGod the  Author^ Sin.  253 

which  is  abfolutely  neceflary  to  the  avoiding  of  Evil  ;  then  in 
the  Nature  of  the  Thing,  God  mull  be  as  properly  the  Author 
of  that  Evil,  as  if  he  were  the  efficient  Caufe  of  it,  P^otn 
whence,  according  to  what  he  himfeif  fays  of  the  Devils  and 
damned  Spirits,  God  muft  be  the  proper  Author  of  their  perfect 
unreftrained  Wickednefs  :  He  muft  be  the  efficient  Caufe  of 
the  great  Pride  of  the  Devils,  and  of  their  perfect  Malignity 
againft  God,  Chrift,  his  Saints,  and  all  that  is  Good,  and  of 
the  infatiable  Cruelty  of  their  Difpofition.  Yox  he  ailowsjthat 
God  has  fo  forfaken  them,  and  does  fo  withhold  his  Affiilance 
from  them,  that  they  are  incapacitated  from  doing  Good,  and 
determined  only  to  Evil,  f  Our  Dodrine,  in  its  Confequence, 
makes  God  the  Author  of  Men's  Sin  in  this  World,  no  more, 
and  in  no  other  Senfe,  than  his  Do6trine,  in  its  Confequence, 
makes  God  the  Author  of  the  hellilli  Pride  and  Malice  of  the 
Devils.  And  doubtlefs  the  latter  is  as  odious  an  Effe6l  as 
the  former. 

Again,  if  it  ^\\\  follow  at  all^  that  God  is  the  Author  of  Sin, 
from  «-aat  has  been  fuppofed  of  a  fure  and  infallibleConneclion 
between  Antecedents  and  Confequents,  it  Vvill  follow  hecaufe 
of  this^  1J12.,  That  for  God  to  be  the  Author,  or  Orderer  of 
thofe  Things  which  he  knows  before-hand,  will  infallibly  be 
attended  with  fuch  a  Confequence,  is  the  fame  Thing  inEftcct, 
as  for  him  to  be  the  Author  of  that  Confequence.  But  if  this 
be  fo,  this  is  a  Difficulty  which  equally  attends  the  Dodrine 
of  Ar?mnians  themfelves  ;  at  leait,  of  thofe  of  them  wlio  allow 
God's  certain  Fore-knowledge  of  all  Events.  For  on  the 
Suppofition  of  fuch  a  Fore-knowledge,  this  is  the.  Cafe  with 
Refpedl  to  every  Sin  that  is  committed  :  God  knew,  that  if  he 
ordered  and  brought  to  pafs  fuch  and  fuch  Events,  fuch  Sins 
would  infallibly  follow.  As  for  Inftance,  God  certainly  fore- 
knew, long  before  Judas  was  born,  that  if  he  ordered  Thing;s 
fo,  that  there  (hould  be  fuch  a  Man  born,  at  fuch  a  Time, 
and  at  fuch  a  Place,  and  that  his  Life  fhould  be  preferved,an(l 
that  he  fhould,  in  divine  Providence,  be  led  into  Acquaintance 
withjefus;  and  that  his  Heart  fhould  be  fo  influenced  by 
God's  Spirit  or  Providence,  as  to  be  inclined  to  be  a  Follov/er 
of  Chriil:  ;  and  that  he  fliould  be  One  of  thofe  Twelve,  .which 
fhould  be  chofen  conftantly  to  attend  him  as  his  Family  ;  and 
that  his  Health  fhould  be  preferved  fo  that  he  fhould  go  up  to 
Jerufaleniy  at  the  laftPaffover  in  Chrift's  Life  ;  and  it  fhould  be 
io  ordered  that  Judas   Ihould   fee  Chrift's  kind  Treatment  of 

the 
X  Ihid?,   3©2.  305. 


5 54        How  GOD  is  concern  d     Part  IV. 

the  Woman  which  anointed  him  at  Bethany^  and  have  that 
Reproof  from  Chrift,  which  he  had  at  that  Time,  and  fee  and 
hear  other  Things,  which  excited  his  Enmity  againft  his 
Mafter,  and  other  Circwmftances  Ihould  be  ordered,  as  they 
■were  ordered  ;  it  would  be  what  would  moil  certainly  and  in- 
fallibly follow,  that  Judas  would  betray  his  Lord,  and  would 
■foon  after  hang  himfelf,  and  die  impenitent,  and  be  fent  to 
HeiJ,   for  his  horrid  Wickednefs. 

Therefore  this  fuppofed  Difficulty  ought  not  to  be  brought 
3san  Objection  againft  theScheme  which  has  been  maintain'd, 
as  difagreelng  v/ith  the  Arminian  Scheme,  feeing  'tis  no  Diffi- 
culty owing  to  fuch  TiDifagreement  ;  but  aDiffi.culty  wherein  the 
Armmians  ihare  with  us.  That  muft  be  unreafonably  made 
an  ObjecStion  againft  our  differing  from  them,  which  we  fhouid 
nQt\efcape  or  avoid  at  all  by  agreeing  with  them. 

And  therefore  I  would  obferve, 
II.  'Fhey  who  object,  that  this  Doc5trine  makes  God  the 
Author  of  Sin,  ought  diftin6tly  to  explain  what  they  mean  by 
that  Phrafe,  The  Author  of  Sin.  I  know,  the  Phrafe,  as  it  is 
commonly  ufed,  fignihes  fomethins;  very  111,  If  by  ihe  Author 
cf  Sin^  be  meant  the  Sinner^  the  Agent^  or  ASior  of  Shi,  or  ihe 
Doer  of  a  wicked  Thing  ;  fo  it  would  be  a  Reproach  and  Blaf- 
phemy,  to  fuppofe  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Sin.  In  this 
Senfe,  I  utterly  deny  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Sin  ;  rejecting 
fuch  an  Imputation  on  the  moft  High,  as  what  is  infinitely  to 
be  abhor'd  ;  and  deny  any  fuch  Thing  to  be  the  Confequence, 
of  what  I  have  laid  down,  fut  if  by  the  Author  of  Sin,  is  meant 
the  Permitter,  or  not  a  Hinderer  of  Sin  ;  and  at  the  fame 
Time,  a  Difpofer  of  the  State  of  Evente,  in  fuch  a  Manner, 
for  v>/ife,  holy  and  moft  excellent  Ends  and  Purpofes,  that  Sin, 
if  it  be  permitted  or  not  hindered,  will  moft  certainly  and  in- 
fallibly follow  :  I  fay,  if  this  be  all  that  is  meant,  by  being  the 
Author  of  Sin,  I  don't  deny  that  God  is  the  Autlior  of  Sin, 
(tho'  I  dilhke  and  reject  the  Phrafe,  as  that  which  by  Ufe  and 
Cuftom  is  apt  to  carry  another  Senfe)  it  is  no  Reproach  for  the 
moft  High  to  be  thus  the  Author  of  Sin.  This  is  not  to  be 
the  AtUr  of  Sin,  but  on  the  contrary,  of  Holwefs.  What  God 
doth  herein,  is  holy  ;  and  a  glorious  Exercife  of  the  infinite 
Excellency  of  his  Nature.  And  I  don't  deny,  that  God's  being 
thus  the  Author  of  Sin,  follows  from  what  I  have  laid  down  ; 
and  I  affert,  that  it  equally  follows  from  the  Doctrine  which  is 
maintained  bv  moft  of  the  Armman  Divines. 

That 


Sed:.  XL      in  the  Exiftence  of  Sin.         255 

That  it  is  moft  certainly  fo,  that  God  is  In  fuch  a  Manner 
the  Difpofer  and  Orderer  of  Sin,  is  evident,  if  any  Credit  is  to 
be  given  to  the  Scripture  ;  as  well  as  becaufe  it  is  impoffible  in 
the  Nature  of  Things  to  be  otherwife.  In  fuch  a  Manner  God 
ordered  the  Obftinacy  of  Pharaoh^  in  his  refufing  to  obey  God's 
Commands,  to  let  the  People  go.    Exod.  iv.  21.  1  will  harden 

his  Hearty   and  he  Jhall  not    let    the  People  go.  Chap.  vii.  2 5. 

Aaron  tl^  Brother  fiall  /peak  unto  Pharaoh,    that  he  fend  the  Chil- 
dren cf  Ifrael  out  of  his  Land.  And  I  will  harden  Pharaoh'j  Hearty 
and  midtiply  jny  Signs  and  my  Wonders  in  the  Land  of  Egypt.     But 
Pharaoh  jhall  not  hearken  unto  you  \  that  I  may  lay  mine  Hand  upon 
Egypt,    by  great  Judgments.,  kc.     Chap.  ix.  12.  Jnd  the    Lord 
\   harden  d  the  Heart  of  Pharaoh,    and  he  hearkened  not  unto  the?n^  as 
\  the  Lord  had  fpoken   unto  Mofes.     Chap.  x.  1,2.   And  the  Lord 
I  faid  unto  Mofes,  Go  in  ««^(7  Pharaoh  ;  for  I  have  harden  d  hisHearU 
\   and  the  Heart  of  his  Servants^   that    I .  might  Jhew   thefe   ?ny  Signs 
I   before  Him.,   and  that   thou  may  ft  tell  it  in  the  Ears  of  thy  Son^  and 
I  thy  Son's  Son^  what  Things  I  have  wrought  in  Egypt,  and  my  Signs 
which  I  have  done  anwngfi  them.,  that  ye  may  knoiv  that  I  am  the  Lord. 
•Chap.  xiv.  4.  And  I  will  harden  Pharaoh's   Heart,  that  he  Jhall 
follow  after  them  :  and  I  will  be  hanoured  upon  Pharaoh,  and  upon 
all  his  Hoji.  V.  8.  And  the  Lord  hardened  the  Heart   i?/' Pharaoh 
King  of  Egypt,  and  he  purfued  after  the  Children  (j/'IfraeL     And  it 
is  certain  that  in  fuch  a  Manner,  God  for  wife  and  good  Ends, 
ordered  that  Event,  Jofeph's  being  fold  into  Egypt  by  his  Bre- 
thren.   Gen.  xlv.  5.    Now  therefore   he   7iot  grieved.,    nor   angry 
:  with  your/elves,  that  ye  fold  ?ne  hither  ;  for  God  did  fend  me  before  you 
\  to  preferve  Life.  Ver.  7,  8.  God  did  fend  me  before  you  to  preferve  a 
I  Pofierity  in  the  Earth.,  and  to  fave  your  Lives  by  a  great  Deliverance  : 
]^^fo  that  now  it  was  not  you,  that  fent  me  hither^   but  God.  Pfal.  evil. 
j  17.  He  fent  a  Man  before  them.,  even  Jofeph,   vjho  zvas  fold  for  & 
!  Servant.     'Tis  certain,  that  thus  God  ordered  the  Sin  and  Folly 
jj  of  Sihon  King  of  the  Amarites.,    in   refufmg  to  let  the  People  of 
j  Ifrael  pafs  by  him  peaceably.    Deut.  ii.  30.   But  Sihon  King  of 
Hefhbon  would  not  let  us  pafs  by  him  ;  for  theLord  thy  God  harden  d 
his  Spirit.,  and  made  his  Heart  objlinate.,  that  He  might   deliver   Him 
into  thine  Hand,     'Tis  certain,  that  God  thus  ordered  the  Sin 
and  Folly  of  the  Kings  of  Canaan.,    that  they  attempted  not  to 
make  Peace  with  Ifrael.,  but  with  a  ftupid  Boldnefs  and  Oblli- 
nacy,   fet  themfeives  violently  to  oppofe  them  and  their  God. 
Jofh.  xi.  20.  For  it  was  of  the  Lord.,  to  harden    their  Hearts ^    that 
'they   fljould    come     againji     Ifrael      in     Battle.,     that     he     mght 
dejhoy   them    utterly^   and  that   they   might    have  no  Favour  j    but 
that   he  might  deftroy    thcm^   as  the   Lord  co?nmanded  Mofes^     'TiS 

evident^ 


256       How  GOD  is  concern  d       Part  IV. 

e^wdent,  that  thus  God  ordered  the  treacherous  Rebellion  of 
Zedekiah^  againft  the  King  of  Babylon.  Jer.  iii.  3.  For  thro'  the 
Anger  of  the  Lord  it  came  to  pafs  in  Jerufalem,  ajid  Judah,  '////  He 
had  caji  them  out  fro?n  his  Prejhice^  that  Zedekiah  rebelled  againfl 
the  Kinz  of  Babylon.  So  2  Kings  xxiv.  20.  And  'tis  exceeding 
manifell,  that  ^God  thus  ordered  the  Rapine  and  unrighteous 
Ravages  of  Nebuchadnezzar,  in  fpoiling  and  ruining  the  Nations 
round  about.  Jer.  xxv.  9.  Behold^  I  will  fend  and  take  all  the 
Fsmil'ies  of  the  Norths  faith  the  Lord,  «,W  Nebuchadnezzar  my  Ser- 
^jant>and^will  bring  them  againfl  this  Land^and  againfl  all  theNations 
round  about;  and  will  utterly  dejlroy  thern^andmake  them  anAfioiiiJhment^ 
nnd  an  hiijfmg,  a7id  perpetual  Deflations.  Ch.  xliii.  10.  Ii.  I  will 
fend  and  take  Nebuchadnezzer  the  King  of  Babylon,  my  Servant ; 
and  I  ivill  ft  his  Throne  upon  thefe  Stones  that  I  have  hid,  and  he" 
fhall  jpread  his  royal  Pavilion  over  them.  And  when  he  cometh,  he 
fhall  finite  the  Land  of  Egypt,  and  deliver  juch  as  are  for  Death  to 
Death,  and  fuch  as  are  for  Captivity  to  Captivity,  and  fiich  as  are 
for  the  Sword  to  the  Sword.  Thus  God  reprefents  himfelf  as 
^ fending  for  Nebuchadnezzar,  and  taking  of  him  and  his  Armies, 
and  bringing  him  agaiiUt  the  Nations  which  were  to  be  deftroy- 
ed  by  him,"  to  that  very  End,  that  he  might  utterly  deftroy 
them,  and  make  them  defolate  ;  and  as  appointing  the  Work 
that  he  fhould  do,  fo  particularly,  that  the  very  Pcrfons  were 
defigned,  that  he  fhould  kill  with  the  Sword  ;  and  thofe  that 
fliould  be  kiird  wnth  Famine  and  Peftilence,  and  thofe  that 
Ihouid  be  earned  into  Captivity  ;  and  that  in  domg  all  thefe 
Things,  he  fnould  aa  as  his  Servant :  By  which,  lefs  can't  be 
intended,  than  that  he  Ihould  ferve  his  Purpofes  and  Defigns. 
And  in  Jer.  xxvii.  4,  5,  6.  God  declares  how  he  would  caufe 
him  thus  to  ferve  his  Deligns,  viz.  by  bringing  this  to  pafs  in 
his  fovereign  Difpofals,  as"  the  great  PofTeflbr  and  Governor  of 
the  Univerfe,  that  difpofes  all  Things  juft  as  pleafes  him. 
Thus  faith  the  Lord  of  Hojls,  the  God  ^/Ifrael  ;  /  have  made  the 
Earth,  the  Man  and  the  Beaft  that  are  upon  the  Ground,  by  my  greaf/ 
Power,  and  my  fr  etched  out  Arm,  and  have  given  it  unto  whom^  it 
feemed  meet  unto  ?ne  :  And  now  I  have  given  all  thefe  Lands  into' 
the  Hands  ^/Nebuchadnezzar  MY  SERVANT,  'and  the  Beafls  ' 
cf  the  Field  have  I  given  alfo  to  ferve  him.  And  Nebuchadnezzar  is 
fpoken  of  as  doing  thefe  Things,  by  having  his  Arms  firengthned 
by  God,  and  \\^v\u2,  God's  Sword  put  into  his  Hands,  for  this- 
End.  Ezek.  xxx.  24,^25,  26.  Yea,  God  fpeaks  of  his  terribly 
ravac;ino;  and  waftino;  the  Nations,  and  cruelly  deftroying  all 
Sorts,  Without  Diftiriaion  of  Sex  or  Age,  as  the  Weapon  in 
God's  Hand,   and   the  Inftrument  of  his  Indignation,  which 

God 


Sed:.  IX.     in  the  Exiftence  of  Sin.       257 

God  makes  ufe  of  to  fulfil  his  ownPurpores,and  execute  his  bwn 
Vengeance.  Jer.  li.  20,  &c.  Thou  art  my  Battle- Axe^  and  Wea- 
pons of  JVar.  For  with  thee  will  I  break  in  Pieces  the  Nations^  and 
with  thee  I  will  dejlroy  Kingdoms^  and  with  thee  I  will  break  in 
Pieces  the  Horfe  and  his  Rider^  and  with  thee  I  tvill  break  in 
Pieces  the  Chariot  an  J  his  Rider  ;  with  thee  alfo  tvill  I  break  in 
Pieces  Man  and  Woman  ;  and  tvith  thee  will  I  break  in  Pieces  Old 
and  Young  \  and  with  thee  will  I  break  in  Pieces  the  young  Man  and 
the  Adaid.,  &c.  'Tis  reprefented,that  the  Defigns  ot  Nekichadnez- 
i&cr,  and  thofe  that  dertroyed  Jerufalem,  never  could  have  been 
accompliflied,  had  notGod  determined  them,  as  well  as  they  j 
Lam.  iii.  37.  Who  is  he  that  faith ^  and  it  cometh  to  pafs^  and  ths 
Lord  conmiandeth  it  not  P  And  yet  the  King  of  Babylon's  thus 
deftroying  the  Nations,  and  efpecially  the  Jews,  is  fpoken  of 
as  his  great  Wickednefs,  for  which  God  finally  dertroyed  him, 
Jfai.  xiv.  4,  5,  6,  12.  Hab.  ii.  5,-12.  and  Jer.  Chap.  1.  &  h. 
'Tis  mofi  manifeft,  that  God,  to  ferve  his  own  Defigns,  provi- 
dentially  ordered  Shimei's  curi\ng  David,  2  Sam.  xvi.  10,  11, 

Trje  Lord  hath  faid  unto  him-,  Curfe  David. Let  him  curfe^  for 

the  Lord  hath  bidden  him. 

'Tis  certain,  that  God  thus,  for  excellent,  holy,  gracious 
and  glorious  Ends,  ordered  the  Fa6l  which  they  committed, 
who  were  concerned  in  Chrift's  Death  ;  and  that  therein  they 
did  but  fulfil  God's  Defigns.  As,  I  truft,  no  Chriflian  will  deny 
it  was  the  Defign  of  God,  that  Chrift  {hould  he  crucified^  and 
that  for  this  End,  he  came  into  the  World,  'Tis  very  manifeft 
by  many  Scriptures,  that  the  whole  Affair  of  ChrilVs  Cruci- 
fixion, with  it's  Circumftances,  and  the  Treachery  of  Judas^ 
that^  made  Way  for  it,  was  ordered  in  God's  Providence,  in 
Purfuance  of  his  Purpofe  5  notwithftanding  the  Violence  that 
is  ufed  with  thofe  plain  Scriptures,  to  obfcure  and  pervert  the 
Senfe  of  'em.  A6t.  ii.  23.  Him  being  delivered^  by  the  detcrininatc 
Cownfel  and  Foreknowledge  of  Gody  f  ye  have  taken.,  and  vjith  wicked 
Hands^  have  crucified  and  fiain.  Luk.  xxii.  21,22.  \\  But  behold  the 
Hand  of  him  that  bctrayeth  me^  is  with  me  on  the  Table:    And  truly 

K  k  the 

f  "  Grotiusy  as  well  as  'Beza,oh(erve%,  that  isroiywi'Tj?  mud  herefig- 
"  nifie  Decree  ;  and  Elfner  has  fhewn  that  it  has  that  Significa- 
"  tion,  in  approved  Gr^^i^  Writers.  And  it  is  certain  irJor'^ 
*'  fjgniiies  one  given  up  into  the  Hands  of  an  Enemy."  Doddridge 
in  hoc. 

II  "  As  this  PaiTage  is  not  liable  to  the  Ambiguities,  which  Tome 
"  have  apprehended  in  ^J?.  ii.  23.  and  iv.  28.  (which  yet  feera 
**  on  the  whole  %q  be  parallel  to  it,  in  their  moll  natural  Conflruc- 

*'  thn) 


258      How  Gob  is  concerned    Part  IV. 


the  Son  of  Man  goeth,  as  it  tCas  determined.  A6t.  iv.  27,  281 
For  of  aTruthy  agamji  thy  holy  Child  Jefus^  whom  thou  haft  anointed^ 
both  Herod,  and  Pontius  Pilate,  with  the  Gentiles^  and  the  People  | 
^Ifrael,  were  gathered  together ^  for  to  do  whhtfoever  thy  Hand  and  (i 
thy  Counfel  determined  before  to  be  done.  A<5t.  iii.  17,  18.  jind  now  | 
Brethren^  I  wot  that  through  Igyiorance  ye  did  it,  as  did  alfo  your  t 
Rulers  :  Bat  thefe  Things  ^  which  God  before  had /hewed  by  the  Mouth  | 
9f  all  his  Prophets y  that  Chriji  Jhould  fuffer^  he  hath  fo  fulfilled.  So  \ 
that  what  thefe  Murderers  of  Chrift  did,  is  fpoken  of  as  what  1i 
God  brought  to  pafs  or  ordered,  and  that  by  which  he  fulfilled  | 
his  own  Word.  | 

In  Rev.  xvii.  17.  The  agreeing  of  the  Kings  of  the  Earth  to  give  I 
their  Kingdom  to  the  Beafl,  tho'  it   was  a  very  wicked   Thing  in 
them,   is  fpoken  of  as   a   fulfilling  God's  PFill,  and  what  God 
had  put  it  into  their  Hearts  to  do.     'Tis  manifeft,  that  God  fome- 
times  perinitsSin  to  be  committed.and  at  the  fameTime  orders  I 
Things  fo,   that  if   he  permits  the  Fad,  it  will  come  to  pafs,  I 
becaufe  on  fome  Accounts  he  fees  it  needful  and  of  Importance  ! 
that  it  (hould  come  to  pafs.    Matt,  xviii.  7.    It   muft   needs  be^  \ 
that  Offences  come  ;  hut  Wo  to  that  Man  by  whom  the  Offence  cometh,  \ 
With  I  Cor.  xi.  19.  For   there  rriuji  alfo  be   Hereftes   among  you^  \ 
that  they  which  are  approved^may  be  made  manifefl  among  you.  \ 

Thus  it  is  certain  and  demonftrable,  from  the  holy  Scrip-  \ 
tures,  as  well  as  the  Nature  of  Things^  and  the  Principles  of  | 
ArminianSy  that  God  permits  Sin  j  and  at  the  fame  Time,  fo  ij] 
orders  Things,  in  his  Providence,  that  it  certainly  and  mfalli-  ■( 
bly  will  come  to  pafs,  in  Confequcnce  of  his  Permiflion.  \ 


I  proceed  to  obferve  in  the  next  Place,  : 

III.  That  there  is  a  great  Difference  between  God*s 
being  concerned  thus,  by  his  Permiffton^  in  an  Event  and  Adt, 
•which  in  the  inherent  Subject  and  Agent  of  it,  is  Sin,  (tho'  the 
Event  will  certainly  follow  on  his  PermilTion,)  and  his  being 
concerned  in  it  by />;Wm«^  it  and  exerting  the- Acfl  of  Sin  j 
or  between  his  being  the  Orderer  of  it's  certain  Exiftence,  by 
7tot  hindering  it,  under  certain  Circumftances,  and  his  being  the 

proper 

*'  tion)  I  look  upon  it  as  an  evident  Proof,  that  thefe  Things  are/ 
**  in  the  Language  of  Scripture,faid  to  be  determined  or  decreed 
**  (or  exadly  bounded  and  mark'd  out  by  God,  as  the  Word 
•*  Qi^\?^oi  moll  naturally  Signifies)  which  he  fees  in  Fa6l  will  hap- 
<*  pen,  in  Confequence  of  his  Volitions,  without  any  necefEtating 
"  Agency  ;  as  well  as  thofe  Events^  of  which  he  \&  properly 
*•  the  Author."    DQdd.  in  hoc. 


Seft.  IX.     in   the  Exiftence  of  Sin.     259 

proper  j£lor  or  Author  of  it,  by  a  pofitive  Agency  or  Efficiency, 
I  And  this,  notwithftanding  ^ix'sxDx .Whithy  offers  about  a  Saying 
of  Philofophers,  thatC^/^y^  defic'iens^  in  Rebus  necejfariis^  ad  Caufam 
\perfe  efficientem  rediicenda  eji.     As  there  is  a  valt  Difference  be- 
tween the  Sun's  being   the  Caufe  of    the  Lightfomenefs   and 
Warmth  oi  the  Atmofphere,   and  Brightnefs    of  Gold   and 
Diamonds,  by  its  Prefence  and  pofitive  Influence  ;  and  its  be- 
ing the  Occafion  of  Darknefs  and  Froft,   in  the  Night,  by  its 
Motion,  whereby  it  defcends  below  the  Horizon.  The  Motion 
of  the  Sun  is  the  Occafion  of  the  latter  Kind  of  Events  ;  but 
it  is  not  the  proper  Caufe,  Efficient  or  Producer  of  them  j.  tho* 
they  are  neceffarily  confequent  on  that  Motion,   under  fuch 
Circumftances  :  No  more   is  any  A6tion  of  the  divine  Being 
the  Caufe  of  the  Evil  of  Men's  Wills.     If  the  Sun    were  the 
i  proper  Caufe  of  Cold  and  Darknefs,    it  would  be    the  Fountain 
[of  thefe  Things,  as  it  is  the  Fountain  of  Light  and  Heat :  And 
!  then  fomething  might  be  argued  from  the  Nature  of  Cold  and 
I  Darknefs,  to  a  Likenefs  of  Nature   in  the  Sun  ;  and  it  might 
be  juifly  infer'd,  that  the  Sun  itfelf  is  dark  and  cold,  and  that 
his  Beams  are  black  and  frofty.     But  from  its  being  the  Caufe 
no  otherwife  than  by  its  Departure,  no   fuch  Thing  can  be 
infer'd,  but  the  contrary  j    it  may  juftly  be  argued,   that  the 
Sun  is  a  bright  and  hot  Body,  if  Cold  and  Darknefs  are  found 
j  to  be  the  Confequence  of  its  Withdrawment  ;  and  the  more 
conftantly  and  necefTarily  thefe  Effeds  are  connected  with,  and 
confined  to  its  Abfence,   the  more   fl:rongly  does  it  argue  the 
Sun  to  be  the  Fountain  of  Light  and  Heat.     So,  inafmuch  as 
Sin  is  not  the  Fruit  of  any  pofitive  Agency  or  Influence  of  the 
moft  High,  but  on  the  contrary,  arifes  from  the  withholding  of 
IJiis  A(5lion  and  Energy,  and  under  certain  Circumftances,  ne- 
ceffarily  follows  on  the  Want  of  his  Influence;  this  is  no  Ar- 
gument that  he  is  finful,  or  his  Operation  Evil,   or  has    any 
I  Thing  of  the  Nature  of  Evil  ;  but  on  the  contra^ry,  that  He, 
I  and  his  Agency,  are  altogether  good  and  hjoly,   and  that  he  js 
the  Fountain  of  all  Holinefs.     It  would  be  flraiige  arguing  in- 
I  deed,  becaufe  Men   never  commit  Sin,   but   o;iiy  when  God 
leaves    'em   to  themfelves^    and    necefTarily    fin,   when    he  does 
fo,  that  therefore  their  Sin  is  not  from  thefnfelves^  but  fromGod  ; 
and  fo,  thatGod  muft  be  a  finful  Being  :  As  flrange  as  it  would 
be   to   argue,  becaufe  it   is    always   dark   when,   the  Sun   is 
gone,   and  never  dark  when  the  Sun  is  prefent,  that  therefore 
I  all  Darknefs   is    from  the  Sun,  and  that  his  Difk  and  Beams 
mufl,  needs  be  black,  ^ 

K  k  2  IV.  It 


26o      How  GOD  is  concerned     Part  IV. 

IV.  It  properly  belongs  to  the  fupreme  and  abfblute  Gover^Sll 
nor  of  the  Univerfe,  to  order  all  important  Events  within   his 
Dominion,  by  his  Wifdom  :    But   the    Events  in  the  moral 
World  are   of  the  moft  important  Kind  ;    fuch  as  the  moral 
A<5tions  of  intelligent  Creatures,  and  their  Confequences. 


Thefe  Events  will   be  ordered  by  fomething.     They   will 
either   be  difpofed  by  Wifdom,  or  they   wnll   be  difpol'ed  by  , 
Chance  ;  that  is,  they  will  be  difpofed  by  blind  ?.nd  undefign-j , 
ing  Caufes,  if  that  were  poffible,  and  could  be  called  a  Dilpo^'^i  I 
fal.     Is  it  not  better,  that  the  Good  and  Evil   which  happensfe'^ 
in  God's  World,    (hould  be  ordered,  regulated,  bounded  and  ^ 
determin'd   by  the  good  Pleafure  of  an   infinitely  Vv^ife  Being,| 
who  perfe^ly  comprehends  within  his Underftanding  and  con-j 
ftant  View,  the  Univerfality  of  Things,  in  all  tlieir  Extent  an4 1 
Duration,    and    fees    all  the  Influence   of  every  Event,    with  ; 
Refpedt  to  every  individual  Thing  and  Circumftance,  through-^  ; 
out  the  grand  Syftem,   and  the  whole  of  the  eternal  Series   of  ' 
Confequences  ;    than   to    leave    thefe  Things  to   fall    out  by  ■ 
Chance,  and  to  be  determined  by  thofe  Caufes  which  have  no'j 
Underftanding  or  Aim  ?  Doubtlefs,  in  thefe  important  Events^ ' 
there  is   a  better  and  a  worfe,  as  to  the  Time,  Subje6t,  Place, 
Manner  and  Circumftances  of  their  coming  to  pafs,  wnth  Re- 
gard to  their  Influence   on  the  State  and   Courfe   of  Things, 
And  if  there  be,   'tis  certainly   bel^  that  they  fhould  be  deter-, 
inine4  to  tha^  Time^  Place,  5cc,  which  is  beft.     And  therefore  : 
'tis  in  its  own  Nature  fit,  that  Wifdom,  and  not  Chance,  fliould 
order  thefe  Things.     So  that  it  belongs   to  the  Being,  who  is. 
the  PofTeflbr  of  infinite  Wifdom,  and  is  the  Creator  andOwner J 
of  the  w^hole  Syftem  of  created  Exiftences,and  has  the  Care  oF  * 
all  ;  I  fay,  it  belongs  to  him,to  take  Care  of  this  Matter  ;  ard  ; 
he  would  iiot  do  what  is  proper  for  him,  if  he  fliould  negiecl  it. 
And  it  is  fo  far  from  being  unholy  in  him,   to  undertake  this 
Affair,  that   it  would  rather  have  been  unholy  to  negled  it  ;  aj^ 
it  would  have  been  a  negle61ing  what  fitly  appertains  to  him  y 
pnd  fo  it  would  have  been  a  very  unfit  and  unfuitable  Negle6^. 

Therefore  the  Sovereignty  of  God  doubtlefs  extends  to  thisj^^ 
Matter  :  efpecially  confidering,  that  if  it  fhould  be  fuppofed*' 
to  be  other  wife,  and  God  ihould  leave  Men's  Volitions,  and  * 
'sxW  moral  Events,  to  the  Determination  and  Difpofition  of  j 
blind  and  unmeaning  Caufes,  or  they  fhould  be  left  to  happen 
perfectly  without  a  Qaufe  ;  this  would  be  no  more  confiflerit 
Wh  Li|:)crty,  in  any  Notion  of  it,  and  particularly  not  in  the 

Arminlan   i 

'  i3 


Sed.  IX.       in  //6^  Exiftence  of  Sin.     261 

Armmtan  Notion  of  it,  than  if  thefe  Events  were  fubje(5l  to  the 
Difpofal  of  divine  Providence,  and  the  Will  of  Man  were  de- 
termined by  Circumftances  which  are  ordered  and  difpofed 
by  divine  Wifdom  ;  as  appears  by  what  has  been  already 
oblerved.  But  'tis  evident,  that  fuch  a  providential  difpofing 
and  determining  Men's  moral  Adions,  tho'  it  infers  a  moral 
NecelTity  of  thofe  Adions,  yet  it  does  not  in  the  leaft  infringe 
the  real  Liberty  of  Manicind,  ;  the  only  Liberty  that  common 
Senfe  teaches  to  be  necefiary  to  moral  Agency,  whifh,  as  has 
been  demonftrated,  is  not  inconfiflent  whith  fuch  Neceffity, 

On  the  whole,  it  is  manifeftjthat  God  may  be, in  theManner 
which  has  been  defcribed,  the  Orderer  and  Difpoler  of  that 
Event,  which  in  the  inherent  Subjed  and  Agent  is  moral  Evil; 
and  yet  His  fo  doing  may  be  no  moral  Evil.  He  may  will  the 
Difpofal  of  fuch  an  Event,  and  it's  coming  to  pafs  for  good 
Ends,  and  hisWill  not  be  an  immoral  or  fmful  Will,  but  a  per- 
fe6tly  holy  Will.  And  he  may  actually  in  his  Providence  fo 
difpofe  and  permitThings,  that  the  Event  may  be  certainly  and 
infallibly,  conneded  with  fuchDifpofal  h.  Permiffion,  and  hisA(5l 
therein  net  be  an  immoral  or  unholy,  but  a  perfectly  holyAct. 
Sin  may  be  an  evil  Thing,  and  yet  that  there  fnould  be  fuch  a 
Difpofal  and  Permiffion, as  that  it  (hould  come  to  pafs,  may  be 
a  good  Thing.  This  is  no  Contradi6tion,  or  Inconfifterjce. 
Jofeph's  Brethren's  felling  him  into  Egypt ^  confider  it  only  as  it 
was  a6ted  by  them,  and  with  RefpeCt  to  their  Views  and  Aims 
which  were  evil,  was  a  very  bad  Thing  ;  but  it  was  a  good 
Thing,  as  it  was  an  Event  of  God's  ordering,  and  confider'd 
with  Refped  to  his  Views  and  Aims  which  were  good.  Gen. 
1.  20.  Js  for  yoii^  ye  thought  Evil  againft  me  \  hut  God  ?neant  it  unt§^ 
Good.  So  the  Crucifixion  of  Chrift,  if  we  coniider  only  thofe 
Things  which  belong  to  the  Event  as  it  proceeded  from  his 
^urde,rers,  and  are  comprehended  within  the  Compafs  of  the 
Affair  confidered  as  their  A61,  their  Principles,  Difpofitions, 
Views  and  Aims  ;  fo  it  was  one  of  the  moft  heinous  Things 
that  ever  wa:s  done  ;  in  many  Refpeds  the  moft  horrid  of  all 
Aels  :  But  confider  it,  as  it  was  v/ill'd  and  ordered  of  God, 
in  the  Extent  of  his  Defigns  and  Views,  it  was  the  moft  ad- 
mirable and  glorious  of  all  Events  ;  and  God's  willing  the 
Event  was  the  moft  holy  Volition  of  God,  that  ever  was  made 
known  to  Men  ;  and  (jod's  Ad  in  ordering  it,  was  a  divine 
Ad,  which  above  all  others,  manifefts  the  moral  Excellency 
©f  the  divine  Being. 

The 


262  OfGOUs  fecret         Part  IV. 

TheConfideration  of  thefeThings  may  help  us  to  a  fufficient 
Anfwer  to  the  Cavils  of  Arminians  concerning  what  has  been 
fuppofed  by  many  Calvinifts^  of  a  Diftindion  between  a  fecret 
and  revealed  Will  of  God,  and  their  Diverfity  one  from  the 
other  s  fuppofing,  that  the  Calvimfts  herein  afcribe  inconfiftent 
Wills  to  the  mod  High  :  Which  is  without  any  Foundation. 
God*s  fecret  and  revealed  Will,  or  in  other  Words,  his  difpofing 
and  preceptive  Will  may  be  diverfe,  and  exercifed  in  diffimilar 
A<5ts,  theu  one  in  difapproving  and  oppoling,  the  other  in 
willing  and  determining,  without  any  Inconfiftence.  Becaufe, 
altho*  thefe  diffimilar  Exercifes  of  the  divine  Will  may  in 
fome  Refpe6ls  relate  to  the  fame  Things,  yet  in  Stridnefs  they 
have  different  and  contrary  Objeds,  the  one  Evil  and  the 
other  Good.  Thus  for  Inftance,  the  Crucifixion  of  Chrift 
was  a  Thing  contrary  to  the  revealed  or  preceptive  Will  of 
God  ;  becaufe,  as  it  was  viewed  and  done  by  his  malignant 
Murderers,  it  was  a  Thing  infinitely  contrary  to  the  holy  Na- 
ture of  God,  and  fo  necefiarily  contrary  to  the  holy  Inclina- 
tion of  his  Heart  revealed  in  his  Law.  Yet  this  don't  at 
all  hinder  but  that  the  Crucifixion  of  Chrift,  confidered  with 
all  thofe  glorious  Confequences,  which  were  within  the  View 
of  the  divine  Omnifcience,  might  be  indeed,  and  therefore 
might  appear  to  God  to  be,  a  glorious  Event  ;  and  confe^ 
quently  be  agreable  to  his  Will,  tho'  this  Will  may  be  fecret, 
i.  e,  not  revealed  in  God's  Law.  And  thus  confidered,  the 
Crucifixion  of  Chrift  was  not  evil,  but  good.  If  the  fecret 
Exercifes  of  God's  Will  were  of  a  Kind  that  is  diflimilar  and 
contrary  to  his  revealed  Will,  refpecSting  the  fame,  or  like 
Obje(fts  ;  if  the  Objedts  of  both  were  good,  or  both  evil  j 
*hen  indeed  to  afcribe  contrary  Kinds  of  Volition  or  Inclina- 
tion to  God,  refpeding  thefe  Objeds,  would  be  to  afcribe  an 
inconfiftent  Will  to  God  :  but  to  afcribe  to  Him  different  and 
oppofite  Exercifes  of  Heart,  refpeding  different  Obje6ls,  and 
Obje(5ls  contrary  one  to  another,  is  fo  far  from  fuppofing  God's 
Will  to  be  inconfiftent  with  it  felf,  that  it  can't  be  fuppofed 
confiftent  with  it  felf  any  other  Way.  For  any  Being  to  have 
a  Will  of  Choice  refpe(5ling  Good,  and  at  the  fame  Time  a 
Will  of  Rejection  and  Refufal  refpeding  Evil,  is  to  be  very 
confiftent  :  But  the  contrary,  vi%,  to  have  the  fame  Will  to- 
wards thefe  contrary  Obje6ts,  and  to  chufe  and  love  both 
Good  and  Evil  at  the  fame  Time,  is  te  be  very  inconfiftent. 

There  is  no  Inconfiftence  in  fuppofing,  that  God  may  hate 
a  Thing  as  it  is  in  it  felf,   and  confidei-ed  fimply  as  Evil,  and 

yet 


Sect.  IX.        and  revealed  TVilL  263 

yet  that  it  may  be  his  Will  it  ihould  come  to  pafs,  con- 
fidering  all  Confequences.  I  believe,  there  is  no  Perfon  of 
good  Underftanding,  who  will  venture  to  fay,  he  is  certain 
that  it  is  impolTible  it  fhouid  be  beft,  taking  in  the  whole 
Compafs  and  Extent  of  Exiftence,  and  all  Confequences  in 
the  endlefs  Series  of  Events,  that  there  fhouid  be  fuch  a  Thing 
as  moral  Evil  in  the  World.  *  And  if  fo,  it  will  certainly  fol- 
low, 

*  Here  are  worthy  to  be  obferved  feme  Paffages  of  a  late  noted 
Writer,  of  our  Nation,  that  no  Body  who  is  acquainted  with  Him 
will  fufpedl  to  be  very  favourable  to  Cahinifm.  **  Jt  is  difficult 
"  (fays  he)  to  handle  the  NeceJJjty  of  E'vH  in  fuch  a  Manner,  as 
**  not  to  Humble  fuch  as  are  not  above  being  alarmed  at  Propo- 
"  fitions  which  have  an  uncommon  Sound.  But  if  Philofophers 
"  will  but  refleft  calmly  on  the  Matter,  they  will  find,  that  con- 
**  fiftently  with  the  unlimited  Power  of  the  fupreme  Caufe,  it 
"  may  be  faid,  that  in  the  beft  ordered   Syftem,   En)ils  muft   have 

**  Place." TurnbuiPs  Principles    of  moral   Philofophy.     Pag. 

327,  328.     He  is  there  fpeaking  of  w^r^/ Evils,  as  may  be  feen. 

Again  the  fame  Author,  in  his  fecond  Vol.  entitled,  Chrijiian  Philofophy^ 
Pag  35.  has  thefe  Words  :  **  If  the  Author  and  Governor  of 
*'  all  Things  be  infinitely  perfeSi^  then  whatever  is,  is  right ;  of  all 
**  poffible  Syllems  he  hath  chofen  the  hejl :  and  confequently  there 

"  is  no  abfolute  Enjil  in  the  Univerfe. ~  This  being  the  Cafe, 

"  all  the  feeming  Imperfedions  or  E'vH!  in  it  are  fuch  only    in  a 
"  partial  View  i  and  with  Refpefl  to  the  wohok  Syftem,  they  arc 

.      "  Goods. 
Ibid.  Pag.  37.   "  Whence  then  comes  E'vH,  is  the  Queftion  that  hath  in 

<  "  all  Ages  been  reckon'd  the  Gordian  Knot  in  Philofophy.  And 
**  indeed,  if  we  own  the  Exiftence  of  Evil  in  the  World  in  an 
"  abfolute  Senfe,  we  diametrically  contradidl  what  hath  been  juft 
*'  now  prov'd  of  God.  For  if  there  be  any  En;il  in  the  Syftem, 
**  that  is  not  good  with  Refpeft  to  the  ivhole,  then  is  the  ivhole  not 
"  good,  but  evil  :  or  at  beft,  very  imperfeft  :  And  an  Author  mufl 
**  be  as  his  Workmanfhip  is  ;  as  is   the  EfFedl,   fuch    is  the  Caufe. 

'  *'  Bttt  the  Solution  of  this  Difficulty  is  at  Hand  ;  That  there  is  »» 
"  E'vH  in  the  Vni'verfe.  What  !  Are  there  no  Pains,  no  Imper- 
"  feftions  ?  Is  there  no  Mifery,  no  Vice  in  the  World  ?  Or  are 
**  not  thefe  £ij//f  ?  Evils  indeed  they  are  ;  that  is,  thofe  of  one 
*'  fort  are  hurtful,  and  thofe  of  the  other  fort  are  equally  hurtful 
•*  and  abominable  :  But  they  are  not  evil  or  mifchievous  with  Re- 

•^     «  fpea  to  the 'w/?.^^^." 

Ibid.  Pag. 42.  <*  But  He  is  at  the  fame  Time  faid  to  create  Evil, 
"  Darknefs,  Confufion  ;  and  yet  to  do  no  Evil,  but  to  be  the  Au- 
**  thor  of  Good  only.  He  is  called  the  Father  of  Lights,  the  Author 
"  oi  e'very  perfcSl  and  good  Gift ,  ivith  fwhom  there  is  no  Variahlenefs 
r  nor  Shadow  of  Turning,  who  tempt fth  w  Man,  but  gi<veth  to  all  Men 

V  iib^rallft 


264  Of  GO  Us   fecret        Part  IV. 

low,  that  an  infinitely  wife  Being,  who  always  chufes  what  is 
beft,  muft  chufe  that  there  fhouid  be  fuch  a  Thing.  And  if 
fo,  then  fuch  a  Choice  is  not  an  Evil,  but  a  wife  and  holy 
Choice.  And  if  fo,  then  that  Providence  which  is  agreable 
to  fuch  a  Choice,  is  a  wife  and  holy  Providence.  Men  do  will 
Sin  as  Sin,  and  fo  are  the  Authors  and  Adors  of  it  :  They 
love  it  as  Sin,  and  for  evil  Ends  and  Purpofes.  God  don't 
v^ill  Sin  as  Sin,  or  for  the  fake  of  any  Thing  evil  ;  tho'  it  be 
bis  Pleafure  fo  to  order  Things,  that  He  permitting.  Sin  will 
come  to  pafs  ;  for  the  fake  of  the  great  Good  that  by  his 
Difpofar  (hall  be  the  Confequence.  His  willing  to  order 
Things  fo  that  Evil  (hould  come  to  pafs,  for  the  fake  of  the 
contrary  Good,  is  no  Argument  that  He  don't  hate  Evil,aiJ 
Evil  :  And  if  fo,  then  it  is  no  Reafon  why  he  mayn't  reafona- 
bly  forbid  Evil  as  Evil,  and  punifh  it  as  fuch. 

The  Armimans  themfelves  muft  be  obliged,  whether  they 
will  or  no,  to  allow  a  Diftin61ion  of  God's  Will,  amounting 
to  juft  the  fame  Thing  that  Calvimfis  intend  by  their  Diftinc- 
tion  of  -^  fecret  and  revealed  TVill.  They  muft  allow  a  Diftindion 
of  thofe  Things  which  God  thinks  beft  fhouid  be,  confidering 
all  Circumftances  and  Confeqiiences,  and  fo  are  agreable  to 
his  difpofing  Will,  and  thofe  Things  which  he  loves,  and  are 
agreable  to  his  Nature,  in  themfelves  confidered^  Who  is 
there  that  v*ill  dare  to  fay,  that  the  hellifti  Pride,  Malice  and 
Cruelty  of  Devils,  are  agreable  to  God,  and  what  He  likes 
and  approves  ?  And  yet,  I  truft,  there  is  no  Chriftian  Divine  , 
but  what  will  allow,  that  'tis  agreable  to  God's  Will  fo  to 
©rder  and  difpofe  Things  concerning  them,  fo  to  leave  them 
to  themfelves,  and  give  them  up  to  their  own  Wickednefs, 
that  this  perfect  Wickednefs  fhouid  be  a  neceflary  Confe- 
quence. Befure  Dr.  Whitby's  Words  do  plainly  fuppofe  and 
allow  it.  t 

Thefc^jj 

**  liberally^  and  uphraideth  not.  And  yet  by  the  Prophet  l/aias  He; 
**  is  introduced  faying  of  Himfelf,  1  form  Light,  and  create  Dark' 
•*  nefs  ;  /  make  Peace,  and  create  E'vil :  I  the  Lord  do  all  theft 
*'  Things.  What  is  the  Meaning,  the  plain  Language  of  all  this,. 
•*  but  that  the  Lord  delighteth  in  Goodnefs,  and  (as  the  Scripture 
**  fpeaks)  Evil  is  his  firange  H'ork  f  He  intends  ^ndpurfues  the 
**  univerfal  Good  of  his  Creadon  :  and  the  En;il  which  happens, 
"  is  not  permitted  for  it's  own  fake,  or  tr^ro'  any  Pleafure  in  Evil,, 
•*  but  becaufe  it  is  requifite  to  the  greater  Good  purfued^'* 

t  Whith^  on  the  five  Points.  Edit.  ^.  P.  300,  305,,  309. 


Sea.IX.          and  revealed  Will           265  % 

',(fl 

Thefe  following  Things    may  be  laid  down  as' Majiims  of  % 

plain  Truth,  and  indifputable  Evidence.  *!l 

1.  That  God  is  a  perfeSfly  happy  Being,  in  the  mofl:  abfo-  ■■ 
lute  and  higheil  Senfe  poffible.  i 

2.  That  it  will  follow  from  hence,  that  God  is  free  from  J 
every  Thing  that  is  contrary  to  Happinefs  ;  and  fo,  that  in  ftridt  ^ 
Propriety  of  Speech,  there  is  no  fuch  Thing  as  any  Pain,  j; 
Gn(if  or  Trouble  in  God.  ;f| 

3.  When  any  intelligent  Being  is  really  crofs'd  and  difap-  % 
pointed,  and  Things  are  contrary  to  what  He  truly  defires,  ^ 
He  is  the  lefs  pkafed^  or  has  lefs  Pleafure^  his  Pleafure  and  Happi-  ** 
nefs  is  dimimjhed^  and  he  fufFers  what  is  difagreable  to  him,  or  v.^ 
is  the  Subje6l  of  fomething  that  is  of  a  Nature  contrary  to  J, 
Joy  and  Happinefs,  even  Pain  and  Grief,  **  % 

From  this  lafl:  Axiom   it  follows,  that  If  no  Di0:in6lion  is  | 

to  be  admitted  between  God's  Hatred  of  Sin,    and  his    Will  •  ■ 

with  Refpect  to  the  Event  and  the  Exigence  of  Sin,   as  the  | 

alwife  Determiner  of  all   Events,  under  the  View  of  all  Con-  J 

fcquences  through  the  whole  Compafs  and  Series  of  Things  ;  f 

I  fay,  then  it  certainly  follows,    that  the    coming  to   pafs  of  '% 

every  individual  Kdi  of  Sin   is    truly,  all  Things   confidered,  h 

contrary  to  his  Will,  and  that  his  Will  is  really    crofs'd  in  it  ;  \ 

and  this  in  Proportion  as  He  hates  it.     And  as  God's  Hatred  ^^ 

of  Sin  is   infinite,  by  Reafon  of  the  infinite  Contrariety  of  his  j; 
holy  Nature  to  Sin  ;    fo  his  Will  is  infinitely  crofs'd,  in  every 

Act  of  Sin  that  happens.     Which  is  as  much   as   to  fay.  He  ' 

ejidures  that  which  is  infinitely  difagreable  to  Him,  by  Means  I 

oF  every  A6t  of  Sin  that  He  fees  committed.     And  therefore,  ') 

as  appears  by  the  preceeding  Pofitions,  He  endures  truly  and  [ 

really,  infinite  Grief  or  Pain  from  every  Sin.     And  fo  He  muft  '^ 

be  infinitely  crofs'd,  and  fufi:''er   infinite    Pain,    every  Day,  in  n 

Millions  of  Millions  of  Infiances  :    He   muft  continually  be  fj 

the  Subje6t  of  an  immenfe  Number  of  ;W,  and  truly  infinite-  \ 

\\  great  CrofTes  and  Vexations.   '   Which  would  be  to   make  \ 

him  infinitely  the  moll  miferable  of  all  Beings.  1 

LI                                            If  I 

**Certain]y  'tis  not  lefs  abfuH  &  unreafonable,  to  talk  of  God's Wil!  | 

andDefire's  being  truly  and  properly  crofs'd,  withoiit  his  fufferirg  j 

any  Uneafinefs,  or  any  Thing  grievous, or  difagreable,  rhan   it  is  -j 

to  talk  of  fomething  that  may  be   called  a  re^uealed  Will,  whicM  \\ 

may  in  fome  Refped  be  different  from   a  fecret  Purpofe  ;  wl^  \ 

Purpofe  may  be  fulfilled,  v/hen  the  other  is  oppofed*  I 


266  Of  GOD's  fecret  Part  IV. 

If  any  Objedor  (hould  fay  ;  All  that  thefe  Things 
s mount  to,  is,  that  God  may  do  Evil  that  Good  may  come  ;  which 
is  juilly  efteem'd  immoral  and  fmful  in  Men  ;  and  therefore 
may  be  juftly  efteem'd  inconfiftent  with  the  moral  Perfedions 
of  God.  I  anfwer.  That  for  God  to  difpofe  and  permit  Evil, 
in  the  Manner  that  has  been  fpoken  of,  is  not  to  do  Evil  that 
Good  may  come  ;  for  it  is  not  to  do  Evil  at  all.— In  Order 
to  a  Thing*s  being  morally  Evil^  there  muft  be  one  of  thefe 
Things  belonging  to  it  :  Either  it  mud  be  a  Thing  unfjt  and 
iinfuitahle  in  it's  own  Nature  -,  or  it  muft  have  a  had  Tendency  ; 
or  it  muft  proceed  from  an  evil  Difpofttion^  and  be  done  for  an 
evil  End.  But  neither  of  thefe  Things  can  be  attributed  to 
God's  ordering  and  permitting  fuch  Events,  as  the  immoral 
Ads  of  Creatures,  for  good  Ends,  (i.)  It  is  not  unfit  in  it's 
own  Nature^  thatHe  fhould  do  fo.  For  it  is  in  it's  own  Nature 
fit,  that  infinite  IVifidom,  and  not  blind  Chance,  fhould  difpofe 
moral  Good  and  Evil  in  the  World.  And  't'lsfit,  that  the 
Being  who  has  infinite  JFifichn,  and  is  the  Maker,  Owner,  and 
fupreme  Governor  of  the  World,  fhould  take  Care  of  that 
Matter.  And  therefore  there  is  no  Unfitnefis,  or  Unfuitablenefs 
in  his  doing  it.  It  may  be  unfit,  and  fo  immoral,  for  any 
other  Beings  to  go  about  to  order  this  Affair  ;  becaufe  they 
are  not  poiTefs'd  of  a  Wifdom,  that  in  any  Manner  fits  them 
for  it  ;  and  in  other  Refpe6ls  they  are  not  fit  to  be  trufted 
with  this  Affair  ;  nor  does  it  belong  to  them,  they  not  being 
the  Owners  and  Lords  of  the  Univerfe. 

We  need  not  be  afraid  to  affirm,  that  if  a  wife  and  good 
Man  knew  v,-ith  abfolute  Certainty,  it  would  be  beft,  all 
Things  confidered,  that  there  fliould  be  fuch  a  Thing  as  moral 
Evil  in  the  World,  it  would  not  be  contrary  to  his  Wifdom 
ajid  Goodncfs,  for  him  to  chufe  that  it  fliould  be  fo.  'Tis  no 
evil  Defire,to  defire  Good,  and  to  defire  that  which, all  Things- 
confidered,  is  beft.  And  it  is  no  unwife  Choice,  to  cliufe  that 
That  fnould  be,  which  it  is  beft  fhould  be  ;  and  to  chufe  the 
Exiftence  of  that  Thing  concerning  which  this  is  known,  viz, 
that  it  is  beft  it  ftiould  be,  and  fo  is  known  in  the  whole 
to  be  moft  worthy  to  be  chofen.  On  the  contrary,  it  would 
be  a  plain  Defedt  in  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  for  him  not  to 
chufe  it.  And  the  Reafon  why  he  might  not  order  it,  if  he 
were  able,would  not  be  becaufe  he  might  not  defire  it,but  only 
the  ordering  of  that  Matter  don't  belong  to  him.  But  it 
*s  no  Flarm  for  Him  Vvho  is  by  Right,  and  in  the  greateft  Pro- 
'  ^:ty,   the   fupreme  Orderer   of  all  Things,   to  order  every 


■^^11 


Sed.lX.  and  xtv^AzdiTVilL  267 

Thing  in  fuch  a  Mann€r,as  It  would  be  a  Point  of  Wifdom  in 
Him  to  chufe  that  the.y  IhoUld  bt;  ordered.  If  it  would  be  a 
plainDefe6t  of  Wifdom  and  Goodfiefs  in  a  Being, not  to  chufe  ^ 
that  That  Ihould  be,  which  He  certainly  knows  it  would,  all . 
Things  confidered,  be  beft  fliould  be  (as^  was  but  now  ob- 
ferved  )  then  it  muft  be  impoliibie  for  a  Being  who  has  no 
Defe6l  of  Wifdom  and  Goodnefs,  to  do  otherwife  than  chufe 
it  fhould  be  ;  and  that,  for  this  very  Reafon,  becaufe  He 
is  perfectly  wife  and  good.  And  if  it  be  agreable  to  perfe61: 
Wifdom  and  Goodnefs  for  him  to  chufe  that  it  fliouid  be, 
and  the  ordermg  of  all  Things  fupremely  and  pcrfedly  belongs 
to  him,  it  muft  be  agreable  to  infinite  Wifdom  and  Gccdnels, 
to  order  that  it  iliould  be.  If  the  Choice  is  good,  the  order- 
ing and  difpofmg  Things  according  to  that  Choice  muft  alfo 
be  good.  It  can  be  no  Harm  in  one  to  whom  it  belongs  to 
do  his  Will  in  the  Annus  of  Heaven^  and  amon^d  the  Inhabitants  of 
the  Earthy  to  execute  a  good  Volition.  If  his  Will  be  good, 
and  the  Objedl  of  his  Will  be,  all  Things  confidered,  good 
and  beft,  then  the  chufing  or  willing  it  is  not  willing  Evil  that 
Good  may  come.  And  if  fo',  th-en  his  ordering  according  to 
that  Will  is  not  doing  Evily  that'  Good  may  come. 

2.  'Tis  not  of  a  bad  Tendency,  (cr  the  fupreme  Being  thus  to 
order  and  perm.it  that  moral  Evil  to  be,  which  it  is  beft  ftiould 
come  to  pafs.     For  that  it  is  of  good  Tendency,  is  the  very 

Thing  fuppofed  in   the  Point   now    in   Queilion. Chrift's 

Crucifixion,  tho'  a  moft  horrid  Fa6l  in  them  that  perpetrated 
it,  was  of  moft  glorious  Tendency  as  permitted  and  ordered 
of  God. 

3.  Nor  is  there  any  Need  of  fuppofing,  it  proceeds  from  any 
'■'tvil  Difpofition  or  Jim  :  for  by  the   Suppofition,  what  is  aim'd 

at  is  Go^d,  and  Good  is  the  adual  Iifue,  in  the  final  Refult  of 
Things. 


L  I  2  Sectioji 


268      Of  Sins  firft  Entrance      Part  IV. 

Section     X. 

Concerning   Sin's    firft    Entrance    into  the' 
World, 


THE  Things  which  have  already  been  offered,  may 
ferve  to  obviate  or  clear  many  of  theObjedions  v^iich 
might  be  raifed  concerning  Sm's  tirft  coming  into  the 
World  ;  as  tho'  it  would  follow  from  theDo61rine  maintain'd, 
that  God  muft  be  the  Author  of -the  firft  Sin,  thro'  his  fo  dif- 
pofmg  Things,  that  it  fhould  r.eceiTarily  follov/  from  his  Per- 
mifTion,  that  the  finfui  A6t  fliould  be  committed,  &c.  I  need 
not  therefore  ftand  to  repeat  what  has  been  faid  already,  about" 
fuch  a  Neceflity's  not  proying  God  to  be  the  Author  of  Sin, 
in  any  ill  Senfe,  or  in  any  fuch  Senfe  as  to  infringe  any 
Liberty  of  Man,  concerned  in  his  moral  Agency,  or  Capacity 
of  Blame,  Guilt  and  Punifhment. 

But  if  it  fhould  neverthelefs  be  faid,  Suppofmg  the  Cafe  fo, 
that  God,   when  he  had  made  Man,  might  fo  order  his   Cir- 

cumftances,  that  from  thefe  Circumftances,  together  with  his  \ 

withholding  further  Aififtance   and  divine  Influence,    his    Sin  I 

would  infallibly  follow,  Why  might  not  God  as  well  have  iirll  'I 

made  Man  with  a  fixed  prevailing  Principle  of  Sin  in  hisHeart?  ;' 

I  anfwer,  i.  It  was  meet,  if  Sin  did  come   into  Exigence,  | 

and  appear  in  the  World,  it  fhould  arife  from  the  Imperfecflion  f 

which  properly  belongs  to  a  Creature,  as  fuch,  and  fl^ould  ap-  j 

pear  fo  to  do,    that  it    might  appear  not  to  be  from  God  as  \ 

the  Efficient  or  Fountain.     But  this    could  not  have  been,  if  ''\ 

Man  had  been  made  at  firft  with  Sin  in  his  Heart  \  nor  unlefs  '■\ 

the  abiding  Principle  and  Habit  of  Sin   were   firft  introduced  j 

by  an  evil  A6f  of  the  Creature.     If  Sin  had  not  arofe  from  the  | 

Imperfection  of  the  Creature,  it  would  not  have  been  fo  vifible,  i 

that  it   did  not  a  ifc  from  God,  as  the  pofitive  Caufe,  and  real  , 

Source  of  it. But  it  would  require  Room  that  can't  be  here  j 

allowed,    fully   to  confider   all    the   Difficulties   which  have  \ 

|?een  fta^-ted.  concerning  the  firft  Entrance   of  Sin   into  the  | 

World,                                      .  '■  ; 

Ani  \ 


Sed.  X.  into  the  World.  269 

And  therefore, 
2.  I  would  obrerve,  that  Objecflions  againft  the  Dodrine 
that  has  been  laid  down,  in  Oppolition  to  the  Arminian  Notion 
of  Liberty,  from  thefe  Difficulties,  are  altogether  impertinent ; 
becaufe  no  additional  Difficulty  is  incurred,  by  adhering  to  a 
Scheme  in  this  Manner  differing  from  theirs,  and  none  would 
be  removed  or  avoided,  by  agreeing  with,  and  maintaining 
theirs.  Nothing  that  the  Armimans  fay,  about  the  Contingence, 
or  felf-determining  Power  of  Man's  Will,  can  ferve  to  explain 
■with  lefsDifficuIty,how  the  hrft  finfulVolition  ofMankind  could 
take  Place,  and  IVlan  be  juftiy  charged  with  the  Blame  of  it. 
To  fay,  the  Will  was  ielf-determined,  or  determined  by  free 
Choice,  in  that  finful  Volition  ;  which  is  to  fay,  that  the  firft 
iinfulVolition  was  determined  by  a  foregoing  finfulVolition  ;  is 
no  .olution  of  the  Difficulty.  It  is  an  odd  Way  of  folving 
Difficulties,  to  advance  greater,  in  order  to  it.  To  fay.  Two 
and  Two  makes  Nine  ;  or,  that  a  Child  begat  his  Father, 
folves  no  Difficulty  :  No  more  does  it,,  to  fay.  The  firft  finful 
A6t  of  Choice  was  before  the  firit  finful  A61  of  Choice,  and 
chofe  and  determined  it,  and  brought  it  to  pafs.  Nor  is  it  any 
better  Solution, to  fiy,The  iirfc  fmiul  Volition  chofe, determined 
and  produced  itfeif  ;  which  is  to  fay.  It  was  before  it  was. 
Nor  will  it  go  any  further  towards  helping  us  over  the  Diffi- 
culty, to  fay.  The  firft  finful  Volition  arofe  accidentally,. 
wiviicut  any  Caufe  at  all  ;  any  more  than  it  will  folve  that 
dirlicuit  Quellion,  Hgvj  the  World  cciild  be  made  out  of  Nothim  f 
to  fay,  It  came  into  Being  out  of  Nothing,  without  any 
Cauie  ;  as  has  been  already  obferved.  And  if  we  fhould  allow 
that  That  could  be,  that  the  firft  evil  Volition  fhould  arife  by 
perfect  Accident,  without  any  Caufe,  it  would  relieve  no  Diffi- 
culty, about  God's  laying  the  Blame  of  it  to  Man.  For  how 
was  Man  to  Blame  for  perfe6t  Accident,  which  had  no  Caufe, 
and  which  therefore,  he  (to  be  fure)  was  not  the  Caufe  of,  any 
more  than  if  it  came  by  feme  external  Caufe  ?—  Such  Kind  of 
Solutions  are  no  better,  than  if  fome  Perfon,  going  about  to 
folve  fome  of  the  ftrange  mtithematical  Paradoxes,  about  infi- 
nitely great  and  fmall  Quantities  ;  as,  that  fome  infinitely  great 
Quantities  are  infinitely  greater  than  fome  other  infinitely 
great  Quantities  ;  and  alfo  that  fome  infinitely  fhiall  Qiiantlties 
are  infinitely  lefs  than  others,  which  yet  arc  infinitely  little  ; 
in  order  to  a  Solution,  fho  ild  fay.  That  Mankind  have  been 
under  a  Miflake,  in  fuppofing  a  greater  Quantity  to  exceed  a 
fmaller  ;  and  that  a  Hundred  multiplied  by  Ten,  makes  but 
SI  f^igle  Unit. 

SiCTlOSf 


270  Of  the   Objeaion         Part  IV. 

Section     XL 

Of  a  fuppofed  Inconfijlence  of  thefe  Pri7t- 
ciplesy   wiih  GOD's  moral  Charader. 

THE  Things  which  have  been  already  obferved,  may  be 
fufficient  to  anfwer  moil  of  the  Objedlions,  and  filence 
the  great  Exclamations  of  Armitiians  againft  XhtCahiniJisy 
from  the  fvippofed  Inconfiftence  of  CcihimJIk  Principles  with 
the  moral  Perfedions  of  God,  as  exercifed  in  his  Government 
of  Mankind.  The  Confiftence  of  fuch  a  Do61rine  of  Neceffity 
as  has  been  maintained,  with  the  Fitnefs  and  Reafonableneis 
of  God's  Com.mands,  Promifes  and  Threatnings,  Reward-s 
and  Eunifhments,  has  been  particularly  confidered  :  TheCavils 
of  our  Opponents,  as  tho'  our  Doarine  of  Neceffity  made 
God  the  Author  of  Sin,  have  been  anlwered  ;  and  alfo  their 
Objedion-againft  thefe  Principles,  as  inconiiftent  with  God's 
Sincerity,  in  his  Counfels,  Invitations  and  Perfwafions,  has 
been  already  obviated,  in  what  has  been  cbferved,  refpeding 
the  Ccnfiftence  of  what  Cahini/h  fuppofe  concerning  the  fecret 
and  revealed  Will  of  God  :  By  that  it  appears,  there  is  no 
Repugnance  in 'fuppofmg  it  may  be  the  fecret  Will  of  God, 
that  his  Ordination  and  Permiffion  of  Events  Ihould  be  fuch 
that  it  fhall  be  a  certain  Ccniequence,  that  a  Thing  never  will 
com.e  to  pafs  ;  which  yet  it  isMan's  Duty  to  do,  and  fo  God's 
preceptive  Will,  that  he  fhould  do  ;  and  this  is  the  fame 
Thing  as  to  fay,  God  m.ay  iincerely  command  and  require  him 
to  do  it.  And  if  he  m.ay  be  fmcere  in  commanding  him,  he 
may  for  the  fam.e  Reafon  be  fmcere  in  counfelling,  inviting 
and  ufing  Perfuafions  with  him  to  do  it.  Counfels  and  Invi- 
tations are  Manife Rations  of  God's  preceptive  Will,  or  of  what 
God  loves,  and  v/hat  is  in  it  Mf,  and  as  Man's  Acl:,agreable  to 
his  Heart  ;  and  not  of  his  difpofmg  Will,  and  what  Tie  chufes 
as  a  Part  of  his  own  infinite  Scheme  of  Things.  It  has  been 
particularly  (hewn.  Part  III.  Sedion  IV.  that  fuch  a  Neceffity 
as  has  been  maintained,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  the  Propriety 
and  Fitnefs  of  divine  Commands  ;  and  for  the  fame  Reafon, 
not  incoafiftent  vyith  the  Sincerity  of  Invitations  and  Counfels, 
in  the  Corollary  at  the  End  of  that  Sedion.  Yea,  it  hath  been 
Ihewn,  Part  III.  Sed.  7.  Coral,  j.  that  this  Objeaion  of  Jr- 

.  tninianSf 


Sed.  XL  from  Gois  moral  Charader.  271 

mlnihus^  concerning  the  Sincerity  and  Ufe  of  divine  Exhortati-* 
ons,  Invitations  and  Counfels,    '\%  demonftrably   againil  them- 

felves. 

Notwithftanding,  1  vc^ould  further  obferve,  that  the  Diffi-» 
culty  of  reconciling  the  Sincerity  of  Counfels,  Invitations  and 
Perluafions,  with  fuch  an  antecedent  known  Fixednefs  of 
all  Events,  as  has  been  fuppofed,  is  not  peculiar  to  thisScheme, 
as  diftinguiflied  from  that  of  the  General ;ty  of  Jrmmians, which 
acknowledge  the  abfolute  Foreknowledge  of  God  :  And  there- 
fore, it  would  be  unreafonably  brought  as  an  Objection  againft" 
my  differing  from  them.  The  mam  feeming  Difficulty  in  the 
Cafe  is  this  :  That  God  in  counfelling,  inviting  and  perfuad^ 
ing,  makes  a  Shew  of  aiming  at,  feeking  and  uiing  Endeavours 
for  the  Thing  exhorted  and  perfuaded  to  ;  whereas,  'tis  im- 
pofTible  for  any  intelligent  Being  truly  to  feek,  or  ufe  Endea- 
vours for  a  Thing,  which  he  at  the  fame  Time  knows  mod 
perfedly  will  not"  come  to  pafs  ;  and  tliat  it  is  abfurd  to  fup- 
^ofe,  he  makes  the  obtaining  of  a  Thing  his  End,  in  his 
.Calls  and  Counfels,  which  he  at  the  fame  Time  infallibly 
knows  will  not  be  obtain'd  by  thefe  Means.  Novv^,  if  God 
knows  this,  in  the  utmoft  Certainty  and  Perfedion,  the  Way 
by  which  he  comes  by  this  Knowledge  makes  no  Difference, 
If  he  knows  it  by  the  Neceffity  which  he  fees  in  Things,  or 
by  fome  other  Means  ;  it  alters  not  the  Cafe. '  But  it  is  in 
Effed:  allowed  by  Jrminians  themfelves,  that  God's  inviting^ 
and  perfuading  Men  to  do  Things,  w^hich  he  at  the  fameTime 
certainly  knows  will  not  be  done,  is  noEvidence  of  Infmcerity; 
Isecaufe  they  allow,  that  Gcd  has  a  certain  Foreknowledge  of 
all  Aden's  fmful  Adions  and  Omiffions.  And  as.this  is  thus 
implicitly  allowed  by  mod  Jrmmia??s^  (o  all  that  pretend  to 
own  the  Scriptures  to  be  the  Word  of  God,mufl:  be  conftrained 
.to  allow  it.—  God  commanded  and  counfei'd  Pharaoh  to  let 
his  People  go,  and  ufed  Arguments  and  Perfuafions  to  induce 
him  to  it ;  he  laid  before  him  Arguments  taken  from  his  infi- 
nite Greatnefs  and  almighty  Power  (Exod.  vii.  i6.)  and  fore- 
warned him  of  the  fatal  Confequences  of   his  Refufal,   from 

Time  to  Time  ;  (Chap.    viii.  i,   2,  20,  21.    Chap.  ix.  1 5. 

X3— 17.  and  X.  3,  6.)  He  commanded  Mofes^  and  the  Elders 
a^  Ifraely  to  go  and  befeech  Pharaoh  to  let  the  People  go  ;  and 
at  the  fame  Time  told  'em,  he  knew  furely  that  he  would  not 
comply  to  it.  Exod.  iii.  18,  19.  And  thou /halt  come.,  thou  and  the 
Elders  of  Ifrael,  unto  the  King  of  Egypt,  and  you  fnall  fay  unto  him  ; 
^iTeLordQod  of  /Mlebjews  hath  met  with  us  j  .and  new  let  us  go^we- 

•         _  "  befeech 


fj  20f  Ohf  fromGod'  $  mor.Characler.P.IV. 

hefeech  thee^  three  Days  journey  into  the  Wildernefs^  that  we  may 
Sacrifice  unto  the  Lord  cur  God :  And,  I  am  fare  that  the  King  of 
Egypt  will  not  let  you  go.  So  our  bleffed  Saviour,  the  Evening 
wherein  he  was  betrayed,  knew  that  Peter  would  (hametuliy 
deny  him,  before  the  Morning  ;  fc3r  he  declares  it  to  him  w  th 
AlTeverations,  to  fliew  the  Certainty  of  it  ;  and  tells  the  Difci-' 
pies,  that  all  of  them  fhould  be  ohended  becaufe  of  him  that 
Night;  Matt.  xxvi.  31,-— 35-  Joh.  xiii.  38.  Luk.  xxii.  31,-34. 
^oh.  xvi.  32.  And  yet  it  was  their  Duty  to  avoid  thefeThings ; 
they  were  very  fmful  Things,  which  God  had  forbidden,  and 
which  it  was  their  Duty  to  watch  and  pray  againil:  ;  and  they 
were  obliged  to  do  fo  from  the  Counfels  and  Perjuafions  Chrift 
ufed  with  them,  at  that  very  Time,  lo  to  do  ;  Matt.  xxvi.  41. 
Watch  and  pray,,  that  ye  enter  not  intoTemptation.  So  that  whatever 
Difficulty  there  can  be  in  this  Matter,  it  can  be  no  Objection- 
againft  any  Principles  which  have  been  maintain'd  in  Oppoii- 
tion  to  the  Principles  of  Arminians  ;  nor  does  it  any  more  con- 
cern me  tc  remove  the  Difficulty,  than  it  does  ihem,  or  indeed 
all  that  call  themfelves  Chriftians,  and  acknowledge  the  divine 

Authority  of  the  Scriptures. Neverthelefs,  this  Matter  may 

poffibly  (God  allowing)  be  m.ore  particularly  and  largely  con- 
fideredj  in  fome  future  Difcourfe,  on  the  Dodrine  of  FredejH- 
tion. 

But  I  would,  here  obferve,  that  however  the  Defenders  of 
that  Notion  of  Liberty  of  Will,  which  I  have  oppofed,  exclaim 
againftthe  Dodrine  01  Caknni/Is^  as  teiiding  to  bring  Men  into 
Doubts,  concerning  the  moral  P^irfedions  of  God  ;  it  is  their  ^ 
Scheme,  and  not  the  Scheme  of  Cahini/ls,  that  indeed  is  jufily 
chargeable  with  this.  For  'tis  one  of  the  m.oft  fundamental 
Points  of  their  Scheme  of  Things,  that  a  Freedom  of  Will, 
confiding  in  felf-determination,  without  all  Neceffity,  is  effen- 
tial  to  Moral  Agency.  This  is  the  fame  Thing  as  to  fay,  that 
fuch  a  Determination  of  the  V/iU  without  all  Neceffity,  muft 
be  in  all  intelligent  Beings,  in  thofe  Things,  wherein  they  are 
tnoral  Agents^  or  in  their  moral  A^s  :  And  from  this  it  will  fol- 
low, that  God's  Will  is  not  neceffiarily  determined,  in  any 
Thing  he  does,  as  a  moral  Agent ^  or  in  any  of  his  AS^s  that  are 
of  a  moral  Nature.  So  that  in  all  Things,  wherein  he  a6ls 
holily^  jufily  and  truly^  he  don't  act  neceffiarily  ;  or  his  Will  is 
not  neceiTarily  determined  to  adl:  holily  and  juftly  ;  becaufe  if 
it  were  necellarily  determined,  he  would  not  be  a  moral  Agent 
in  thus  aaing  :  His  Will  would  be  attended  with  Neceffity  ; 
Hfhich  they  fay  is  inconfiftent  with  maral  Agencf  :  *'  He  can  a(5t 


Se.XL  0/"  Arm"^  u^r^'^yr^;^  Scripture.  273 

"  no  otherwife  ;  He  is  at  no  Liberty  in  the  Affair  ;  He  id 
♦'  determined  by  unavoidable  invincible  Neceflity  :  Therefore 
*'  ruch  Agency  is  no  moral  Agency  ;  yea,  no  Agency  at  all, 
"  properly  fpeaking  :  A  neceiTary  Agent  is  no  Agent  :  He 
"  being  pallive,  and  fubjed  to  Neceffity,  what  He  does  is  no 
*'  A61  of  his,  but  an  Effe6l  of  a  Neceflity  prior  to  any  Act  of 
*^  his."  This  is  agreable  to  their  Manner  of  arguing.  Now 
then  what  is  become  of  all  our  Proof  of  the  moral  PerfecSlions 
of  God  ?  How  can  we  provcj  that  God  certainly  will  in  .any 
one  Inftance  do- that  which  is  juft  and  holy  ;  feeing  hisWill  is 
determin'd  in  the  Matter  by  no  Neceflity  ?  We  have  no  other 
Way  of  proving  that  any  Thing  certainly  will  be,  but  only  by 
the  Neceflity  of  the  Event.  Where  we  can  fee  no  Neceflity, 
but  that  the  Thing  may  be,  or  may  not  be,  there  we  are  un- 
avoidably left  at  a  Lofs.  We  have  no  other  Way  properly 
and  truly  to  demonfl:rate  the  moral  Perfections  of  God,  but 
the  Way  that  Mr.  Chubb  proves  them,  in  P.  252,  261,  262, 
263.  of  his  Tracts  ;  viz.  That  God  mufl:  neceflJarily  perfedly 
know  what  is  mofl  v/orthy  and  valuable  in  it  felf,which  in  the 
Nature  of  Things  is  beft  and  fitteft:  to  be  done.  And  as  this 
is  moft  eligible  in  it  felf,  He  being  omnifcient,   mufl:  fee  it  to 

.  be  fo  ;  and  being  both  omnifcient  and  felf-fuflicient,  cannot 
have  any  Temptation  to  rejedt  it  ;  and  fo  mufl  neceflarily  will 

*that  which  is  beft.  And  thus,  by  this  Neceflity  of  the  De- 
termination of  God's  Will  to  what  is  good  and  beft^  we  de- 
monftrably  eftablifli  God's  moral  Character. 

Corol.  From  Things  which  have  been  obferved,  it  appears, 
that  mofl:  of  the  Arguments  from  Scripture,  which  Ar?mmcms 
make  ufe  of  to  fupport  their  Scheme,  are  no  other  than  begging 
the  ^ejlion.  For  in  thefe  their  Arguments  they  determine  in 
the  tirfl:  Place,  that  without  fuch  a  Freedom  of  Will  as 
they  hold.  Men  can't  be  proper  moral  Agents,  nor  the  Sub- 
lets of  Command,  Counfel,  Perfuafion,  Invitation,  Promifes, 
Threatnings,  Expoftulations,  Rewards  and  Punifhments  ;  and 
that  without  fuch  a  Freedom  'tis  to  no  Purpofe  for  Men  to 
take  any  Care,  or  ufe  any  Diligence,  Endeavours  or  Means,  in 
order  to  their  avoiding  Sm,  or  becoming  holy,  efcaping  Punifli- 
liient  or  obtaining  Happinefs  :  and  having  fuppofed  thefe 
'Things,  which  are  grand  Things  in  Queftion  in  the  Debate, 
then  they  heap  up  Scriptures  containingCommands,  Counfeis, 
Calls,  Warnings,  Perfuaflons,  Expoftulations,  Promifes  and 
Threatnings  ;  (as  doubtlefs  they  may  find  enough  fuch  ;  the 
Bible  is  confeflT^diy  full  of  them,   from  the  Be^inniti;;  to  tha 

M  m  £nii ) 


2  74     Whether  thefe  Principles      Part  IV. 

End  )  arid  then  they  glory,  how  full  the  Scripture  is  on  their 
Side,  how  many  more  Texts  there  are  that  evidently  favour 
theirScheme,than  fuch  as  feem  to  favour  the  contrary.  But  let 
them  firft  make  manifeft  the  Things  in  -Queftion,  which  they 
fuppofe  and  take  for  granted,  ^nd  (hew  them  to  be  confident 
with  themfelves,  and  produce  clear  Evidence  of  their  Truth  j 
and  they  have  gain'd  their  Point,  as  all  will  confefs,  without 
bringing  one  Scripture.  For  none  denies,that  there  are  Com- 
mands, Counfels,  Promifes,  Threatnings,  &c.  in  the  Bible. 
But  unlefs  they  do  thefe  Things,  their  multiplying  fuch  Texts 
of  Scripture  is  infignificant  and  vain. 

It  may  further  be  obferved,  that  fuch  Scriptures  as  they 
bnng,are  really  againft  them,  and  not  for  them.  As  it  has  been 
demonftrated,  that  'tis  their  Scheme,  and  not  ours,  that  is  in- 
confiftent  with  the  Ufe  of  Motives  and  Perfuafives,  or  any 
moral  Means  whatfoever,  to  induce  Men  to  the  Pra6lice  of 
Vertue,  or  abftaining  fromWickednefs  :  Their  Principles,  and 
not  ours,  are  repugnant  to  moral  Agency,  and  inconfiftent  with 
moral  Government,  with  Law  or  Precept,  with  the  Nature  of 
Vertue  or  Vice,  Reward  or  Punifliment,  and  with  every 
Thing  whatfoever  of  a  moral  Nature,  either  on  the  Part  of 
the  moral  Governor,  or  in  the  State,  Adions  or  Condudt  of 
the  Subject  * 


Section     XII. 

Of  a  fupfofed  Tendeitcy  of  thefe  Principles 
to  Atheifm  and  Licentioufnefs^ 

IF  any  objed  againft  what  has  been  maintained,  that  it 
tends  to  Atheifm  ;  I  know  not  on  what  Grounds  fuch  an 
Objection  can  be  raifed,  unlefs  it  be  that  fome  Atheifts 
have  held  a  Dodrine  of  Necelhty  which  they  fuppofe  to  be  like 
this.  But  if  it  be  fo,  I  am  perfuaded  the  Jrminians  would  not 
look  upon  it  juft,  that  their  Notion  of  Freedom  and  Contin- 
gence  ihould  be  charged  with  a  Tendency  to  all  the  Errors 
that  ever  any  embraced,  who  have  held  fuch  Opinions,     Thc> 

Stoic 


Sedl.  XII.  tend  to  Atheifm.  275 

,5/<?;VPhilorophers,whom  the  Cahinlfls  are  charged  with  agreeing 
with,  were  no  Atheiils,  but  the  greateft  Theifts,  and  neareft 
a-kin  to  Chriftians  in  their  Opinions  concerning  the  Unity 
and  the  Perfedions  of  the  (jodhead,  of  all  the  Heathen  Philo- 
fophers.  And  jS'/>/V«rtti,  that  chief  Father  of  Atheifm,  main- 
tain'd  no  fuch  Dodtrine  of  Neceffity,  but  was  the  greateft 
Maintainer  of  Contingence. 

The  Doctrine  of  NecefTity,  which  fuppofes  a  neceflary  Con- 
;ne6tion  of  all  Events,  on  fome  antecedent  Ground  and  Reafon 
of  their  Exigence,  is  the  only  Medium  we  have  to  prove  the 
Being  of  God.  And  the  contrary  Do6lrine  of  Contingence, 
even  as  maintain'd  by  Annmans  (which  certainly  implies  or 
infers,  that  Events  may  come  into  Exiftence,  or  begin  to  be, 
without  Dependence  on  any  Thing  foregoing,  as  their  Caufe, 
Ground  or  Reafon)  takes  away  all  Proof  of  the  Being  of  God; 
which  Proof  is  fum manly  exprefs'd  by  theApoIlle,  in  Rom.  i.  20. 
And  this  is  a  Tendency  toy/r/6^//;/i  with  aWitnefs.  Sothat  indeed 
it  is  tht:Do6irine  of  Arminians^  and  not  of  the  Calvlnijis^  that  is 
juftly  charged  with  a  Tendency  to  Atheifm  ;  it  being  built  on 
a  Foundation  that  is  the  utter  Subverfion  of  every  demonltra-  . 
tive  Argument  for  the  Proof  of  a  Deity  ;  as  has  been  (hown, 
Part  II.  Sea.  3d. 

And  whereas  it  has  often  been  faid,  that  the  Cahintjlic  Doc- 
trine of  Ncceffity,  faps  the  Foundations  of  all  Religion  and 
Vertue,  and  tends  to  the  greateft  Licentioufnefs  of  Pra(5lice  : 
This  Objedion  is  built  on  the  Pretence,  that  ourDo6lrine  ren- 
ders vain  all  Means  and  Endeavours,  in  order  to  be  vertuous 
and  religious.  Which  Pretence  has  been  already  particularly 
confidered  in  the  5th  SeSiion  of  this  Part ;  where  it  has  been 
demonftrated,  that  this  Dodrine  has  no  fuch  Tendency  ;  but 
that  fuch  a  Tendency  is  truly  to  be  charged  on  the  contrary 
Dodrine :  inafmuch  as  the  Notion  of  Contingence, .  which. 
,  their  Do6trine  implies,  in  its  certain  Confequences,  overthrows 
all  Connexion,  in  every  Degree,  between  Endeavour  and 
Event,  Means  and  End. 

And  befides,   if  many  other  Things  which  have  been  ob- 
ferved  to  belong  to  the  Arminian  Doctrine,  or  to  be  plain  Con- 
fequences of  it,  be  confidered,    there    will  appear  juft  Reafon 
to  fuppofe  that  it  is  that^   which  muft  rather  tend   to  Licenti- 
'  oiifnefs.     Their  Docflrine  excufes   all  evil  Inclinations,  which 
.  Men  find  to   be  natural  ;  becaufe  in   fuch  Inclinations.,   they 
" :  M  m  2  arc 


276      Whether  thefe  Principles      Part  IV. 

are  not  felf-dctermined,   as  fuch  Inclinations  are  not  owing  \jo^ 
anyChoice  orDetermination  of  their  ownWills.  .  Which  lead?  . 
Men  wholly  tojuftify  themfelves  in  all  their  witked  Aaions,fQ  '] 
far  as  natural  Inclination  has  had  a  Hand  in  determining  their  4 
Wills,  to  the  Commiirion  of  'em.     Yea,  thefe  Notions  which  / 
fuppofe  moral  Neceffity    and  Inability  to  be  inconfiftent  with  /. 
Blame  or  moral  Obligation,  will  direcE^ly   lead  Men  to  juftify 
the  vileft  Adts  and  Pradtices,  from  the  Strength  ofjheir  wicked 
Inclinations  of  all  Sorts  ;  ftrong  Inclinations  inducing  a  moral 
Neceffity  ;  yea,  to  excufe  every  Degree  of  evil  Inclination,  fo 
far  as  this  has  evidently  prevailed,  and  been  the  Thing  which 
has  determined   their  Wills  :  Becaufe,  £b   far  as    antecedent; 
inclination  deterrhined  the  Will,  fo  far  the  Will  was  without 
Liberty  of  Indifference  and  Self-determination.     Which  at  laft  ■ 
will  come  to  this,  that  Men  will  juftify  themfelyes  in   all   the 
Wickednefs  they  commit.     It  has  been  obferved  already,  that 
this  Scheme  of  Things  does  exceedingly  diminifh  the  Guilt  of  . 
Sin,   and  the  Difference  between  the  greateft  and  fmalleft  Of- 
fences :  *  And  if  it  be    purfued  in   its  real  Confequences,    it 
leaves  Room   for   no  fuch  Thing,    as  either  Vertue  or  Vice, 
Blame  or  Praife  in  the  World,  f  And  then  again,    how  natur 
rally  does  this  Notion  of  the  fovereign  felf-determining  Power 
of  the  Will,  in  all  Things,  vertuous  or  vicious,  and  whatfoever 
deferves  either  Reward  or  Punifhment,  tend  to  encourage  Merj 
to  put  off  the  Work  of  Religion  and  Vertue,  and  turning  from' 
Sin  to  God  J  it  being  that  which  they  have  a  fovereign  Power 
to  determine  themfelves  to,  juft  when  they  pleafe  ;  or  if  not, 
they  are  wholly  excufeablc  in  goir^g  on  in  Sm,  becaufe  of  their 
Inability  to  do  any  other. 

If  it  fhonld  be  faid,  that  the  Tendency  of  this  Do6lrine  of 
Neceffity,  to  Licentioufnefs,  appears  by  the  Improvement  many 
at  this  Day  a6tually  make  of  it,  to  juftify  themfelves  in  their 
diffolute  Courfes  j  I  will  not  deny  that  fome  Men  do  unrea- 
fonably  abufe  this  Dodrine,  as  they  do  many  other  Things 
which  are  true  and  excellent  in  their  own  Nature  :  But  I  deny 
that  this  proves,  the  Do6trine  itfelf  has  any  Tendency  to 
Licentioufnefs.  I  think,  the  Tendency  of  Dodrines,  by  what 
now  appears  in  the  World,  and  in  our  Nation  in  particular, 
may  much  more  juftly  be  argued  from  the  general  Effed  which 

has 

*  Part  IIT.  Sta.  6. 

i  Part  in.  Sea.  6.  Ib'd.  Sert.  7.  Part  IV.  Se^.  ?.  Part  Il{. 
S«a.  3.  Cor.<*l.  I.  afi^r  ih^  firilHead, 


1\ 


Se(9:.  XII.       fend  to  hiccntioufncfs.       277 

has  been  feen  to  attend  the  prevailing  o^  t^ne  Principles  of  Jr^ 
tniniam^  and  the  contrary  Principles  ;  as   both  have  had  their 
Turn  of  general  Prevalence  in  our  Nation.     If  it   be  indeed, 
as  is  pretended,    that  Calvimftic  Dodrines  undermine  the  very 
Foundation  of  all  Religion    and  Morality,    and   enervate    and 
difannul  all  rational  Motives,  to  holy  and  vertuous,  Pradlice  ; 
and  that  the  contrary  Do6trines  give  the  Inducements  to  Ver- 
tue  and  Goodnefs  their  proper  Force,  and  exhibit  Religion  in 
a  rational  Light,  tending  to  recommend   it  to  the  Reafon   of 
Mankind,  and  enforce  it  in  a  Manner  that   is  agreable  to  their 
natural  Notions  of  Things  :  I  fay,if  it  be  thus,  'tis  remarkable, 
that  Vertue  and  religious  Practice   fnould  prevail  moft,   when 
the  former  Dodrines,  fo  inconfiftent  with  it,   prevailed  almoft 
univerfally  :  And  that  ever  lince  the  latter  Doctrines,  fo  hap- 
pily agreeing  with  it,  and  of  fo  proper  &  excellent  a  Tendency 
to  promote  it,  have  been  gradually  prevailing,Vice,  Prophane- 
nefs.  Luxury  and  Wickednefs  of  all  Sorts,   and  Contempt  of 
all  Religion,    and  of  every  Kind  of  Serioufnefs  and  Stridnefs 
of  Converfation,  rfiotild  proportionabiy  prevail  ;  and  that  thefe 
Things  (hould  thus  accompany  one  another,  and  rife  and  pre- 
vail one  with   another,   now  for  a  whole  Age  together.     'Tis 
remarkable,   that  this  happy   Remedy    (difcover'd  by  the  free 
Enquiries,and  fuperior  Senfe  and  Wiidom  of  this  Age)  againft 
the  perniciousEffeds  of  Cahiriifm-,  fo  inconiiftent  withReligion, 
and  tending  fo  much  to  banifli  all  Vertue  from  the  Earth, (hould 
on  fo  long  a  Trial,  be  attended  with  no  good  EfFed ;  but  that 
the  Confequence  (l^iould  be  tiie  Reverfe  of  Amendment  ;  that 
in  Proportion,  as  the  Remedy  takes  Place,    and  is  thoroughly 
applied,   fo  the  Difeafe  fb.ould  prevail ;  and  the  very  fame  dif- 
jnal  Eifed  take  Place,  to  the  higheft  Degree,  which  Calvinijiic 
Dodrines  are  fuppofed  to  have  io  great  a  Tendency  to  ;  even 
the  banifhing  of  Religion  and  Vertue,  and  the    prevailing   of 
unbounded  Licentioufnefs  of  Manners.     If  thefe  Things  are 
truly  fo,  they  are  very  remarkable,  and  Matter  of  very  curious 
Speculation  I 


Section 


278  Of  Metaphyfical  Part  IV, 

,    Section     XIIL 

Cmcermng  that  ObjeSlion  again/l  the  Rea- 
ibning,  by  which  the  Calviniftic  DoEirine 
is  fupportedy  that  it  is  Metaphyfical 
and  Abftrufe, 

IT  has  often  been  objected  againfl  the  Defenders  of  Calvin 
nijlic  Princples,  that  in  their  Reafonings,  they  run  into 
nice  Schalaftic  Diftin6tions,  and  abi'trufe  metaphyfical 
Subtihies,  and  fet  thefe  in  Oppofition  to  common  Senfe.  And 
,'tis  poflible,  that  after  the  former  Manner  it  may  be  alledged 
againft  the  Reafoning  by  which  I  have  endeavoured  to  contute 
the  Arminian  Scheme  of  Liberty  and  moral  Agency,  that  it  is 
very  abftra^led  and  metaphyficaL —  Concerning  this,  I  would 
obferve  the  following  Things. 

L  If  that  be  made  an  Obje6lion  againft  the  foregoing  Rea- 
foning, that  it  is  metaphyfical^  or  may  properly  be  reduced  to  the 
Science  of  Metaphyficks,  it  is  a  very  impertinent  Objection  ; 
whether  it  be  fo  or  no,  is  not  worthy  of  any  Difpute  or  Con- 
troverfy.  If  the  Reaibning  be  good,  'tis  as  frivolous  to  en- 
quire what  Science  it  is  properly  reduc'd  to,  as  what  Language 
it  is  delivered  in  :  And  for  a  Man  to  go  about  to  confute  the 
Arguments  of  his  Opponent,  by  telling  him,  his  Arguments 
are  Metaphyfical^  would  be  as  weak  as  to  tell  him, his  Arguments 
could  not  be  fubftantiai,  becaufe  they  were  written  in  French  or 
Latin.  The  Queftion  is  not.  Whether  what  is  faid  be  Meta- 
phyficks,  Phyficks,  Lugick,  or  Mathematicks,  Latin,  French, 
Englilh,  or  Mohawk  ?  But,  Whether  the  ReaConing  be  good, 
and  theArguments  truly  conclufive  ?  The  foregoingArguments 
are  no  more  metaphyfical,  than  thofe  which  vv^e  ufe  againll  the 
Papifts,  to  difprove  their  DocStrine  of  Tranfubftantiation  ;  al- 
jedging,  it  is  inconfiftent  with  the  Notion  of  corporeal 
Identity,  that  it  fliould  be  in  ten  Thoufand  Places  at  the  fame 
Time.  'Tis  by  metaphyfical  Arguments  only  we  are 
able  to  provQ,that  the  rational  Soul  is  not  corporeal  ;  thatLead 
or  Sand  can't  think  ;  that  Thoughts  are  not  fquare  or  round, 
©r  doh*t  weigh  a  Pound*    The  Arguments  by  whi<;h  we  prove 

the 


Sed*  XIII.   and  abftrufe  Reafotiing-     279 

the  Being  of  God,  if  handled  clofely  and  diftincftly,  fo  as  to 
{hew  their  dear  and  demonftrative  Evidence,  muft  be  meta- 
phyikally  treated.  'Tis  by  Metaphyficks  only,  that  we 
can  demonftrate,  that  God  is  not  limited  to  a  Place,  or  is  not 
mutable  ;  that  he  is  not  ignorant,  or  forgetful  ;  that  it  is  im- 
pofTible  for  him  to  lie,or  be  unjuft  j  and  that  there  is  one  God 
only,  and  not  Hundreds  or  Thoufands.  And  indeed  we  have 
no  ftria  Demonftration  of  any  Thing,  excepting  mathematical 
Truths,  but  by  Metaphyficks.  We  can  have  no  Proof,  that  is 
properly  demonftrative,  of  any  one  Proportion,  relating  to  the 
Being  and  Nature  of  God,  his  Creation  of  the  World,  the 
Dependence  of  all  Things  on  him,  the  Nature  of  Bodies  or 
SpiritSjthe  Nature  of  our  own  Souls,  or  any  of  the  greatTruths 
of  Morality  and  natural  Religion,  but  what  is  metaphyfical. 
I  am  willing,  my  Arguments  (hould  be  brought  to  the  Teft  of 
the  ft:ri6teft  and  jufteft  Reafon,  and  that  a  clear,  diftin^t  and 
determinate  Meaning  of  the  Terms  I  ufe,  ihould  be  infifted 
on  ;  but  let  not  the  Whole  be  rejected,  as  if  all  were  confuted, 
by  fixing  on  it  the  Epithet  MetaphyficaL 

II.  If  the  Reafoning  v\ihich  has  been  made  ufe  of,  be  ill 
fome  Senfe  Metaphyfical,  it  will  not  follow,  that  therefore  it 
muft  needs  be  abftrufe,  unintelligible,and  a-kin  to  the  Jargon 
of  the  Schools.  I  humbly  conceive,  the  foregoing  Reafoning, 
at  leaft  as  to  thofe  Things  which  are  moft  material  belonging 
to  it,  depends  on  no  abftrufe  Definitions  or  Diftindlions,  or 
Terms  without  a  Meaning,  or  of  very  ambiguous  and  unde- 
termined Signification,  or  any  Points  of  fuch  Abftra<5tion  and 
Subtilty,  as  tends  to  involve  the  attentive  Underftanding  in 
Clouds  and  Darknefs.  There  is  no  high  Degree  of  Refine- 
ment and  abftrufe  Speculation,  in  determining,  that  a  Thing  is 
not  before  it  is,  and  fo  can't  be  the  Caufe  of  itfelf  ;  or  that  the 
firft  A61  of  free  Choice,  has  not  another  A&i  of  free  Choice 
going  before  that,to  excite  or  dire<5l  it  5  or  in  determining,  that 
no  Choice  is  made,  while  the  Mind  remains  in  a  State  of 
abfolute  Indifference  ;  that  Preference  and  Equilibrium  never 
co-exift  ;  and  that  therefore  no  Choice  is  made  in  a  State  of 
Liberty,  confifting  in  Indifference  :  And  that  fo  far  as  theWill 
is  determined  by  Motives,  exhibited  and  operating  previous  to 
i  the  A6t  of  the  Will,  fo  far  it  is  not  determined  by  the  Ad  of 
I  the  Will  itfelf ;  that  nothing  can  begin  to  be,  which  before 
was  not,  without  a  Caufe,  or  fome  antecedent  Ground  or  Rea- 
ibn,  why  it  then  begins  to  be  ;  that  Effeds  depend  on  their 
Caufes,  and  are  connected  with  them  i  that  Vertue  is  not  the 

worfe, 


2  8o  Of  Metaphyfical  Part  IV. 


d 


worfe,  nor  Sin  the  better,  for  the  Strength  of  Inclination,  with 
which  it  is  praclifed,  and  the  Difficulty  which  thence  arifes  of 
doing  otherwife  ;  that  when  it  is  already  infallibly  known,that  | 
aThing  will  be, it  is  not  aThing  contingent  whether  it  will  ever  \ 
be  or  no  j  or  that  it  can  be  truly  faid,  notwithftanding,  that  \ 
it  is  not  neceiTary  it  (hould  be,  but  it  either  may  be,  or  may  | 
not  be.  And  the  like  might  be  obferved  of  many  otherThing*  * 
which  belong  to  the  foregoing  Reafoning.^ 

If  any  (hall  ftill  ftand  fo  ,it,  that  the  foregoing  Reafoning  i»  | 
nothing  but  metaphyfical  Sophiftry  ;  and  that  it  myft  be  fo,  % 
that  the  feeming  Force  of  the  Arguments  all  depends  on  fomef  > 
Fallacy  and  Wile  that  is  hid  in  the  Obfcurity,  which  always 
attends  a  great  Degree  of  metaphyfical  Abrtra^tion  and  Re- 
finement ;  and  fliall  be  ready  to  fay,  "  Here  is  indeed  fome- 
*'  thing  that  tends  to  confound  the  Mind,  but  not  to  fatisfy  it : 
•'  For  who  can  ever  be  truly  fatisfied  in  it,  that  Men  are  iitly 
*'  blamed  or  commended,  punifhed  or  rewarded,  for  thofe 
"  Volitions  which  are  not  from  themfel,es,  and  of  whofe  Ex- 
*'  iftence  they  are  not  the  Caufes.  Men  may  refine,  as  much 
*'  as  they  pleafe,  and  advance  their  abftrac^  Notions,  and  make 
•«  out  a  Thoufand  feeming  Contradidions,  to  puzzle  our  Un- 
*'  derftandings  ;  yet  there  can  be  noSatisfadion  in  fuchDodrine 
«'  as  this  :  The  natural  Senfeof  the  Mind  of  Man  will  always 
'«*  refill  it."  *  I  humbly  conceive,  that  fuch  an  Objedtor,  if  he 

has' 

*  A  certain  noted  Author,  of  the  prefent  Age,  fays,  The  Argument* 
for  NeceJ/ity  are    nodiing    but   Quibbling,  cr    Logomachy,  ujing  Wordi  ; 
nvithout   a    Meanings   or   Begging  the  ^ef ion. — 1  don't    know  what' 
K-ind  of  Necefiiiy  any  Authors  He  may   have    Reference    to,   arc 
Advocates  for  ;  or  whether  they  have   managed   their  Arguments 
well,  or  ill.     As  to  the  Arguments  I  have  made  ufe  of,  if  tney  are  ' 
Nibbles,  they  may  be  (hewn  to  be  fo  ;  fuch  Knots  are  capable  of  ' 
being  untied,  and  the  Trick  and  Cheat  may  be  detefled  and  plainly 
laid  open.     If  this  be  fairly  done,  with  Refpeft  to  the  Grounds  and 
Reafons  I  have  relied  upon,  I    lliall   have  juft   Occafion   for  the 
future  to  be  filent,  if  not    to   be  alhamed  of  my  Argumentations.   , 
I  am  willing,  my  Proofs  fhould  be  thoro'ly  examined  ;  and  if  there 
be  nothing  but  Begging  the  ^uejiiorty  or  m^tx Logomachy,  or  Difpute  of 
Words,  let  it  be  madij  manifcft,and  ftiewn  how  the  feeming  Strength 
of  the  Argument  depends  on  my  vftng  Words  ^without  a  Meanings  or 
sirifes  from  the  Ambiguity  of  Terms,  or  my  making  ufe  of  Words  ii 
an  indeterminate   and   unfteady  Manner  ;    and  that  the  Weight  of 
my  Reafons  relt  mainly  oa  fuch  a  Foundation  :  And  then,   I  fhall 
either  be  readv  to  r^usa  what  X  have  urged,  and  thank  the  Mait 
'  that, 


Sea.  XHI.     ^«a^  abftrufe  Reafohing.    2 Sir 

has  Capacity  and  Humility  and  Calmnefs  of  Spirit,  Efficient 
impartially  and  thoroughly  to  examine  himfelf,  will  find  that 
he  knows  not  really  what  he  would  be  at  j  and  that  indeed 
his  Difficulty  is  nothing  but  a  meer  Prejudice,  from  an  inad- 
vertent cuftomary  Ufe  of  Words,  in  a  Meaning   that   is  not 

clearly  underftood,  nor   carefully  refleded  upon. Let  the 

Objector  refled  again,  if  he  has  Candor  and  Patience  enough, 
and  don't  fcorn  to  be  at  the  Trouble  of  clofe  Attention  in  the 

Affair. He  would  have  a    Man's  Volition   ht  from  himfclf. 

Let  it  hQfrom  himfelf  moft  primarily  and  originally  of  any  Way 

N  n  conceivable  ; 

that    has   done  the  kind  Part,   or  fhall   be  juftly  expofed  for  my 
Obftinacy. 
,The  fame  Author  is  abundant  in  appealing,  in  this  Affair,  from  what 
he  calls  Logomachy  and  Sophijiry^  to  Experience.'^'  '  A  Perfon  can 

experience  only  what  palfes  in  his  own  Mind.  But  yet,  as  we 
may  well  fuppofe,  that  all  Men  have  the  fame  human  Faculties  ; 
fo  a  Man  may  well  argue  from  his  own  Experience  to  that  of 
Others,  in  Things  that  fhew  the  Nature  of  thofe  Faculties,  and  the 
^^""  Manner  of  their  Operation.  But  then  one  has  as  good  Right  to 
alledge  his  Experience,  as  another.  As  to  my  own  Experience,  I 
find,  that  ia  innumerable  Things  I  can  do  as  I  will  ;  that  the  Mo- 
tions of  my  Body,  in  many  Refpeds,  inftantaneoufly  follow  the 
A6ts  of  my  Will  concerning  thofe  Motions  ;  and  that  my  Will  has 
fome  Command  of  my  Thoughts  i  and  that  the  A6ls  of  my  Will 
are  my  own,  /.  e.  that  they  are  Ads  of  my  Will,  the  Volitions  of 
my  own  Mind  ;  or  in  other  Words,  that  what  I  will,  I  will. 
Which,  I  prefame,  is  the  Sum  of  what  others  experience  in  this 
Affair.  But  as  to  finding  by  Experience,  that  my  Will  is  originally 
determined  by  it  felf  ;  or  that  my  Will  firfl  chufing  what  Volitioa 
there  fhall  be,  the  ehofen  Volition  accordingly  follows  ;  and  thac 
this  is  the  firft  Rife  of  the  Determination  of  my  Will  in  any 
Affair;  or  that  any  Volinon  arifes  in  my  Mind  contingently;  I 
declare,  I  know  nothing  in  my  felf,  by  Experience,  of  this  Nature  ^ 
and  nothing  that  ever  1  experienced,  carries  the  leafl  Appearance 
;.  or  Shadow  of  any  fuch  Thing,  or  gives  me  any  more  Reafon  to 
,  fuppofe  or  fufpedt  any  fuch  Thing,  t'.an  to  fuppofe  that  my  Volj- 
»  tions  exiiled  twenty  Years  before  they  exifled.  'Tis  true,  I  find 
my  felf  poffefs'd  of  my  Volitions  before  I  can  fee  the  efFeftuSl 
Power  of  any  Caufe  to  produce  them  (for  the  Power  and  Efficacy 
of  theCaufe  is  not  feen  but  by  the  Effedjand  this,  for  ought  I  know, 
may  make  fome  imagine,  that  Volition  has  no  Caufe,  or  that  it 
produces  itfelf  But  1  have  no  moreReafon  from  hence  to  determine 
any  fuchThing.than  I  have  to  determine  that  I  gave  my  felf  myowix 
Being,  or  that  I  came  into  Being  accidentally  without  a  <-^aic, 
becaufe  1  firfl  found  my  felf  pofTsfled  ©f  Being,  befQre  I  had  K-a.ov^?- 
..     $&dge  of  a  Caufe  of  my  Bsing. 


« 8  2  Of  Mdtaphyfical  Reafoning..   Part  IV.  ^ 

conceivable  ;  tMt  is,   from  his' own  Choice  :  How  will   that 
help  the  Matter,  as  to  his  being  juftly  blamed  or  praifed,  un-     | 
lefs  that  Choice  itfelf  be  blame  or  praife-worthy  ?  And  how  is 
the  Choice  itfelf  (an  ill  Choice,^  for  Inftance)  blame-worthy,    j 
according  to  thefe  Principles,  urdefs  that  be  from  himfelf  too,     \ 
in  the  fame  Manner  ;  that  is,   from  his  own  Choice  ?  But  the    \ 
original   and   firft   determining  Choice   in   the  Affair    is   not    \ 
from  his  Choice  :  His  Choice  is  not  the  Caufe  of  it.— And  if    \ 
it  be  from  hirrifelf  fome  other  Way,  and  not  from  his  Choice, 
furely  that  will  not   help  the  Matter  :  If  it  ben't  from  himfelf 
of  Choice,  then  it  is  not  from  himfelf  voluntarily  ;  and  if  fo, 
he  is  furely  no  more  to  Blame,  than  if  it  were  not  from  him- 
felf at  all.     It  is  a  Vanity,  to  pretend   it  is  a   fufficient    An- 
fvver  to  this," to  fay,  that  it  is  nothing  but  metaphyseal  Refine- 
ment and  Subtilty,  and  fo  attended  with  Obfcurity  and  Uncer- 
tainty. 

If  it  be  the  natural  Senfe  of  bur  Minds,  that  what  is  blartie- 
worthy  in  aMan  muft  be  from  himfelf,then  it  doubtlefs  is  alfo, 
that  it  muft  be  from  fomething  bad  in  himfelf,  a  bad  Choice^  or 
bad  Difpofition.  But  then  our  natural  Senfe  is,  that  this  bad 
Choice  or  Difpofition  is  evil  in  it  felf^  and  the  Man  blame- 
worthy for  it,  on  ifs  own  Account^  without  taking  into  our  Notion 
of  it's  Blame-worthinefs,  another  bad  Choice,  or  Difpofition 
going  before  this,  from  whence  this  arifes  :  for  that  is  a  ridi- 
culous Abfurdity,  running  us  into  an  immediate  Contradidlion, 
which  our  natural  Senfe  of  Blame-worthinefs  has  nothing  to 
do  with,and  never  comes  into  theMind,  nor  is  fuppofed  in  the 
Judgment  we  naturally^  make  of  the  Affair.  As  was  demon- 
ftrated  before,  natural  Senfe  don't  place  the  moral  Evil  of  j^ 
Volitions  and  Difpofitions  in  the  Caufe  of  them,  but  the  Na- 
ture of  them.  An  evil  Thing's  being  FROM  a  Man,  or 
from  fomething  antecedent  in  him,  is  not  eflential  to  the 
original  Notion  we  have  of  Blame-worthinefs  :  But  'tis  it's 
being  the  Choice  of  the  Heart  ;  as  appears  by  this,  that  if  a 
Thing  be/r^/Arus,  and  not  from  our  Choice,  it  has  not  th»- 
Nature  of  Blame-worthinefs  or  Ill-defert,  according  to  our 
natural  Senfe.  When  a  Thing  is  from  a  Man,  in  that  Senfe, 
that  it  is  from  his  Will  or  Choice,  he  is  to  Blame  for  it,  be- , 
caufe  his  Will  is  IN  IT  :  So  far  as  the  Will  is  in  it^  Blame  is 
%n  it^  and  no  further.  Neither  do  we  go  any  further  in  our 
Notion  of  Blame,  to  enquire  whether  the  bad  Will  be  FROM 
a  bad  Will  :  There  is  no  Confideration  of  the  Original  of 
that  bad  Willi,  becaufe  according  to  our  natural  Apprehenfion,  ^  , 

•a 


Sea.XIII.  ^F««/if  o/ Armin"  Writers.  283 

Blame  originally  conftjh  in  it.  Therefore  a  Thing's  being /r^m  a 
Man,  is  a  fecondary  Coniideration,  in  the  Notion  of  Blame  or 
lU-defert.  Becaufe  thofe  Things  in  our  external  Actions,  arc 
«ioft  properly  faid  to  beyr(?/?2  us,  which  are  from  our  Choice  5 
and  no  other  external  kdi\ow%  but  thofe  that  are  from  us  in  this 
Senfe,  have  the  Nature  of  Blame  ;  and  they  indeed,,  not  lb- 
properly  becaufe  they  "sxzfrom  us,  as  becaufe  we  are  in  the?n^ 
i,  e.  our  Wills  are  in  them  ;  not  fo  much  becaufe  they  are 
from  fome  Property  of  ours,  as  becaufe  they  are  our  Properties, 
However,  all  thefe  external  Adions  being  truly  from  us^  as 
their  Caufe  j  and  we  being  fo  ufed,  in  ordinary  Speech,  and 
in  the  common  Affairs  of  Life,  to  fpeak  of  Men's  Actions  and 
Conduit  that  we  fee,  and  that  affed  human  Society,  as  delerv- 
ing  111  or  Well,  as  worthy  of  Blame  orPraife  ;  hence  it  is  come 
to  pafs,  that  Philofophers  have  incautioufly  taken  all  their 
Meafures  of  Good  and  Evil,  Praife  and  Blame,  from  the 
'  Dictates  of  common  Senfe,  about  thefe  overt  A£ts  of  Men  ;  to 
the  running  qf  every  Thing  into  the  moft  lamentable  and 
dreadful  Confufion.         And  therefore  I  obferve, 

III.  ^Tis  fo  far  from  being  true  (whatever  may  be  pretended) 
that  the  Proof  of  the  Do6trine  which  has  been  maintain'd, 
depends  on  certain  abftrufe,  unintelligible,  metaphyiical  Terms 
and  Notions  ;  and  that  the  Arrninian  Scheme,  without  needing 
"  fuch  Clouds  and  Darknefs,  for  it's  Defence,  is  fupported  by 
the  plain  Dictates  of  common  Senfe  ;  that  the  very  Ps.everfe  is 
moft  certainly  true,  and  that  to  a  greatDegree.  'Tis  Fact,  that 
they,  and  not  we,  have  confounded  Things  with  metaphyiical, 
unintelligible  Notions  and  Phrafes,  and  have  4rawn  them  from 
the  Light  of  plain  Truth,  into  the  grofs  Darknefs  of  abftrufe 
metaphyfical  Propofitions,  and  Words  without  a  Meaning. 
Their  pretended  Demonftrations  depend  very  much  on  fuch 
unintelligible,  metaphyfical  Phrafes,  as  Self-determination  and 
Sovereignty  of  the  JVill ;  and  the  metaphyfical  Senfe  they  put  oil 
fuch  Terms,  as  Necejjity^  Contingency^  J^ion^  Agency^  &c.  quite 
diverfe  from  their  Meaning  as  ufed  in  common  Speech  ;  and 
which,  as  they  ufe  them,  are  without  any  consent  Meaning, 
or  any  Manner  of  diftin6t  confident  Ideas  ;  as  far  from  it  as 
any  of  the  abftrufe  Terms  and  perplexed  Phrafes  of  the  Peri- 
patetick  Philofophers,  or  the  moft  unintelligible  Jargon  of  thd 
Schools,  or  the  Cant  of  the  wiideft  Fanaticks.  Yea,  we  may 
be  bold  to  fay,  thefe  metaphyfical  Terms,  on  which  they  build 
fo  much,  are  what  they  uie  without  knov^ing  what  they  mean 
t^ieaiielvcs  i  they  ai'e  pure  metaphyfical  Sounds,  without  any 

N  n  2  Wcas 


284  Armlnians  too  metaphyftcaL     Part  IV. 

Ideas  whatfoever  in  their  Minds  to  anfwer  them  ;  in-as-much 
as  it  has  been  demonftrated,  that  there  cannot  be  any  Notion  1 
in  the  Mind  confiftent  with  thefe  Expreflions,  as  they  pretend 
to  explain  them  ;  becaufe  their  Explanations  deftroy  them- 
felves.  No  fuch  Notions  as  imply  Self-contradidion,  and 
^elf-abolition,  and  this  a  great  many  Ways,  can  fubfift  in  the 
Mind  J  as  there  can  be  no  Idea  of  a  Whole  which  is  lefs  than 
any  of  it's  Parts,  or  of  folid  Extenfion  without  Dimenfions,  or 

of  an  EfFe6t  which  is  before    it's  Caufe. Arminians  improve 

thefe   Terms,    as   Terms  of  Art,   and   in  their  metaphyseal  , 
Meaning,    to  advance  and  eftablifh  thofe  Things  which  are 
contrary  to  common   Senfe,  in  a  high  Degree,     Thus,  inftead 
of  the  plain  vulgar  Notion  of  Liberty,  which  all  Mankind,  in 
every  Part  of  the  Face  of  the  Earth,  and  in  all  Ages,  have  ; 
confifting  in  Opportunity  to  do  as  one  pleafes  ;  they  have  in- 
troduced a   new   ftrange  Liberty,    confifting  in  Indifference, 
Contingence,  and  Self-determination  ;  by  which  they  involve 
themfelves  and  others  in  great  Obfcurity,   and  manifold  grofs   j 
Jnconfiftence.     So,   inftead    of  placing  Vertue   and  Vice,   as"; 
common  Senfe  places  them  very  much,   in  fix'd  Bias  and  In-    j 
clination,  and  greater  Vertue  and  Vice  in  ftronger  and  more 
eftablilh'd  Inclination  ;  thefe,thro'  their  Refinings  and  abftrufe 
Notions,  fuppofe  a  Liberty   confifting  in  Indifference,  to   be 
eftential  to  all  Vertue  and  Vice.     So  they  have  reafoned  them* 
felves,   not   by  metaphyfical    Diftindtions,    but   metaphyseal 
Confufion,  into  many  Principles  about  moral  Agency,  Blame, 
Praife,  Reward  and  Punifliment,  which  are,  as  has  been  (hewn, 
exceeding  contrary  to   the  common  Senfe  of  Mankind  ;  and    . 
perhaps  to  their  own  Senfe,  which  gover^is  them  in  common 
Lit>o'  ^      ■ 


TH£ 


(     285     ) 

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THE 


CONCLUSIOK 


WHETHER  the  Things  which  have  been  alledged,  ar6 
liable  to  any  tolerable  Anfwer  in  the  Ways  of  calm, 
intelligible  and  fi:ri(5l  Reafoning,  I  muft  leave  others  to 
judge  :  But  I  am  fenfible  they  are  liable  to  one  Sort  of  Anfwer. 
* Tis  not  unlikely,  that  fome  wiio  value  themfelves  on  the 
fuppofed  rational  and  generous  Principles  of  the  modern 
fafhionable  Divinity,  will  have  their  Indignation  and  Difdain 
raifed  at  the  Sight  of  this  Difcourfe,  and  on  perceiving  what 
Things  are  pretended  to  be  proved  in  it.  And  if  they  think 
it  worthy  of  being  read,  or  of  fo  much  Notice  as  to  fay  much 
about  it,  they  may  probably  renew  the  ufual  Exclamations, 
with  additional  Vehemence  and  Contempt,  about  the  Fate  of 
the  Heathen^  Hobbes's  ISlecefftty^  and  making  Men  meer  Machines  ; 
accumulating  the  ternble  Epithets  oi fatal ^  unfrujirable,  inevita^ 
hle^  irrefijlible^  &c.  and  it  may  be,  with  the  Addition  of  horrid 
and  blajphemous  ;  and  perhaps  much  Skill  may  be  ufed  to  fet 
forth  Things  which  have  been  faid,  in  Colours  which  fhall  be 
fhocking  to  the  Imaginations,  and  moving  to  the  Paflions  of 
thofe  who  have  either  too  little  Capacity,  or  too  much  Con- 
fidence of  the  Opinions  they  have  imbibed,  and  Contempt  of 
the  contrary,  to  try  the  Matter  by  any  ferious  and  circumfpedt 
Examination,  f  Or  Difficulties  may  be  ftarted  and  infilled  oa 

which. 

f  A  Writer,  of  the  prefent  Age,  whom  I  have  feveral  Times  had 
Occafion  to  mention,  fpeaks  once  and  ag^iin  of  thofe  who  hold  the 
Doftrine  of  Neceffitx^  as  fcarcely  worthy  of  the    Name  of  Philofo^ 

phers. 1  don'c  know,  whether  he  has  refpetfl  to  any  particulaf 

Notion  of  Neceifity,  that  fome  may  have  maintain'd  ;  and  if  (o, 

what  Doftrine  of  NeceiTity  it  is  that  He  means. Whether  I  am 

worthy  of  the  Name  of  a  Philofopher,  or  nor,  would  be  a  Quellion 
litde  to  the  prelent  Purpofe.  Jf  any,  and  ever  fo  many,  fhould 
deny  it.,  I  fhould  not  think  it  worth  the  while  to  enter  into  a  Dif- 
Jpute  oa  \^  Quofticn  ;  tho'  at  the  fame  Time  1  might  exped, 

fome 


286         r^  CONCLUSION. 

which  don't  belong  to  the  Controverfy  ;  becaufe,  let  them  be 
more  or  lefs  real,  and  hard  to  be  refolved,  they  are  not  what 
are  owing  to  any  Thing  diftinguifhing  of  this  Scheme  froni 
that  of  the  Ay-minians^  and  would  not  be  removed  nor  dimi- 
nifhed  by  renouncing  the  former,  and  adhering  to  the  latter. 
Or  fome  particular  Things  may  be  pick'd  out,  which  they 
may  think  will  found  harfhcft  in  the  Ears  of  the  Generality  ; 
and  thefe  may  be  glofs'd  and  defcanted  on,  with  tart  and  con- 
temptuous Words  ;  and  from  thence^  the  whole  treated  with 
Triumph  and  Infult. 

"'TIS  eafy  to  fee  how  the  Decifion  *  of  moH:  of  the  Points  in 
Controverfy,  between  Calvimjh  and  Arminians^  depends  on  the 
Determination  of  this  grand  Article  concerning  the  Freedom  of 
the  Will  reqmfite  to  moral  Agency  ;  and  that  by  clearing  and  eftab' 
lifhing  the  Cahinijlic  Dodrine  in  this  Point,  the  chief  Argu- 
ments are  obviated,  by  which  Armlman  Dodlrines  in  general 
are  fupported,  and  the  contrary  Docflrines  demonftratively 
confirmed,  Hereby  it  becomes  manifeft,  that  God's  moral 
Government  over  Mankind,  his  treating  them  as  moralAgents, 
making  them  the  Objeds  of  his  Commands,  Counfels,  Calls, 
Warnings,  Expoftulations,  Promifes,  Threatnings,  Rewards 
and  Punifhments,  is  not  inconfiftent  with  a  determining  Dijpofal 
of  all  Events,  of  every  Kind,  throughout  the  Univerfe,^  in  his. 
Providence ,  either  by  poiitive  Efficiency,or  Permiffion.  Indeed 
fuch  an  univerfal^  determining  Providence^  infers  fome  Kind  of 
Neceflity  of  all  Events  ;  fuch  aNecelTity  as  implies  an  infallible 
previous  Fixednefs  of  the  Futurity  of  the  Event :  But  no  other 
Neceffiiy  of  moral  Events,  or  Volitions  of  intelligent  Agents, 
is  needful  in  order  to  this,  than  moral  Neceffity  \  which  does  as 
much  afcertain  the  Futurity  of  the  Event,  as  any  othef 
Neceffity.  But,  as  has  been  demonftratcd,  fuch  a  Neceffity  is 
not  at  all  repugnant  to  moral  Agency,  and  the  reafonable  Ufe 
of  Commands,  Calls,  Rewards,  Punifhments,  &c:  Yea,  not 
only  are  Objedions  of  this  Kind  againfl  the  Do(5lrine  of  an 
univerfal  determining  Providence^  removed  by  what  has  been 
iaid  s  but  the  Truth  of  fuch  a  Dodrine  is  demonflrated.     A^ 

it 

fome  better  Anfwer  fliould  be  given  to  the  Arguments  brought  for 
the  Truth  of  the  Do<arine  I  maintain  ;  and  I  might  further  reafo- 
rably  defire,  that  it  might  be  confidered,  whether  it  don't  become 
thofe  who  are  truly  ^worthy  of  the  Name  of  Philofophers,  to  be 
(enfible,  that  there  is  a  Difference  between  Argument  and  Contempt ;. 
yea,  and  a  Difference  between  the  Con  tern  ptiblenefs  of  the  Perfom 
that  argues,  and  the  Inconcl^AY€jJefs  of  th«  Ar^umenti  he  oSer^ 


The  CONCLUSION.  287 

it  has  been  demonftrated,  that  the  Futurity  of  all  futureEventS 
is  eftablifhed  by  previous  Neceffity,  either  natural  or  moral ; 
fo  'tis  manifeft,  that  the  fovereign  Creator  and  Difpofer  of  the 
World  has  ordered  this  NecelTity,  by  ordering  his  own  Con- 
dud:,  either  in  defignedly  acting,  or  forbearing  to  ad.  For,  as 
the  Being  of  the  World  is  from  God,  fo  the  Circumftances  in 
which  it  had  it's  Being  at  firft,  both  negative  and  pofitive,  muft 
be  ordered  by  him,  in  one  of  thefe  Ways  ;  and  all  the  necef- 
fary  Confequences  of  thefe  Circumftances,  muft  be  ordered  by 
him.  And  God's  a<5live  and  pofitive  Interpofitions,  after  the 
World  was  created,  and  the  Confequences  of  thefe  Interpofiti- 
ons ;  alfo  every  Inftance  of  his  forbearing  to  interpofe,  and  the 
Aire  Confequences  of  this  Forbearance,  muft  all  be  determined 
according  to  his  Pleafure.  And  therefore  every  Event  which 
is  the  Confeguence  of  any  Thing  whatfoever,  or  that  is  con- 
neded  with  any  foregoing  Thing  or  Circumftance,  either  po- 
fitive or  negative,  as  the  Ground  or  Reafon  of  its  Exiftence, 
muft  be  ordered  of  God  ;  either  by  a  defigned  Efficiency  and 
Interpofition,  or  a  defigned  forbearing  to  operate  or  interpofe. 
But,  as  has  been  proved,  all  Events  whatfoever  are  neceffarily 
conne6ted  with  fomething  foregoing,either  pofitive  or  negative, 
w  hich  is  the  Ground  of  its  Exiftence.  It  follows  therefore,  that 
the  whole  Series  of  Events  is  thus  connecSted  with  fomething 
in  the  State  of  Things,  either  pofitive  or  negative,  which  is 
criginal  in  the  Series  ;  /'.  e.  fomething  which  is  connected  with 
nothing  preceding  that,  but  God's  own  immediate  Condud, 
either  his  ading  or  forbearing  to  ad.  From  whence  it  follows, 
that  as  God  designedly  orders  his  own  Condud,  and  its  con- 
neded  Confequences,  it  muft  neceflarily  be,  that  he  defignedly 
orders  all  Things. 

The  Things  which  have  been  faid,  obviate  fome  of  the  chief 
Objedions  of  Anninians  againft  the  Calv'inijiic  Do6h'ine  of  the 
total  Depravity  and  Corruption  of  Man's  Nature,  whereby  his 
Heart  is  wholly  under  the  Power  of  Sin,  and  he  is  utterly  un- 
able, without  the  Interpofition  of  fovereign  Grace,  favingly  to 
love  God,  believe  in  Chrift,  or  do  any  Thing  that  is  truly- 
good  and  acceptable  in  God's  Sight.  For  the  main  Objedion 
againft  this  Dodrine  is,  that  it  is  inconfiftent  with  theFreedom 
of  Man's  Will,  confifting  in  Indifference  and  felf-determining 
Power ;  becaufe  it  fuppofes  Man  to  be  under  a  Neceffity  of 
Sinning,  and  that  God  requires  Things  of  him,  in  order  to 
his  avoiding  eternal  Damnation,  which  he  is  unable  to  do  ; 
and  tliat  this  Dodrine  is  wholly  inconfiftent  with  the  Sincerity 

of 


288        The  CONCLUSION. 

©f  Counfels,  Invitations,  &:c.  Now  this  Do(5lrine  fuppofes  nt 
sther  NeceJJity  of  Sinning,  than  a  moral  Neceffity  ;  which,  as 
has  been  fhewn,  don't  at  all  excufe  Sin  j  and  fuppofes  no  other 
Jnability  to  obey  any  Command,  or  perform  any  Dut\\  even  the 
moft  fpiritual  and  exalted,  but  a  moral  Inabiiiry,  which,  as  has 
been  proved,  don't  excufe  Perfons  in  the  Non-ptrformance  of 
any  good  Thing,  or  make  'em  not  to  be  the  proper  ObjecSts  of 
Commands,  Counfels  and  Invitations.  And  moreover,  it 
has  been  fhewn,  that  there  is  not,  and  never  can  be,  either  in 
Exiflence,  or  fo  much  as  in  Idea,  any  fuch  Freedom  of  Will, 
confiftingin  Indifference  and  Self-determination,  for  the  Sake 
of  which,  this  Do6trine  of  priginal  Sin  is  caft  out  ;  and  that  no 
fuch  Freedom  is  neceffary,  in  order  to  the  Nature  of  Sin,  and 
a  jufl  Defert  of  Punifhment. 

The  Things  which  have  been  obferved,  ^o  alfo  take  off 
the  main  Objedions  of  Arminians  againfl  the  Doctrine  oi  effca- 
iious  Grace  ;  and  at  the  fame  Time,  prove  the  Grace  of  God 
in  a  Sinner's  Converfion  (if  there  be  any  Grace  or  divine  In- 
fluence in  the  Affair)  to  be  efficacious^  yea,  and  irrejifiihle  too, 
if  by  irrefiflible  is  meant,  that  which  is  attended  with  a  moral 
Isfeceflity,  which  it  is  impofUble  Ihould  ever  be  violated  by  any 
Refiftence.  The  main  Obje(5tion  of  Arminians  agamft  this 
Do(5lrine  is,  that  it  is  inconfifient  with  their  felf-determining 
Freedom  of  Will;  and  that  it  is  repugnant  to  the  Nature  of 
Vertue,  that  it  fliould  be  wrought  in  the  Heart  by  the  deter- 
mining Efhcacy  and  Power  of  another,  infiead  of  its  being 
owing  to  a  felf-moving  Povv^er  ;  that  in  that  Cafe,  the  Good 
which  is  wrought,  would  not  be  our  V  ertue,  but  rather  God\ 
Vertue  ;  becaufe  it  is  not  the  Perfon  in  whom  it  is  wrought, 
that  is  the  determining  Author  of  it,  but  God  that  wrought  it 
in  him.— But  the  Things  which  are  the  Foundatfon  of  thefe 
Obje(5tions,  have  been  coniidered  ;  and  it  has  been  demons 
ftrated,  that  the  Liberty  of  moral  Agents  does  not  confifl  in 
felf-determining  Power  j  and  that  there  is  noNeed  of  any  fuch 
Liberty,  in  order  to  the  Nature  of  Vertue  ;  nor  does  it  at  all 
hinder,  but  that  the  State  or  A(5l  of  the  Will  may  be  the 
Vertue  of  the  Subject,  though  it  be  not  from  Self-determina- 
tion, but  the  Determination  of  an  extrinfic  Caufe  ;  even  fo  as 
to  caufe  the  Event  to  be  morally  necefTary  to  the  Subje(5t  of  it, 
Arwi  as  it  has  been  proved,  that  nothing  in  the  State  or  A(Sts 
of  the  Will  of  Man  is  contingent  ;  but  that  on  the  contrary, 
every  Event  of  this  Kind  is  necefTary,  by  a  moral  NecefTity  ; 
and  has  a]|9  been  now  demonflrated^  that  the  Dodrine  of  am 

uxiiyerl^l 


The     CONCLUSION.       289 

tiiiiverfal  determining  Providence,  follows  from  that  Do<5lrine 
of  NecefTity,  which  was  proved  before  :  And  To,  that  God  does 
decifively,  in  his  Providence,  order  all  the  Volitions  of  moral 
Agents,  either  by  poiitive  Influence  or  Permiflion  :  And  it 
being  allowed  o\\  all  Flands,  that  what  God  does  in  theAffair  of 
Man's  vertuous  Volitions,  whether  it  be  more  or  lefs,  is  by  Ibmo 
pofitive  Influence,  and  not  by  meer  PermifTion,  as  in  the  Affair 
of  a  fmful  Volition  :  If  we  put  thefe  Things  together,  it  will 
follow,  that  God's  Aflift:ance  or  Influence,  muft  be  determin- 
ing and  decifive,  or  muft  be  attended  with  a  moral  Neceflity 
of  the  Event  ;  and  fo,  that  God  gives  Vertue,  Holinefs  and 
Converfion  to  Sinners,  by  an  Influence  which  determines  the 
Efteift,  in  fuch  a  Manner,  that  the  Effe6t  will  itifallibly  follow 
by  a  moral  Necefllty  ;  which  is  what  Calvinifls  mean  by  effi- 
cacious and  irrefiftible  Grace. 

The  Things  which  have  been  faid,  Ao  likewifc  anfwer  the 
chief  Obje6tions  againft  the  Do^lrine  of  God's  unlverfal  and 
abfolute  Decree^  and  aff'ord  infallible  Proof  of  that  Dodrine  % 
and  of  the  Do6trine  of  ahfolute^  eteynal^  perfonal  Ele^iion  in  parti- 
cular. The  main  Obje6tions  againft  thefe  Do6trincs  are,  that 
they  infer  a  Necefllty  of  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents,  and  of 
the  future  moral  State  and  A6ts  of  Men  ;  and  fo  are  not  con- 
fiftent  with  thofe  eternal  Rewards  and  Punifhments,  which  arc 
conneded  with  Converfion  and  Impenitence  5  nor  can  be  made 
jto  agree  w^ith  the  Reafonablenefs  and  Sincerity  of  thePrecepts, 
Calls,  Counfels,  Warnings  and  Expoftulations  of  the  Word  of 
God -J  or  with  the  variousMethods  andMeans  of  Grace,which 
God  ufes  with  Sinners,  td  bring  'em  to  Repentance  ;  and  the 
whole  of  that  moral  Government,  which  God  exercifes  towards 
Mankind  :  And  that  they  infer  an  Inconfiftence  between  the 
Jecret  and  revealed  Will  of  God  ;  and  make  God  the  Author  of 
Sin.  But  all  thefe  Things  have  been  obviated  in  the  preceed- 
ing  Difcourfe.  And  the  certain  Truth  of  thefe  Do6lrines, 
concerning  God's  eternal  Purpofes,  will  follow  from  what  wa§ 
jufl:  nowobferved  concerning  God's  univerfal  Providence  j  how 
it  infallibly  follows  from  what  has  been  proved,  that  God, 
orders  all  Events,  and  the  Volitions  of  moral  Agents  amongft 
others,  by  fuch  a  decifive  Difpofal,  that  the  Events  are  infaj- 
Jibly  connected  with  his  Difpofal.  For  if  God  difpofes  all 
Events,  fo  that  the  infallible  Exiftence  of  the  Events  is  decided 
,by  his  Providence,  then  he  doubtlefs  thus  orders  and  decides 
Things  knowingly^  and  on  Defign.  God  don't  do  what  he  does^ 
.  »cr  order  what  h«  orders,  accidentally  and  unawares  j  either 
t  O  o  mthout 


290       t:^^  CONCLUSION. 

without^  or  hefide  his  Intention.  And  if  there  be  a  foregoing 
Defign  of  _doing  and  ordering  as  he  does,  this  is  the  fame  with 
a  Pitrpofe  or  Decree.  And  as  it  has  been  fliewn,  that  nothing 
is  new  to  God,  in  any  Refpedl,  but  all  Things  are  perfe6lly 
and  equally  in  his  View  from  Eternity  ;  hence  it  will  follow, 
that  his  Defigns  or  Purpofes  are  not  Things  formed  anew, 
founded  on  any  new  Views  or  Appearances,  but  are  all  eternal 
Purpofes.  And  as  it  has  been  now  Ihewn,  how  the  Do6!rine 
of  determining  efficacious  Grace  certainly  follows  from" 
Things  proved  in  the  foregoing  Difcourfe  ;  hence  will  necef- 
farily  follow  the  DocStrine  of  particular^  eternal^  abfolute  Eleffion,  '\ 
For  if  Men  are  made  true  Saints,  no  otherwife  than  as  God 
makes  'em  fo,  and  diftinguidies  'em  from  others,  by  an  effica- 
cious Power  and  Influence  of  his,  that  decides  and  fixes  the 
Event  J  and  God  thus  makes  fome  Saints,  and  not  others,  oa 
Defign  or  Purpofe,  and  (as  has  been  now  obferved)  no  Defigns 
of  God  are  new  ;  it  follows,  that  God  thus  diftinguifhed  from 
others,  all  that  ever  become  true  Saints,  by  his  eternal  Defign 
or  Decree.-—  I  might  alfo  fliew,  how  God's  certain  Foreknow- 
ledge muft  fuppofe  an  abfolute  Decree,  and  how  fuch  a  Decree 
can  be  proved  to  a  Demonftration  from  it  :  But  that  this  Dif- 
courfe mayn't  be  lengthen'd  out  too  much,  that  muft  be  omit- 
ted for  the  prefcnt. 

From  thefe  Things  it  will  inevitably  follow,  that  however 
Chrift  in  fome  Senfe  may  be  faid  to  die  for  all^  and  to  redeem 
all  vifible  Chriftians,  yea  the  whole  World  by  his  Death  ;  yet 
there  muft  be  fomething  particular  in  the  Defign  of  his  Death, 
with  Refpe6l  to  fuch  as  He  intended  Ihould  adually  be  faved 
thereby.  As  appears  by  what  has-been  now  ftiewn,  God  has 
the  adual  Salvation  or  Redemption  of  a  certain  Number  in  J 
his  proper  abfolute  Defign,  and  of  a  certain  Number  only  y 
and  therefore  fuch  a  Defign  only  can  be  profecuted  in  any.; 
Thing  God  does,  in  order  to  the  Salvation  of  Men.  God. 
purfues  a  proper  Defign  of  the  Salvation  of  the  Ele6t  in  giving 
Chrift  to  die,  and  profecutes  fuch  a  Defign  with  Refped  to  no 
other,  moft  ftricftly  Ipeaking  j  for  'tis  impoffible,  that  God 
fliould  profecute  any  other  Defign  than  only  fuch  as  He  has  : 
Ke  certainly  don't,    in   the  higheft  Propriety  and  Stridnefs  of 

•Speech,  purfue  a  Defign  that  He  has  not. And  indeed  fuch 

a  Particularity  and  Limitation  of  Redemption  will  as  infallibly 

follow  from  the  Do6^rine  of  God's    Foreknowledge,    as  from 

that  of  the  Decree.     For   'tis  as  impoffible,    in  StricStnefs   of 

•  Speech,  >  that  Gcd   ftiould   profecute  a  Defign  or  Aim  at  a 

Thins*; 


TU  CONCLUSION.        291 

Thing,  which  He  at  the  fame  Time  moft  perfectly  knows  will 
not  be  accomplifhed,  as  that  he  (hould  uie  Endeavours  for 
that  which  is  befide   his  Decree. 

By  the  Things  which  have  been  proved,  are  obviated  fomc 
of  the  mainObjeaions  againft  theDo6trine  of  the  infallible  and 
neceiTary  Perfeverance  of  Saints,  and  fome  of  the  main  lounda- 
tions  of  this  Do(5trine  are  eftabiilhed.     The   main  Prejudices 
of  Arminians  againft  this  Dodrine  feem  to  be  thefe  j  they  lup- 
pofe  fuch  a  neceffary,  infallible  Perfeverance  to   be  repugnant 
to  the  Freedom  of  the  Will  ;   that  it  mull  be  owing  tc  Man's 
own  felf-determining  Power,  that  he /r//  beco??ies   vertuous  and 
holy  ;  and  (o  in  like  Manner,  it  muft  be  left  a  Thing  contin- 
gent, to  be  determin'd  by  the  fame  Freedom  of  \^  ill,  whether 
he  vv^ill  perfevere  in  Vertue  and    Holinefs  ;  and    that  otherwife 
his  continuing  ftedfaft  in  Faith  and  Obedience  would  not  be 
his  Vertue,  or  at  ail  Praife-worthy  and  Rewardable  ;  nor  cculd 
his  Perfeverance  be  properly  the  Matter  of  divine  Commands, 
Counfels  &  Promifes,  nor  his  Apoftacy  be  properly  threaten'd, 
and  Men  warned  againil  it.     Whereas  we  find  all  thefe  Thmgs 
in  Scripture  :  There  we   find  Stedfaftnefs  and  Perfeverance  in 
trus   Chriftianity,  reprefented  as  the   Vertue  of  the    Saints, 
fpoken   of  as   Praife-v/orthy   in  them,   and  glorious  Rewards 
:  promifed  to  it  ;  and  alfo  find,that  God  makes  it  the  Subjed  of 
his  Commands,  Counfels  and  Promifes  ;   and  the  contrary,  of 
Threatnings  and  Warnings.      But  the  Foundation  of  thefe 
..Objections  has  been  removed,  in   it's  being  (hewn  that  moral 
Neceility  and  infallible  Certainty  of  Events  is  not   inconfiftent 
with  thefe  Things  ;  and  that,  as  to  Freedom  of  Will  lying  in 
the  Power  of  the  Will  tp  determine  it  felf,  there  neither  is  any 
fuch  Thing,  nor  any  Need  of  it,  in  order  to  Vertue,  Reward, 
Commands,  Counfels,  &c. 

And  as  the  Doctrines  of  efficacious  Grace  and  abfolute 
Ele6lion  do  certainly  follow  from  Things  which  have  been 
proved  in  the  preceeding  Difcourfe  ;  fo  fome  of  the  main 
.  Foundations  of  the  Do6lrine  of  Perfeverance  are  thereby  efta- 
biilhed. If  the  Beginning  of  true  Faith  and  Holine's,  and  a 
Man's  becoming  a  true  Saint  at  firft,  don't  depend  on  the 
felf-determining  Power  of  the  Will,  but  on  the  deter- 
mining efficacious  Grace  of  God  ;  it  may  well  be  argued, 
that  it  is  fo  alfo  with  Refpec^  to  Men's  being  continued  Saints, 
or  perfevering  in  Faith  and  Holinefs.  The  ConverfiOn  of  a 
Sinner  being  not  owing  to  a  Man's  Self-determination,  but 
'  to  God's  DeterminatioHj  and  eternal  EleiVioa,   which  in  abfo- 

O  o  2  Ivitv, 


292       The    CONCLUSION, 

lute,  and  depending  on  the  fovereign  Will  of  God,  and  not 
on  the  free  Will  of  Man  ;  as  is  evident  from  what  has  been 
faid  :  And  it  being  very  evident  from  the  Scriptures,  that  the 
eternal  Eledlion  which  there  is  of  Saints  to  Faith  and  Holinefs, 
is  alfo  an  Eledion  of  them  to- eternal  Salvation  ;  hence  their 
Appointment  to  S,alvation  muft  alfo  be  abfolute,  and  not  de- 
pending on  their  contingent,  felf-determining  Will.  From 
all  which  it  follows,  that  it  is  abfolutely  fix'd  in  God's  Decree, 
that  all  true  Saints  (hail  perfevere  to  adual  eternal  Salvation. 

But  I  muO:  leave  all  thefe  Things  to  the  Confiderafion  of 
the  fair  and  impartial  Reader  ;  and  vv'hen  he  has  maturely 
weighed  them,  I  would  propofe  it  to  his  Conlideration,  whe- 
ther many  of  the  tiril  Reformers,  and  others  that  fucceeded 
them,  whom  God  in  their  Day  made  the  chief  Pillars  of  his 
Church,  and  greateft  Inftruments  of  their  Deliverance  from 
Error  and  Darknefs,  and  of  the  Support  of  the  Caufe  of 
Piety  among  them,  have  not  been  injured,  in  the  Contempt 
with  which  they  have  been  treated  by  many  late  Writers,  for 
their  teaching  and  maintaining  fuch  Dcdtrines  as  are  com- 
monly called  Cahinijuc.  Indeed  fome  of  thefe  new  Writers, 
at  the  fame  Time  that  they  have  reprefented  the  Do6trines  of 
thefe  antient  and  eminent  Divines,  as  in  the  higheft  Degree 
ridiculous,  and  contrary  to  common  Senfe,  in  an  Oftentation 
of  a  very  generoqs  Charity,  have  allowed  that  they  were  honeil: 
well-meaning  Men  :  Yea,  it  may  be  fome  of  them,  as  tho'  it 
were  in  great  Condefcenfion  and  Compaflion  to  them,  have 
allowed  that  they  did  pretty  well  for  the  Day  which  they  lived 
3n,  and  confidering  the  great  Difadvantages  they  laboured  un- 
der :  When  at  the  fame  Time,  their  Manner  of  Specking  has 
naturally  and  plainly  faggefted  to  the  Mipds  of  their  Readers, 
that  they  were  Perfons,  who  through  the  Lownefs  of  their 
Genius,  and  Greatnefs  of  the  Bigotry,  with  which  their  Minds 
Vv'ere  Ihackled,  and  Thoughts  coniined,  living  in  the  gloomy 
Caves  of  Superftition,  fondly  embraced,  and  demurely  and  zea-^ 
loufly  taught  the  moft  abiurd,  filly  and  monilrous  Opinions, 
worthy  of  the  greateil:  Contempt  of  Gentlemen  poffefied  of 
that  noble  and  generous  Freedom  of  Thought,  which  happily 
prevails  in  this  Age  of  Light  and  Enquiry.  When  indeed  fuch 
is  the  Cafe,  that  we  might,  if  fo  difpofed,  fpeak  as  big  Words, 
as  they,  and  on  far  better  Grounds.  And  really  all  the  Ar^ 
•miniam  on  Earth  might  be  challenged  without  Arrogance  or 
Vanity,  tc  make  thefe  Principles  of  theirs  wherein  they  mainly 
4iftr  froci  their  fathiys,  whom  tl>ey   fo  Xiiuch   defpife?   con* 

^  fiftent 


r/^^    CONCLUSION.      29s 

fiftent  with  common  Seiife  j  yea,  and  perhaps  to  produce  any 
Dodrine  ever  embraced  by  the  bhndeft  Bigot  of  theChurch  of 
Rome^ov  the  moft  ignorant  M.ujfulman^  or  extravagant  Enthufiaft, 
that  might  be  reduced  to  more,  and  more  demonllrable  Incon- 
fiftencics,  &  Repugnancies  to  c*mmonSenre,and  to  themfelves  ; 
tho'  their  Inconfiftencies  mdeed  may  not  he  fo  deep,  or  be  {6 
artfully  vail'd  by  a  deceitful  Ambiguity  of  Words,  and  an  in- 
determinate Signification   of  Phrafes. I  will  not  deny,  that 

thefe  Gentlemen,  many  of  them,  are  Men  of  great  Abilities, 
and  have  been,  helped  to  higher  Attainments  in  Philofophy, 
than  thofe  antient  Divines^  and  have  done  great  Service  to  the 
Church  of  God  in  fome  Refpeds  :  But  I  humbly  conceive, 
that  their  differing  from  their  Fathers  with  fuch  magifterial 
AlTurance,  in  thefe  Points  in  Divinity,  muil  be  owing  to  fome 
other  Caufe  than  fuperiour  Wifdom. 

It  may  alfo  be  worthy  of  Confideration,  whether  the  great 
^Iteration  which  has  been  made  in  the  State  of  Things  in  our 
Nation,  and  fome  other  Parts  of  the  Proteftant  World,  in 
this  and  the  pad  Age,  by  the  exploding  fo  generally  CahinijVic 
Dodrines,  that  is  fo  often  fpoken  of  as  worthy  to  be  greatly 
Tejoyced  in  by  the  Friends  of  Truth,  Learning  and  Vertue,  as 
an  Inftance  of  the  great  Increafe  of  Light  in  the  Chriftian 
Church  ;  1  fay,  it  may  be  worthy  to  be  confidered,  whether 
this  be  indeed  a  happy  Change,  owing  to  any  fuch  Caufe  as 
an  Increafe  of  true  Knov^lege  and  Underftanding  in  Things 
of  Religion  ;  or  whether  there  is  not  Reafbn  to  fear,  that  it 
may  be  owing  to  fome  worfe  Caufe. 

And  I  deiire  it  may  be  confidered,  whether  the  Boldnefs 
of  fome  Writers  may  not  be  worthy  to  be  refle6led  on,  who 
have  not  fcrupled  to  fay,  That  if  thefe  and  thofe  Things  are 
true  (which  yet  appear  to  be  the  demonftrable*  Dilates  of 
Reafon,  as  well  as  the  certain  Dictates  of  the  Mouth  of  the 
moft  High)  then  God  is  unjull:  and  cruel, and  guilty  of  manifeft 
Deceit  and  double-dealing,  and  the  like.  Yea,  fome  have 
gone  fo  far,as  confidently  to  afrert,That  if  anyBook  which  pre- 
tends to  be  Scripture,  teaches  fuch  Dodrines,  that  alone  is  fuf- 
ficient  Warrant  for  Mankind  to  reject  it,  as  what  cannot  be 
the  Word  of  God.  Some  who  have  not  gone  fo  far,  have 
faid,  That  if  the  Scripture  feems  to  teach  any  fuch  Do6trines,fa 
contrary  to  Reafon,  we  are  obliged  to  find  out  fome  other  In- 
^pretation  of  thofe  Texts,  where  fuch  DocSlrines  feem  to  be 
exhibited.  Others  exprefs  themfelves  yet  more  modefily  :  They 
exprefs  a  Tendernefs  and  religious  Fear,  left  they  Paould  re-* 
•civp  zuid  teach  any  Thing  that  ihould  feem  to  refle<5l  oaGod's 

moral 


294       ^^^   CONCLUSION. 

inoral  CharacfVer,  or  be  a  Difparagement  to  his  Methods  of 
Adminiftration,  in  his  moral  Government ;  and  therefore  ex- 
prefs  themfelves  as  not  daring  to  embrace  fome  Do6lrines, 
though  they  feem  to  be  deHvered  in  Scripture,  according  to 
the  more  obvious  and  natural  Conftru(ftion  of  the  Words* 
But  indeed  it  would  (hew  a  truer  Modefty  and  Humility, 
if  they  would  more  entirely  rely  on  God's  Wifdom  and  Dif- 
cerning,  who  knows  infinitely  better  than  we,  what  is  agreable 
to  his  own  Perfecflions,  and  never  intended  to  leave  thefe  Mat- 
ters to  the  Decifion  of  the  Wifdom  and  Difcerning  of  Men  ; 
but  by  his  own  unerring  Inftruclion,  to  determine  for  us  what 
the  Truth  is  ;  knowing  how  little  our  Judgment  is  to  be  de- 
pended on, and  how  extremely  prone,  vain  and  blind  Men  are, 
to  err  in  fuch  Matters. 

The  Truth  of  the  Cafe  is,  that  if  the  Scripture  plainly 
taught  the  oppofite  Dodrines,  to  thofe  that  are  fo  much  ftum- 
bled  at,  viz,  the  Jrminian  Do61rine  of  Free-Will,  and  others 
depending  thereon,  it  would  be  the  greateft  of  all  Difficulties 
that  attend  the  Scriptures,  incomparably  greater  than  its  con- 
taining any,  even  the  moft  myfterious  of  thofe  Dodrines  of  the 
firft  Reformers,  which  our  late  Free-thinkers  have  fo  fuperci- 
lioufly  exploded.—  Indeed  it  is  a  glorious  Argument  of  the 
Pivinity  of  the  holy  Scriptures,  that  they  teach  fuchDo6trines, 
which  in  one  Age  and  another,  thro'  the  Blindnefs  of  Men's 
Minds,  and  ftrong  Prejudices  of  their  Hearts,  are  rejeded,  as 
moft  abfurd  and  unreafonable,  by  the  wife  and  great  Men  of 
the  World  ;  which  yet,  when  they  are  moft  carefully  and 
ftridly  examined,  appear  to  be  exactly  agreable  to  the  moft 
demonftrable,  certain,  and  natural  Dictates  of  Reafon.  By 
fuch  Things  it  appears,  that  the  Foolijhnefs  of  God  is  wifir  than 
Meriy  and  God  does  as  is  faid  in  i  Cor.  i.  19,  20.  For  it  is 
written^  I  will  deftroy  the  Wifdoin  of  the  Wife  ;  /  will  bring  to  no^ 
thing  the  Und^rjianding  of  the  Prudent.  Where  is  the  Wife  I  Where 
is  the  Scribe  f  Where  is  the  Difputer  of  this  World  !  Hath  not  God 
piadefoolijh  the  Wifdom  of  this  World  ?  And  as  it  ufed  to  be  in 
Time  paft,  fo  it  is  probable  it  will  be  in  Time  to  come,  as  it 
is  there  written,  in  ver.  27,28,29.  But  God  hath  chofen  the  foolijh 
Things  of  the  Worlds  to  confound  the  Wife  :  And  God  hath  chofen  the 
weak  Things  of  the  World,  to  confound  the  Things  thai  are  mighty  : 
And  bafe  Tlnngs  of  the  World,  and  Things  which  are  defpifed,  hath 
God  chofen  :  Tea,  and  Things  which  are  not,  to  bring  to  noughtThingf 
that  are  ;  thai  no  Flejh  Jhould  glory  in  hisPrefence,     Amen. 

F    I    N    I    S, 


INDEX 


^^ 


{N.  B.  The  Capital  P.  fignifies  the  Part\  this  Mark,  §,  the 
Section  ;  ConcL  the  Conclufton  ;  and  the  fmall  p.  the  P^^^  ; 
where  the  Things  here  rpeciiied,  are  to  be  found.] 


yfBftranidox  Ahjirufe  Rea- 

\j^  foning,   whether  juftly 

objeded    againft  Calvi- 

■nijis,  P.  4.  §  13.  p.  278. 

\    ASiion^  Inconfiftence  of  the 


dency  to  fuperfede  all  Ufe  of 
Means,  and  make  Endeavours 
vain,  P.  4.  §  5.  p.  222.  and  in 
EfFed,  to  exclude  all  Vertuc 
and  Vice   out  of  the  World, 


■:<^r;w/m'^«Notionofit,  P.4.  §2.     P.  3.  §4.  p.  161,  167.    Ibid. 


199.  and  whence  this  arofe, 

204.  what  it  is  in  the  com- 
"mon  Notion  of  it,  Ibid.  p.  201. 
—and  how  diftinguifh'd  from 
^Pajfion^  Ibid.  p.  203. 
•  ASiivity  of  the  Nature  of  the 
Soul,  whether  thro'  this.  Voli- 
tion can  arife  without  aCaufe, 
t.  2.  §  4.  p.  47. 

Apparent  Good,  the  greateft, 
'in  what  Senfe  it  determines 
•the  Will,  P.  I.  §  2.  p.  7. 

Arminians,  obliged  to  talk 
inconfiftently,  P.  2.  §  5.  p.  53. 
^Ibid.  §  7.  p.  70.  §.  9.  p.  77. 
where  the  main  Strength  of 
their  pretendedDemonftrations 
^lies,  P.  4.  §  4.  p.  219.  Their 
Obje6tion  from  God's  moral 
'■Chara6ler,  confider'd  and  re- 
torted. Ibid.  §  II.  p.  271,2. 

Armhmn  Do^rine^  its  Tcn- 


§  6.  p.  184.   and  §  7.  p.  190. 
p.  276. 


4.  §  I.  p.  196,7.  Ibid.  §  12 


,7.  It 


Atheifm,  the  fuppofed  Ten- 
dency of  C^/ww/Z^/VPrinciples  to 
it,  P.  4.  §  12.  p.  274.  How 
Arnilnian  Principles  tend  to  it. 
Ibid.  p.  275, 

Attending  to  Motives,  of  Li- 
berty's being  fuppofed  to  con- 
fift  in  an  Ability  for  it,  P.  2. 
§  9.  p.  80. 

Atonement,     See  Christ. 

Author  of  Sin,  whether  it 
would  follow  from  the  Doc- 
trine here  maintain'd,  that 
God  is  fo,  P.  4.  §  9.  p.  252. 

jnLam.e-worthinefs,  wherein  it 
•^  confifts, according  to  com- 
mon Senfe,  P.  4.  §  4.  p.  212. 


Cahimjm^ 


L 


I    N     D     E     X 


f^Alifhiifm^  confiftent  with 
^  common  Senfe,  P.  4.  §  3. 
p.  2g6. 

Cauje^  how  the  Word  is 
tifed  in  this  Difcourfe,  P.  2. 
§  3.  p.  41.  No  Event  without 
one,  P.  2.  §  3.  p.  42.—  and 
Effe^y  a  neceiTary  Conneoflon 
between  them,P.2.  §  8.  p.  73.- 
This  refpedts  morale  as  well  as 
naturalCaufes,  P.  2.  §  3.  p.  41. 

Chrtji^  his  Obedience  necel- 
fary,  yet  vertuous  and  praife- 
tvorthy,  P.  3.  §  i.  p.  139.  His 
Atonement  excluded  in  Con- 
fequence  of  Arminian  Princi- 
ples, P.  3.  §  3-  P-  158. 

Chubb  (Mr.)  the  Inconfift- 
rnce  of  his  Scheme  of  Liberty^ 
&c.  P.  2.  §  9.  p.  85,-98. 

Commands^  confiftent  with 
moral  Neceftity  and  Inability, 

P.3-§4-P-i59-'P-.4-§^i-P- 

270.  Inconfiftent  vj'nhArminian 

Principles,. P.  3.  §  4-  P-  i^i- 

Common  SenJ^,  why  the  Prin- 
ciples maintain'd  in  this  Dif- 
courfe,appear  to  fome  contrary 
to  it,  P.  4.  §  3.  p.  206.  Ne- 
ceiTary Vertue  &Vice  agreable 
to  it,  P.  4.  §  4.  p.  212. —  Jr~ 
minlan  Tenets  oppofite  to  it, 
P.  3.  §  6.  p.  178.  Ibid.  §  7. 
p.  187. 

Co7itingcnce^  P.  I.  §  3.  p.  20. 
thelnconfiftence  of  theNotion, 
P.  2.  §  3.  p.  45.  Whether  ne- 
ceflary  in  order  to  Liberty,  P. 

2.   §  8.  p.  73. implied  in 

Jrtninian  Liberty,  and  yet  in- 
confiftent with  It,  P.  2.  §  13. 
p.  132.  Epicurus  the  greateit 
Maintainer  of  it,  P.  4.  §  6.  p. 
aa8.  Ibid.  §  12.  p.  275. 


Corruption  of  Man^t  Nature, 

CONCL.  p.  287. 

Creation  of  the  Worlds  at  fuch 
a  particular  Time  and  Flace^  P. 
4.  §  8.  p.  240* 


T\Ecree  abfolute^notitikrnng 
-*-^  Neceffity,  any  more  than 
certain  Fore-knowledge  does, 
P.  2.  §  12.  p.  122.  How  it  fol- 
lows from  Things  proved  in 
thisDifcour.e.  Concl.  p.  289. 

Dcfsrminatior,.     See  IVill. 

Dictates.  See  Vnderftanding, 

'T'FfeSf,     See  Caufe. 

■^  Ej/icaciousGrace,Qot^.^.2^^*, 
EleSiion  pcrfonaL    See  Decree, 
Endeavours^    what    it   is   for 

them  to  be  in  vain^    P.  4.  §  5. 

p.  220. Render'd   vain  by, 

Anninian   Principles,  Ibid.  p. 

222.    But  not  fo  by  Calvinifmy 

Ibid.  p.  224. —  See  Sincerity, 
Entrance   of    Sin     into    the 

World,  P.  4.  §  10.  p.  268. 
Equilibrium.  See  Indifference, 
Exhortation.    See  Invitation, 

T^AIIen  Man,     See  Inability. 
-^  Fatefioical,  P.  4.  §  6.  p.228.!^ 

Fatality.,   the    Principles   of 
Arminians  inferring  that  which  '; 
is  mofl:  {hocking,  P.  4..  §  8-.  p. 
251. 

Foreknowledge  of  God,  of  Vo* 
litions  of  moral  Agents,proved 
P,  2.  §  1 1,  p.  98.—  Inconfift- 
ent with  Contingence,  P.  2. 
§  12.  p,  I  ij7\  Proves  Neceffity, 
as  much  as  a  Decree,  Ibid,  p. 
122.  The  feeming  Difficulty 
of  reconciling  it  with  the  Sin- 
cerity of  hisPrtcepts^Counfelsp 

&c. 


I     N     D     EX. 


&c.  not  peculiar  to  thtCalvlnifik 
Scheme,  P.  4.  5  ii.  p.  271. 

f^OD^  his  Being  how  known, 
^  P.2.  §3,p.43.  P.4.§i2. 
p.  275.  His  moral  Excellencies 
neceffary,  yet  vertuous  and 
praife-worthy,P.  3.  M-  P-^SS- 
P.  4.  §  4.  p.  219.  The  Ne- 
ceffity  of  his  Volitions,  P.  4.  § 
7.  p.  230.  Whether  the  Prin- 
ciples maintain'd  in  this  Dif- 
courfe  are  inconfiftent  with  his 
moral  Character,  P.  4.  §  11. 
p.  270.  How  Armmiamjm  de- 
stroys the  Evidence  of  his  mo- 
ral rerfe(5tions.  Ibid  p.  272. 

Grace  of  the  Spirit^  excluded 
by  Jrmiman  Principles,  P.  3.  § 

3.  p.  159. 

Grace^ii^s  Freenefs  confident 
with  the  moral  NecefRty  of 
God's  Will,  P.  4.  §  8.  p.  249. 

TTJhitSy  vertuous  &  vicious, 
"^-^  inconfiftent  withv^rw/«/^« 
Principles,  P.  3.  §  6.  p.  181. 

Heathen,  of  their  Salvation, 
P.  3.  §  5.  p.  177. 

Hobbes^  his  Doctrine  of  Ne- 
cefTity,  P.  4.  S  6.  p.  229. 

jMpofibility,  the  fame  as  ne- 
■*  gativeNeceffity,P.i.53.p.i9. 
Inability^  how  the  Word  is 
iifed  in  common  Speech,  and 
how  by  Metaphyficians  and  Jr~ 
miniansy  P.  i.  §  4.  p.  14,  17. 
P.  4.  §  3.  p.  207.  Natural  and 
moral,  P.  i.  §  4.  p.  20.  Moral, 
the  feveral  Kinds  of  it,  P.  i.  § 

4.  p.  25.  P.  3.  §  4.  p.  165. 
— of  fallen  Man  to  perform 
perfcv^  Obedience,  P.  3-  §  3 


p.  157,  What  does,  and  what 
does  not  excufeMenj  P.  3.  §  3, 
p.  155.  Ibid.  §4.  p.  167.  P.  4. 
$  3.  p.  206. 

Inclinatlom ;  fee  Habits, 

Indifference,  whether  Liberty 

confifts  in  it,  P.  2.  §  7.  p.  63. 

-—Not  necefTary  to  Vertue,but 

inconfiftent  with  it,  P.  3.  §  6, 

p.  178. 

IndifferentThings, thoio.  which 
appear  fo,  never  the  Objecfts  of 
Volition,  P.  I.  &  2.  p.  7.  P.  2. 
§  6.  p.  56.  Whether  the  Will 
can  determine  it  {qM  in  chufing 
among  fuch  Things,  P.  2.  §  6» 

p.  SI', 

Invitations,  confif^ent  with 
moral  Neceffity  and  Inability. 
P.  3.  §4.  p.  169.  P.  4.  §  II. 
p.  270.  But  not  connftent  with 
Arminian  Principles,  P.  2.  §  9. 
p.  8r.  P.  3.  §  7.  p.  188.  P4. 
S  II.  p.  272. 

T  Aws,  the  End  whereof  is  to 
-^  bind  to  one  Side,  render'd 
ufelefs  by  Arminian  Principles, 
P.  3.  §  4.  p.  162. 

Liberty, tht  Natur^of  it,P.  i. 
h  5.  p.  27,  ■  The  Arminian  No^ 
tion  of  it, .  Ibid.  p.  28.  This 
inconfiftent  with  other  Armz 
iiian  Notions,  P.  2.  §  9.  p,  77, 
t^c, 

Licentiotijhefs,  whether  the 
Calvinifiic  Dodtrine  tends  to  it, 
P.  4.  §  12.  p.  275. — See£«- 
deavours, 

l\jrAchineSy  whether  Cahinifm 
•^'^  makes  Men  fuch.  P.  4. 
§  5.  p.  226. 

Meansy  fee  Endeavours, 
P  p  Mita^hyfi^i 


I     N     D     E     X. 


Metaphyseal  Reafoning  ;  fee 
Ahfiraaed.-'-To  be  juftly  ob- 
jected againft  the  Armmian 
Scheme,  P.  4.  S  13.  p.  283. 

Moral  Agency^   it*s  Nature, 

P.  I.  s  5.  p,  29. 

Motives^  what  they  are,  P.  i, 
§  2.  p.  5,  6,  The  ftrongeft 
determining  the  Will,  Ibid, 
p.  6.  P.  2.  S  10.  p.  88»  A- 
mtnian  Principles  inconliftent 
with  their  Influence  and  Ufe 
in  moral  A6tions,  P.  3.  §  7.  p. 
185.  P.  4.  §  II.  p.  273. 


N' 


Atural  Notions  ',  fee  common 
Se7ife, 

Necejftty^  how  the  Term  is 
ufed  in  common  Speech,  and 
how  by  Philofophers,  P.  1. 
§3.  p.  13.     P.  4.  !  3.  p.  207. 

Philofophical,  of   various 

Kinds,  Ibid.  p.  210.  Natural 
and  moral,  P.  i.  §  4.  p.  20. 
P.  4.  §4.  p.  217.— No  Liberty 
without  moral  Necefiity,  P.  2. 
§  8.  p.  73.  Neccflity  andGon- 
tingence,both  inconfiftentwith 
Ahmman  Liberty,  P.  2.  §  13. 
p.  131.—  Neceflity  of  God's 
Volition,  P.  3.  §  I.  p.  135. 
P.  4.  §  7.  p.  230.  This  con- 
iiftent  v/ith  the  Freenefs  of  his 
Grace,  Ibid.  §  8.  p.  249.— Ne- 
ccfTity,  of  Chrift's  Obedience, 
^^•'  ^'  3*  §  2.' p.  140. — of  fhe 
Sin  of  fuch  as  are  given  up  to 
jSin,  P.  3:  §  3.  p.  153.——  of 
fallen  Man,  in  general,  P.3.  § 
3.  p.  157.  What  Neceffity 
•wholly  excufes  Men,  P.  3  §  4. 
jp.  168,  P.  4.  §.  3.  p.  206.  and 
§4.  p.  215. 


/\Bedience  ;    fe?   Chrift^  Com^ 
^-^.  mandsy  Neceffity, 

"p  Articles  perfe^ly  alike ,  of  the 
^   Creator's  placing  fuch  dif-i 
ferently,  P.  4.  §  8.  p.  242. 
Perfeverance  of  Saints ^    CoNr 

CLUS.  p,  291. 

Promifes^  \vh ether  any  are. 
made  to  the  Endeavours  of 
iinregenerate  Sinners,  P.  3.- 
§  5.  p.  176.. 

Providenecy  univerfal  and  de- 
cifive.  CoNCL.  p.  286. 
T^Edemption  partiaular.    CoN- 
•^   CLUS.  p.  290. 

Refor7ners  ^/>^/r/?,how  treated 
by  many  late  Writers.  Con- 
CLus.  p.  292.  ' 

Qjints  in  Heaven^  their  Li- 
"^  berty,  P.  4.  §  4.  p.  219. 

Scripture^  of,  the  Ar?ninians 
Arguments  from  thence,  P.  4. 
§  II.  p.  273. 

Self- deter ?nming  Power  of  the 
Willy  it's  Inconliftence,  P.  2. 
§  I.  p.31.  Evafwns  of  the  Ar- 
guments againft  it  confidered, 
P.  2.  §  2.  p.  35.  fliewn  to  be 
impertinent.  Ibid.  §  5.  p.  51. 

Sin  ;  fee  Author y  Entrance', 

Sincerity  of  Defires  and  En- 
deavours y-v^hit  is  no  juft  Excufe, 
P.  3.  §  5.  p.  170.  The  different 
Sorts  ot  Sincerityy  lb.  p.  175. 

Shthy  not  encouraged  by 
Calvinifm^  P.  4.  $  5.  p.  224. 

Stoic  Phikfophersy  great  The- 
ifls,P.  4.  §  12.  p.  2y4..~SeeFate. 

Stfpending  Vclitiony  of  the 
Liberty  of  the  Will  fuppofed 
to  coniift   in  an  Ability  for  it, 

P.  2.  S  7-  P-  70.      P.   3-  §   4- 
p.  164.  Ibid.  §  7.  p.  186. 

Tendency 


I     N    D     E     X. 


CJ^Endency  of  the  Principles 
-^  here  maintairi'djtoAtheifm 
and  Licentioufneii^,  the  Ob- 
jcition  confider'd  and  retorted^ 
P.  4.  §  12.  p.  274. 

T/'Ertue  and  pke,  the  Being 
^  of  neither  of  'em  confid- 
ent with  Jrm'mia?i  Principles  ; 
•See  Arminian  Doctrine,  Their 
Eflence,  not  lying  in  their 
Caufe,  but  their  Nature,  P.  4. 

I.  p.  192. 

Underjianding,  how  it  deter- 
mines the  Wilj,  P.  I.  §  2.  p. 
12.  P.  2.  §  9.  p.  76.  Dictates 
©f  thellnderftanding  asidW^ili,. 
as  luppofed  by  fome,  the  fame, 
P.  2.  §Q.  p.  81. 

Uneajinefsy    as  fuppoffed    to 


determine  the  Will,  P.  i.  §  2. 

VoUfion^  not  wiDhout  aCaufe, 
P.2.§3.p.46.  P.2.§4.  p.50. 

•rrrlLLy  it's.  Nature,  P.  r. 
§  I.  Pj,  i,^r.  Its  Deterr 
mination,  rT  i.  §  2.  p.  5,  is^c. 
The  very  Being  of  fuch  a  Fa- 
culty inconfifteiU  with  Armi- 
nian  Principles,  P.  3.  §  7.  p. 
190.—  Of  God,  Jecrct  and 
revealed^  P.  4.  §  9.  p.  262.  Ar- 
minians  themfclves  oblig'd  to 
allow  fuch  a  Diftlndion,  Ibid, 
p.  264. 

WUlingnefs  to  Duty,  what  is 
no  Excufe  for  the  Negle6t  of 
it.     See  Binarity, 


Advertifement. 


E    R    R    A    T   A.    ^^  ; 

pAge  26.  line  22.read,c:^;^^^r/wzg'.-— p.34l.i.r.6't'/7'*-^'^— p.37, 
■*  1.  27.  r.  eicciie  that— p. 65. 1.  2.  from  Bot.r.and  (2^7  the-— 
p.  82.  1.  laft,  r.  Notion  of  Liberty  he  jujl^  then  all  Liberty  — 
p.  91.  L  12.  r.  Thus^  if—  Ibid.  1.  37.  for  (7r,r.  <?«— p.  115.L 
3C.r.  their  wziT^?/— p.  132.1.  3.dele  «^/— -p.183. 1.  i. dele //;.—= 
ibid,  1,  3a,  x.Jh^withey  are  not—-p. 2^0,1. 37,8.  x.meafurallcc 


P  P  2 


A 


mms^^^mmmmimmmm^^^^^ 


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Mr.  Samuel  Mofeley,  -— -  Majfachufetts.  6  Bopks. 

Rev.  Mr.  John  McLaurin,  Glafgow^    Scotland. 

Rev.  Mr.  William  McCullock,   Cambkflang.,  Scotland, 

Mr.  John  Munn,  Deerfield.,   Majfachufetts. 

Mr.  John  Murdock,  late  Baily  of  Glafgow.,  Scotland. 

Mx,  Peter  Murdock,  Student  at  TaU-CoUege. 

N. 

V/l  R,  Thomas  Naprefs,  late  Bailie  of  Glafgotv.,  Scotland. 
^^  Rev.   Mr.   Samuel  Newell,    New-Cambridge.,  Farmijigtdfi^ 
Conneaicut.  6  Books. 

Ebenezer  Nichols,Efq;  Reading.,  Majfachufetts. 
ReVi  Mr.  Samuel  Niles,  Braintrce^  ditto ^  2  Books. 

Mr.  • Nimmo,  Receiver-General  of  the  Excife,  Scotland, 

Mr.  Gideon  Noble,  Student  at  Tale- College. 

Mr.  Garrat  Noel,  Bookfeller,  New-Torky  2^  Books. 

6. 

MR.  Thomas  Ogden,  New-York. 
Mr.  John  Old,   Majfachufetts, 

P. 

"D  Ev.  Mr.  Jonathan  V^ccionsyNewhuryyMaJfachufdts.    6  Books, 

-■^  Rev.  Mr.  Mofes  Parfons,    ditto. 

Mr.  Nathaniel  Parker,  Readings   ditto. 

Mr.  Samuel  Parkhurft,  Newark.,    Ncw-Jerfey. 

Rev.  Mr.  Ebenezer  Pemberton,   Bojhn^  Majfachufetts,. 

Mr.  Nathaniel  Phelps, ,  ditto. 

Rev.  Mr.  James  Pike,   Somerswcrth,    New-Hji-mpfjirc. 

Rev.  Mr.  Timothy  Pitkin,  Farmington^  Conned icut,      6  Book*. 


SUBSCRIBERS. 

Mr.  Afhbell  Pitkin,  Student  at  rde'Cellege, 
Rev.  Mr.  Thomas  YxincQ^  Bojion^  MaJj'achufetU, 
ilev.  Mr.  Ebenezer  Prime,  Long-Ifiand, 

Mr.  John  Prout, ,  CmneSiicnt. 

Mr.  Abraham  Purdy,    Hanover^  Nevj-Torky 
Hon.  Jofeph  Pynchon,  Efq;  Bofton^  Majfachufetts, 

R. 


6  Books. 
6  Books* 


MR.  Wilham  Rainfey,  Student  ^.tNew-Jerfey  College. 
Rev.  Mr. Randal,  Inckture^\Scotland. 

Mr.  James  Reeves,  Student  at  New-Jerfey  College. 

Rev.   Mr.  Aaron  Richards,  Raivay^   New^JerJey. 

Mr.  Jofeph  Riggs,  Newark^  ditto, 

Mr.  Arthur  Robertfon,  Merchant,  Glafgow^  Scotland, 

Rev.  Mr.  Philemon  Robins,  Branfardy  Conne^icut^         2  Bjoks, 

Mr.  Chandler  Robins,  Student  at  Tale-College, 

Mr.  Philemon  Robins,  Jun.  Student  at  ditio. 

Rev.  Mr.  Nathaniel  Rogers,  Ipfwich,  Maffacbujdts, 

Mr.  JefTe  Roots,    Woodbury^  Conne^kut, 

Ecnajah  Roots,  A.  B, 

Mr.  Robert  Rofs,  Strr.tfald,,  Connefflcut,  2  Books. 

Mr.  Timothy  Rofe,  Bcthlem^  Conne^ffcut, 


S. 

MR.  David  Sanford,  Student  at  Tale-College, 
^Mr.  Edmund  Sawyer,  Newbury ,  MaJJhchufctts. 
Mr.  Samuel  Sawyer,  ditto. 
Mr.  Robert  Scot,  Jun.  Merchant  in  Glafgciu, 

Mr.  John  Se^rle, MaJJachufetts. 

Rev.  Jofeph  Sewall,  D.  D.  Bojion^  Mcjadmfeits, 

Mr.  Jofeph  '^^^{^xons^—MaJfachufetts. 

Mr.  Thomas  Seymour,— -^/V/^, 

Mr.  Thomas  Seymour,  Student  at  Tale-College, 

Mr.  Thorqas  Shelden,  Suffieldy  ditto. 

Mr.  Reuben  Sherman,  JVoodlniry^  Conne£lici'i » 

Mr.  David  Shipman,  Neivark^  Nevj^Jerfey. 

Mr.  Jofeph  Shippen,  Jun.    A.  B. 

Rtv,  Mr.  Robert  Siiliman,  Norwalk^  Conne£licut, 

Mr.  Ebenezer  Smeads,  Deerfeld.,  Majfaclmfeits. 

P'Tr. Smibcrt,  at  Kihncnie.,  Scotland. 

f/lr.  The  Hon.  WiDiam  Sm.ith,  Efqj     Nciv-Tork. 

Mr.  WiJliarn  Smith,  Jun.  ditto. 

}Ax.  Jpnathnn  Smith,  Bethlem^  Cor.nepicni, 


6  Books. 


6  Books. 


SUBSCRIBERS. 

Ivcv.  Mr. Smith,  Newhurn^  Scotland.  2  Books^ 

Mr.  Daniel  Smith,  Woodbury ^  Connecticut.  12  Books. 

'Mr.  Ephraim  Starkweather,  ^tudent  at  Tale-College. 
,!Rev.  Mr.  James  Stirling,  Glafgow^  Scotland. 
Mr.  Simeon  Stoddard,  Student  at  Tale  College. 
Mr.  Smith  Stratten,  Student  at  New-Jerfey  College, 
Mr.  John  Strong,    Student   at  Tale  College.  2  Books. 

Rev.  Mr. Strong,  New- Marlborough .,  MaJJhchufetts 

Mr.  Nehemiah  Strong,  Student  at  1[ ale-College. 

Mr.  Nicholas  Street, Majfachujetts. 

.Mr.  James  Stuart,-  Receiver-General  of  the  Widow's  Annuity 
Scotland. 

T. 

in  Ev.  Mr.  Nathan  Tayler,  New-MUford.,  Conneaictet. 
''"^  Mr.  John  Temple,  Readings  Majfachufetts. 

Mr.  Thomas  Tiffany, ditto. 

Mr,  Gerfhom  Tinney,  Bofton.,  Majfachufetts, 

Lieut.    Richard  Thayer,  Braintree.,   ditto.  2   Books. 

William  Thompfon,  A.  B. 

Rev.  Mr.  Samuel  Todd,  Northbinjy  ConneSlicut. 

Mr.  John  Tompfon,  New-Tork. 

Mr,  Jeremiah  Townfend,  New-Haven.,  ConneBicut. 

Mr.  Ifaac  Townfend,  Student  at  N^w-y^r/^_y  College. 

Mr. Traill,  Bookfeller,  Edinburgh  Scotland.  6  "Books., 

Rev.  Mr.  Henry  True,  Hamp/lead,  New-Hat?ipfjir^. 
Rev.  Mr.  John  Trumhle ,.  IFaterbury,  ConneSlicut, 
Rev.  Mr.  Turnbell,  Denny,  Scotland. 

U. 
I^Aptain  James  Utley, Majfachufetts. 

W 

MR.  Noah  Waddam,  A.  B. 
Rev.  Mr.  Walker,  South-Lleth,  Scotland. 
Rev.  Mr.  Thomas  Walker,  at  Dundonnald,  Scotland. 
R.ev.  Mr.  Robert  Wallis,  Edinburgh,  Scotland. 
Mr.  John  Walton,  Jun.  Reading,  Maj/aclmfetts. 
Mr.  Jofiah  Walton,  ditto. 
Rev.  Mr.  Wandrope,  Bathgate,  Scotland. 
Rev.  Mr.  Alexander  Webiter,  Edinburgh,  Scotland. 
Robert  Wei  wood,  Elq;  Gelloi,  Scotland. 
Mr.  Samuel  Wellea,  Deerficld,  MaJJachufetts. 
Mr.  Stephen  Weil:,  Student  at  Tale-College. 


SUBSCRIBERS. 

Mr.  Nath.  Whittaker,  Bafking-Ridge^  New-Jeifey,        2  Books, 

Deacon  Jabe^^Whittlefey,  Bethlem^  ConneSiicut. 

Rev.  Mr.  Stephen  Williams,  Springfield^  Majfachufctts,  6Book^, 

Mr.  Samuel  Williams,  Ipfwichy  MaJJachufetts. 

Rev.  Mr.  George  W\ih.2.n^  Edinburgh  Scotland. 

Rev.  Mr.  Jeremiah  Wife,  Berwick^  Maffachufetts, 

Rev.  Mr.  John  Witherfpoon,  Beath^  Scotland. 

Timothy  Woodbridge,  Efq;  Maffachufetts. 

John  Wright,  A.  M.  Hanover ^  Virginia^  12  Books. 

Mr.  Philip  Freeman,    Bofton^    Majfachufetts, 

Mr.   William  Hyflup   Bojign,    Merchant,  MaJJachufetts. 

Mr.  Ebenezer  Little,  Neivbury^  Majfachufetts. 

V 

N.  B.  7/*  there  Jhould  be  any  of  the  Names  in  the  foregoing  Lift 
without  their  proper  Titles .,  wrong^pelt^  or  Places  of  Abode 
not  right  inferted^  wi  deftre  the  fame  ma-^  he  excufedy  as  done 
thro'  Mijlake, 


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